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ABSTRACT  
  
This thesis examines the lives and emotions of male and female ground personnel 
who served in Bomber Command during the Second World War. Histories of 
Bomber Command usually focus on the flyers, or on the strategy of the bombing 
campaign. The experiences of four fifths of the service, the ground personnel, are 
often neglected. They are frequently reduced to two dimensional stereotypes, as the 
‘Erk’ who serviced the aircraft, or the WAAF ‘chop girl’ whose sexual promiscuity 
presaged death. The RAF assigned personnel to different trades ranging from the 
most technical to the most mundane. The central theme of this thesis is the gendered 
hierarchy of trades within Bomber Command. It was constructed in part by 
widespread beliefs about fear, heroism and stoicism, the interconnected discourses of 
class and gender, and specific quirks of RAF culture. These included its trade 
selection process, dialect, pay scale, and trades’ perceived importance to the raison 
d’être of Bomber Command. The hierarchy is important in explaining the 
experiences of ground personnel, as some personnel were overstretched while others 
felt that they were not ‘doing their bit.’ Bomber Command servicemen and women 
were part of a community that experienced high rates of air crew loss. This thesis 
also discusses their emotional responses to service life and the treatment by the RAF 
medical services of those who suffered breakdowns. In examining non-combatant 
military personnel who served on operational stations but were also part of the home 
front, my thesis will inform and bring together different areas of study. It gives a 
voice to an important but previously underrepresented group and in doing so, 
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contributes to the histories of the RAF, emotions, military medicine and psychiatry, 
as well as understandings of the wartime experience, work and citizenship. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
In the 1940s, it was common to use a full-stop in between the letters of acronyms, 
(R.A.F. for example). Following modern practice however, I have omitted them, 
except where they are included in direct quotations. 
A/C 
   
Aircraft 
ACH 
   
Aircrafthand  
AC1 
   
Aircraftsman first Class 
AC2 
   
Aircraftsman Second Class 
ACW2 
   
Aircraftswoman Second Class 
AM 
   
Air Ministry 
AMO 
   
Air Ministry Order 
AMCO 
   
Air Ministry Confidential Order 
ARP 
   
Air Raid Precautions 
ATS  
   
Auxiliary Territorial Service 
AWL 
   
Absent Without Leave  
BCATP 
   
British Commonwealth Air Training Plan 
BMJ 
   
British Medical Journal 
CO 
   
Commanding Officer 
CTTB 
   
Central Trade test Board 
DAH 
   
Disordered Action of the Heart 
DGMS 
   
Director General Medical Services 
DI 
   
Daily Inspection  
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DRO 
   
Daily Routine Orders 
DWAAF 
   
Director Women’s Auxiliary Air Force 
EMS 
   
Emergency Medical Services 
ENSA  
   
Entertainments National Service Association 
FFI 
   
Free From Infection 
FPRC 
   
Flying Personnel Research Committee 
GD 
   
General Duties or Ground Defence 
HCU 
   
Heavy Conversion Unit 
IWM 
   
Imperial War Museum 
LAC 
   
Leading Aircraftsman 
LACW 
   
Leading Aircraftswoman 
LMF 
   
Lack of Moral Fibre 
HMSO  
   
His Majesty’s Stationary Office 
MOA 
   
Mass-Observation Archive 
MO 
   
Medical Officer 
MOI 
   
Ministry of Information  
MRC 
   
Modern Records Centre University of Warwick 
MSU  
   
Mobile Signals Unit 
MT 
   
Motor Transport 
NAAFI 
   
Navy Army and Air Force Institute 
NCO 
   
Non Commissioned Officer 
NSA 
   
National Service Act 
NYDN 
   
Not Yet Diagnosed Neuropsychiatric 
ORB 
   
Operational Record Book 
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OTU 
   
Operational Training Unit 
PNB 
   
Pilot, Navigator, Bomb Aimer 
PT  
   
Physical Training 
RAF 
   
Royal Air Force 
RAFVR 
   
Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve 
RAFMH 
   
Royal Air Force Museum Hendon 
RAMC 
   
Royal Army Medical Corps 
RCAF 
   
Royal Canadian Air Force 
RDF 
   
Radio Direction Finding (Radar) 
RT 
   
Radio Telephone 
SD 
   
Special Duties 
SSQ 
   
Station Sick Quarters 
TNA 
   
The National Archives 
USAAF 
   
United States Army Air Force 
VE Day 
   
Victory in Europe Day (8 May 1945) 
WAAF 
   
Women's Auxiliary Air Force 
WL 
   
Wellcome Library  
WMC 
   
RAF Wickenby Memorial Collection 
WOM 
   
Wireless Operator/ Mechanic 
WOP 
   
Wireless Operator 
WReN  
   
Women's Royal Naval Service 
WT 
   
Wireless Telephone 
YMCA 
   
Young men’s Christian Association  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Eric Sykes ‘Ode to the Erk’ (1942) 
Wherever you walk, you will hear people talk, 
Of the men who go up in the air. 
Of the dare-devil way, they go into the fray; 
Facing death without turning a hair. 
They'll raise a cheer and buy lots of beer, 
For a pilot who's home on leave; 
But they don't give a jigger 
For a flight mech or rigger 
With nothing but 'props' on his sleeve.
1
 
They just say 'Nice day' and then turn away, 
With never a mention or praise. 
And the poor bloody ‘erk’ who does all the work; 
Just orders his own beer And pays! 
 
They've never been told of the hours in the cold 
That he spends sealing Germany's fate. 
How he works on a kite, till all hours of the night; 
And then turns up next morning at eight. 
He gets no rake-off for working till take off; 
Or helping the aircrew prepare; 
But whenever there's trouble, it's 'Quick at the double'; 
The man on the ground must be there. 
Each flying crew could tell it to you; 
They know what this man's really worth. 
They know he's part of the RAF's heart, 
Even though he stays close to earth. 
He doesn't want glory, but please tell his story; 
Spread a little of his fame around. 
He's one of the few so give him his due; 
Three cheers for the man on the ground.
2
 
                                                 
1
 The ‘props’ on his sleeve refers to the representation of a propeller which was the badge of rank of a 
leading Aircraftman (LAC).  
2
 RAF Wickenby Memorial Collection (WMC), E. Sykes, ‘Three Cheers For The Men On The 
Ground’ The Wickenby Register Newsletter, (1988), No. 26, p. 8. This poem was written in 1942 by 
electrician LAC Eric Sykes in 1942. (Conversation with Geoff and Margret Sykes 27 June 2014.) It is 
frequently quoted on internet forums and on websites concerning the RAF during the Second World 
15 
 
Concentrating on RAF Bomber Command between 1939 and 1945, this thesis 
examines the lives and emotions of ‘WAAFs’ of the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force, 
and ‘Erks’, as low ranking RAF ground personnel were colloquially known.3 
Throughout this thesis ‘ground personnel’ will refer to service personnel, of all 
ranks, and all trades who were not air crew; ‘ground crew’ refers only to those 
mechanics, riggers and fitters who worked directly on the aircraft. Flyers accounted 
for only 16 per cent of the home force, indeed between 1942 and 1944 there were 
more women in the service.
4
 At its peak in 1944, more than 190,000 male and female 
ground personnel worked to support around 36,000 Bomber Command air crew;
5
 
ground personnel accounted for more than four-fifths of the population on an 
operational station. As the poem suggests, ground personnel acknowledged that, 
despite playing a vital role in the war, their importance was largely unrecognised; 
they are also often overlooked in popular and academic histories. Men and women 
from a wide variety of social groups, including exiles from occupied Europe, and 
volunteers from the British Empire and the Dominions, served in Bomber Command. 
Ground personnel included ‘professionals’ who joined in the interwar period, and 
volunteers and conscripts who were ‘in for the duration.’ Beginning with an 
examination of their recruitment and training, this thesis investigates what it was like 
                                                                                                                                          
War. See for example: T. Bint, ‘626 Squadron and RAF Wickenby: The Ground crews’ (2012) 
http://www.626-squadron.co.uk/groundcrew.htm (accessed 22 January 2015). The actor and comedian 
Eric Sykes was a leading aircraftman in the RAF during the war. He joined in mid 1941 and after 
being trained as a wireless operator he served in a Mobile Signals Unit (MSU) in Europe after D-day. 
However, he was never posted to an operational aerodrome. See: E. Sykes, If I Don’t Write it, Nobody 
Else Will, (London, Harper Perennial, 2006), p. 131. Songs with similar sentiments were sung at 
station concert parties. See for example Ward- Jackson W. C. (ed) Airman’s Song Book, (London, 
Sylvan Press, 1945), p.168, 173. 
3
 It is likely that the etymology of ‘Erk’ was a bastardisation of ‘aircraftsman’, or its acronym, A.C., 
the lowest rank in the RAF. 
4
 Air Ministry, Royal Air Force Personnel Statistics for the period 3
rd
 September 1939 to 1
st
 
September 1945, (Air Ministry, 1946), pp. 1-5. 
5
 Ibid., pp.6-31. 
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to serve as ground personnel on an operational bomber station. Engaging with the 
history of emotions, it asks how they coped with hardship, while the final chapters 
consider the medical treatment of those who were perceived to be insufficient to the 
task.  
Historiography 
The historiography of the RAF prioritises ‘the cult of the flyer’,6 while social and 
cultural histories, and the historiography of wartime mental health, usually examine 
either combatants or civilians. The lives and experiences of non-combatant ground 
personnel are infrequently addressed. In the political context of the Cold War and its 
aftermath, historians have debated the ethics and morality of the bombing, its 
economic effectiveness, and strategic counter-factuals as new evidence became 
available. The materiel and strategies of RAF have been compared and contrasted to 
the USAAF, and there is a multitude of other publications on Bomber Command.
7
 
First published in 2001, Mark Connelly examines representations of Bomber 
Command during and after the war and how the modern impression of Bomber 
Command has been constructed,
8
 and most recently Richard Overy considered the 
technological, strategic and political influences on the bombing war. From both sides 
of the conflict, he discusses the experiences of those who carried out the bombing, 
                                                 
6
 M. Francis, The Flyer: British Culture and the Royal Air Force 1939-1945, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2008), p. 201. 
7
 See for example: P. Bishop, Bomber Boys: Fighting Back 1940-1945, (London, Harper press, 2007), 
M. Middlebrook, The Nuremburg Raid: 31-31March 1944, (London, Cassell, 2000), D. Richards, The 
Hardest Victory: RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War, (London, Penguin, 2001) or K. 
Wilson, Bomber Boys: The Ruhr, the Dambusters and bloody Berlin, (London, Casell, 2005), A. C. 
Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: was the Allied bombing of civilians in WWII a necessity or a 
crime? (London, Bloomsbury, 2006).  
8
 M. Connelly, Reaching for the Stars: A History of Bomber Command, (London, Tauris, 2014). 
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and those who were unfortunate enough to be targeted.
9
 Some examinations of the 
psychological effects of combat on air crew have been published, and several studies 
have considered the RAF policy on ‘lack of moral fibre’ (LMF).10 In The Flyer, 
Martin Francis examines the place of the RAF airman in British popular culture 
during the war. He discusses gender and how the concepts of courage, cowardice and 
fears impacted on airmen’s masculinity, but in focusing on ‘the flyer’ Francis does 
not examine the overwhelming majority of RAF personnel.
11
 As yet there has been 
very little academic interest in ground personnel. Some work has been published on 
women in the WAAF, but this tends to be anecdotal and descriptive rather than 
analytical.
12
 An exception is the feminist historian Tessa Stone, who examined 
women of the WAAF through the lens of the ‘double helix’ model of gender 
relations; she focuses on their role as workers and their adoption of uniform.
13
 
                                                 
9
 R. Overy, The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945, (London, Allen Lane, 2013). 
10
 Although the RAF admitted that some emotional casualties had genuine medical reasons for their 
inability to fly, many were seen to have a weakness of character. The term ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ 
(LMF) was first recorded as being used by the RAF in March 1940 after a meeting to discuss the 
treatment and disposal of men, without a medical reason to explain their actions, who openly admitted 
they did not intend to fly. See: J. McCarthy, ‘Air crew and ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ in the Second World 
War’ War and Society, Vol.2, 1984, pp. 87-101. See also: J. Terraine, The Right of the Line, (Ware, 
1997), S. Brandon, ‘LMF in Bomber Command 1939-45: Diagnosis or Denouncement?’ in Freeman 
& Berrios (eds) 150 Years of British Psychiatry, Vol. 2: The Aftermath, (Athlone, 1996), pp. 119-129. 
A. D. English, The Cream of the Crop: Canadian Air crew, 1939 – 1945, (Montreal & Kingston), 
1996. E. Jones, ‘LMF: The Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the Royal Air Force during the Second World 
War’ The Journal of Military History, 70 (2006), pp. 439-458. B. Shephard, A War of Nerves, 
(London, 2000). See also: B. Shephard, ‘Pitiless Psychology: the role of prevention in British military 
psychiatry in the Second World War’ History of Psychiatry, 40, 4 (1999), pp. 491-524, and M. K. 
Wells, Courage and Air Warfare: The Allied Air crew Experience in the Second World War, (London, 
1995).  
11
 Francis, The Flyer. 
12
 See for example: B. E, Escott, Woman in Air Force Blue: The story of women in the Royal Air 
Force from 1918 to the present day, (Wellingborough, 1989) and B. E. Escott, Our Wartime Days: 
The WAAF, (Stroud, 2005) For autobiographical sources see for example: P. Beck, Keeping Watch: A 
WAAF in Bomber Command, (Manchester, 2004) M. Gane-Pushman, We All Wore Blue: Experiences 
in the WAAF, (Stroud, 2006) D, Lindo, A WAAF at War: Wartime Jottings of a WAAF Driver 1941 – 
1946, (Fontwell, 1992). S. Pickering, Tales of a Bomber Command WAAF (& her horse), (Bognor 
Regis, 2002) and J. Wyndham, Love is Blue: A Wartime diary, (London, 1987). 
13
 T. Stone, ‘Creating a (Gendered?) Military Identity: the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force in Great 
Britain in the Second World War’ Women’s History Review, 8, 4, (1999), pp. 605- 624. See also: T. J. 
18 
 
However, by including a more in depth consideration of male ground personnel 
identities using the theories of Raewyn Connell, David Morgan, and Frank Barrett,
14
 
this thesis will examine the gendered cultural hierarchy of the RAF from a more 
inclusive and wider perspective.  
Theoretical approaches including class and gender are more frequently 
applied to other areas of twentieth century conflicts, and several are pertinent to my 
thesis. Histories of emotion and gender have been more often applied to combatants 
in the First World War however, and there has been a renewed interest in what 
enabled these men to keep going in spite of the odds that they faced. In The Secret 
Battle: Emotional Survival in the Great War Michael Roper applies Kleinian 
psychology to combatants’ memoirs, letters and diaries.15 He examines the emotional 
damage caused by the war and how support from home and from comrades enabled 
combatants to attempt to come to terms with their role in the war. This thesis will 
occasionally use a similar methodology; as well as receiving support from their 
families, ground personnel relied on friendship groups and emotional communities. 
After his seminal work on World War One, Paul Fussell considered understanding 
and behaviour in the Second World War. Through poetry and literature he examined 
the discourses of war, and considered ‘the rationalizations and euphemisms’ 
combatants used to come to terms with their part of the ‘unacceptable actuality’ of 
                                                                                                                                          
Stone, ‘The integration of women into a military service: the Women's Auxiliary Air Force in the 
Second World War.’ PhD thesis (University of Cambridge, 1999).  
14
 R. W. Connell, Masculinities (Second Edition), (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2010), F. J. Barrett, ‘The 
Organizational construction of hegemonic masculinity: The case of the U.S. Navy’, Gender, Work and 
Organization, 3, 3, (1996), pp. 129-142. D. Morgan, ‘Theatre of War: Combat, the military and 
masculinity’ in: Brod, H & Kaufman, M (eds), Theorizing Masculinities, (London, Sage Publications, 
1994), pp. 165-182. 
15
 M. Roper, The Secret Battle: Emotional Survival in the Great War. (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 2009). 
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the industrialised slaughter.
16
 Sonya Rose examines the impact of gender, race and 
class on the citizenship and national identity of the non-combatant work force, and 
the relationship between individuals and society.
17
 As a period of rapid social 
change, wars are often regarded as a pivotal point in various narrative trajectories 
such as the decline in the importance of class culture, the rise of democracy, feminist 
emancipation and the creation of the ‘modern self.’18 James Hinton examines how, 
by negotiating conflicting cultural sources and discourses, ‘individuals sought to 
construct a coherent sense of their own identities.’19 My research will also highlight 
ontological conflicts between individual identities and the responsibilities of a 
communal wartime citizenship in this previously understudied group. In particular 
this thesis examines how ground personnel constructed their identity and a sense of 
meaning through language, shared identities, ‘otherings’ and binary oppositions 
within the hierarchical structure of Bomber Command. 
The ‘no neuroses myth’, that the public stoically accepted the hardships of 
war and only a small minority suffered and broke down was formed during the war 
and was perpetuated in popular history.
20
 Using oral interviews, Penny Summerfield 
has defined two contrasting discourses with which women constructed their wartime 
roles: women were either ‘heroic’, (enjoying masculine roles and seeing the war as a 
                                                 
16
 P. Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behaviour in the Second World War, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1990), p. ix. 
17
 S. Rose, Which People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain 1939 – 1945, 
(Oxford, 2003). 
18
 See for example: C. Taylor, Sources of the Self: The making of the modern identity, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press,1989), C. Langhamer, The English in Love: The Intimate Story of an 
Emotional Revolution, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), and K. A. Cerulo, ‘Identity 
Construction: New Issues, New Directions’, Annual Review of Sociology, 23, (1997), pp. 385-409. 
19
 J. Hinton, Nine Wartime Lives: Mass Observation and the Making of the Modern Self, (Oxford, 
2010), p. 17. 
20
 See: Glover, E. 'Notes on the Psychological Effects of War Conditions on the Civilian Population 
(3) The “Blitz” - 1940-41' The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 23, (1942), p. 36. See also: E. 
Jones, R. Woolven, B. Durodié, and S. Wessely, ‘Civilian Morale During the Second World War: 
Responses to Air Raids Re-examined’ Social History of Medicine, 17, 3, (2004), pp. 463-479. 
20 
 
period of dramatic change) or they were ‘stoic’ (enduring the war and creating a 
narrative of continuity).
21
 My work examines how men and women in the military, 
but not in a combat role, fit this paradigm. Seen in comparison to heroic flyers and 
stoic civilians who endured the Blitz, members of the WAAF and RAF ground 
personnel either maintained their role as efficient workers dedicated to the war effort, 
or failed. The bravery and masculinity of those who broke down could be called into 
question, and failures were either diagnosed as congenitally weak and predisposed to 
psychoneuroses or regarded as unpatriotic malingerers. My thesis engages with the 
historiographies of civilian war neuroses and ‘LMF’ within the RAF. Unlike many 
studies of the history of military psychiatry and mental health, it considers the 
treatment of patients with a strong understanding of their place in the social structure 
of the military.
22
 By engaging with mid twentieth-century ideas of mental health and 
theories concerning predisposition to neuroses in this previously unexamined group, 
my thesis will inform areas of the History of Medicine and in particular give new 
perspectives on the history of psychiatry. 
Often focussing on a single emotion,
23
 the history of emotions studies the 
social construction of how feelings were expressed and the history of how displays of 
                                                 
21
 P. Summerfield, Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives: Discourse and Subjectivity in Oral 
Histories of the Second World War, (Manchester, 1998), pp. 78-105. 
22
 See for example: J. Bourke, ‘Disciplining the Emotions: Fear, Psychiatry and the Second World 
War’ in: Cooter, R. Harrison, M. and Sturdy, S. (eds) War Medicine and Modernity, (Stroud, Sutton 
Publishing, 1999), pp. 225-234, E. Jones, and S. Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD: Military Psychology 
from 1900 to the Gulf War, (Hove, Psychology Press, 2005), N. Thalassis, ‘Useless Soldiers: The 
Dilemma of Discharging Mentally Unfit Soldiers during the Second World War’ Social History of 
Medicine 23, 1, (2010), pp. 98-115, M. Thomson, ‘Status, Manpower, and Mental Deficiency in the 
First World War’, in Cooter, R. Harrison, M. and Sturdy, S. (eds.), War, Medicine and Modernity, 
(Stroud, Sutton Press, 1999), pp. 149-66, B. Shephard, ‘‘Pitiless Psychology’: the role of prevention in 
British military psychiatry in the Second World War’ History of Psychiatry, 40, 4, (1999), pp. 491-
524, and B. Shephard, A War of Nerves, (London, Jonathon Cape, 2000). 
23
 See for example: J. Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History, (London, Virago Press 2006), S. J. Matt, 
‘You Can’t Go Home Again: Homesickness and Nostalgia in U.S. History’ The Journal of American 
History, 94, 2, (2007), pp. 469–497, or B. H. Rosenwein, Anger's Past: Social Uses of an Emotion in 
the Middle Ages, (Cornell, Cornell University Press, 1998). 
21 
 
emotion were regarded.
24
 Joanna Bourke’s work on fear is most pertinent to this 
study.
25
 This thesis will also examine fear and other emotions (including anxiety, 
grief and boredom), commonly experienced in wartime in a previously overlooked 
group.  
Cultural Representations of Bomber Command 
Although Churchill’s famous speech about ‘The Few’ had originally included the 
role played by all the RAF and the importance of Bomber Command’s disruption of 
the German’s build up of invasion barges in winning ‘The Battle of Britain’,26 the 
dominant narrative of the RAF was of heroes of Fighter Command defending homes, 
businesses and the civilian population. The supremacy of the Spitfire and Fighter 
Command was quickly established in wartime propaganda and in popular culture, 
and has continued in the decades afterwards.
27
 Nationwide Battle of Britain 
anniversary services were held in the month of September throughout the war (and 
since) to raise funds and to commemorate ‘Battle of Britain Day’ 15 September, the 
supposed turning point of the battle. These celebrations prioritised the fighters over 
the bombers and the importance of the RAF’s defensive rather than offensive role, as 
it fitted rather better into the powerful cultural construction of the British underdog 
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winning against the odds.
28
 Naming and defining an event or period of history is a 
political rather than a historical necessity,
29
 and the ‘Battle of Britain’ was soon 
defined as having a beginning and an end, and Fighter Command was seen to win a 
decisive victory that could be celebrated. In contrast, while Arthur Harris, the 
commander of Bomber Command from early 1942, was keen to describe different 
‘battles’ over specific targets, operations against German targets were a constant 
throughout the war, and the bombing of German cities and the targeting of German 
morale failed to bring about the victory Harris hoped it would achieve.
30
 Although 
after D-day there was less about Bomber Command in the press, for much of the war 
a large amount of ‘print and celluloid were devoted to it.’31 Throughout the war the 
public were ‘firmly in favour’ of the bombing campaign against Germany.32 The 
popular press ‘hinted at Bomber Command’s awesome powers of mass 
destruction’,33 but for most of the war the popular narratives concerning Bomber 
Command were of the accurate bombing of military targets, and, fighting for survival 
against the elements, flak, searchlights and fighters, either a heroic sacrifice, or a safe 
return to England against the odds. However ‘the British people must have had 
knowledge of what British bombing policy actually entailed.’34 By the last stages of 
the war, the myths of accurate bombing of military targets could not be maintained 
due to a growing awareness of the effects of area bombing. The continuing 
controversy over the effectiveness and ethics of bombing has shaped the personal 
testimony of individual members of Bomber Command recorded since the war. 
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Parallels have been drawn between Harris and the bombing campaign, and the 
futility and stubbornness of Haig and the attrition and sacrifice of the trench warfare 
of The First World War.
35
  
Partially constructed by propaganda,
36
 unifying discourses were a particularly 
strong part of the hegemonic narrative of the war.
37
 To encourage volunteers and to 
enlighten new recruits about the recruitment and training process, an official 
narrative of life on a bomber command station began to be created during the war 
itself. Propaganda in books such as Bill Hooper’s Behind the Spitfires,38 as well as 
films, newsreels, newspapers, public recruiting events and marches also helped to 
construct a narrative of life in the RAF. To counter the general belief that women in 
uniform suggested immorality and promiscuity,
39
 as well as the Markham report,
40
 
books such as Girls you Amaze Me and Kiss the Girls Goodbye, and films such as 
The Gentle Sex informed the public and potential women recruits what to expect in 
military service.
41
 Serving WAAFs were also recruited as publicity officers,
42
 and 
early in the war other ranks were encouraged to record their experiences for potential 
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propaganda and recruitment purposes.
43
 A final discourse that should be considered 
was that, in order to win the war, the British armed forces needed to modernise and 
become as ruthlessly efficient as the enemy were perceived to be.
44
 The RAF, as the 
youngest and most modern service, was regarded as the epitome of this efficiency. 
Early in the war they were seen as the only force capable of taking the war to the 
enemy and, regardless of their capability to do so,
45
 the bombing of German industry 
and cities was thought to be an important step towards victory.
46
  
As Martin Francis maintains, it is important to consider how understanding of 
the campaign of area bombing influenced representations and self-understandings of 
Bomber Command; it is more complicated than a simple binary between opposing 
representations of the command as either war criminals or victims made scapegoats 
‘by an embarrassed military and political establishment’.47 Michael Roper and others 
have argued it has become hard to formulate a unified public memory since the 
war.
48
 A multitude of conflicting and competing narratives exist simultaneously, but 
certain ‘signal events’ dominate the cultural memory of the war.49 Continuing the 
wartime fixation with the Spitfires of Fighter Command, one popular conception of 
the history of the war has reduced the story of the RAF to the ‘few’ who saved 
Britain during a few months in 1940; indeed, the one remaining airworthy Lancaster 
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bomber in this country has become part of the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight. 
Bomber Command’s role does not sit comfortably within the discourse of the war 
being a good war, or Britain’s ‘finest hour’,50 but a popular narrative has been 
created around 617 squadron’s famous raid against the dams in the Ruhr valley. 
Influenced by the 1955 film The Dam Busters,
51
 the raid has become a synecdoche 
for Bomber Command and, like the film, the Lancaster bomber itself has come to 
represent Bomber Command’s campaigns in public memory. The dams raid is 
acceptable in public opinion because it is portrayed as a skilful and daring precision 
attack against a legitimate target. The targets were inanimate concrete objects; the 
bouncing bomb Barnes Wallis designed only indirectly killed people, and at a great 
cost to the air crews.  
Similar to the ‘memory boom’ identified by Jay Winter decades after the First 
World War,
52
 as they reached their old age, many veterans of the Second World War 
felt the need to tell their stories and actively to transmit the past to future 
generations.
53
 Often encouraged by the sequence of fiftieth anniversaries that began 
in 1989,
54
 squadron and station associations, newsletters and reunions - ‘fictive 
kinships’ and ‘families of remembrance’ - were formed as an act of memorialisation 
to share experiences and to reaffirm the events of the war.
55
 Physical memorials were 
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created by these groups,
56
 and personal testimony was recorded and either published, 
or saved in archives. It must be acknowledged that individual memory of events was 
likely to have been reconstructed through a discussion of events with others, through 
retelling, as well as with the aid of diaries, personal papers, and official records such 
as unit operational record books (ORBs).
57
 In the last few decades, the counter 
narrative of the injustice that the Command did not receive official commemoration 
has become prevalent in the media. The controversy about area bombing and the 
Dresden raids were countered by tales of the sacrifice made by the flyers and the 
unfairness of their lack of recognition.
58
 Official commemoration came slowly: the 
memorial to Arthur Harris was unveiled in 1992, the Bomber Command Memorial in 
Green Park in London 2012, and the issue of the Bomber Command clasp to veterans 
in 2013.
59
 Bomber Command’s role in the war remains contentious even today. 
Methodology and sources 
Like other studies of the wartime RAF, use has been made of administrative sources 
such as Operation Record Books (ORBs), and other official reports and publications 
preserved in museums and archives. To study personal responses to service in 
Bomber Command however, different sources have been drawn on. Some archived 
oral history has been utilised, in addition to sources such as archived letters, diaries 
and Mass-Observation reports created during the war, but this thesis relies heavily on 
life writing, published and unpublished personal testimonies created in the decades 
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since the end of the war. While this may be regarded as problematic, it is 
unproductive and restrictive to prioritise the ‘cult of the archive.’ It is the uses made 
of the sources and how they are interpreted that is important.
60
 If treated with 
sensitivity and an awareness of potential pitfalls, such witting sources can be 
revealing, and, when used alongside sources contemporary to the war, the effect of 
the passage of time since the events they describe can be negotiated. It was decided 
at the start of the research that while I would make use of archived oral history, I 
would not conduct my own interviews. The numbers of personnel who are still alive 
are rapidly diminishing, and tend to be those who were in the service towards the end 
of the war. It was felt that there were already sufficient sources available. The 
sources used tend to discuss shared events and themes; narratives of ground 
personnel’s experiences in Bomber Command established during the war were 
expanded on by later sources. Commonalities included accounts of their recruitment 
and training, including kitting out and medical inspections, followed by descriptions 
of the living and working conditions, as well as the cold, the food and long hours. All 
sources, whether produced during the war or decades afterwards, commented on the 
heroism of those who flew.  
No source is ever produced in a vacuum. All sources have been constructed 
in the cultural context of the time in which they were produced, they have been 
influenced by hegemonic narratives or discourses, and either support or contradict 
them. Sources produced during the war were influenced by propaganda and popular 
public narratives of the war. Later sources are mediated between their author’s 
memory and cultural influences such as official and revisionist histories, shared life 
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stories, newspaper articles, films and the like.
61
 They often involve the meaning that 
people make themselves and express in their own words and narratives.
62
  
During the war individuals negotiated their place within hegemonic or 
alternative narratives; their experiences recorded in letters, diaries and Mass-
Observation reports were filtered through the public culture.
63
 Individuals 
unconsciously picked and chose aspects from cultural texts to help them construct 
their own identity and selfhood.
64
 Consequently, wartime letters and diaries were 
already intertwined with established narratives and discourses. They can be regarded 
as a lens onto how their authors rationalised and consumed collective narratives 
while creating their own personal stories. As Jörg Friedrich argues in The Fire, the 
bomb-loads and the proportions of incendiaries to high explosive carried made it 
clear to air crew what the intention of the bombing of German cities was.
65
 
Armourers would also know the capabilities of the ordnance and, in the context of 
the war, may have had to come to terms with the role they were playing. The 
intended audience of a source should be remembered however, as there may be 
conflict in some sources. Letters could be edited so as not to concern loved ones, the 
author may have written what they felt they should write when they wrote home,
66
 
and while such sources contemporary to the war may be free from teleology, even 
diaries were a performance to the self. There is a similar intended audience to Mass-
                                                 
61
 L. Noakes, & J. Pattinson, (eds) British Cultural Memory and the Second World War, (London 
Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 4. See also: L. Noakes, War and the British: Gender and National Identity, 
1939-91, (London, I. B. Tauris, 1998), p. 12. 
62
 T. G. Ashplant, G. Dawson, & M. Roper, Commemorating War: The Politics of Memory, (London, 
Transaction Publishers, 2004), p.12. 
63
 Rose, Which People’s War, pp. 20-26. See also: Ashplant, Dawson, & Roper, Commemorating 
War, p.12 and C. Langhamer, The English in Love: The Intimate Story of an Emotional Revolution, 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), p. xvii.  
64
 Hinton, Nine Wartime Lives, p .19. 
65
 J. Friedrich, (Trans’ Brown, A.) The Fire: The Bombing of Germany 1940-1945, (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 44-46. 
66
 Roper, The Secret Battle, p. 20. 
29 
 
Observation sources.
67
 Here, as well as private reports and journals, some Mass-
Observation correspondents reported conversations. Although some were recorded 
covertly, some interviews and observations were overt and undertaken with groups 
of people. Even covertly recorded conversations involved an element of 
performance, affected by individual’s expectations of what was acceptable to their 
peers.
68
 Similar considerations need to be applied to ‘retrospectively crafted 
narratives’, oral history, and published and unpublished memoirs. 69 Memory is 
fallible even immediately after the event, and sources produced in the decades after 
the war will have been altered by the intervening years, by reconstructions and 
interpretations, and conflicting discourses. Like the construction of identity, memory 
is also culturally mediated.
70
  
Survivor narratives often support the dominant narrative, for example oral 
history often conforms to the concept of the ‘people’s war’;71 memories at odds with 
the hegemonic narrative are often ‘muffled.’72 The majority of the sources used were 
produced before the recent memorials and medals were commissioned. In the 
testimony of personnel who served in Bomber Command, an agenda to set the record 
straight and to right the perceived injustice of the Command’s lack of recognition 
since the end of the war is often evident. While this is easiest to identify in the 
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memoirs and testimony of air crew,
73
 it can also be seen in sources created by ground 
personnel. Sources tend to support a narrative of air crew’s heroic sacrifice and the 
‘sectional narratives’ of injustice. Sources created by ex ground personnel often 
highlight the risk and sacrifice of the flyers and focus on events and narratives of less 
controversial roles during the war. These ‘sectional narratives’ which have not yet 
secured recognition and acceptance into the dominant narratives,
74
 often include 
descriptions of operation Manna, supplying food to the occupied low countries, and 
missions to bring home freed prisoners of war. The creators of many of the sources 
used in this thesis were effectively doubly marginalised because they were not flyers 
and because they served in Bomber Command. As expected from a marginalised 
group,
75
 compared to air crew, male ground personnel have produced less life 
writing, memoirs or archived material. More material concerning female rather than 
male ground personnel is available. This may be because female personnel felt they 
had a sufficiently different, interesting or historically important tale to tell, indeed a 
substantial proportion of sources created by men involve those who served overseas 
at some point. It would seem that they felt that this made their stories of historical 
note. Many men may have been reluctant to record their stories because, in common 
with the dominant narrative of the war, they did not play a big part in the war effort 
and they have been perceived as un-heroic. The reluctance to tell their story or leave 
a record of their lives has been problematic for the study of emotions.  
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The recent study of the history of emotions uses a careful choice of texts 
produced by a community,
76
 usually in order to discern how far emotions were 
restrained or expressed.
77
 For this study, in a similar way to which Fussell used 
literature, contemporary sources such as films and novels can be used in an attempt 
to understand the ‘dominant emotionology’, (the cultural expectations of acceptable 
behaviour and appropriate expressions of emotion).
78
 Letters, diaries, Mass-
Observation and poems are also used to create this picture, but also to examine to 
what extent individuals conformed to or resisted the norms of society. It should not 
be forgotten that these records and recollections are not representative of the lives of 
others. Using memoirs and oral history created after the war to recover how people 
felt requires care and sensitivity. Although to a lesser extent, in some visual sources 
such as photographs, film, or cartoons, an interpretation of body language and 
expression may be made, emotions can only really be accessed through written or 
spoken language.
79
 However, as with written sources, the changing meaning and the 
risk of anachronistic modern interpretations has to be considered. It is important to 
try to understand the interpretation and understanding of emotions at the time; all the 
same, problems of memory and the effect of the intervening years on memoirs and 
oral history apply to individuals’ reports of their emotions.  
Everyone makes up stories about themselves. Usually they present 
themselves in a positive light,
80
 and tempered by the idea that anything that ground 
personnel experienced was unremarkable compared to the life of the flyers, there 
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appears to be reluctance in many sources to moan about their lot or to divulge really 
unpleasant stories. In many sources produced during or shortly after the war, 
witnesses seem prepared to talk about someone else who broke down, but not to 
admit to their own weakness. Later sources seem less reluctant to display their own 
emotions, although in some sources created in the last decades of the twentieth 
century descriptions of traumatic events are described through the lens of their 
author’s understanding of PTSD. In all sources however, as discovered by Michael 
Roper in his study of letters from the previous war, Freudian ‘parapraxes’, ‘slips of 
the pen, grammatical errors, contradictions, repetitions…[can] give the merest 
glimpse of emotional states.’81 Similarly, the emotional impact of retelling stories is 
evident in oral history through uncharacteristic stuttering or pauses. This ‘bottom up’ 
social, cultural and ethnographic methodology will be combined with a ‘top down’ 
approach using ‘official’ records. By close reading and psychological interpretation 
of such sources, this thesis contrasts dominant discourses with the experiences and 
emotions of those with the lowest status in the force.  
Thesis Themes  
Martin Francis acknowledges that the ‘institutional culture’ of the RAF was 
influenced by the ‘stiflingly hierarchical and class bound’ wider society of the 
1940s.
82
 ‘Wingless wonders’ or ‘penguins’ were marginalised in the RAF; as Mark 
Wells acknowledges ‘these humorous nicknames... [were] clues to the existence of a 
clearly defined social hierarchy, at the top of which stood the pilots.’83 The central 
theme of this thesis is how the gendered hierarchy of RAF Bomber Command was 
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culturally constructed, and how it affected the lives of male and female personnel. 
The hierarchy was more complex than the structure of rank or pay scales. RAF 
medics endorsed the idea that some roles were ‘pansy job[s]’,84 and it is also evident 
in ‘Ode to the Erk.’ Mentioning ‘flight mechs’ (mechanics) and ‘riggers’ who 
worked on the aircraft and those who helped the air crew ‘prepare’, the poem does 
not include the others further behind the scenes, the clerks, cooks and drivers. 
Official records make similar omissions. Figure 0.1. shows the personnel ideally 
needed to keep a Short Stirling flying. 
 
FIG. 0.1. Photographs. Royal air Force Bomber Command 1942 -1945, IWM, CH 5988.
85
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The eight members of the air crew are in the foreground of the picture; immediately 
behind them is the meteorological officer, a WAAF parachute packer and the Flying 
Control officer. The next row consists of 12 flight maintenance crew, and 18 ground 
service crew; behind them is a bomb train, its driver and 11 armourers. Behind the 
bomber is a petrol bowser, an oil bowser and their drivers.
86
 The groups are arranged 
to create the rough cruciform shape of an aircraft, but they also symbolically 
demonstrate the hierarchy of the RAF. Although the ground crews are part of the 
service as a whole, they are literally and figuratively behind the aircrew; importantly 
the vast majority of those who served in other roles are absent. Those in the 
photograph represent only one of around seventy possible trades for women and 
merely a handful of the hundred or so ground trades open to men in the RAF.
87
  
This thesis examines the gendered hierarchy within the RAF more fully than 
previous works which focus exclusively either on the flyers or on WAAFs. It will 
show that the hierarchy of Bomber Command was complex and nuanced. It was 
constructed by the legacy of the civilian class structure, and by a combination of 
signifiers particular to the culture of the RAF: the division of labour into specific 
trades, their pay scales and their respective levels of skill and importance to the war 
effort. Within the culture of Bomber Command, the trades with the closest 
association to aircraft or air crew had the highest status, and the power that came 
from rank and authority was sometimes subverted. 
Ground personnel occupied a position in society between civilians and 
combatants. In bringing this significant group of the wartime population into focus, 
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this thesis will also have an impact on the understanding of wartime experience, 
work and citizenship. Michael Roper pointed out that, in the trenches of the First 
World War, even when absent, women played a role in the creation of masculinity.
88
 
However, although it was very unusual in a military environment, men and women 
worked together in the RAF. This study will consider the implications of this 
relationship for male constructions of technical expertise and heroism, and the 
corresponding emotions and internal conflicts of women of the WAAF. Women 
performed male roles and threatened male personnel. This thesis addresses a 
significant gap in the historiography of the RAF during the Second World War as 
well as informing debates surrounding the social and cultural history of the home 
front, the history of emotions and the history of medicine.  
Through an examination of a selection of contemporary novels, films, 
cartoons and propaganda, chapter one examines cultural representations of the RAF 
personnel as seen by the wartime population, and by the study of relationships, and 
the language peculiar to the service, the chapter introduces the concept of the 
hierarchy of trades and roles implicit but recognisable in the wartime RAF. It 
considers how perceptions of both the Erk and the WAAF were constructed, and how 
the ‘dilution’ of trades previously thought of as masculine by WAAF personnel 
impacted on both male and female identities. Chapter two describes the expansion of 
Bomber Command, and the recruitment, initial training, trade selection and training 
of ground personnel. It examines attempts to use psychological testing to facilitate 
the trade selection of ground personnel, and discusses individuals’ reaction to 
common experiences including their inoculations and medical inspections. In its 
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examination of the living and working conditions on operational bomber stations, 
chapter three develops the concept of the hierarchy of RAF and WAAF trades 
further. It examines three groups of personnel, those who worked directly with the 
aircraft and members of air crew, those who sometimes did, and those, such as clerks 
and ground defence personnel furthest removed from the raison d'être of the Air 
Force. It discusses how the sometimes harsh living and working conditions impacted 
on the lives of ground personnel and describes some of the dangers and traumatic 
events they faced. Chapter four directly examines the lives and emotions of ground 
personnel. It begins with a discussion of the history of emotions and examines the 
emotional regimes of the RAF. It highlights the wartime construction of fear and 
anxiety, and personnel’s responses to traumatic events, loss and grief. Personnel had 
to cope with a range of events and resultant emotions including the loss of aircraft 
and air crew, guilt, and boredom. I suggest that as well as relying on superstition and 
ritual, as part of the hierarchy of the RAF, personnel coped with the stresses of 
performing their duty during wartime because they were supported by emotional 
communities that were largely constructed around their trade groups.  
Several years ago I worked in an old aircraft hangar that was being used as a 
warehouse. Having experienced the conditions of two winters there, I became 
curious about the lives of the people who worked on similar sites, but in far worse 
circumstances over seventy years ago. In particular I became interested in how 
ground personnel’s negative emotional responses to their experiences were treated by 
the RAF. The final important theme of the thesis is a consideration of mental health 
issues, and the relative resilience of ground personnel in comparison to both civilians 
and air crew. Building on the focus of the earlier chapters on social and cultural 
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history, the final chapters consider the medical treatment of ground personnel and 
how personnel suspected or diagnosed with neuroses and mental health issues were 
perceived and treated by the RAF authorities and the RAF medical profession.  
Chapter five concentrates on the role of the RAF medical officer. It considers 
the social construction of mental health in popular culture. It engages further with the 
trope of stoic endurance, with diagnoses of hysteria and anxiety, and it examines the 
wartime belief that certain people were more predisposed to neuropsychiatric illness. 
It considers the problem of malingerers, and the medical officers’ conflict of duty: to 
do what was best for the individual patient, or for the needs of the RAF and the war 
effort. In doing so it highlights the perceived difference between male and female 
patients, and the medical legitimisation of the RAF hierarchy. The final chapter 
focuses on the role of RAF neuropsychiatric specialists at ‘Not Yet Diagnosed 
Neuropsychiatric’ (NYDN) centres in RAF hospitals. The chapter discusses the 
merits of treatments and disposal of personnel, and the pensions awarded to 
personnel invalided from the service for neuropsychiatric illnesses.   
Each chapter returns to themes of the social and cultural construction of 
hierarchy and identity within RAF Bomber Command through discourses important 
in the context of the Second World War. The thesis is informed by, and engages 
with, the history of the RAF, the history of medicine and psychiatry, the history of 
emotions, and the social and cultural history of the war. By examining how different 
discourses socially and culturally constructed the gendered hierarchical structure 
within Bomber Command, in particular this thesis informs areas of debate around 
mental health, and the wartime construction of gender and identity.  
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Ground personnel ‘were accustomed to playing eighth fiddle’ during the 
war,
89
 From necessity, the discourses of the heroism and supremacy of the flyer were 
created during the war by propaganda; they have been perpetuated and strengthened 
in the decades after 1945. Since then, the veterans of Bomber Command have 
struggled for official recognition and acceptance of their role in the war, and 
attention has continued to be focussed on the air crew. This thesis contributes to the 
historiography of the RAF and the Second World War by bringing a significant but 
neglected group of the wartime population into focus. Located within popular culture 
somewhere between the stoic civilian population and the heroic fighting man, this 
thesis gives them a voice. In doing so, this thesis is important in adjusting our 
understanding of RAF Bomber Command and our picture of wartime experience, 
work and citizenship.  
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1  
RAF CULTURE AND CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS OF RAF GROUND 
PERSONNEL 
  
 I sometimes think that, after the air crews and maintenance crews, it is the 
common A.C.2 who deserves the thanks of the country for showing “devotion 
to duty” in trying circumstances, and I for one never cease to admire their 
eternal cheerfulness. Many joined the R.A.F. to fly, but for one reason or 
another failed to pass the necessary tests and have had to be content with a 
back seat on the ground floor.
1
  
Squadron leader A. J. Brown, the author of Ground Staff, from which this quote was 
taken, served as an intelligence officer in Bomber Command. As an example of 
wartime propaganda, his book reveals the inherent hierarchy within RAF Bomber 
Command. Maintenance crews followed the air crew in the hierarchy, and it is 
implicit that, having ‘failed’ to become air crew, low ranking ground personnel were 
marginalised. Equal to a private in the Army, an AC2, or aircraftman, second-class, 
was the lowest rank in the RAF.  
This chapter examines popular wartime representations of RAF ground 
personnel, the culture peculiar to those within the Air Force itself, and the unspoken 
hierarchy of Bomber Command. Texts including films, popular novels, humorous 
books, the press and recruitment material will be used as sources to examine the RAF 
in popular culture, while official RAF publications, Mass-Observation archives, 
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diaries, oral history and published and unpublished memoirs will be utilised in the 
study of the internal workings of the RAF. The RAF’s distinctive vernacular is 
particularly useful in revealing hidden power structures, and the Erk and WAAF’s 
position in the Air Force.  
As Michael Roper argues, there are two distinct methodologies that can be 
used to examine identity, gender and emotions; to look at cultural norms through 
discourse and texts, and to examine individual’s lives and how they negotiate their 
identity on a psychological level.
2
 While chapter four utilises the second 
methodology and considers how individuals negotiated their own emotions and 
identities, this chapter examines how RAF and WAAF ground personnel were 
constructed in the popular media and in the culture of Bomber Command, and it 
considers the discourses that framed this construction. Through the examination of 
both male and female ground personnel, this chapter will engage with recent 
historiography, in particular the work of Martin Francis and Tessa Stone. In The 
Flyer, Francis examines the place of the RAF airman in British popular culture 
during the war but only briefly considers ground personnel.
3
 From a feminist 
perspective, Stone examines the gendered identity of women in the WAAF, but her 
study, using oral testimony, does not include male perspectives.
4
 She admits that a 
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study of the experiences male ground personnel is overdue.
5
 Both Francis and 
Stone’s work will be re-examined by placing them in the wider context of the rest of 
the Air Force.  
Cultural Representations 
By the 1930s, ‘the cult of the air fighter’ had been created. RAF flyers were regarded 
as a technically minded and heroic elite, who offered an alternative to the brutal 
slaughter of trench warfare.
6
 After war was declared, this public image of the RAF 
was reinforced by the Air Ministry and by official propaganda; several authors and 
poets were employed by the Air Ministry in their public relations department.
7
 By 
1941, the RAF was the service ‘most admired’ by the public.8 Literature was 
produced for both service and civilian audiences by authors such as David Masters 
and the cartoonist Bill Hooper under his pseudonym ‘Raff’,9 and films became an 
important source of the construction of the RAF, and especially the flyer, in popular 
imagination.
10
  
The British propaganda machine deliberately and of necessity attempted to 
construct the perception of national identity and unity which, for the consideration of 
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Bomber Command, has two important aspects. The British were depicted as stoic 
underdogs, fighting a ‘good war’ against Nazi aggression and their tactics of 
‘Blitzkrieg’, indiscriminate bombing and terror.11 In order to win, sacrifices and 
changes needed to be made. The concept of ‘fair play’ and the inefficient ‘Colonel 
Blimps’ who were responsible for early British setbacks and defeats had to make 
way for ruthlessly efficient modern warfare.
12
 Bomber Command fits more closely 
with the more problematic narrative of the need for ruthless efficiency, while, fitting 
firmly into the narrative of the ‘good war’, Fighter Command and the ‘Battle of 
Britain’ has achieved dominance in public memory. The RAF depicted by the 
popular media was frequently the fighters of the Battle of Britain, public school boys 
of the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR), epitomised by Richard Hillary 
in his book The Last Enemy.
13
 After the success of Fighter Command in the late 
summer of 1940, both the Spitfire and the fighter pilot became synecdoches for the 
RAF. Most trainee air crew wanted to fly fighters; Bomber Command and Coastal 
Command pilots were regarded as second rate ‘bus drivers’.14 However, bomber air 
crew were also utilised by official propaganda throughout the war. The teamwork of 
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men from different backgrounds who made up bomber crews became a metaphor for 
a united war effort.
15
 For many, however inaccurate their bombing may have been, 
Bomber Command was the only way to take the war to the Germans.
16
 Although 
they were performing similar functions, people convinced themselves that Bomber 
Command were heroes, but that the Luftwaffe were villains deliberately targeting 
civilians. Bomber Command was presented to the public in newspaper reports, radio 
interviews and films such as The Lion Has Wings, or One of Our Aircraft is Missing, 
but understandably the focus was on the flyers. 
In the Air Force itself, training passed on idiosyncrasies of the service’s 
culture, and publications peculiar to the RAF such as Tee Emm, Slipstream and the 
RAF Journal reinforced them. Both public perception of the RAF and the culture of 
the service itself evolved as the war progressed, but as part of the war effort, the role 
of the man or woman on the ground was marginalised. Flyers, whether of fighter or 
bomber aircraft, were prioritised in public discourse. As will be discussed below, 
RAF ground personnel are rare in popular wartime texts and frequently conform to 
certain two-dimensional stereotypes. Comparing the RAF to other services, Francis 
comments on its ‘relatively lax discipline, rampant individualism, ostensible 
cosmopolitanism, regular access to women and families, and its proportionately high 
death rates.’17 However, this was only ever the case for a minority of the air force. 
Even among flyers the culture of the RAF was fractured, and ground personnel had a 
very different experience.  
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RAF Culture  
Angus Calder discusses that, within the Army, ‘some forms of life were much lower 
than others’; in particular the personnel in the Pioneer Corps included too many 
‘pacifists and aliens.’18 The RAF was a distinct hierarchy; to some extent all those 
without ‘wings’ on their uniform were marginalised.19 As Peter Gray recently 
quipped when summing up Churchill and the Air Ministry’s policy towards medal 
allocation, it has been commonly felt that ‘ground crew suck.’20 As he highlights, 
Churchill expressed his disdain for RAF ground personnel ‘who he saw as cosseted 
and little different from ordinary members of the domestic population.’21 As the 
‘apex of the station pyramid’,22 air crew were the ‘visible bearers of hegemonic 
masculinity’.23 However, consisting of career air crew who had joined in the 1930s, 
members of Auxiliary Air Force, and the RAFVR, air crew were heterogeneous 
group even at the start of the war. As the war continued, air crew also included 
increasing numbers of volunteer air crew from the Dominions, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand and Rhodesia. Small numbers of black West Indians became air crew, 
and as well as differences of race, the creation of the new air crew position of flight 
engineer and the heavy attrition of air gunners led to a broadening of the class 
spectrum of flying personnel. It was widely understood that there were distinctions 
between the importance and quality of men who filled air crew positions. These 
functioned in parallel with class and rank. Pilots, navigators and bomb-aimers were 
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held in higher esteem than flight engineers and air-gunners.
24
 By the middle of the 
war, flyers were more likely to be grammar school boys or volunteers from the 
Dominions than public school boys, members of university squadrons, and the 
RAFVR of 1939 and 1940. Francis argues that, partially created by the social 
differences and the ‘service’s pre-war tripartite division’, there were three 
‘distinctive cultures’ within RAF flyers before the war.25 There was also a distinct 
difference between officers and sergeant pilots, and as John James comments, during 
the twentieth century the two groups were identifiable by their own ‘traditional 
patterns of social intercourse’, their recreational pastimes (especially drinking) and 
by their unique speech patterns.
26
  
However, neither James nor Francis considers similar divisions among 
ground personnel. According to Brown, ‘the élite of the ground staff’ were the 
mechanics, fitters and riggers of the ground crew who worked on the aircraft. Then 
there were those who had ‘nothing directly to do with aeroplanes’, ‘thousands of 
A.C.2.s and A.C.W.s who sweep the floor, type the letters and fill up the forms’. 27 
Ground personnel were also divided by their rank and the trades they were assigned 
to, and, as the service expanded, those recruited or conscripted for the duration of the 
war outnumbered ‘Trenchard’s brats’ and career personnel.28 They included people 
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from a wide variety of nationalities, social backgrounds, and abilities. By 1943, over 
180,000 of those serving were female. 
An RAF station was its own community separate from wider society. RAF 
personnel developed their own ‘peculiar verbal idiom’,29 that revolved around 
euphemisms, black humour and making light of danger. Ambulances and fire tenders 
were referred to as the ‘heat and meat wagons’ for example.30 The Force’s 
colloquialisms or ‘slanguage’ were sufficiently unusual to provide the content for an 
article in the Royal Air Force Journal, a short humorous book explaining the 
meaning and derivation of words and phrases to the civilian population and for Mass-
Observation correspondents to comment on.
31
 Civilians looked up to the RAF and 
began to emulate its culture and speech patterns. It was the language of the flyer that 
filtered down through the ranks, many phrases made their way into everyday 
parlance and some are still in common use today, or at least are still understood. As 
part of a sign system, the language of a particular culture reflects or refracts the 
culture, its dynamics and the construction and maintenance of its power structures.
32
 
As the RAF rapidly expanded and the first generations of air crew were killed, the 
culture and the language changed; by 1943, few in the RAF would have used 
expressions such as ‘what ho?’ ‘pip pip’ or ‘old boy’.33 However, throughout the 
war, the linguistic reinforcement of a hierarchy was also evident in the RAF patois. 
Perhaps because of their brown uniforms, and in combat they were frequently 
                                                 
29
 Francis, The Flyer, p.11, 36. 
30
 P. Gray, Ghosts of Targets, p. 35. 
31
 E. H. Partridge, ‘Slanguage’ in R. Raymond, & D. Langdon, (eds) Slipstream: A Royal Air Force 
Anthology, (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1946). See also, Ward-Jackson, It’s a Piece of Cake, and 
‘WAAF: Reports from an Observer, (1941-1942)’ Mass-Observation Archive (MOA), 
SxMOA1/2/32/3/2. See also ‘Reports and letters from LAC Papineau’, (1941). MOA, 
SxMOA1/2/29/2/2/G. 
32
 A. Mangan, ‘Manufactured’ Masculinity: Making Imperial Manliness, Morality and Militarism, 
(London, Routledge, 2012), p. 145. 
33
 Gray, P. Ghosts of Targets, p. 70. Gray was a Canadian from a middle class background. 
47 
 
unwashed and muddy, the Army were referred to as ‘pongos’ after the African 
apes.
34
 Even amongst air crew the position of pilot was the most revered. Observers 
were called ‘flying arseholes’ or ‘feathered arseholes’ because of the ‘O’ on their 
wing.
35 
High-ranking officers were ‘scrambled eggs’ because of the gold braid on 
their uniforms and a large number of medal ribbons were referred to as ‘fruit salad.’36 
WAAFs in Balloon Command in particular were punningly called the ‘Spare 
service’, and as well as ‘penguins’ and ‘wingless wonders’, desk bound ground 
personnel were also occasionally referred to as ‘the chair force’.37  
Hierarchy of trades 
It is accepted that masculine identity and occupation are connected,
38
 and that to play 
an active role in society during the war, both men and women felt the need to be in 
uniform, but within the service there was an appreciation that some trades were of 
more value than others. As Stone discovered with her examination of WAAFs, some 
trades which might be expected to be coded as highly masculine, were regarded 
rather disparagingly on operational bomber stations, even by those whose duty it was 
to perform them. In the case of the WAAF, as Stone suggests, it was the supposed 
importance of a particular trade to the war effort that was crucial to its positioning in 
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the culture of the service.
39
 Complex stratification and hierarchies of power are 
created in societies through intertwined discourses.
40
 Gender, rank, social class, trade 
(and its prestige and pay scale), together with the length of service and whether 
personnel were pre-war ‘old boys’, or war-time recruits, were all important factors in 
determining the complex and interlinked hierarchy of the RAF. The importance of 
rank and pay scale are more nuanced than might be expected, and will be discussed 
below, together with the implications of class and gender. This section will examine 
the more obscure implications of trade to the hierarchy within Bomber Command. 
This hierarchy may be considered by exploring how the Air Ministry defined certain 
trades, and by how personnel on operational stations perceived them.  
While personnel of all ranks worked in all trades, the RAF pay scale, 
recruitment, training and trade selection processes effectively prioritised some trades 
over others. Trades were divided into six groups each with its own rates of pay 
across all ranks.
41
 Group 1 included aircraft trades such as engine and airframe fitters 
and armourers, those in Group 2 were also often involved with aircraft and included 
mechanics and other skilled craftsmen. Group 3 included cooks and butchers, Group 
4 largely consisted of clerks, while Group 5 was for general duty aircrafthands, 
ground gunners, barbers and batmen. The final group, Group M was for medical 
orderlies and similar roles. For example, skilled technicians, such as welders or radio 
mechanics were in pay Group 1, armourers specialising in bombs were in Group 2, 
while motor transport drivers were in Group 5.
42
 For AC2s, the difference between 
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pay groups could be as much as one shilling and nine pence a day.
43
 Pay for an AC2 
in Group 5 started at 2 shillings a day while an AC2 fitter in Group 1 received 3s.9d 
per day. A leading aircraftman in Group 1with over three years service earned six 
shillings a day.
44
 As will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, 
psychometric intelligence tests were introduced to the RAF in 1941, for the 
suitability of personnel for different ground trades.
45
 Using ‘a battery of three 
intelligence tests’ it was thought possible quantitatively to assess the likelihood that a 
candidate would pass or fail a trade training course.
46
 Although the tests did not 
necessarily take into account different levels of education or social and cultural 
differences,
47
 they effectively placed different trades in a hierarchy of the amount of 
intelligence required to pass the training. ‘Radio Wireless Mechanic’ or ‘R.D.F. 
Wireless Mechanic’ were considered ‘high-grade trades’ that required an average 
score of 80 on the combined tests to be ‘assured success’, while at the bottom of the 
scale it was expected that candidates for ‘Ground Gunner’, ‘Cook and Butcher’, 
‘Batman’ or ‘Aircrafthand General Duties’ would only fail their training if their 
scores were below 15.
48
  
Such distinctions were clearly made by new recruits as they progressed 
through training and on to their first postings. An observer for Mass-Observation was 
of the opinion that there was a connection between WAAF’s social class and the 
                                                 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Hammerton, ABC of the RAF, p.12. See also Appendix D. 
45
 P. E. Vernon, & J. B. Parry, Personnel Selection in the British Forces, (London, University of 
London Press, 1949), pp. 67-71. For a list of trades open to RAF and WAAF personnel see Appendix 
B. 
46
 Ibid., pp. 278-279. 
47
 N, Thalassis, ‘The Uses of Intelligence Testing in the Recruitment of ‘Other Ranks’ in the Armed 
Forces during the Second World War’ History and Philosophy of Psychology, 5, 1, (2003), p. 20.  
48
 Vernon, & Parry, Personnel Selection in the British Forces, pp. 279-280. See also: Operational 
Record Book: Central Trade Test Board, West Drayton, UK. (1941-1945) and CTTB Operation 
Record Book, ‘Instructions on the use of GVK Intelligence Test Results by C.T.T.BD. Interviewers’ 
(1942), The National Archives (TNA), AIR 29/710. 
50 
 
trades they were assigned to. Working-class girls became ‘cooks, sparking plug 
testers, general duty hands’, middle-class girls were ‘orderlies, teleprinters,[sic]’ and 
‘clerks’ while those who were ‘middle-middle class and above’ became 
‘administrative workers, radio-operators,’ and ‘plotters’.49 Stone found in her 
interviews that there were ‘ding dong battle[s]’ and ‘feuds’ between WAAFs of 
different trades,
50
 and at training establishments and on operational stations, ‘cliques’ 
of girls were formed based loosely on social class and on their trade training.
51
 At all 
levels in the hierarchy ‘group solidarities’ were created, and as a form of resistance 
to the hegemonic military values, a sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ was formed.52 WAAF 
typist, Doreen May tried to resist the authority of one particular WAAF 
administration officer by burying her paperwork in her ‘in tray’ for several days, and 
by trying to persuade others not to sign out when they went to a dance in the station 
gym. She thought they would not be able to punish all of them.
53
 Different trade 
groups can be thought of as ‘status groups’ and, as will be discussed in chapters three 
and four, group unity was constructed around common qualities. 
54
 Ronald Hall 
served with 115 squadron as an engine fitter; he believed that on the flights there was 
‘a greater feeling of involvement than any other ground trade.’55 The hierarchy of 
trades was evident in the culture of the wartime RAF and has also been maintained 
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by personal narratives recorded and published after the war. It can even be identified 
in wartime propaganda, when it was acknowledged in a book exalting women’s 
wartime roles, that most women ‘preferred the garage atmosphere of the hangar to 
the kitchen-front life of the cook-house.’56 Ian C----s and his fellow armourers 
regarded drivers and other personnel who worked ‘beyond the perimeter tracks’ with 
‘little more than indifference’.57 After the war, aircraftsman Robert Collins recalled 
similar divisions. During the war he worked on the ‘flight lines’, and although he did 
not consider himself to be technically minded, he rationalised it as being ‘necessary 
war work and… better than being demoted to kitchen helper.’58 Kitchen and 
domestic tasks were regarded as one of the lowest trades and certain chores, such as 
cleaning, ‘spud bashing’ or refuse collection, which were an everyday part of some 
personnel’s working day were used as ‘jankers’, punishments for minor 
misdemeanours.
59
 As an AC2, Collins could not be demoted in rank; he could only 
be demoted by a lowering in prestige of his role, and by a lowering of trade group. 
He regarded working with Lancasters to be the pinnacle of his service.
60
 As an 
airframe mechanic, Collins was in pay Group 2. Cook was a Grade 3 trade, while an 
untrained aircrafthand was in Group 5. The difference in pay between the groups was 
one shilling and sixpence a day.
61
 Women held similar perceptions of trade status; 
despite cooks being in a higher pay group than clerks, together with general duty 
aircraftwomen and kitchen staff, they were felt to be at the bottom of the ‘social 
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scale’ by clerks.62 Another WAAF felt that working with radar had more prestige 
than being commissioned as an officer.
63
 
Although they had weapons, because they had the least to do with operations 
and little or no contact with air crew or aircraft, ground defence personnel were at the 
bottom of the Bomber Command hierarchy. Theoretically ground defence could have 
been coded as a highly important, masculine position; it potentially involved firing 
weapons in a combat role and, because of this, it was closed to women. However, 
after the threat of invasion diminished, their duty was often repetitive and boring. A 
comic strip published during the war depicts an Erk being challenged by an airman 
standing guard duty complete with helmet, webbing and fixed bayonet. The Erk 
quickly outwits the guard and relieves him of his weapon and torch.
64
 Ground 
defence was one of the few trades open to the least intelligent, or those who did 
poorly on the aptitude tests. Little education was required to become a ground 
gunner, and in Group 5, it was one of the lowest paid trades.
65
 In 1942 the 
psychiatrist Group Captain Robert Gillespie thought that the trade of ground gunner 
had been ‘classified in such a low category’ that it risked becoming ‘a receptacle for 
a considerable proportion of the near-defectives recruited into the service.’66 Ground 
defence personnel invariably had to do more parades and drill with the corresponding 
amount of ‘bull’ and attention to boots, buttons and uniforms that was avoided 
whenever possible by air crew and other trades. In the culture of the RAF, ground 
defence was a position uncomfortably close to the ‘pongos’ of the Army. Aircraft 
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fitter, leading aircraftman (LAC) Roderic Papineau thought that ground defence was 
done by ‘a few almost “unemployable” aircraft hands’,67 and medical officer, David 
Stafford-Clark held an equally poor impression of them.
68
 He also thought that men 
in some trades were perhaps deliberately avoiding danger and their duty. In his diary, 
he wrote that the mess secretary was ‘young enough to make a far more active 
contribution – dim though he be.’69 In the patois of the RAF, undesirable trades far 
removed from air crew were given derogatory epithets, drill instructors were known 
as ‘gravel crushers’,70 the service police were known as the ‘Gestapo’ or ‘snoops’,71 
and any aircraftman was belittlingly known as an ‘Erk’ or ‘Plonk.’72  
The Erk 
The airman is an uncommon figure in popular wartime culture, but when he is 
visible, as an Erk or airman Plonk, he was frequently a figure of fun. The character of 
AC2 ‘Joe Mullings’ created by Ward-Jackson, in No Bombs At All, almost exactly 
describes the Erks ‘AC2 Joe’ and ‘Joe Soap’ drawn by David Langdon.73 (See Fig. 
1.1) It is worthwhile quoting this description at length. 
Joe was a little fellow. About twenty-five, with shoulders not very broad nor 
back very upright, he was five feet four when he had his medical. His simple, 
pallid face usually wore a slightly inane grin beneath the steel-rimmed, 
                                                 
67
 ‘Reports and letters from LAC Papineau’, (1941). MOA, SxMOA1/2/29/2/2/G . 
68
 D. Stafford-Clark, Diary 1940-1945. 2 January 1941, WL, PP/DSC/A/2/2. 
69
 Ibid., p. 22. 
70
 Ward-Jackson, It’s A Piece of Cake, p.34. 
71
 Papineau, MOA, SxMOA1/2/29/2/2/G. 
72
 Ward-Jackson, It’s a Piece of Cake, p. 26, and Partridge, ‘Slanguage’, p. 62. See also: Francis, The 
Flyer, p.52. Both Ward-Jackson and Partridge discuss the etymology of ‘erk’. 
73
 C. H. Ward-Jackson, No Bombs At All: Some short stories of the Royal Air Force, (London, Sylvan 
Press, 1944), pp. 39-48, D. Langdon, All Buttoned Up! A Scrapbook of RAF Cartoons, (London, 
Sylvan Press, 1944), pp. 31-38, and D. Langdon, ‘The Erk’, in: Ward-Jackson, It’s a Piece of Cake p. 
30. He is also very similar in appearance to an erk drawn by C. F. Greatbach in Boothroyd, B. Are 
Sergeants Human? (London, Allen and Unwin, 1944), p. 15. See also character sketches on pp. 23-31.  
54 
 
Service-issue spectacles with the bit of tape wound around the bridge of the 
nose. He had a sturdy body with short arms and legs, and he seemed to be 
nearer the ground than he should have been. His working blue tunic was hung 
up in the drying room and he slaved in his shirt, sleeves rolled up, cloth belt 
at waist supporting trousers. His soft collar wrinkled at the points and his 
black tie was frayed with knotting and revealed down one edge a slip of white 
lining. On an untidy head his cap with a fag stuck in it was jammed askew. 
Across his chin was a wipe of grease. That was Joe. A bit of a swede, the 
other chaps said.
74
  
Apart from a few details of uniform and the absence of a cigarette, Ward-Jackson’s 
‘Joe’ and Langdon’s ‘AC2 Joe’ and ‘Joe Soap’ are one and the same. Both can be 
seen in stark contrast to the glamorous and heroic pilots and air crew. Having broken 
his glasses, it is clear that he is clumsy; he is scruffy and down-at-heel rather than 
displaying the debonair, casual untidiness of the flyer.
75
 Joe Soap is short, fat and un-
heroic; wearing glasses and with a hand in his pocket, he appears babyish and 
innocent. A ‘swede’ was understood to be ‘a raw recruit – i.e., one just from the 
country; or an airman with a rural, countrified manner.’76 Rooted ‘nearer the ground 
than he should have been’, Joe is seen in stark contrast to the heroism and glamour of 
the flyer, and it is obvious that neither will ever fly. As Francis comments, Ward-
Jackson’s ‘apparent celebration of an ordinary aircraftsman is undermined by a 
condescending tone which predominates throughout the narrative.’77 Joe, the 
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‘mythical idiot’,78 is happy in his role peeling potatoes, shovelling coal or sweeping 
the hangar.
79
 
                       
FIG 1.1. D Langdon, ‘The Erk’, in: C.H. Ward-Jackson, It’s a Piece of Cake or RAF Slang Made 
Easy, (Milton Keynes, Lightning Source, 2010), p. 30. (First published in 1943.)
80
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However, Joe is also a likable character; in the forward to a collection of Langdon’s 
cartoons, the author Hector Bolitho pointed out ‘Langdon’s “Erk” is twice as noble 
as he looks and half as foolish as he seems.’81 In one of Langdon’s four panel cartoon 
strips, Joe eschews a dance, the cinema, and a darts match with free beer in order to 
work on the plot of the station’s gardening scheme, and unable to hear the news on 
NAAFI radio in another strip, he fetches a flying helmet in order to use its head-
phones.
82
 Despite his little victories against RAF authority and service life, as an 
example to others, it is clear that Joe is a conscientious worker and content with his 
place near the bottom of the service hierarchy. As will be discussed below, Joe can 
be seen to be the personification of the unassuming but quietly capable ‘little man’ 
identified by Sonya Rose and others.
83
  
When ground personnel are present in other popular representations of the 
RAF, dialects and unflattering adjectives are frequently used to construct two-
dimensional character stereotypes.
84
 Ground personnel are reduced to ‘willing 
hands’85 or are ‘plodding ground crew’ who ‘slave joyously – to see their patent 
handiwork leap skywards in such master hands.’86 In Cloud Cover, D. G. Barnes’ 
collection of short stories, other airmen play less of a part in the war effort. A mess 
waiter was a ‘cheerful, downright, chubby north countryman… One could well 
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imagine him as a sturdy farmer’,87 while in The Stories of Flying Officer X, by H. E. 
Bates, Erks are referred to as ‘stooges’ who shelter from the rain under the wings of 
aircraft and smoke.
88
 However, in light-hearted, popular literature that explains what 
new recruits could expect from their first days in the service, the humble Erk is 
constructed differently. In Behind the Spitfires, under his pseudonym ‘Raff’, the 
cartoonist Bill Hooper, who created the character of Flying Officer Prune for the 
RAF’s Tee Emm magazine, described the character of aircraftsman ‘Plonk’ through 
the authoritative narrative voice of an intelligence officer. It must be remembered 
that this is a piece of deliberate propaganda, but by closely associating the Erk with 
the fighter aircraft of the ‘few’, giving them a more masculine sartorial elegance and 
describing how they continue to work during an air raid, Hooper allowed the Erk to 
share some of the fighter pilot’s heroism and glamour.89  
How those in the Air Force negotiated their identity will be discussed in 
following chapters, but there is evidence that the Forces were concerned about the 
morale of all ranks, especially that of lowly AC2s. Welfare Committees composed of 
senior officers were established on some stations after 1942,
90
 and early in the war, a 
lecture on morale was to be given to all home stations.
91
 It is clear that the RAF were 
concerned about motivating personnel during ‘slack periods’ when airmen could 
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‘indulge in “wishful thinking”, sit back, do nothing and hope that everything will 
come right of its own accord.’92 However, although the lecture was ostensibly 
intended for ‘everyone – however great or however small his responsibility’ it is 
clear that the target audience was male and more likely to be from the ranks rather 
than an officer or NCO.
93
 It was explained to personnel that, due to the rapid 
expansion of the RAF, promotion could be a matter of luck rather than ability, but 
that if airmen had pride in the service they would remain loyal to their superiors 
despite not receiving due recognition for their work.
94
 Those who had joined up for 
the war were also given particular attention in order to motivate them after the 
sometimes disappointing realities of the service had lowered their morale.
95
 In the 
forward to the Air Ministry’s publication The Airman’s Welfare: Notes for Officers, 
officers were informed that for new recruits it was inevitable that the ‘violent 
interruption of the normal ways of life’ would create anxiety and cause ‘personal 
problems’. They were reminded that, for many, adapting to the restrictions of 
military service was not easy and required conscious effort.
96
 Both physical and 
psychological influences on morale were stressed. RAF officers were reminded of 
the importance of ‘good and adequate food’, letters from home, leave, and 
recreational activities on the morale of those in their command.
97
  
It is evident that the Air Ministry and the upper echelons of the RAF were 
aware of the importance of psychology on the welfare and morale of the lowest 
ranks, especially new recruits and conscripts in for the duration; that there were 
                                                 
92
 Ibid., p. 4. 
93
 Ibid. (My emphasis). 
94
 Ibid., p. 5. 
95
 Ibid., p. 8. 
96
 Air Ministry, The Airman’s Welfare: Notes for Officers, (Air Ministry, 1941), p.4.  
97
 Ibid., pp. 6-13.  
59 
 
measures put in place to influence morale suggests that the morale of ground 
personnel was, at least at times, regarded as a problem. The Erk was expected to be 
lacking in self discipline and motivation. During the war, the psychological treatment 
of such personnel was informed by discourses that culturally constructed wartime 
society, and in particular, the beliefs and cultural assumptions about bravery and 
stoicism.  
As Penny Summerfield has discussed, women were either ‘heroic or ‘stoic’.98 
However, as Sonya Rose argues, these two alternative discourses constructed the 
courage of the nation. One saw the nation as unassuming and ‘quietly… heroic 
people’ while the other depicted a ‘nation of quintessentially reasonable citizens who 
willingly and with good humour sacrificed their private and personal interests and 
desires for the common good.’99 Risking their lives in combat, fighter pilots and 
bomber crews epitomised cool heroism of the first group, while for those on the 
ground, the second more stoic mould was more apt; the RAF’s ‘press on’ attitude and 
wider society’s ‘stiff upper lip’ stoicism was evoked. Airmen and women were urged 
not to worry about the disappointing ‘realities’, ‘discomforts’ and ‘boredom’ of the 
service. They were told that morale was dependent on both external and internal 
factors, by uncontrollable external events such as the weather, but also by the 
individual’s health and ‘state of mind’. They were reminded that if their state of mind 
was ‘sound’ then their morale would ‘stand the worst physical conditions.’100 Such 
rhetoric of self sacrifice for the common good, Rose argues, was central to the 
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concept of ‘Britishness’ and citizenship,101 as, during the war there was a paradigm 
shift away from prioritising ‘individual liberty’ towards ‘emphasizing the common 
good.’102  
The ethos that men must not ‘blub’ and must keep control of their emotions 
was taught to males early in their life.
103
 However, during the war such ‘emotional 
reticence’ was also a desirable female attribute,104 and can be seen in popular 
culture.
105
 In the film The Gentle Sex, Anne Lawrence (Joyce Howard), an Auxiliary 
Territorial Service (ATS) artillery-woman, continues to work through the night on an 
ambulance even after learning that her fiancé had been posted as missing presumed 
killed.
106
 As Leslie Howard narrates, she ‘won’t forget’ and ‘won’t go under.’ 
Similarly, in Neville Shute’s novel Pastoral, after her lover’s aircraft is late returning 
from an operation, WAAF signal officer, Gervase Stephenson, also carries on with 
her duties. 
This was what training was for, she thought. This was what discipline was 
for, to enable you to pigeon-hole your feelings and carry on and do the job 
you had to do. Discipline, she thought sadly, meant the difference between a 
grown-up and a child. A child would cry.
107
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Air crew were discouraged from ‘figuring the odds.’108 The use of euphemism in the 
RAF’s own distinctive idiom disguised what air crew were probably most anxious 
about. Two things could end a flying career, ‘coffins or crackers’;109 air crew could 
be killed or lose their sanity. Operational air crew were afraid of displaying 
symptoms of LMF,
110
 and to be killed was to have ‘bought it’ or to have ‘gone for a 
Burton.’111 For those still training as air crew, it was almost as worrying to be given a 
‘bowler hat’112 and return to civilian life. If flyers were not able to admit to their 
fears, in the culture of laconic understatement in the RAF, they were also 
discouraged from ‘shooting a line’, or publicly admitting their bravery and skills.113 
Ground personnel struggled to measure up to the kind of courage air crew 
seemed to display daily and placed the ‘gallant company’ of air crew on a 
pinnacle.
114
 However, the fears of ground personnel were more akin to those of 
civilians and the majority had less dangerous trials to endure. Highlighting harrowing 
experiences in his humorous account of the life of a new recruit, Basil Boothroyd 
described men being detailed to wait ‘outside a derelict slaughter-house’. Not 
knowing that they were queuing to have their photographs taken for their identity 
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cards, the new recruits ‘suspected the worse’ and their fear is palpable in the 
accompanying illustration.
115
 (See Fig 1.2.)  
 
                             
Fig. 1.2. ‘1425371’ by C. F. Greatbach in: B. Boothroyd, Adastral Bodies, (London, Allen and Unwin, 
1942), p. 26. 
 
The new recruit, not yet even an aircraftsman, is once again a figure of fun, but while 
these childish fears may have been intended to humorously strike a chord with an 
audience of servicemen or future intake, the men stoically await their fate. Airmen 
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(and airwomen) were trained to accept their lot passively, and this characteristic is 
also evident in the language of the RAF. When asking for things they were entitled 
to, but that were unavailable, it was common for them to be told: ‘You’ve had it!’116 
Similarly, in RAF parlance ‘Joe Soap’ and to ‘carry the can’ signified the lowly 
unfortunate scapegoat who was left with the most unpleasant duties and 
responsibilities.
117
 (See FIG.1.1) 
After a hit and run attack by a Messerschmitt 109, it seems that Ward-
Jackson’s character, ‘Joe Mullings,’ battles heroically to extinguish the resultant fire 
in the tail of an aircraft hit by incendiary bullets. However, this was not because he 
was a heroic character, but rather because he was unintelligent and lacked 
imagination. He is not clever enough to recognise the danger he is in. He and a rigger 
were slow to take cover, and when he did realise what was happening, Joe was not 
concerned about saving the burning aircraft, but his favourite broom which was 
inside it.
118
 In the RAF and in wider society, it was accepted that there was a 
relationship between the need for bravery and intelligence. A Canadian AC2 
airframe mechanic realised: 
without better education or being in aircrew, we would never attain their 
rank, with its better clothes, better food, better pay, and its salutes from the 
lower classes. We were the poor in the low-rent district; they were the upper 
class.
119
  
 Clearly not officer material, Erks were also firmly positioned in discourses of class. 
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Race and Class 
Despite there being a predominant narrative of national community,
120
 during the 
war, the RAF was divided by race, class, and gender as well as by military rank.
121
 
Rose argues that ‘active citizenship’ was linked to ‘social responsibility’,122 and that 
representations of national identity in wartime either subsumed or denied the 
significance of other identities.
123
 However, while those serving in the military were 
playing an active part in society, some roles seemed to be more crucial to the war 
effort than others. In the RAF identities were therefore largely constructed around the 
numerous and varied trades personnel were assigned to. It must also be remembered 
that people can simultaneously have several identities. As Angus Calder discusses in 
The Myth of the Blitz, British propaganda created the mythical image of British 
national identity through a series of binary oppositions creating the Germans as the 
other.
124
 Although many RAF personnel were British subjects, personnel came from 
the Dominions and from all over the world. Many saw England as the ‘Mother 
country’, while others, such as the Poles, came to Britain to continue their war 
against Germany. There were deliberate attempts to create a shared national identity 
around an idyllic and mythical rural England depicted in films such as Went the Day 
Well? and A Canterbury Tale,
125
 but, living on isolated, bleak and windswept bomber 
stations in Lincolnshire and Yorkshire, this may not have been particularly 
successful. Such propaganda had even less resonance with those from the Dominions 
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who were used to a warmer climate, and for them there was an added confusion as to 
whether they were serving a nation or an empire.
126
  
The RAF was a multinational service. More than two fifths of air crew came 
from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Southern Africa,
127
 and over 5500 
coloured personnel from the West Indies were recruited and served in the RAF in the 
United Kingdom in the latter half of the war.
128
 Although, as Neil Wynn argues, the 
British population was less prejudiced than American troops who were stationed in 
Britain, and there was no official colour bar,
129
 there is evidence of racial 
discrimination in the RAF.
130
 Trades that involved intimate physical contact with 
others, such as masseur, mental nursing orderly or dental clerk orderly, were closed 
to West Indians.
131
 As elements of the RAF had effectively served as a colonial 
police force in the interwar period, the concept of colonial racial superiority 
remained ingrained in some officers. Beliefs in stereotypical racial traits such as that 
‘non-whites [were] both morally inferior and more childlike than whites’ persisted 
during the war and helped to legitimise colonial rule.
132
 Intelligence officer Hector 
Bolitho noted that the RAF was a multinational force with ‘a mixture of blood and 
race’. Visiting a desolate bomber station, he ‘saw an alert little airman from 
Barbados, darting about under a bomber that had just landed.’133 Ground personnel 
were frequently marginalised in popular representations, but there is an added racial 
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dimension in the condescending tone with which Bolitho describes this West Indian 
airman. Prejudices continued right up to the end of the war, On VE day, a WAAF 
radio mechanic was dancing with one of the four West Indian NCOs on her station 
when she was told ‘you really shouldn’t be mixing with those niggers you know.’134 
Reporting to a new posting, Jamaican general duties clerk, E. Martin Noble, 
overheard a WAAF clerk discussing him with a flight lieutenant. They were curious 
as to whether he could read.
135
 
In his diary published after the war, Bolitho made similar assumptions about 
class. Discussing RAF language, he makes the distinction between air crew officers 
who insist on calling their aeroplanes ‘aircraft’ while the fitters and riggers he 
describes admit: ‘You sort of become attached to the kite on which you are working, 
just like a groom with his horse.’136 Calling the aircraft a kite probably originated 
from the ‘box-kite’ appearance of the earliest aircraft,137 but because a kite is 
controlled from the ground, it effectively gives the riggers and fitters a suggestion of 
increased importance (or at least diminishes that of the air crew). However, the 
language Bolitho’s characters use reveals more about the author, his imagined reader 
and his prejudices. While ground crew undoubtedly did become attached to the 
aircraft they worked on, and did call them ‘kites’, it is unlikely that men (and 
women) drawn from a wide social background would have chosen this particular 
simile to describe their relationship. Bolitho’s class assumptions are evident in the 
simile of a groom and his horse.  
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  Before the war, a commission could be purchased by ‘laying out a fair sum of 
money’;138 consequently many senior officers were from affluent families and had 
received private school educations.
139
 One Canadian airman felt that the Air Forces’ 
‘caste system, like a sliver under the thumbnail, was always there,’140 and an 
observer for Mass-Observation reported a physical training instructor had confided 
that the social order and ‘unfair inequalities of treatment’ were ‘not quite dependant 
on stripes.’141 Francis admits that although the RAF appeared to be an informal 
meritocracy, it was deeply scarred by social divisions.
142
 Rose argues that despite the 
rhetoric of ‘national cross-class unity’, ‘the issue of class inequality was central to 
the wartime nation.’143 The RAF then, was a microcosm of wider society. After the 
Ministry of Information’s disastrous early attempts at propaganda, such as the poster 
‘Your courage, Your cheerfulness, Your resolution, will bring Us victory, which 
‘seemed to imply that the efforts of the people would be for the benefit of the ruling 
elite,’144 Rose highlights that the government propaganda machine deliberately 
framed the war through the discourse of ‘the equality of sacrifice.’145 Consequently, 
there was a swell of public support for the Beveridge report that the government 
could not ignore.
146
 Rose maintains that many saw social reform as a priority after 
the war. Rather than ‘interpreting cynicism as a sign of apathy,’ she argues ‘that it 
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was a symptom of the fear of unfulfilled desire.’147 While certain high ranking RAF 
officers favoured conservative politics,
148
 representative of their class and education, 
among bomber crew the dominant political outlook was ‘a mildly sceptical socialism 
and belief in social justice.’149 Mass-Observation found that 92 per cent of the 
population had heard of the Beveridge report and that 88 per cent though it should be 
implemented.
150
 For ground personnel, as well as the perennial struggle against the 
RAF authority,
151
 many leant towards the left politically.
152
 As well as class and 
political divisions, the importance of gender should also be considered. David 
Morgan calls for ‘a much more detailed, finely nuanced, and systematic comparative 
analysis of the constructions of masculinities around the sites of war, combat, and 
military life.’153 Such a study of the wartime RAF is further problematised because 
men and women served together in the Air Force. 
Gender and WAAF ‘dilution’ 
The war pushed the boundaries of traditional gender roles. Many women were taught 
to drive and to carry out what had been considered masculine tasks. By the end of 
1940, more trades including instrument mechanic and radio operator were open to 
women. There were 70 shared trades and 19 WAAF only trades including charging 
board operator, instrument mechanic and sparking plug tester.
154
 In 1939, the only 
trades open to women were roles in ‘administration, as cooks, mess and kitchen 
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orderlies, clerks, equipment assistants, motor transport drivers and fabric workers.’155 
In 1941, Group 1trades of radio and wireless mechanics were opened to women, and 
in clerical positions 1:1 substitution had reached 43 per cent by 1945.
156
  
With a specific focus on the idiosyncratic culture of bomber stations, this 
section will examine both masculinity and femininity within the RAF. The 
importance of gender on the negotiation of ‘subjective identity’ will be discussed in 
chapter four.
157
 It must be remembered that genders are constructed in opposition to 
each other, and that meanings and cultural assumptions are fluid rather than fixed.
158
 
During the war, hegemonic masculinity was especially unstable because, as Rose 
argues, the successful enactment of masculinity depended on being in one of the 
three services.
159
 However, the RAF differed from the other services in that only a 
minority wore the ultimate symbol of masculinity, the air crew brevet, and also 
because women served alongside men and undertook the same work in the same 
trades. Unlike other women’s auxiliaries, the WAAF was fully integrated into the 
parent service’s organisation and administration.160 They wore almost identical 
uniforms, and in certain trades they achieved parity in rank and ability, if not in pay. 
Men and women had separate living quarters, ablutions and messes, and disciplinary 
procedures were in place to enforce a curfew and segregation of the sexes; the 
punishment for a man being found in women’s quarters was strict.161 The model of 
‘separate spheres’, between male and female, public and private, is now regarded as 
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an over simplification,
162
 and as Michael Roper pointed out, even in an all male 
environment such as in the trenches during the First World War, women played a 
role in the creation of masculinity.
163
 In the RAF however, domestic ‘normality’ was 
available on the other side of the boundary fence and on the station men and women 
mixed daily. As the war progressed and the numbers of WAAF increased, the mess 
arrangements were integrated on many stations.
164
 The two spheres model is 
especially problematic when applied to an RAF station where the domestic and 
military worlds were frequently blurred.
165
 As Francis states, unlike other more 
traditionally patriarchal services, the presence of women on operational stations 
‘allowed the possibility of heterosexual romantic attachments developing on the base 
itself.’166 While he admits that male and female roles were ‘complementary and 
interrelated’, Francis has only room to examine the masculine role of the airman; he 
recommends that The Flyer should be read together with studies of women’s wartime 
roles.
167
 However, as well as considering how women’s roles within the RAF were 
constructed, the implications of their presence on male ground personnel are also 
important. Women performed what had previously been considered male roles, and 
made it necessary for some men, already emasculated in comparison to air crew, to 
renegotiate their masculinity.  
The replacement of men by women in industry and the military was known 
by the term ‘dilution’ which effectively ‘reinforced their secondary status, and often 
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their low pay relative to men.’168 While in some trades there was a one to one 
substitution, in the Air Force it was understood that a WAAF was equal to two-thirds 
of an airman.
169
 This stems from the pay scale, which for women in 1945 remained 
two thirds of the male rate for corresponding ranks.
170
 For example, AC2 radio 
telephone operators received three shillings and three pence per day, while WAAF 
ACW2s in the same occupation received two shillings and two pence.
171
 It was 
discovered that it took longer to train airwomen than airmen in certain trades such as 
electrician, and proportionately more women failed the seven-week driving course.
172
 
This was of course due to earlier gender specific expectations and education rather 
than any intrinsic characteristics; however these gender differences were reinforced 
by the RAF.  
As Rose and others have argued, men resented the intrusion of women into 
the workspace.
173
 Within the RAF, some felt that work that WAAFs were doing 
‘were immediately classed as “cissy” jobs.’174 If the same tasks were being 
performed by women, men could no longer establish and maintain their masculinity 
through a display of their technical knowledge, skills, strength and mechanical 
understanding. Using oral testimony, Tessa Stone tested Higonnet and Higonnet’s 
‘double helix’ model of continued female subordination, against the experiences of 
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women in WAAF during the war.
175
 Higonnet and Higonnet suggested that although 
women may be seen to make what appear to be advances in status, the ‘gender-linked 
structure of subordination’ remains constant. During wartime, roles undertaken by 
women were ‘temporarily reclassified as appropriate for women, but the gendered 
hierarchy was maintained by an equal advance in status of the men they replaced.
176
  
Stone contends that the double helix model cannot be applied to the RAF and 
the WAAF. She found that airwomen did not necessarily feel inferior to airmen, but 
that in many instances ‘WAAF trade status functioned in parallel to RAF status’.177 
Women in prestigious trades felt superior to both men and women working in other 
trades. Stone concludes that an airwoman’s identity as a member of the WAAF was 
constructed, not in relation to the potential ‘glamour’ of her situation, but was 
premised on a notion of service and duty and on a clear sense of direct participation 
in, and active contribution to, the war effort.
178
 She suggests that men were 
emasculated by women doing their trade and were ‘doubly undermined… by the 
implicit contrast of their own role with that of “real” men’ who were theoretically 
released to fly.
179
 Considering ground forces, David Morgan argues that there is ‘a 
dynamic and fluid distinction’ between combat and non-combat, ‘and individuals 
may move between these military positions according to circumstances.’180 However, 
apart from a minority of ground personnel who volunteered and were accepted as air 
crew, this was not often the case in the RAF and certainly not in the WAAF. Over 
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900 men released from the balloon trade of ‘operator driver’ by WAAF replacements 
were to be directly remustered as ‘driver M.T. Group V.’181 Stone highlights that 
‘definitions of both feminine and masculine roles in the RAF were contested and 
shifting’,182 and within the RAF, the majority of the men working in trades ‘diluted’ 
by women did not then go on to become air crew. For many their status was severely 
undermined,
183
 and there was an ‘implicit suggestion that they were not real men 
because they were not air crew.’184  
Although a plotter interviewed by Stone regarded balloons as a ‘back up 
trade’,185 Stone focussed much of her study on WAAFs in Balloon Command 
because of its ‘dangerous and combat-oriented nature.’186 Despite being physically 
taxing and having the potential to bring down enemy aircraft and therefore a 
masculine role, Stone was surprised to find that Balloon Command was not a 
prestigious posting for women.
187
 She concluded that combat was not gender 
specific, but specific to air crew,
188
 and that the most important factor in any 
particular trades’ perceived importance was ‘its proximity to operations’.189 Stone is 
right to consider WAAF identity in a military context as well as from a feminist 
perspective, however, by focussing entirely on women, by considering balloons 
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almost a combat role, and by failing to differentiate between operational and non 
operational commands, she over simplifies the complexity of the RAF hierarchy.  
Even before WAAF dilution replaced the majority of male personnel in 
Balloon Command, working with balloon trades were not considered prestigious. 
Stafford-Clark was bitter that he was posted to balloons in July 1940 after serving 
with operational squadrons in France. He wrote in his diary:  
These middle aged men, trying so painfully and perpetually to be skittish 
because they were in R.A.F. uniforms made me feel again sick of the dead 
beat atmosphere of the B[alloon] B[arrage], utterly restless, and frustrated in 
being returned to balloons after a brief period in the real Air Force.
190
 
Like ground defence, throughout the war, balloons were thought to be unglamorous, 
unimportant postings by RAF personnel. By 1943, Balloon Command was being 
reduced in scale and balloon WAAFs were remustered to new trades. Largely 
because their trades required physically strong women who could endure harsh living 
and working conditions, ex balloon WAAFs were considered unfeminine.
191
  
Stone believes that, in all the home forces, ‘women generally replaced men at a ratio 
of one for one in all trades except balloon operators, cooks, and, under particular 
conditions, flight mechanics and motor transport drivers.’192 This tended to be the 
case in many trades where work was routine, indeed while still applying gendered 
assumptions about male and female capabilities, women were found to be better than 
men in some in some trades. Female code and cipher officers were thought to be 
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superior to men,
193
 as were lower ranks telephonists and radio-telephone operators.
194
 
However, in Bomber Command, WAAFs were thought to be ‘slightly inferior to 
men… [at] all trades technical and other trades which involve fitting equipment to 
aircraft, fault finding, and heavy work.’ Specific trades included ‘aircrafthand, M.T. 
mechanic and M.T. driver (heavy vehicles only).’195 Although a limited number of 
women were trained as fitters and mechanics, trades such as charging board operator, 
instrument mechanic and sparking plug tester became WAAF trades rather than a 
small part of a male mechanic or fitter’s responsibility. This was justified because: 
Much of the mechanical work was done at benches in workshops, and only 
required an adaption of skill in the descendants of generations of patient 
delicate fingered females who had devoted long hours to cross-stitch, petit 
point or invisible mending.
196
  
Gendered assumptions of women’s capabilities continued to dictate which trades 
were open to them. Women mechanics and fitters only worked directly on aircraft at 
training establishments. Regardless of their gender, it was of course also more 
economical to train someone with little mechanical knowledge to perform one 
isolated but important task rather than to teach them all the skills and knowledge 
required to be a highly skilled craftsperson or engineer. It was accepted that ‘most 
women prefer one-process to multiple jobs in mechanical trades’ and that they 
‘raised no objection to a soothing repetition of work.’197 Still conforming to a model 
of physical strength and technical expertise, it was only at more passive, sedentary, 
                                                 
193
 ‘Substitution of WAAF for RAF personnel: reports and policy, (1942- 1945)’, Appendix A. 
Officers, TNA, AIR 14/1009. 
194
 Ibid., Attachment 7B, 21 March 1945. See also: Brown, Ground Staff, p. 40. 
195
 Attachment 7B, 21 March 1945, TNA, AIR 14/1009. ‘MT’ is the abbreviation for motor transport. 
196
 K. Bentley-Beauman, Wings on Her Shoulders, (London, Hutchinson, 1943), p. 112. 
197
 Ibid., p. 112. 
76 
 
and repetitive trades that WAAFs were superior to men. Competence at trades and 
skills which were coded as feminine did not challenge patriarchy.
198
 Like roles in the 
Air Raid Precaution (ARP) service, roles in the Air Force were gendered; women’s 
roles were restricted to seemingly more passive roles in order to enable men to play 
an active role in citizenship.
199
 For men in some trades, any slight to their 
masculinity was tempered by the knowledge that WAAFs received less pay, and 
because the substitution was rarely on a one to one basis. In common with dilution in 
civilian industry, skilled trades were divided into smaller jobs, women received less 
training and there was no parity in the work they carried out.
200
 While male 
instrument repairers were trained to repair all aircraft instruments, because it was 
believed that women found repetitive work ‘soothing’ rather than monotonous, 
women might only ever work on oil gauges.
201
 New trades such as sparking plug 
tester were created especially for the WAAFs and it was found that, for such roles, 
only a month’s training was required.202 This was a new trade in 1941. The main 
requirement was ‘reliability’ and ‘the job consist[ed] of stripping down spark plugs 
taken from aircraft, cleaning them, re-assembling them and adjusting the spark plug 
gap.’203 Conforming to the double helix model, after the creation of this role, a male 
aircraft engine mechanic would remove the spark plugs from an engine but regard 
cleaning them beneath him. It is likely that any crisis of masculinity caused by 
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dilution was experienced predominantly by airmen who were already in trades (such 
as kitchen hands and general duty airmen who carried out domestic duties) that were 
already far from the heroic masculine ideal.  
Britain in the 1940s was a largely patriarchal society,
204
 and despite the 
increase in numbers of female personnel, the armed forces remained patriarchal 
establishments. As part of patriarchal class structure, the codes and concepts of 
hegemonic masculinity propagated throughout society.
205
 Masculine norms were 
reinforced wherever and whenever males gathered together, at work or when 
socialising in clubs, societies, or the public house.
206
 Boys who became air crew in 
the RAF were inculcated in the Edwardian values of sportsmanship and the 
emotional control of ‘stiff upper lip’ through their education in public schools and 
grammar schools.
207
 Those lower in the social scale were introduced to an ethos of 
physical fitness, service and patriotism similar to ‘public-school manliness’ by 
movements such as the boy scouts,
208
 and ‘muscular Christianity.’209 For the working 
classes, masculinity was constructed in the culture of the work environment; work 
that could be dangerous and physically demanding required skills that could only be 
attained by what amounted to a rite of passage. Belonging to the group was 
reinforced by an ‘occupational culture’ of language, humour and obligations to each 
other.’210 Already ‘institutionalised and taught from childhood by socialisation’,211 
gender roles were further reinforced by the RAF during training. Despite the rapid 
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expansion of the service, personnel were taught how to behave and perform their 
roles in the service by a core of NCO instructors who were ‘old sweats.’ 
Rose argues that the traditional model of heroic, military manliness was 
challenged after the First World War, and that a more ‘homely’ calm and thoughtful 
male also became an acceptable face of masculinity.
212
 The British male in the late 
1930s and early 1940s was constructed in opposition to the ‘hyper-masculine’ male 
of Nazi Germany.’213 Within the RAF, as Francis discusses, it was acceptable for the 
flyer to exhibit his manliness in seemingly contrasting ways, displaying either 
uncultured militaristic aggression or a sympathy for the arts.
214
 Ideals of manliness 
were equally nuanced for ground personnel. AC2 Joe and the character of Carter in A 
Matter of Life and Death epitomise these alternative masculinities.
215
 In the lecture 
on morale mentioned previously, the perceived differences between the British and 
the German character and masculine ideals were compared. German hyper-
masculinity, extremes of physical fitness and harsh discipline were ultimately 
regarded as a weakness.
216
  
As David Morgan shows, military organizations ‘produce a complex range of 
masculinities’,217 and it is useful here to consider masculinity using the model 
proposed by Raewyn Connell. She proposes masculinity can be thought to operate 
through the dynamics of power, through the division of labour, and through 
‘cathexis’, which she defines as the rules of desire and emotional attachment.218 In 
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Bomber Command, pilots and air crew represented the hegemonic masculine ideal 
against which femininity and other forms of masculinity were measured, 
‘marginalised and subordinated.’219 Despite wearing the same uniform, different 
trades in the RAF were effectively regarded as more or less masculine than others. 
As the personification of hegemonic masculinity, at the top of Bomber Command 
hierarchy, air crew wore the coveted symbolic flying brevet, and were entitled to all 
the privileges that accompanied it. They took risks every time they flew, they had the 
power of military rank, better pay, and were idolised by women. Air crew and 
officers were secure in their masculinity in terms of power, production and cathexis; 
they had the authority due to their rank and they flew in the aircraft that were the 
focus of the RAF. Men in trades closely associated with aircraft also were able to 
construct their masculinity in relation to production and cathexis. Aircraft mechanics 
and fitters were disparagingly called ‘grease monkeys’ by the flyers (and by those in 
lesser trades who were envious of their skill and prestige),
220
 but they were second 
only to air crew in the hierarchy. Their masculinity was constructed through their 
training, their work with aircraft, their technical skill and their mechanical 
knowledge.
221
 As will be highlighted in chapter three, men working on the aircraft 
also had to stoically endure long hours and harsh working conditions. Men further 
down the hierarchical scale could make fewer claims about their bravery, their skills, 
or the importance of their trade. In a similar way that male office clerks experienced 
a crisis in masculinity due to the influx of female clerks during the late Victorian 
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period,
222
 the ‘dilution’ of men’s trades by WAAF personnel undermined the status 
of previously all male trades.
223
 In the military, male traits are thought to include 
discipline, stoicism, rationality and lack of emotion, while the feminine other is 
undisciplined, emotional, and unreliable.
224
 However, disenfranchised from authority 
and feminised by doing ‘cissy jobs’ that were also undertaken by WAAFs,225 men at 
the bottom of the hierarchy could only rely on aggressive sexuality and ‘othering’ of 
women for their masculinity. In the parlance of the RAF, a woman could be referred 
to as a ‘bint, pig, piece of rope, bit, or old boot.’226 One airman admitted that 
throughout his service it was ‘not only acceptable but mandatory’ to boast about 
what were often fictitious sexual conquests.
227
 When male ground personnel at RAF 
Marston in Kent were asked by an observer for Mass-Observation what they missed 
most from peacetime, several replied ‘cunt’ and one replied he missed ‘fuck all’ but 
then added ‘tarts’ and laughed.228 It is likely that these blustering answers were given 
by younger men, who may or may not actually have been sexually active before (or 
during) their service in the RAF. Slightly less than half of those asked replied that 
they missed their home life and comforts, three mentioned their wives and family, 
and one a ‘fireplace and easy chair.’229 For older men, masculinity could be 
constructed around the responsibility for a family.
230
 Francis argues that for flyers, 
notions of love and male/female relationships were ‘informed by a popular late 
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romanticism’, by popular music, and especially by film.231 However, when films 
were shown on RAF stations, romantic scenes were met with whistles, cat-calls and 
sarcastic commentary.
232
 RAF audiences were ‘less tolerant and more demonstrative’ 
than civilian cinema audiences, they were critical of ‘mushiness’ overly sentimental 
scenes were ‘howled down.’233 At a subjective level, these love scenes may have 
shown the audience how to behave, but such public events were an opportunity for 
men to publicly perform and display their masculinity to their peers.  
Only the flyers were regularly called upon to risk their lives in the RAF, for 
others in the service, technical skill and stoicism provided alternative masculine 
performances to that of the military hero. People joined the services to fulfil their 
obligation to society, to win the war, and then return to civilian life. Despite this, it 
was understood that those that flew and risked their lives gave more to society than 
those who remained at home or on the ground. ‘There was always the suggestion, 
albeit implicit, that those men without their pilot’s wings could be doing more.’234 
Representing hegemonic masculinity, pilots and air crew remained at the top of the 
hierarchy of the RAF. 
Throughout the war, the importance of the home was emphasised and 
‘women were reminded that their primary roles were as mothers and wives.’235 Those 
who joined the auxiliary services were regarded with suspicion. Even propaganda 
supposed to assuage fears about women in the WAAF reinforced patriarchal 
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assumptions and gender stereotypes.
236
 It was accepted that women’s roles in the 
military were for the duration only; after the war it was assumed that they would 
return to their more traditional roles as wives and mothers.
237
 Women in the services 
could not be active combatants. As Rose argues, it was only acceptable for women to 
be in a position of danger if ‘like children, they were victims.’238 Women were still 
often considered by society in the terms of the virgin or the whore.
239
 Purity and 
passivity were positive feminine attributes while negative female traits included 
‘disobedience and sensuality.’240 Images of WAAFs in popular culture conformed to 
one of these stereotypes. (See FIG 1.3 and 1.4.) David Wright’s ‘Lovelies’ first 
appeared in the The Sketch, in 1941 and became popular additions to barrack room 
walls.
241
 Although the title of the pin up poster suggests that the woman is changing 
her attire, it is not clear whether she has just taken her uniform off or if she is just 
about to put it on. Maintaining eye contact with the viewer, Wright’s WAAF is 
seductive and sexually confident. In some ways she resembles the highly sexualised, 
predatory femme fatale in government posters that warned the public to ‘keep mum 
she’s not so dumb.’242  
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FIG 1.3. David Wright ‘Off with the old on with the new’ The Sketch 30 April 1941. T. Parker, 
Sirens: The Pin-Up Art of David Wright, (London, Titan Books, 2013), p. 21. 
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FIG 1.4. J. Foss, ‘Serve in the WAAF with the men who fly’ Imperial War Museum Art.IWM PST 
3096 (1941). 
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In contrast, in Figure 1.4, the WAAF Foss presents embodies the virtuous 
ideal. She and the pilot may work together, but their relationship appears purely 
professional. They are not making eye contact, but are both looking towards a shared 
‘abstract goal’.243 The image of the WAAF was superimposed on the existing image 
of the pilot which may suggest the lack of permanence of her role. As Penny 
Summerfield discusses, the WAAF in the photograph Foss selected for this poster 
‘exuded considerable feminine charm,’244 but, rather than being sexually threatening, 
by association she shares the heroic and saintly symbolism of the pilot. The RAF 
roundel behind the pilot’s head was deliberately placed where a halo would be in a 
traditional painting,
 245
 and I would also suggest that the stylised clouds may also be 
taken for angelic wings or the RAF brevet.  
WAAF recruitment advertisements and propaganda enticed young women to 
imagine themselves patriotically playing an important part in the war effort, 
supporting the flyers. In 1941, a recruitment leaflet used a similar image. It depicted 
a WAAF standing in front of a Blenheim bomber below the words ‘Join the 
W.A.A.F.- help the R.A.F.’ It continued: 
The days have passed when women could only wait anxiously for the success 
of our forces… [the WAAF’s] object is to replace airmen by airwomen in 
certain ground appointments and trades. Day by day the magnificent deeds of 
the R.A.F. thrill our hearts. Will you join the W.A.A.F. and work with the 
R.A.F. to help win the war?
246
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The leaflet went on to detail many of the trades that were open to women aged 
between 17 ½ and 43 and their rates of pay.
247
 Another recruitment leaflet appealed 
to women’s patriotism while also conforming to the paradigm of women’s 
subordinate status: ‘You are enrolled to replace airmen on ground occupations, and 
anywhere where airmen are working you may be needed. Do not fail them!’248 Rose 
argues that such recruitment materials intended to reassure people that traditional 
gender roles would be preserved.
249
 However, some targeted advertisements certainly 
alluded to the possibility of social change. An advert in Health and Beauty magazine 
stressed that the women’s services gave an ‘equal chance for… every woman [and] 
any woman and the sky’s the limit!’250 Mentioning the suffragettes, the 
advertisement also hinted at gender equality. For some the presence of women 
working alongside men in the forces threatened disturbing social change.
251
 Women 
were performing the same tasks as men for less pay while attempting to maintain an 
acceptable face of femininity.
252
  
In popular literature, WAAFs were marginalised and their skills were 
frequently downplayed. For example, a WAAF driver was ‘unskilled’ and ‘crunched 
the gears’ of the vehicle she was driving,253 while a WAAF corporal was 
condescendingly described as being:  
nothing to look at, although her complexion was good. A little bit of a thing, 
she had rather fine, mousey hair combed back into an unpretentious bun, a 
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small mouth and tightish lips, and a slightly tilted nose. Her eyes were the 
noticeable feature, behind a forbidding pair of spectacles.
254
  
WAAFs were often objectified and described using diminutive adjectives. It is open 
to interpretation whether her small stature has the effect of increasing the reader’s 
appreciation of her stoicism or whether it empowers the male, but the narrative voice 
also hints at the character’s hidden sexual potential while at the same time 
‘forbidding’ it. Female characters in popular wartime films and novels were 
frequently two dimensional stereotypes, whose roles were the romantic love interest 
for the heroic male characters.
255
 They conform to the expectation that women in the 
auxiliary services would become ‘officer’s ground sheets’.256 In the early days of the 
war the press painted the picture of women’s auxiliary services as either ‘the worst 
kind of domestic service administered by uniformed amazons’ or ran stories about 
servicewomen’s lack of morals.257 Public concerns about the morality of the 
women’s’ auxiliary service were sufficient to persuade the government to take 
action. The 58 page ‘Markham Report’ was the result of a committee of enquiry into 
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the conditions in women’s services and the ‘accusations about drink and 
immorality.’258  
WAAF discipline was different to that of men. The Air Force Act was ruled 
not to apply to women. Therefore officers lacked the authority to punish women 
other than by confining them to base, and this was perceived to be especially 
problematic after conscription swelled the size of the WAAF and the numbers of 
‘black sheep’ increased.259 Within the RAF, from the upper echelons to the lowest 
Erk, male personnel also saw WAAFs as belonging to the ‘virgin or whore’ 
stereotypes. Air Chief Marshall Joubert de la Ferte, an Inspector General to the RAF 
in 1943, was of the opinion that the vast majority of the WAAF were ‘gallant, 
hardworking and responsible’, but that amongst the ‘decent women’ were 
approximately one in ten women who were ‘Borstal girls, trollops and thieves’. 
Among them illegitimate pregnancy, ‘desertion and other major crimes were 
common’.260 Asked questions about male attitudes to women in the forces, AC2 G. 
W. Kelly, a Mass-Observation correspondent answered: ‘the men feel the women 
members of the auxiliary service are either spinsters or prospective old maids “last 
stands” or “hot mamas” out for a good time.’261 Within the service WAAFs were 
regarded as sexual objects. Describing an attempt to form a concert party to put on a 
stage show, D. G. Barnes writes: 
I had collected six really attractive WAAFs- with something of a stage 
presence, and such legs that the boys wouldn’t give a damn whether they 
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sang or danced or stood there and knitted, so long as they stayed there long 
enough.
262
 
Although the women are objectified by a largely male audience, for the women who 
took part, concert parties may have provided some women the opportunity to feel 
feminine and to wear glamorous civilian clothes rather than uniform. Rose argues 
that because women in the services were performing what had previously been 
thought of as male roles and were unable to express themselves through fashion, the 
female body was sexualised.
263
 There was a concern that if women looked too 
masculine in uniform they would ‘emasculate the men… and defeminise 
themselves’, while an overtly feminine appearance suggested ‘sexual impropriety.’264 
Femininity was expressed by minor infringements to the dress code, details of hair 
and makeup and subtle individual alterations to uniform.
265
 WAAF issue knickers 
were known as ‘blackouts’, ‘passion killers’ or ‘finger nippers’.266 Women preferred 
to maintain their individuality and feminine identity by a ‘lavish use’ of makeup,267 
and by wearing civilian underwear under their uniforms.
268
 However, Rose argues 
that ‘if taken too far, sexualised femininity might become “libidinal femininity” - the 
“other” to good citizenship’.269 Sexually promiscuous women could not also be good 
citizens.
270
 Despite this image of servicewomen, the pregnancy rate for civilians from 
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the same age groups was higher than for WAAFs throughout the war.
271
 Pregnant 
WAAFs were discharged from the service, but no more than 1.5 per cent were 
discharged each year, and only around one in twenty of those were unmarried.
272
 
After informing their commanding officer they had got a girl ‘into trouble’, men 
were quickly posted away with no further repercussions.
273
 For WAAFs, promiscuity 
was punishable in other ways too. Many WAAFs entered into relationships with air 
crew members and were broken hearted when they failed to return from operations. 
However, it was not seen as an unlucky coincidence when a woman was unfortunate 
enough to have lost several successive boyfriends. Rumours would spread that any 
air crew who associated with her would be for the ‘chop’ and the woman would be 
labelled a ‘chop girl.’274 It was thought to be bad luck even to accept a drink from 
such a pariah and often the WAAF would be posted to a non-operational station.
275
 
Conclusion 
The culture of the RAF influenced, and was influenced by, wider society. Like the 
wider civilian society, the Air Force can be regarded as a patriarchal hegemony. In 
popular culture the glamour of air crew was prioritised, male ground personnel were 
regularly disregarded and WAAFs were often constructed as sexual objects. When 
ground personnel were visible they were frequently figures of fun; Erks, WAAFs and 
West Indian personnel were all described using diminutive adjectives and language. 
Several discourses framed the cultural construction of the identity of ground 
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personnel. These included discourses of race, class and gender, but also medical 
theories, and beliefs about heroic behaviour and the popular concept of stoicism and 
the ‘stiff upper lip’. Heroism and stoicism was constructed in such a way that while 
air crew could be regarded as heroes, ground personnel could only stoically accept 
their misfortunes.  
Examining gender within the culture of the RAF, it has been shown that the 
model of separate spheres cannot be applied but that Higonnet and Higonnet’s 
double helix model, while problematic, fits better than Stone suggests. However, as 
Stone proposed, in the hierarchy of the RAF, the trades that ground personnel were 
assigned to were more important than their gender. The RAF had a distinct 
hierarchical structure with the air crew firmly placed at the top, but rather than being 
based entirely on patriarchy and gender, it was constructed partly by particular 
trades’ perceived importance to the war effort and especially its proximity to air crew 
and aircraft. Regardless of gender, the further removed a trade was from aircraft and 
air crew, the raison d'être of the Air Force, the less prestigious it was. For men and 
women at the lower reaches of this hierarchy constructing individual identity was 
problematic. Unable to frame their masculine identity in terms of heroic deeds, some 
male ground personnel saw themselves in relation to the feminine other; they 
objectified women and attempted to persuade each other of their sexual prowess as 
Lotharios or Casanovas. Others conformed more to the masculine stereotype of the 
homely male. WAAFs had to negotiate their feminine identity as ‘dilutees’ in a 
masculine environment. This process began during RAF and WAAF recruitment and 
training as the next chapter will discuss. 
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2 
RECRUITMENT, SELECTION AND TRAINING 
  
God, this is awful. Hesitating for two hours up and down a filthy street, lips 
and hands and knees tremulously out of control, my heart pounding in fear of 
that little door through which I must go to join up.
1
  
This chapter concentrates on the experiences of those who joined the RAF and 
WAAF during the war. The experience of RAF recruits trained during the pre-war 
period is eloquently documented by T. E. Lawrence in The Mint.
2
 Pre-war entrants 
and ‘Trenchard’s brats’ of the aircraft apprentice scheme, provided the force with an 
important backbone of experienced professionals who helped train the far larger 
numbers of recruits and conscripts who joined for the duration of the war. In the six 
years of war the RAF grew from what has been likened to ‘a private flying club’,3 to 
a force that was capable of performing a wide range of tactical and strategic roles. In 
September 1939, Bomber Command consisted of 33 operational squadrons based at 
13 stations; it could field an average of only 280 aircraft and crews.
4
 Shortly before 
the end of war in Europe, Bomber Command’s order of battle included 94 
operational squadrons at 69 stations, and a daily average of over 1600 bombers were 
                                                 
1
 T. E. Lawrence, The Mint, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1978), 35. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 ‘Reminiscences by former members of Bomber Command gathered in research for the writing of 
The Hardest Victory’, (W. E. Wilkinson), RAFMH, AC96/5. 
4
 RAF War room Summaries, daily strength returns September 1939, TNA, AIR 22/1. This included 
the Advanced Striking Force then in France, and in 1939 many aircraft were types that were already 
considered obsolete. 
93 
 
serviceable and could be crewed-up.
5
 The foundations for the expansion of the RAF 
were laid down in the 1930s. Expansion schemes were drawn up between 1933 and 
1938 but were only completed after several years of the war.
6
 As well as recruiting 
and training personnel, the schemes saw the building of new airfields, and the 
expansion and modernisation of existing stations. Between 1940 and 1942, over 300 
sites for new airfields had been acquired by the Air Ministry.
7
 It was also during the 
interwar period that the design of the twin engine Hampden, Whitley and 
Wellington, and the heavier, four engine Halifax and Stirling bombers were 
commissioned.
8
  
All air crew personnel were volunteers, but a combination of volunteers and 
conscripts served as ground personnel. The RAF was forced to recruit and train large 
numbers of personnel very quickly, and training was divided into a brief period of 
initial training, common to all recruits, followed by weeks or months of trade 
training. In order to assign recruits to a trade as efficiently as possible, a system of 
psychological testing was developed. As will be discussed below, tests which 
quantified intelligence were established, and experiments were carried out in an 
attempt to discern individuals’ predisposition to neurosis and psychosis. This chapter 
will discuss experiences during initial training including their accommodation, 
inspections, medicals, drill, lectures and tests. Recruits were under social pressure to 
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accept military discipline and practices. Training was intense and consequently left a 
lasting impression on recruits. As well as examining their motives for joining the 
RAF or WAAF, this chapter will examine the emotional responses of recruits to 
events they shared and how they renegotiated their identity to conform to service life. 
The historiography on the expansion of the RAF and Bomber Command 
often focuses on political decisions and the materiel rather than personnel required. 
The training of personnel was divided into Flying Training Command and Technical 
Training Command in May 1940,
9
 and by 1943 there were more flying training 
establishments than operational squadrons in Bomber Command. As well as their 
complement of experienced instructors, each aircraft had to be maintained and 
serviced, and each unit needed ancillary personnel.
10
 John Terraine acknowledges 
that the skilled fitters and mechanics essential to the RAF did not ‘sprout from the 
bushes’, but he then discusses the training of air crew.11 The majority of pilots, 
navigators and bomb-aimers were trained in Canada and the dominions, and there is 
a comprehensive historiography of flying training and the British Commonwealth 
Air Training Plan.
12
 Dating from the war itself, other studies examine the 
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psychological profiling and selection of air crew candidates.
13
 Little work has been 
done on the recruitment and training of ground personnel however.  
Between 1940 and 1942, the total numbers of RAF and WAAF personnel 
serving in the home commands more than doubled from 370,000 to over 800,000. 
The total number of RAF and WAAF recruits in 5 years of war was 1,201,106.
14
 By 
far the largest majority of these personnel served on the ground. The increase in 
personnel was achieved by a massive expansion of the recruiting programme. 
Bomber Command was the largest operational command, expanding from around 
15,000 personnel in 1939, to over 225,000 men and women at its largest in the 
summer of 1944.
15
 By the middle of 1943 however, there was a shortage of skilled 
technicians, especially aircraft fitters, and, as Richard Overy points out, the 
expansion of the Bomber Command was restricted by the need for ‘specialized 
ground personnel’.16 Technical Training Command was responsible for the supply of 
trained personnel to the front line units. With over 180,000 staff, instructors, 
ancillary staff and trainee personnel, it was the largest command between 1941 and 
1943. In September 1941, more than 130,000 other ranks ground personnel were 
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undergoing training,
17
 and by the end of the year over 600,000 men and 60,000 
women had been ‘attested’ by the Central Trade Test Board (CTTB).18 
Initial training and trade training were standardised. With the exception of a 
few roles such as balloon trades, specific trade training was common to all 
commands. Once qualified, personnel were posted as individuals, and it was 
common to serve in several commands. It varied during the war, but male recruits 
initially spent up to five days at a reception centre (such as Cardington in 
Bedfordshire) where they were enrolled and issued with uniforms, and between four 
and eight weeks basic training and drill at a training camp (often at seaside resorts, 
such as Skegness or Scarborough), before undergoing a more specific trade training 
at another establishment. Similarly, from 1941, women were sent to the receiving 
centre at Innsworth in Gloucestershire before being sent to Morecambe for their 
initial training. After 1943, Wilmslow in Cheshire became the only WAAF training 
centre.
19
 WAAF initial training lasted an average of three weeks.
20
  
Recruitment and Conscription: Volunteers and the National Service Act 
In 1939, it was declared by the government that, apart from those in reserved 
occupations, all men between the ages of 18 and 41 may be required to serve in the 
military. The first intake was of men aged between 20 and 23. National service 
conscripts were called up to a recruiting unit where they were medically graded. If 
they expressed a preference for the RAF they were interviewed by an RAF officer. If 
they were found to be unsuitable for the RAF they were consequently called up for 
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an interview by the Army.
21
 Volunteers were interviewed at a recruitment centre and 
either enlisted or signed up for deferred service. Men joined the RAFVR for the 
duration of the ‘present emergency.’22 They would be accepted providing they met 
the age requirement for the trade, had relevant civilian experience, were not a 
reservist for the Army or Navy, were adequately fit and they were either not in a 
reserved occupation or had dispensation from the Ministry of Labour.
23
 The lower 
limit of the age requirement was 18; the upper limit varied from 38 to 50 depending 
on the trade applied for. Eventually the upper age limit was removed, provided the 
candidate met the medical requirements for a particular trade.
24
 To join as an 
aircrafthand, recruits had to be aged between 18 and 38 and of at least grade two 
fitness; no special qualifications were required.
25
 Conscription of women was not 
introduced until December 1941, but the Air Ministry advertised the WAAF and the 
trades open to women in the press, women’s magazines, parades and even loud 
speaker vans.
26
 As part of a recruiting drive in July 1940, WAAFs from RAF 
Coltishall in Norfolk interrupted the programme at a cinema in Haymarket. In an 
attempt to persuade young women to volunteer they gave a display, handed out 
leaflets and talked to members of the public.
27
 The success of these campaigns can be 
measured by the fact that during the war more than 183,000 women served in the 
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WAAF as volunteers while less than 34,000 were conscripted in the two years 
following the 1941 National Service Act. (See FIG. 2.1.)  
 
FIG. 2.1. ‘Recruiting for the Royal Air Force During the War Period 3rd September 1939 to 2nd 
September 1944’ pp. 8, 13, TNA, AIR 20/8992. 
 
The National Service Act of 1941 made the conscription of almost all single women 
aged between 20 and 30 compulsory, and in December 1941 it was announced that 
the first draft of women would be those born in 1920-1921. As a consequence, in 
December 1941, WAAF recruiting offices were ‘inundated’ with applications from 
volunteers. Over 7000 application forms were received in one week.
28
 Influenced by 
advertising and the glamour of the Air Force, women volunteered for the WAAF to 
avoid being conscripted for service in less appealing roles.
29
 In May 1943, the 
Ministry of Labour closed the WAAF to further entrants,
30
 but by then 182,000 
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women were in the WAAF. Growing from a force of less than 2000, by the end of 
the war over a quarter of a million women had served in the WAAF.
31
 Perhaps in 
part due to its extensive advertising, for many women service in the WAAF was 
more attractive than the other services, the ‘land army’ or industrial work. 
The benefits of service in the WAAF were frequently mentioned in 
advertisements and propaganda. These included ‘free medical and dental treatment, 
free clothing, food and accommodation, as well as two free railway warrants per year 
when proceeding on leave – not to mention the free entertainments, cinemas sport, 
etc.’32 Rates of pay and family benefits were also stressed. Women joined the WAAF 
for a number of reasons. After conscription was announced, one WAAF discerned a 
rush of ‘reluctant females dashing to join the WAAF in preference to entering 
munitions factories’.33 Many highlight the particular appeal of the WAAF uniform as 
a ‘key factor’.34 Gwen Arnold had wanted to be a WREN (the women’s branch of the 
Royal Navy), but when she volunteered she was told there were only vacancies in the 
WAAF and the ATS. She decided on the WAAF because RAF blue was ‘more 
flattering than khaki.’35 Other factors were important too however. Interviewed for 
Mass-Observation in 1940, a 25 year old woman from a working class family in 
London did think the WAAF uniform was more appealing than the ATS, but the 
service did not pay as well as a bus conductor.
36
 Joan Rice joined for four reasons: to 
do her bit, to get away from home and gain her independence, for the adventure, and 
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to ‘swank around in a uniform.’37 Motives were both personal and patriotic. It was 
not a decision to be taken lightly however. The appeal of a uniform had to be 
weighed against remaining at home and contributing to the war effort by working in 
industry. In a letter to a friend in October 1942, Miss P. Wilmott aged twenty, wrote: 
‘P.S. I’ve sent my papers in too – But I’m terribly scared – I haven’t yet told my 
people because I can’t bear the thought of upsetting them too soon.’38 She was called 
for her medical in January 1943, but was still undecided which service she would 
join. She was called up to report to RAF Innsworth in March 1943.
39
 Before the war, 
young men from working-class backgrounds joined the RAF as after leaving school 
it seemed to be a better prospect than ‘a suffocatingly boring job’ or 
unemployment.
40
 Fred Hitchcock remained in the service from a ‘combination of self 
and national interest’.41 West Indian recruitment adverts stressed importance of trade 
training and future peacetime employment prospects rather than duty and loyalty.
42
 
Jamaican E. Martin Noble joined the RAF for patriotic reasons,
43
 but the Guyanese 
born Cy Grant admitted he joined the RAF as air crew for the adventure and to 
escape a dull future in a British colony.
44
 Ted Sadler joined the RAF in 1941 hoping 
to become a flight mechanic. He joined the RAF to avoid the Army ‘bullshit’ which 
he thought was below his intelligence.
45
 It was the appeal of flying and the modernity 
of the service that persuaded many men to join the RAF. Many men joined in the 
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hope they would fly Spitfires; the government, the media, and the Air Ministry drew 
heavily upon the appeal of the fighter pilot in propaganda and advertisements for the 
RAF. Although he volunteered to fly, Noble was employed as a clerk, perhaps 
because of his colour, but also because he did not reach England until late in the war 
when the attrition of air crew was at least matched by the numbers of graduates from 
the overseas training schemes.
46
 Regardless of their final trade, many recruits shared 
similar experiences at recruitment and initial training centres.  
Recruitment and Initial Training Centres 
The majority of primary sources, whether contemporary letters, diaries and Mass-
Observation reports, or memoirs and oral history interviews mediated by the passing 
of time, appear formulaic when studied in quantity. They tend to vary only in degrees 
of eloquence; the same episodes occur repeatedly and follow a similar chronology. 
These events and experiences are especially emphasised in sources concerning 
WAAFs. Contemporary narratives may have been influenced by wartime propaganda 
and recruitment material explaining what to expect on arrival in receiving centres 
and later narratives may be influenced by official and public histories, including 
other published memoirs, but it is clear that for many there was a shared experience.  
The huts looked GRIM, but at least the bed (one of about 20) is a niche I can 
call my own… Every bed has a weird hairy mattress which is divided into 
three, each piece is called a biscuit, and during the day they are piled neatly 
on top of each other, with our three hairy blankets and two coarse sheets on 
top – leaving the bare springs showing. The corporal in charge shrieks at us if 
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they are piled half an inch out of line. We each have a pillow which looks like 
a sausage and feels like concrete.
47
  
The majority of WAAF recruits recalled the iron bed frames and mattress made from 
three separate ‘biscuits’ and the pot bellied stoves in the huts.48 Other descriptions of 
the first weeks in the service often highlight queuing to be issued with ill-fitting 
uniforms, the unfamiliarity of drill and discipline, the indignity of collective medical 
inspections and inoculations and the problems of communal living. Many sources tell 
of the shame of an unfortunate girl who was discovered to have head lice, and for 
women the loss of individuality enforced by a lack of privacy and the WAAF 
uniform was hard to come to terms with. Homesickness, humour and the importance 
of forming friendships are also frequently stressed. Reacting to the changing needs of 
the service and the events of the war, the RAF improvised and constantly altered the 
structure of its recruitment and training programmes. The main variations were the 
location and duration of their reception and training. Of necessity the size and 
location of recruitment and training centres and the length of the courses they ran 
was fluid during the war.
49
 Individuals’ experiences were similar because to a great 
extent all recruits were treated the same by the RAF and WAAF. Recruits had to be 
given their uniforms and kit, they had to be medically examined, inoculated and 
given instruction in drill. The economies of scale dictated how and where they could 
be accommodated and trained.  
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The emotional experience for recruits, whether conscripts or volunteers began 
at the recruiting centre. As she entered a room at the London recruiting office, Diana 
Lindo ‘felt like a prize animal at a show,’50 and when Nina Chessall was told by 
letter to report to Gloucester, she felt the same apprehension she did at the start of an 
air raid.
51
 Told to report to Hendon after volunteering in 1939, Joan Rice had ‘the 
same sick and “wish I hadn’t done it” feeling in my tummy that was there on going 
back to the convent (boarding school) evenings’52 and a middle aged man joining as 
an intelligence officer originally felt as insecure as he had been when he first went to 
public school.
53
 Reporting in London for the transport to the reception centre in 
Harrogate, Muriel Gane-Pushman remembered: 
the collection of apprehensive females in the corner, of which I would soon 
be one, appeared awkward and in the way. They looked pretty wretched, and 
I wondered how many were having second thoughts. I banished my own, 
with a bracing talk from my “inner friend”, and imaginary companion I had 
created for comfort when I first went away to school. The gist of our 
unilateral conversation was to pull myself together, that everyone else was in 
the same boat, and for heaven’s sake to stop snivelling.54  
The metaphor of public school was useful for those who had already spent time away 
from home. Such people often went on to become officers, but many recruits lacked 
any comparable experience and were totally unprepared for what they found. Joining 
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aged twenty, Gwen Arnold had seldom spent nights away from home.
55
 In April 
1941, Air Marshall William Welsh, then the head of Technical Training Command, 
acknowledged the physical and emotional effect of what was then an intensive two 
week course for WAAF recruits. He admitted that:  
Many of these women came from homes they have never left before; they 
find themselves in a strange and possibly “hard” atmosphere with communial 
[sic] living and feeding and a number of them are naturally homesick at 
first.
56
  
On her first night in the WAAF at Innsworth, Gwen Arnold found herself sharing a 
hut with: 
forty-eight oddly assorted strangers… Not only the ‘long and the short and 
the tall’ we had the ‘posh and the common’, the ‘tearful and the giggly’, the ‘I 
feel sick’, the chatterboxes’, the ‘know it alls’, and the ‘where are the men?57  
Joan Rice immediately clashed with one of the other girls who ‘smelled’ and was 
‘loud, man-mad and crude’.58 One WAAF found living with 29 other girls from all 
over the empire surprisingly easy although her first days at Innsworth were ‘hell’ as 
they ‘were herded’ from one place to another and perpetually kept ‘waiting and 
hanging around.’59 Innsworth was a receiving centre only; at its peak it processed 
and kitted out 2,700 women a week who were then sent to places such as Morecambe 
for training.
60
 Seaside resorts were chosen as training centres because there was 
plentiful accommodation in the form of hotels, holiday camps and guest houses, and 
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their transport links, amenities and services could cope with large numbers involved. 
During the fastest expansion of the service, accommodation for over 40,000 
personnel had to be found.
61
 The accommodation at Morecambe was in billets in 
small hotels and guest houses and it was felt that women who had just started to get 
used to communal living and the force’s discipline at reception centres were 
disrupted by the change.
62
 The Markham report into the conditions in the women’s 
services was greatly concerned with the varying quality of billets, their comfort, the 
standard of their food and their toilet and bathroom facilities.
63
 Its authors 
recommended that reception centres and basic training should be combined and that 
communal hutted accommodation was preferable to billets.
64
 From 1943 onwards, 
when numbers allowed, WAAF recruits’ reception and initial training was combined 
at Wilmslow. Hutted accommodation was easier to supervise and maintain standards. 
One WAAF liked billets at Morecambe because although she had to share the house 
with 11 other women she had access to a bathroom and a dressing table.
65
 In contrast, 
a landlady at Blackpool would let her tenants boil a kettle to make a hot drink in the 
evening, but not for their hot water bottles.
66
 Mona Clowes felt the private billets she 
stayed in at Blackpool were ‘poor’ and did not provide enough food.67 Together with 
the personalities of their fellow roommates, the quality of the accommodation had an 
important effect on how new recruits perceived service life. Gwen Arnold believed 
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that the kindness of landladies and comfortable billets helped to overcome the 
homesickness that many had felt on first joining the service.
68
 
Majorie Bevan-Jones was fortunate enough to undergo her training along 
with an old friend,
69
 however others felt Gloucester was ‘cold dark and miserable.’ 
Sheila Orrell felt homesick and heard ‘muffled cries under the old grey blankets from 
other new recruits.’70 Writing for Mass-Observation, Richard Picton admitted he felt 
miserable because he was parted from his girlfriend. He lost contact with most of his 
friends and was ‘thrust in with a mob of unsympathetic people.’71 Recruits were not 
allowed to give their address during the first week of their service and subsequently 
could not receive any letters.
72
 As soon as she was posted to Morecambe, Gwen 
Arnold was quick to send a note home and consequently was one of the first recruits 
to receive a ‘much needed letter from home’.73 Getting a letter from home could 
make the postal delivery the best part of the day.
74
 Of course, contact from home 
could also make people feel worse. Gwen Arnold’s family did not have a telephone, 
but she recalls watching girls queuing to use a telephone box. She could read the lips 
of the girls as they said ‘hello mum’ and then wasted part of their three minutes by 
crying.
75
 Kathleen Brassington was upset because her mother cried as she waved her 
off on the train to Gloucester.
76
 In the book, Kiss the Girls Goodbye Jenny 
Nicholson, a WAAF public relations officer, attempted to downplay melancholic 
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letters home. The book’s gentle propaganda explained what women could expect in 
the forces and attempted to convince readers that many wrote ‘unhappy letters home’ 
to discover how much they were missed by their family rather than because they 
were genuinely unhappy. Parents of new recruits were informed that their daughters 
expected cheerful letters from home telling them about family life and ‘local gossip’ 
and that overly sympathetic letters led to outbursts of emotion.
77
 Recruits were given 
a lecture on ‘How to be Happy in the WAAF’78, and told ‘if you can stand the first 
fortnight in the WAAF you will enjoy it.’79 For both men and women, the first few 
days in the RAF was bewildering and, like the services in general, consisted of 
periods of frantic activity interspersed by long periods of waiting and queuing.  
Symbolically the change from civilian to service life was established by the 
force’s discipline and drill, but also by the lack of contact from the outside world and 
by the issue of uniforms. There was little time to keep in touch with the outside 
world through the media, and during their first week in service, although recruits 
were interested to hear news about the RAF, as they made the transition from civilian 
to servicemen their interest in the news ‘progressively declined’.80 A Mass-
Observation correspondent felt that many men in the NAAFI would have liked to 
listen to Lord Haw Haw on the radio ‘but bowed to the social pressure… [of] the 
loud opinion expressed by the few.’81 In common with T. E. Lawrence’s experiences 
in the inter-war RAF, recruits had to submit to the omnipotent military authority of a 
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total institution, as defined by Erving Goffman.
82
 However, the pressure to conform 
came from the recruits themselves as well as from the authority of the RAF. In one 
hut a confident ‘top drawer girl’ who ‘undressed right down to the altogether’ when 
she changed clothes was clapped and given ‘cat calls. From then on she too learnt to 
dress in such a fashion so as not to bare her all.’83 In common with First World War 
conscripts, the military was a ‘bureaucratic maze’ to be passively endured.84 Recruits 
were informed by propaganda and by their instructors how important it was for them 
to conform to authority and practices in each establishment they found themselves.
85
 
Richard Picton quickly realised the RAF wanted ‘absolute uniformity’ and strongly 
felt he was caught up in a ‘machine’.86 Once confident in their own abilities as 
civilians, but now daunted by the intricacies of saluting, WAAFs began to feel 
‘terrified of meeting an officer’.87 Picton realised he eventually lost some of his 
ability to act without orders,
88
 but for some the conformity of the service was a 
positive experience. The absence of responsibilities appealed to Joan Rice. She liked 
the security of service life and ‘not having to worry about clothes and food and 
money’.89 On joining up as an intelligence officer 41 year old Derek Barnes found 
himself ‘suddenly freed from responsibility.’90 At training establishments recruits 
lives were ‘constricted by endless and infuriating petty restrictions and… Bullshit.’91 
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A trainee reported to Mass-Observation that he had overheard a man say: ‘My one 
ambition from now on is to be an ex serviceman.’92 While the RAF broke the spirit 
of some, the force’s discipline also had the effect of creating cohesion among the 
recruits, even if, as David Morgan argues, such solidarity was sometimes counter 
hegemonic and constructed in opposition to the official ethos of the service.
93
 By the 
end of their first evening, recruits at a Canadian reception centre were already 
becoming ‘united against It and Them’: the RAF ‘system’ and the NCOs.94 As Ilana 
Bet-El highlighted in her study of conscripts in the previous war, even by the end of 
their basic training, many conscripts still saw themselves as civilians in uniform 
rather than military personnel.
95
 Trainees quickly learned to play the system. Told to 
polish a floor in a secluded room, WAAF Barbara Mills ‘looked busy’ when 
someone was nearby, but did not really do any work.
96
 A Mass-Observation reporter 
overheard another recruit declaring:  
when I just joined… I was like some helpless thing grabbing at anything and 
anybody who did not look as if he would bite my head off; shaken by every 
grim jibe & pessimistic tale. But now I have passed all that… I have grown 
my hide.
97
  
Similar sentiment was expressed by others Picton observed. Successful recruits 
endured the ‘bullshit’ and grew their ‘hide.’ In the WAAF, Joan Rice learnt to accept 
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unpleasantries ‘without regret or protest.’ She attempted to stop herself from 
‘indulging in memories’, take ‘each unpleasant day as it comes’ and focus on the 
positive that she was doing something positive that contributed to the war effort.
 98
 
Others were able to resist authority in their own small way. Armourer Ian C----s 
recalled a man who annoyed the instructors by giving ‘Tarzan calls’ over the noise of 
the workshop. It was a ‘puerile school boy’s jape, but scoring over authority in a 
training camp was always satisfying.’99  
Being thrown together with people from different backgrounds was a 
bewildering experience for many. Patricia Lockitt remembered:  
it was a shock to have to share a room with so many other people… I didn’t 
realise what a sheltered existence I’d had… I didn’t really appreciate what a 
prostitute was until I had one in the bed next to me… in the other bed was 
someone… who’d never had to do anything for herself. It was a great shock 
to her.
100
 
Cliques formed in some huts, as, even after the issue of uniforms, women could not 
disguise their class or ‘caste’.101 Friendships formed and split as people fell out or 
helped each other and shared their skills and knowledge,
102
 but all felt pressure to 
conform to what was expected by the majority and what was dictated to them by 
tradition and the example of the corporal in charge of their hut. Pip Beck quickly lost 
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her ‘snooty’ attitude towards RAF slang and was soon ‘speaking the language 
fluently.’103  
Richard Picton disliked ‘the absence of privacy in the sleeping 
accommodation’,104 but for Fred Hitchcock, the key to successful service life was for 
recruits to lose their inhibitions and enjoy the ‘bawdy, cryptic or black humour’. 
Farting and masturbation were typical sources of comedy and conversation; Hitchock 
once told the man in the next bed to either stop his bed from rattling or ‘join Wankers 
Anonymous’.105 In huts and billets, much of the conversation was on ‘shop’ but there 
was also often ‘intimate talk, generally dealing with sexual matters, adventures with 
women, constipation etc.’106 Male recruits bragged that on an evening’s leave in 
Blackpool they were going looking for ‘crumpet’.107 Men were able to display and 
perform their masculine identity and stoic indifference to the vicissitudes of service 
life. For older men being able to play a part in the war in uniform as part of the 
armed services was important.
108
 
At Cardington recruits were in ‘complete isolation from [the] outside 
world’.109 For many, the first contact recruits made with home was when they sent 
their civilian clothes home in a brown paper parcel. It was also an act that created a 
distance between themselves and their previous lives.
110
 Training was problematic 
for some because the constraints of the service, the uniform and loss of freedom 
caused them to question their identity. Majorie Bevan-Jones felt: ‘I’m no longer 
ME… I am a cog in a wheel with lots of other cogs. We are all feeling rather 
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gloomy; we don’t want to be Cogs all the time.’111 Another WAAF found the lack of 
privacy one the hardest things to cope with: 
we were locked into a system where we were numbers and did as we were 
told: our human likes, dislikes, fads, or even temperaments were not a matter 
for consideration. Furthermore, we were always together. Ever since 
childhood, I had loved to tuck myself away in my room for moments of 
necessary isolation. In that first day, I was to discover that solitude was an 
almost unattainable paradise, and those rare moments when it beckoned were 
to be cherished.
112
  
In joining the service, recruits sacrificed their liberty and had to renegotiate their 
identity and self image. Their service number was one of the first things that recruits 
were given by the Air Force and most sources make a point of its importance; 
although many only served for a few years before being demobbed, even decades 
afterwards it is a described as unforgettable. Even though it was imposed on them by 
the military, each individual’s service number became a symbol of their 
individuality. Most importantly their service number enabled them to be paid, which 
in turn gave them an opportunity to regain some autonomy on leave and evenings 
off. Together with their uniform it became the first part of their new identity.  
The change into uniform and the ‘consequent loss of identity’ led to an 
increase in recruits’ perception ‘of unity and solidarity.’113 Once in uniform, however 
ill fitting it was at first, recruits felt part of the armed services. After sending her 
‘civvies’ home, one WAAF felt ‘now all I have left that is ME are my nighties and 
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undies.’114 After uniforms were issued, people Picton had begun to recognise 
‘disappeared’.115 Badly fitting clothes were common; as a source of humour they 
were one of a number of shared experiences that began to bring the recruits 
together.
116
 The uniform was of special importance to women in the WAAF as it 
strongly symbolised the change in their identity and for some conflicted with their 
feminine self image. Patricia Lockitt was prepared to go into uniform and ‘knew 
what it looked like anyway’ but like most women, she was ‘not impressed with the 
‘blackouts’ (navy blue knee length knickers), or the ‘dreadful’ pink brassieres.117 
Another WAAF was unaware that the uniform would be ‘from the skin out.’118 They 
soon found that the issue bra ‘would only produce two flat bulky blobs under a 
manly shirt.’119 By retaining their own underwear women could preserve some of 
their femininity and individualism, but regulations dictated how they could wear 
their hair and makeup. Some girls had trouble tying their ties and with the uniform 
collars and studs. They also found it strange to wear ‘clothes which fastened from 
left to right rather than the usual ladies way.’120 WAAFs trained in some trades were 
issued with trousers or overalls and were pleased with their more practical and 
masculine appearance. Posted to Hednesford for their trade training as a flight 
mechanics, WAAFs were ‘proud’ to be issued with trousers as they denoted a 
technical trade.
121
 The appearance of their uniform also signified their status in the 
forces. The casual attire of the archetypal fighter pilot who could wear their top 
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button undone was the desired ideal. As part of the newest and most technical 
service, unlike the traditions of the Army or Navy, oil stained and well worn 
uniforms denoted competence and time served seniority. Consequently it was 
important for new recruits to quickly lose the appearance of new issue uniforms. 
With time the blue of their uniforms faded, their footwear was broken in and, after 
hours of polishing, uniform buttons and badges began to lose their sharply defined 
edges. Recruits wanted to be taken for old hands or at least look less ‘sproggy.’122 
WAAFs spent time pressing pleats into the straight skirt,
123
 and altering the length of 
their coats.
124
 Both male and female recruits tried to make their hats look fashionably 
worn. Eileen Smith learnt the trick of wetting her hat and pressing it flat, bending the 
peak and filling the sharp edges of the cap badge with a nail file to make it look 
older.
125
 A WAAF tried to get worn looking ‘tapes’ to sew on her uniform when she 
was promoted so she would look like she had more seniority,
126
 and another WAAF 
ensured she retained her old badges and buttons when exchanging worn out clothing 
to ensure that she looked like she had ‘got some in’ rather than appearing as a new 
recruit.
127
 Stone argues that, rather than attempting to retain their femininity, WAAFs 
altered their uniforms in order to conform to military identity. Their uniforms 
symbolised competence and belonging, while the impression of long service faded 
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buttons and a battered hat gave, were also concessions to their vanity and 
individuality.
128
 
Initial Training 
For WAAFs, initial training was mainly disciplinary and was aimed at getting 
recruits used to communal life. Until the end of 1941, the training lasted for two 
weeks. This was later increased to four weeks, but in 1942, when numbers of new 
recruits grew again, it was reduced to three weeks. It was three weeks for much of 
the war from then on. Recruits were given their kit and a medical, both of which 
were time consuming, and they were told of their rights and duties. A typical training 
programme in 1941 consisted of 14 hours of organisation and administration 
(including four lectures on hygiene), 15 hours of anti-gas and station-defence 
instruction and exercises, 6 hours of physical training and 12 hours of drill.
129
 The 
tedious job of marking up all their kit took place in their own time,
130
 as did 
polishing boots and buttons, and cleaning the huts. In 1940, at the Reception Centre 
at West Kirby, male recruits underwent four and later five weeks training. Their 42 
hour week was carefully timetabled. (See FIG. 2.2.) It can be seen that a great 
emphasis was placed on drill, physical fitness and infantry skills. Drill, organised 
games and physical training were supposed to instil discipline and fighting spirit, and 
turn civilians into military personnel as quickly as possible.
131
 The regime was 
intense and physically draining. Despite being a vet used to the Yorkshire dales, Alf 
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Wight (James Herriot) was not as fit as he thought he was and struggled with 
physical training (PT).
132
 
 Week 1 (42 
hours) 
Week 2 (42 
hours) 
Week 3 (42 
hours) 
Week 4 (42 
hours) 
Week 5 
(28hours) 
Drill 16 18 8 11 9 
Physical Training 6 6 6 6 4 
Musketry - 3 15 13 7 
Lectures on service 
subjects 
5 4 - - 2 
Anti Gas 5 3 - - - 
Fitting and 
cleaning 
1 - - - 1 
Medical officer’s 
lecture 
1 1 - - - 
Inoculations 6 - - - - 
Inspections 1 2 2 3 2 
Cinema - 1 - -  
Padre’s lecture - 1 - - - 
Organised Games - 2 3 3 - 
Pay parade 1 - 1 - 1 
Bayonet Fighting  - 1 5 5 2 
Fire fighting - - 2 - - 
 
FIG. 2.2. Initial Training at West Kirby September 1940. No.5 Recruit Centre, West Kirby (1940-
1948), September 1940. Appendix A, TNA, AIR 29/501. 
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Arthur Batten remembered that some of the PT exercises were painful even though 
he was fit and hardened by labouring in previous occupation.
133
 Musketry (target 
practice with rifles and other firearms), was a great concern in 1940 because of the 
threat of invasion and the expected need for airmen to defend airfields. Infantry skills 
were thought to be even more important after the German invasion of Crete in 1941, 
because of the perceived vulnerability of RAF airfields to an attack by parachute 
troops. Airmen were expected to be able to handle weapons and have some 
knowledge of infantry fighting as ‘backers up’ even after the creation of the RAF 
regiment in 1942. However, as the threat of invasion diminished as the war 
continued, fewer hours were spent on rifle practice. By joining the RAF rather than 
the Army, men like Ted Sadler had hoped to avoid the ‘square bashing’ and the ‘spit 
and polish’ of the Army.134 The RAF they imagined was a modern force and they 
had not joined to practice bayonet fighting and to stand guard duty, but to work with 
aircraft. At the training centre at West Kirby in Merseyside an appendix to the ORB 
shows that someone was trying to either lighten the mood of recruits or cultivate 
their aggression towards the enemy. (See FIG. 2.3.) The caricatures by AC2 
Plummer depict Mussolini, Himmler, Hitler, Hess and Goering, and are not typical. 
Recruits usually had to attack shapeless, faceless sacks during bayonet practice. The 
photograph also shows the quality of the brick built huts in a purpose built permanent 
training camp. These huts were luxurious in comparison to the tented 
accommodation some had to endure. The hours of drill also had a mixed reception 
from amongst new recruits. Once they were proficient and they had broken in their 
shoes, many WAAFs enjoyed marching along the seafront of seaside towns and were 
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proud of their appearance. Pat Lockitt thought the male drill sergeants were rude but 
‘never insulting’ and noted that there was ‘very little swearing in front of the 
girls’,135 but many male recruits had a different experience. For RAF recruits there 
was ‘loads of bullshit’.136 
  
FIG. 2.3. RAF Recruit Centres, (1940-1948). Recruit Centre, West Kirby, Appendix B, TNA, AIR 
29/501. 
 
Trained before the war, Fred Hitchcock felt he was constantly singled out during drill 
for not swinging his arms high enough and marching like a ‘handcuffed hunchback’; 
after trying hard on one occasion he felt like a ‘wanked out windmill.’137 Little 
changed after war was declared; Ronald Hall thought that the ‘bull’ and ‘square-
bashing’ was ‘rigorous and unnecessary’,138 and Ted Sadler ‘objected’ to it.139 
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Whether on the parade ground or ‘foot slogging’ on the promenade in Blackpool,140 
the drill instructors often became a human face for all that was disliked about the 
RAF by new recruits. Wartime propaganda accepted this and tried to explain that it 
was not their fault. 
Accompanied by an unflattering cartoon of their ‘apoplectic drill instructor’ 
in Raff’s Behind the Spitfires, the character of a new recruit explains to his audience 
that:  
We do not like this man, but then, he doesn’t like us. There is nothing 
personal in it, he explained once in bitter tones; but whereas when we have 
had a month of it we shall move to perhaps a different occupation he will stay 
on and start all over again with another set of just as “dim sprogs”.141 
A ‘sprog’ was the RAF’s equivalent to the Army’s ‘rookie’.142 Many who progressed 
from their initial training to perform quite technical roles during their time in the 
RAF remember the NCO instructors as unnecessarily insensitive, unimaginative and 
‘moronic’.143 At Cardington a musician and motor transport driver thought there was 
‘too much bull’ and that the instructors had ‘too much power’ and were often ‘of low 
intelligence’. 144 When it came to asserting their authority, the instructors were not 
without a sense of humour however. On the first day at a training course at 
Cardington a sergeant was heard to confront an airman and ask: ‘What kind of 
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moustache is that? Grow a full one by morning.’145 As well as drill, other parts of the 
training programme had a profound effect on recruits.  
Health and Hygiene: ‘FFI’s, Lectures and Inoculations 
The Free from Infection Inspection was known by the acronym FFI, and by some 
WAAFs as the ‘find flea examination’.146 Canadian recruits came to know the 
medical inspection as the ‘short- arm inspection’ after the force’s euphemism for the 
penis.
147
 The inspection was intended to find recruits with visible signs of illness or 
infection. Sometimes thousands of recruits had to be processed as quickly as possible 
so a mass examination technique was employed. In church halls and aircraft hangars 
personnel were paraded, told to strip, and were examined by a medical officer.
148
 
Robert Collins remembers: 
You lined up with your fellows by the score… and held your private parts at 
the ready. As you rounded in front of the medical officer… you presented 
your penis… the MO checked for chancre, discharge, rash, or other evidence 
of… disease.149  
FFIs were also part of routine; all personnel were supposed to have one when they 
reported to a new posting. As well as head lice infestations and sexually transmitted 
diseases, the FFI sometimes picked up problems such as sebaceous cysts and 
hernias.
150
 The FFI was one of the first things that the RAF subjected recruits to. For 
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many baring their all in front of hundreds of strangers was quite traumatic. Robert 
Collins found it ‘shocking and humiliating’.151 However, men quickly became 
‘blasé’ about the inspection, exposing themselves to the medical officer ‘like 
practised flashers’152 and WAAFS gradually showed ‘less and less modesty’.153 For 
some unfortunate women the most humiliating thing that could happen during their 
FFI was the discovery of head lice. Studies found that during the war a quarter of the 
civilian population of comparable age groups were infested with head lice. In the 
services this was reduced to two per cent. The incidence in new recruits was found to 
be higher in ‘certain reception centres’,154 and it was believed that head lice thrived 
in women who had tried to keep their ‘dearly bought’ perm ‘undisturbed’.155 The 
official treatment was with the insecticide,
156
 however, a girl with hair so long she 
could sit on it had her head shaved when the FFI found head lice,
157
 and Gwen 
Arnold remembers witnessing a ‘poor girl sobbing her heart out, so great was the 
shame of the discovery.’158 Those who had been found to be infected were isolated 
from the rest of the group. They made excuses and blamed pillows or railway 
carriage headrests, while the remainder of the girls were provided with a topic of 
conversation and gossip that began to draw them together.  
Inoculations and the lecture on sexual health and hygiene provided further 
shared experience for new recruits and are frequent topics in the sources. As Claire 
Langhamer has highlighted, men were warned about the dangers of venereal disease, 
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while women were exhorted to avoid sexual intercourse because of the stigma of 
unwanted pregnancy.
159
 The medical officer’s sex education lectures were usually 
accompanied by a description of the perils of sexually transmitted diseases. Male 
recruits were dissuaded from consorting with prostitutes by being shown pictures of 
the symptoms of syphilis and gonorrhoea.
160
 Angus Rob remembers that ‘some of the 
slides were quite horrific’161 Prostitutes were thought to be the main source of 
infection, and while the ‘gruesome’ lecture was probably effective at dissuading 
some young men from ‘going with… loose ladies’,162 married women and virginal 
WAAFs were thought of as safer sexual partners. WAAFs were taught less about 
diseases, but there was an emphasis on the risk of pregnancy; they were discouraged 
from having sex outside marriage. Despite a Ministry of Information campaign about 
the risks of VD,
163
 some WAAFs admitted they had no knowledge of some 
diseases,
164
 and found the lecture on sex both embarrassing and enlightening. One 
WAAF remembered ‘we all shuffled out of the cinema with pink cheeks and furtive 
looks at each other.’165 However, another WAAF thought that the sex lectures had 
little effect on some women. She reported to Mass-Observation that ‘if a girl wants to 
do wrong, she’ll do it… and blow the regulations.’166 The war caused dislocations 
across society, and there were similarities between civilian and the military 
experiences. In civilian life, young girls moved away from home to work in factories 
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and live in hostels; as Angus Calder highlights, this led to ‘increasing enlightenment 
in sexual matters’.167 Courtship rituals changed; the war offered young men and 
women pay and periods of leave, it gave them the experience of long distance travel 
and the opportunities provided by the blackout, and freedom from parental 
supervision.
168
 As Sonya Rose argues, for young single women, celibacy was 
regarded as a part of ‘good citizenship,169 while ‘libidinal femininity’ was 
constructed as an unpatriotic ‘internal other’.170 The RAF sexual education lectures 
effectively reinforced national hegemonic patriarchy.  
Recruits were given an anti-tetanus injection and an inoculation that gave flu-
like symptoms. ‘Some men fainted immediately before or after’.171 All were given a 
day of light duty afterwards and those with an adverse reaction were admitted to sick 
quarters. Diana Lindo felt fine immediately afterwards but the following morning she 
‘couldn’t have got up for the King himself.’ She felt nauseous, her head and body 
ached and her arm ‘had swelled up like a balloon’.172 The jab made their eyes smart 
and it was several days before the dull ache in their arms abated.
173
 Richard Picton 
reported he felt depressed after his inoculations.
174A WAAF felt ‘so terribly fed up’ 
and ‘groggy’ she longed to be back at home.’175 For an unfortunate few, who were 
badly affected by the combination of homesickness and a bad reaction to their 
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vaccinations, the first week of their initial training was an unpleasant ordeal. In an 
official publication officers were reminded: 
It is not surprising that this violent interruption of the normal ways of life 
should have produced many personal problems and created many anxieties. 
Moreover, the very change from civil to military life with its novel 
conditions and unfamiliar restrictions demand a conscious effort of adaption. 
For many men the process will be difficult and for some painful.
176 
 
It was expected that this transition would be more difficult and painful for women. 
With typical patriarchal condescension, in Girls You Amaze Me, a wartime book 
intended to publicise the role women played in the auxiliary services, Vernon Noble 
wrote:  
To bring a girl into line with Service requirements and keep her there is a 
tribute to anybody who can manage it; and having got her into that co-
operative frame of mind and then maintain her mental as well as physical 
happiness strikes me as being a bit of a miracle.
177
  
At first ‘wastage’- the numbers of girls who left the WAAF during or shortly after 
their training - was considerable. In May 1940, over a quarter of recruits left the 
service, while in some domestic trades the wastage was almost half. In the early days 
of the WAAF this was seen as ‘an effective selection process.’178 Failures were seen 
as weak, and propaganda gave the credit for success of the WAAF training 
programme to the service and its instructors rather than emphasise the successful 
recruit’s flexibility and stoicism. However, it was understood that the RAF and the 
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Navy got the ‘first pick of the recruits’.179 Given the supposed quality of the materiel 
a high proportion of wastage was unacceptable. One cause of the problem was 
thought to be misemployment; recruits were being placed in trades they were 
unsuitable for. Although there was a wide range of trades, recruits were frequently 
offered only a limited choice depending on the needs of the RAF at the time. There 
were often vacancies for cooks, clerks, nursing orderlies and MT drivers.
180
 In the 
parlance of the time, square pegs were forced into round holes, and it was officially 
recognised that recruits often had little ‘interest or aptitude’ for the trades they were 
assigned to.
181
 It was admitted that errors were unavoidable, but medical boards 
attempted to categorise recruits’ ‘physical, constitutional and psychological’ 
fitness.
182
 Psychometric tests were introduced to the RAF in 1940 to assist in the 
selection of air crew, and the following year, in an attempt to assign recruits more 
efficiently, a series of ground trade selection tests were introduced.
183
  
‘GVK’ tests and Psychological Profiling  
As yet there has been no comprehensive study of the selection process of RAF 
ground personnel. Mark Wells and Allan English have briefly considered the 
psychological selection of RAF air crew,
184
 while Ben Shephard and Nafsika 
Thalassis have examined the development of the selection procedure in the British 
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Army.
185
 At the start of the war, air crew selection was based on a medical and an 
interview to discern the ‘essential characteristic’ of a likely candidate, evident 
through their intelligence and education.
186
 At first, ability was linked to heredity and 
‘Social Darwinism’,187 but psychophysical tests of reflexes and coordination were 
introduced by 1942.
188
 The screening of recruits in all services was thought to be 
necessary because of the numbers of neurotics discharged in the first years of the 
war,
189
 and intelligence tests were seen as the most practical method of establishing 
who was likely to breakdown and who would make the best candidates for different 
trades.
190
 Mathew Thomson highlights the understanding of the difference between 
shell shock and mental deficiency that developed in the inter-war period;
191
 the 
unintelligent were thought to be more ‘likely to contract disease, suffer a nervous 
breakdown and commit military offences.’192 To facilitate trade selection in the 
Army, mathematics and mechanical comprehension tests together with written and 
verbal tests were used from 1943 onwards.
193
 Recruits were graded in ‘progressive 
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matrices.’ Apart from the top and bottom 10 per cent, each group represented 20 per 
cent of the population,
194
 and a similar system was developed in the RAF for ground 
personnel. As Thalassis argues, intelligence tests ‘favoured the better educated and… 
served to biologise the perceived superiority of the upper classes.’195 While 
maintaining the hierarchical class and social divisions within the services, such tests 
also legitimised the role of military psychologists. In the RAF, psychiatrists also 
attempted to develop screening processes for both air crew and ground personnel to 
reduce the numbers discharged from the service.  
The psychological profiling of RAF recruits was discussed in a meeting at the 
Air Ministry in July 1941.
196
 Following the advice of the Oxford psychologist, Dr. 
William Stephenson, a three-month trial of the effectiveness of psychometric tests on 
recruits was carried out at reception centres.
197
 Stephenson acted as a personnel 
advisor to the Central Trade Test Board until 1943, and established a battery of three 
tests for the trade selection of ground personnel known as the GVK tests. The tests 
were adopted, and after training CTTB personnel to administer them, they became 
standard in the six main recruiting centres in January 1942.
198
 The combination of 
scores from the separate intelligence tests gave an indication of ‘general ability’ and 
whether recruits were more suited to practical or theoretical work.
 199
 The tests were 
strictly timed ‘group paper and pencil tests’, and included both written and verbal 
                                                 
194
 Ibid., pp. 108-109. 
195
 Thalassis, ‘The Uses of Intelligence Testing, p. 20. Thalassis, ‘Treating and preventing trauma’, p. 
110. 
196
 Directorate, WAAF: Air Ministry, Appendices, (1941-1942), Meeting to discuss Psychological tests 
5 July 1941 at Adastral House, TNA, AIR 24/1645. 
197
 Ibid. Cardington and Blackpool were chosen for the men and Gloucester and Bridgnorth for 
WAAFs. 
198
 Operation Record Book: Central Trade Test Board, West Drayton, 12 January 1942, TNA, AIR 
29/710. 
199
 Vernon and Parry, Personnel Selection, p. 70. 
128 
 
instructions.
200
 They were run by specially trained administration staff; large 
numbers could be tested at once and the three tests took around an hour to 
complete.
201
 G tests measured ‘general analytical intelligence’, V ‘verbal 
intelligence’ and K ‘practical mindedness’.202 In Ministry of Information propaganda 
aimed at an American audience it was explained that:  
When you join up in either service you are put under the psychological 
microscope by specially trained airwomen. The tests are rapidly paying a 100 
per cent dividend. There are three main tests – G. V. and K. The G. test 
records the ‘patient’s’ capacity for detail, facts and general intelligence. The 
V. test shows quickness of uptake, a gift for learning parrot-wise and for 
verbal agility. The K. test is mechanical and highly practical in application.
203
  
General knowledge questions included the age of the King or the name of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. Verbal tests had questions such as ‘What is the 
opposite of “moist”?’204 In the 1990s, one WAAF remembered a ‘simple maths’ 
section, a ‘general knowledge quiz’ and likened the K test to television’s ‘Krypton 
factor’ test with shapes to fit into a pattern.205 In the general intelligence tests, male 
and females scored equally, women were more successful at the verbal intelligence 
tests, but men did better at the practical K test.
206
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GVK tests were used to choose which trade recruits went in to. The tests were 
checked for effectiveness and accuracy by sampling recruits’ progress through their 
trade training and defining the average acceptable average success rate of personnel 
at different trades with varying GVK scores.
207
 Each test was scored out of a 
hundred. For example, to become a Grade 2 electrician, a candidate had to achieve 
GVK scores higher than 60, 50, and 65 respectively. Scores below 40, 30, and 40 
indicated that they would not make successful electricians.
208
 A ground gunner 
would fail his training only with a score below 10, 15, and 5.
209
 Recruits could be 
found fit for trade training, fit for unskilled service as aircrafthands, or rejected. 
Those with ‘anomalous’ scores or who scored 15 or less were seen by a psychiatrist, 
and the recruitment centre’s officers and NCOs were also encouraged to refer 
personnel who complained of illness, exhibited unusual behaviour, or seemed to have 
an ‘intellectual defect’ to be interviewed by the specialist.210 Such interviews lasted 
around twenty minutes. In her interview with a psychiatrist, Marjorie Bevan-Jones 
did not want to admit her true motives for joining the WAAF. Although she gave a 
ridiculous answer, she was accepted into the service and went on to become an 
officer. She must have been thought to have ‘the right temperament.’211 Recruits who 
the specialist thought to be ‘unlikely to make good as airmen or airwomen’ were 
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discharged from the service.
212
 At Penarth 7 per cent of the men seen were rejected, 
while at Gloucester 16 per cent of WAAF recruits were rejected.
213
 However, the 
GVK tests were intended to help trade selection rather than to reject unsuitable 
recruits.  
In 1942, 36 per cent of RAF and 49 per cent of WAAF invalided from the 
service were on psychiatric grounds,
214
 and it was hoped that it should be possible to 
‘weed out the obviously undesirable recruit at the onset, rather than waste time, 
trouble and money on … an obviously hopeless recruit’.215 The psychiatrist Eric 
Jewesbury complained that the medical inspection during the recruitment process 
could be inefficient. He quoted examples of airmen who had been invalided from the 
RAF but who passed medicals and were allowed to re-enlist months later. Including 
cases of affective disorders, anxiety, hysteria and epilepsy, these airmen were soon 
referred to RAF specialists and invalided once again.
216
 Like the WAAF above, 
recruits would tell the recruiting officer and medical officer one thing in order to be 
accepted for the RAF and the complete opposite if they later desired to leave the 
service.
217
 A neuropsychiatric specialist highlighted that ‘completed questionnaires 
made by entrants to certain branches of the RAF bear little relation to histories 
obtained after breakdown.’218 At Bridgnorth 5 per cent were referred to the 
psychiatrist and 2 per cent were rejected, while at Gloucester 13.6 were referred to 
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the specialist and 5 per cent were rejected.
219
 The practice at different recruitment 
centres varied, and at some establishments the opinions of the neuropsychiatric 
specialist was ignored or overruled. Many regarded as unfit for ‘any form of service’ 
were accepted into the RAF and WAAF.
220
 Examining recruitment centres, the 
consultant psychiatrist, Group Captain, Robert Gillespie found that CTTB officers 
overruled the recommendations of the neuropsychiatric specialists and trade trained 
some personnel the specialist considered were only fit for unskilled work. At 
Penarth, twenty cases considered only suitable for unskilled occupations were trained 
as ‘Batman, Gunner, Driver M.T., Cook and Butcher and Concretor [sic].’221 
Psychiatrist G. L. James complained a ‘difficult enrolling officer’ would not reject 
anyone, and gave examples: 
C.T.T.B. advised 14 days ago that this girl was psychopathic… Four days 
later … on a charge, awarded 3 days C.C for thieving. Three days ago in 
close arrest for wholesale thieving, also trimming the edge of a groundsheet. 
Further she needed a clothes line, so promptly cut the tapes of gas capes, tied 
tapes together – a clothes line. Exasperated administrative people refer to me! 
For discharge.
222
  
A follow up of cases thought by a psychiatrist to be ‘unfit for any form of Air Force 
Service, but accepted by the Executive’ showed that within a year 79 per cent were 
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giving ‘unsatisfactory service’ or had been discharged.223 In 1942, Gillespie 
attempted to improve the psychological profiling with the aid of a questionnaire 
which he envisaged would be given to all recruits in addition to the GVK tests.  
In an attempt to prevent personnel predisposed to neurosis being accepted as 
air crew, Gillespie had previously developed a ‘predisposition score’ which gave a 
point for ‘adverse factors’ in the patient’s history.224 During an interview with the 
candidate, adverse constitutional and social factors such as nail biting, fainting at the 
sight of blood, or ‘timidity’ were noted by the psychiatrist and awarded points.225 
Five points or more on the scale ‘meant the probability of ultimate breakdown’.226 
Reviewing Gillespie’s report, Charles Symonds, the RAF consultant neurologist, saw 
the main advantage of such a system was that it gave ‘a numerical rating’ to a 
qualitative study, but that it was time consuming and could not replace an 
examination by a specialist.
227
 Gillespie’s ideas were tested further, but throughout 
the war the RAF continued to rely on physical tests and general knowledge and 
mathematic exams to assess the temperament and capabilities of potential air crew.
228
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After being asked to visit and report on recruitment centres,
229
 Gillespie 
devised a questionnaire to be given to ground personnel in an attempt to predict 
which personnel would fail to complete their trade training, or give unsatisfactory 
service.
230
 The written paper took less than half an hour to complete and was given to 
recruits together with the GVK tests. One version consisted of twelve questions 
including: ‘Have you ever suffered from “nerves” or had a “nervous breakdown”?’231 
The questionnaire was intended to highlight recruits who should then be interviewed 
by the recruiting centre’s neuropsychiatric specialist. Small scale trials of the 
questionnaire were held, and more recruits were rejected by this system than by the 
GVK tests alone.
232
 Gillespie’s experiments continued with 1000 subjects, but the 
RAF continued to rely on the GVK tests for the remainder of the war.
233
 Harold 
Whittingham, the Director General Medical Services, concluded that Gillespie’s 
questionnaire was too time consuming and did not reject many more than the practice 
of psychiatric interviews following GVK test results.
234
 Wells discusses Gillespie’s 
work with both air crew and ground personnel, but fails to recognise the continuity in 
his work.
235
 However, Gillespie’s interviews with air crew, and his ground personnel 
questionnaire (and a later suggestion that air crew candidates should be given his 
questionnaire) were all logical progressions of his study of predisposition to break 
down. 
In common with other studies of the recruitment of air crew and Army 
personnel, there were conflicts of interests about the selection of ground personnel 
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within the RAF and the Air Ministry, and between psychologists and psychiatrists, 
over which methods of testing should be used. Both psychologists and psychiatrists 
hoped to use their methods to identify and reject unsuitable recruits, but also to 
consolidate their profession’s standing in military medicine. At the same time, 
Whittingham was under pressure from the Ministry of Labour to ‘accept the halt, the 
maimed, and the blind… and men and women of dull intelligence’.236 Even as late as 
1944, it was felt that there was a need to recruit grade three personnel to perform 
menial tasks because, due to a manpower shortage, skilled men were spending a 
large proportion of their time on unskilled work.
237
 Only the worst psychopaths, 
neurotics, schizophrenics and ‘homosexualists’ were to be excluded from the 
service.
238
  
Trade training  
The GVK tests divided recruits into several groups of ‘broad ability’.239 To 
accommodate the needs of the service there was still an amount of flexibility as to 
which trade recruits would be assigned to. The recruit’s own preference was of 
secondary importance but was considered if possible. Many individuals believed that 
their trade selection was decided by chance or in order to find the worst fit 
possible.
240
 The grading of personnel and their allocation to different trades began to 
create and enforce the hierarchy of trades within the RAF. The length of a trade 
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training course varied according to their perceived importance and how technical 
they were. 
Ted Sadler wanted to be an engine mechanic. He believes he was made to 
become an airframe mechanic because the first letter of his surname came in the 
second half of the alphabet.
241
 The Markham report highlighted that girls were often 
not trained in their chosen trade because they were either unsuitable or because there 
were no vacancies. It also meant that often their talents and experience were not 
always put to best use. The appeal of learning to drive meant that many girls who had 
secretarial skills and experience were being trained as MT drivers.
242
 A WAAF flight 
mechanic/ fitter originally turned down the trade of ‘clerk: special duty’ (plotter) 
because she did not understand what it was and she wanted to be more involved with 
aircraft.
243
 Another had promised her mother she would not become a driver as it 
would entail her being alone in a vehicle at night. She found that the only open trades 
for her intake in 1943 were MT driver, batwomen or radar operator.
244
 Not getting 
the trade they hoped for, either because it was unavailable, or because their GVK test 
results suggested they were unlikely to complete the training successfully, meant that 
some recruits began trade training with a negative attitude. By her second day at 
Gloucester, Nina Chessall felt ‘miserable’ at being told her chosen trade was 
closed.
245
  
Trade training ‘was carefully ‘phased’,246 and, in 1943 lasted between three to 
seven months.
247
 For WAAFs, trade training could last between one and six 
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months.
248
 Trainee flight mechanics were first taught how to handle tools and 
progressed to work on small ‘test pieces’ before taking a trade test.249 WAAFs being 
taught technical trades had to be taught the very basics down to the names and 
purpose of the tools.
250
 Ted Sadler’s technical training as an airframe mechanic 
lasted 16 weeks. He was taught ‘metal work, riveting, woodwork, sewing for repairs 
to fabric covered aircraft, and painting.’ He also learned about pneumatics and 
hydraulics, splicing, lighting systems, and the theory of flight.
251
 The training courses 
were both practical and academic. Ian C----s underwent his trade training to become 
an armourer at Melksham in Wiltshire. He thought his training ‘was thorough and at 
times like one’s school days, sitting at desks and making copious notes in issue 
exercise books.’252 At the top of the ground personnel hierarchy, trainee aircraft 
mechanics and fitters effectively had to create their workshop manuals in their own 
time after lectures and demonstrations. Indicating the level of pride technicians took 
in learning their trade, numerous copies of handwriten and handrawn notebooks 
containing intricate diagrams and meticuolous notes can be found in the archives of 
the RAF museum and the Imperial war Museum.  
Trade training met with a mixed response from recruits and varied across 
different trades. Trained in December 1939, fitter Ronald Hall found his trade 
training ‘comprehensive and to an excellent standard,’253 however, an armourer 
thought that much of his syllabus ‘was over-elaborate, and sometimes quite 
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erroneous’ and was not adequate preparation for working on operational stations.254 
Armourer Donald Aris found his trade training for both guns and bombs ‘adequate 
but hurried’ and was forced to pick up the practicalities of being an armourer on an 
operational station.
255
 Also at RAF Melksham, during the summer of 1941, John 
Sommerfield reported for Mass-Observation that his training on a bombing course 
was a:  
fearful bind, and extremely irritating. A great deal of what we have to learn is 
obsolete stuff, and much of the rest consists of having to memorise endless 
tables of bomb components that are a complete waste of time to learn… we 
aren’t learning to do a job at all, but to pass a test board. This seems pretty 
general in these training places, [the] result is that chaps who arrive 
enthusiastic to learn a new job, after a few weeks don’t give a fart in a 
colander for it and are only concerned with getting through with the 
minimum amount of trouble.
256
  
For all trades however, the final trade test was a daunting prospect. Those that 
passed became AC1s, AC2s or were promoted to LACs.
257
 The 18 girls on a training 
course at Cranwell were told that there were three outcomes, passing the course and 
being sent to an operational station, further training, or remustering to another trade.
 
They were fearful that they would suffer the ignominy of failure.
258
 One of Ted 
Sadler’s test pieces included ‘interior and exterior threading with taps and dies.’ 
After his 16 weeks he was examined by a senior NCO and was led to believe that if 
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he failed he would be posted to the Army.
259
 Test pieces had to be accurate to a 
tolerance of 2 thousanths of an inch.
260
 Trade tests represented the culmination of 
weeks of work and studying. Some recruits recorded or made light of their worries 
through humourous cartoons but it is clear that tests were daunting. (See FIG. 2.4. 
and 2.5) 
 
  
FIG.2.4. Cawner note book, ‘Trade Test Board’, RAFMH, X006 7041. 
 
Here the knock-kneed young recruit is visibly shaking as he is questioned by a panel 
of his ‘angelic’ older, knowledgeable and confident superiors. In figure 2.5, the 
recruit is physically dwarfed by the three officers standing over him. 
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FIG. 2.5. Goldsmith papers, ‘Standard Efficiency Tests’, RAFMH, X003.9925. 
 
He is sweating, and trembling while raising his right hand to his mouth; he is either 
worried or has caught his fingers in part of the mechanism of the gun which is in 
140 
 
pieces on the floor. The task of reassembling the gun is to be completed against the 
clock and the officer on the right is impatiently tapping his foot and holding a stop 
watch which is crying. The task is not helped by the fact that the wing commander on 
the left appears to be shouting at him while at the bottom right of the page a 
‘gremlin’ is nonchalantly making off with the crucial main spring. Almost everything 
that could go wrong has done so. 
Recruits had to learn to cope with the stress of trade tests and examinations 
as, even after their initial training was completed and newly qualified personnel left 
for their first postings, training was continuous throughout an individual’s service. 
Personnel could voluntarily remuster or be promoted, which entailed new training 
courses. For example, trade test papers for reclassification ACW1 to ACW2 or 
LACW as a clerk were three-hour written papers and were concerned with RAF 
bureaucracy and regulations. There was also a typing test and a voluntary shorthand 
test.
261
 Male personnel whose trades were diluted by the influx of WAAFs were 
retrained in other roles, while later in the war many WAAFs from Balloon Command 
were remustered and retrained when their roles also became unnecessary. As will be 
discussed further in the following chapters, within the RAF, an individual’s trade 
was part of their identity, and was partly constructed in opposition to the other. Many 
of those on a flight mechanic’s course at RAF Hednesford over the winter of 1942 
and spring of 1943 were WAAFs from Balloon Command being remustered. Others 
on the course ‘thought some of them were a bit rough’.262  Such WAAFs were also 
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‘pretty disgruntled with having to remuster... so were not receptive to any 
discipline.’263 
As well as personnel who were remustered, people who failed in one trade 
were retrained in other roles. Arthur Batten volunteered to be an air crew wireless 
operator and air gunner but he failed his initial Morse code aptitude test. Rather than 
being posted to an air gunnery school he was ‘washed out’ and posted to a ground 
gunnery course as part of the RAF regiment instead.
264
 Others were less lucky; the 
sick bay at Blackpool contained some men who were ‘morse happy’ from the strain 
of trying to learn morse code.
265
  
Their time at training establishments changed recruits both mentally and 
physically. Mervyn Base found the pre-war training at Cardington ‘strenuous’ but he 
put on weight and was fitter and wiser at the end of his twelve weeks there.
266
 From a 
more affluent background, James Herriot lost weight.
267
 Pat Lockitt thought that the 
food was ‘fairly good’ but ‘stodgy’ and she thought that most of the girls put on 
weight.
268
 In a letter to her friend, another WAAF thought that life in the service was 
a healthy combination of fresh air and good food. She expected she would ‘grow 
horribly fat’.269 The weeks and months of training forged strong friendships that were 
usually broken by the RAF policy of posting individuals rather than forming units as 
the Army did. When people that he knew were posted in different directions, Picton 
thought ‘Christ I’m browned off. I don’t suppose we shall see half of these blokes 
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again.’270 Most were very sad to be posted away from their friends, but it was an 
important lesson to be learned about the Air Force; friendships ‘could burn bright for 
six months, then flicker and die’ as personnel were posted to different units.271 One 
WAAF thought her training had not been as harsh as she had expected and with the 
exception of only a few days, she had been happy during her training.
272
 In common 
with many, looking at the faces of the crowds all smiling and waving at her passing 
out parade a WAAF ‘felt a lump rising in… [her] throat’.273 
Conclusion  
For recruits and conscripts it was during training that an understanding of the RAF 
hierarchy was established. GVK tests quantitatively scored recruits’ aptitude, and for 
those in technical trades, their training began to instil a sense of pride and belonging. 
Unskilled recruits ‘got some in’, and learnt how to cope with being in the RAF. 
Thousands of recruits shared common experiences as they progressed through the 
‘machine’ that was created by the RAF to fill vacancies in the rapidly expanding 
force. At their peak the RAF and the WAAF received thousands of new recruits each 
week, their reception and initial training was compressed into a few days and even 
the most technical trades were taught in the shortest time possible. The GVK tests 
were introduced to increase the efficiency of trade selection from 1942, but by then 
many had already been assigned their trades, and even after the tests became policy, 
the exigencies of the service meant that often the choice of trades was limited. Some 
felt they were in the wrong job, and others found that their trade training did little to 
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prepare them for working on operational stations. Specialists in the RAF medical 
services were very much aware that some people were incapable of performing 
adequately in the roles they had been assigned to. After the National Service Act, 
many thought the WAAF was preferable to other armed services, working on the 
land or in munitions factories. WAAFs joined from a sense of duty, for the 
adventure, and because of a romantic image of aircraft and flying. For some the 
alluring blue of the uniform was also a factor. They found that the ability to ‘swank’ 
around in a uniform came at a price however. Many were homesick; recruits were cut 
off from civilian life and under pressure to conform to military discipline. The RAF 
and WAAF appealed to many as it was perceived to be a modern technical force, 
specialist trades such as engine or airframe mechanic or fitter seemed preferable to 
becoming an army infantryman. Some recruits were dismayed to find that they could 
not avoid the ‘bullshit’ and hours of drill during their initial training. As well as the 
weight of the RAF authority conveyed to the recruits by their drill instructors and the 
corporals in charge of their huts, new recruits created their own social pressure to 
conform. The change into uniform and sending their civilian clothes back home was 
a symbolic event for many; outwardly at least the recruits had conformed to military 
service. Recruits had to negotiate their new self image themselves however. WAAFs 
could retain some of their femininity and individuality by keeping their own 
underwear. Their uniform and trade became an important part of their identity and it 
was important for them that they did not stand out as ‘sprogs’. Once in the service 
they accepted its language and fashion, investing their free time in making their 
uniforms look like they were time served. It was also during training that individuals’ 
pride in their trade and their place in the hierarchy of the service began to be formed. 
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Together, recruits survived the ordeals of FFI inspections, inoculations and drill. 
These ‘rites of passage’ helped to mould the new recruits into service personnel,274 
and they learned to accept hardships and disappointments and to grow their ‘hide.’ 
The final test of their strength of personality came at the end of their training when 
friendships were broken up by the forces policy of individual postings. This 
identification with the popular trope of a stoic ideal was to continue as recruits were 
posted to stations within Bomber Command and ‘got some in’. The next chapter will 
examine the experience of ground personnel on operational stations. 
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3 
LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS 
 
Life on a bomber station is made up of moments of feverish activity and 
breathless excitement, followed by suspense and, all too often, heartbreaks, 
interspersed with long periods of boredom – but especially boredom.1  
For many, in common with the other services in wartime, life on an operational base 
was one of monotony occasionally interrupted by panicked rushes of work or 
‘flaps.’2 The work of an engine mechanic ‘required little courage and was not 
particularly exciting – except at odd moments – although at times [it was] unpleasant 
and often tiring.’3 AC1 Frank Taylor complained in a letter to his parents that life in 
the Air Force was ‘a rather monotonous’ experience.4 This chapter will examine the 
living conditions, working conditions, and leisure activities of non flying personnel 
on operational bomber stations. Using examples, it will examine the roles of three 
groups of personnel: ground crew who worked directly with the aircraft and flyers; 
those (including some WAAFs) with limited contact with either aircraft or air crew; 
and finally those such as cooks, general duties clerks or airfield defence personnel 
who were furthest removed from flying and operations. Examples of the dangers 
ground personnel risked and the potentially traumatic events they witnessed will also 
be discussed. 
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FIG. 3.1. Plan of RAF Wickenby, a dispersed bomber station circa 1944, 626 Squadron Research 
Project, RAF Wickenby Memorial Collection (WMC). 
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Taking into account local topography, wartime dispersed sites such as Wickenby or 
Woodhall Spa in Lincolnshire were built to a similar design.
5
 (See FIG. 3.1.) A 
typical dispersed wartime bomber station, RAF Wickenby was built and opened in 
1942. Home to Wellingtons and later Lancasters from 12 squadron, it was expanded 
in 1943 when the dispersed sites to the south of the airfield were built to 
accommodate 626 squadron’s personnel. The plan of the station shows the wide 
dispersal of the living, accommodation and working sites, together with the circular 
‘pan stands’, the aircraft dispersal points. To give an idea of scale, the shortest 
runway was around three quarters of a mile long (1.2 km). From the main communal 
site to the furthest aircraft dispersals was around 1 ½ miles as the crow flies, and a 
much longer journey around the perimeter track. The bomb dump, built in a slight 
depression, was even further away. As can be seen, the station’s buildings were more 
numerous and occupied much more ground than the nearby villages of Holton cum 
Beckering and Rand. (The slightly larger village of Wickenby lies to the North West 
of the airfield.)
6
 Surrounded by a perimeter track which connected the aircraft 
dispersals, the three runways were the centre of the airfield. At points from the 
perimeter track were access lanes to the hangars, and the technical site, (with stores 
and offices). The communal site, (NAAFI, ablutions, kitchens and messes) and the 
domestic sites where personnel slept were outside the perimeter track. The petrol and 
bomb dumps were as far away as possible, often camouflaged by a wood. During the 
working day personnel could expect to walk or cycle miles between their living 
quarters, the ablutions (the facilities provided for washing), the mess, and the sites 
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where they worked. At Wickenby it is a twenty minute walk from the WAAF site to 
the technical site. When Don Charlwood dated a WAAF at Elsham Wolds in 
Lincolnshire, the round trip between the camp cinema, the ‘waafery’ (the WAAF 
quarters) and his own quarters was a five mile round trip.
7
 Travel of up to 30 miles a 
day between ‘sleeping, messing and working sites’ by bicycle was the norm on some 
dispersed sites.
8
 Bicycles also enabled people to escape from the airfield into the 
surrounding countryside, villages and towns.
9
 Pre-war permanent stations differed in 
that they were built to a better standard. They had better amenities and infrastructure 
and were less dispersed, but personnel still had to travel long distances between the 
communal areas and aircraft dispersals.
10
 RAF stations were in effect small towns or 
large villages themselves. A section of this chapter will examine the social lives of 
ground personnel on and off the station through the lens of Erving Goffman’s theory 
of closed sites. On each bomber station the Air Force provided eating, sleeping and 
washing facilities for over 2,000 male and female personnel of different ranks, some 
of whom worked unusual shift patterns. On most stations an effort was also made to 
provide facilities for recreation; a camp cinema, ‘the Astra’, was common on many 
stations as were Navy, Army and Air Forces Institute (NAAFI) canteens. The 
influences of scale and military authority dictated that, of necessity, personnel had to 
live and work communally, to share facilities, and conform to regulations. As an 
institution, the RAF had authority over the lives of personnel in almost all areas of 
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their life. However, as part of wider society, personnel came into contact with the 
civilian population in neighbouring villages and local towns. Surrounded by 
numerous stations from two Bomber Groups, Lincoln was the city in the centre of 
‘Bomber County.’  
Living Conditions  
As Bomber Command rapidly expanded, wartime stations were built quickly and on 
a restricted budget. The paucity of materials and the speed of construction meant that 
buildings were of poor quality, and that on many stations the facilities ‘were 
overtaxed’.11 Buildings were ‘austere’ and ‘purely functional’.12 At Wickenby, the 
majority of the buildings were prefabricated, either of concrete with corrugated roofs, 
or nissen huts. 
It was a half round corrugated iron hut with brick ends, each containing two 
windows and a door, while internally there was a concrete floor covered with 
brown linoleum. The walls were lined with matchboard and hooks were 
provided for hanging up clothes and equipment. A round coke stove with an 
iron chimney pipe was situated in the centre of the hut… A good roaring fire 
in the stove made the place comfortable enough in winter, but on the winter 
mornings long after the stove had died out, the damp advanced across the 
floors almost to the centre of the hut. The beds nearest the stove were the 
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warmest to be in, but had the disadvantage that people congregating around 
the stove always sat on them.
13
  
The shared accommodation made a lasting impression on its inhabitants and is 
frequently described in contemporary sources and later memoirs. The 
accommodation at Ludford Magna in Lincolnshire, described above, is a typical 
depiction of a nissen hut. The alternative prefabricated concrete, wooden or asbestos 
huts were little warmer in winter, and all could be oppressive in the summer. The 
cold and the ineffectiveness of the ubiquitous and temperamental cast iron stoves are 
also a common theme in many sources.
14
 The stoves often went out either due to 
their inefficiency or the lack of fuel. Combustible material was ‘begged, borrowed 
and scrounged’,15 while many have admitted to having gone on ‘commando raids’ to 
steal coke from the supply for the officers’ mess.16 During the winter, the cold in 
nissen huts ‘seemed to soak through the walls, up from the damp concrete floor, 
untouched by the small round iron stoves.’17 The RAF medical services noted a high 
incidence of upper respiratory tract infections, pneumonia, and pulmonary 
tuberculosis.
18
 For extra warmth it was common practice for airmen to put newspaper 
between their blankets and sleep under their groundsheets to protect their bedding 
from the condensation which dripped from the ceiling.
19
 Conditions were cramped 
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too; as Angus Calder notes, overcrowding was a common wartime experience for 
many, especially in industrial areas,
20
 and, within the RAF, the space allocated to 
each individual in the shared living accommodation decreased during the war. After 
December 1942, WAAF officers were allocated 96 square feet, senior NCOs 58 
square feet and airwomen only 38 square feet.
21
 Airmen originally were to have 45 
square feet, but by necessity this was reduced to 32 square feet per man.
22
 In their 
sleeping quarters airwomen had a bed (after 1943 often a bunk), ‘2 feet of shelving 
with two hooks, half a mat and a quarter of a folding chair.
23
 Airmen in wooden or 
brick built huts lived in similar conditions.  
Between the rafters are tied pieces of string from which a variety of clothing 
is hanging to dry, and by each bed are a couple of coat-hooks, a shelf, and a 
kit bag, these constituting each man’s own little world. On the wall above the 
beds are lurid pin-up girls, or a snap of “the wife and kids”. The atmosphere 
is thick and stuffy, the black-out frames not providing the best of ventilation, 
while the floor is littered with cigarette-ends, sweet wrappers and other 
rubbish.
24
  
Both men and women kept their limited possessions in ‘bomb boxes’ under the beds. 
The floor was swept each morning but, other than the day of the weekly inspection, 
when the huts were tidied and the floor polished, the huts were obviously lived in. 
The Markham Report into the welfare of service women concluded that they could 
expect to live in ‘Spartan decency’.25 The report was especially concerned with the 
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condition of the ablutions.
26
 In rare instances the WAAF facilities were connected to 
sleeping quarters by covered walkways. However, the men never had this luxury, and 
for both males and females, the paths to the ablutions could be waterlogged and 
muddy in inclement weather.
27
 The Air Ministry were aware of the effect this had on 
the hygiene of both male and female personnel, and were particularly concerned 
about the ‘impropriety’ of women having to walk outside ‘in a state of dishabille’.28 
To allow for adequate ventilation while also accommodating the blackout, ablutions 
were unlit on some stations; on some sites they could only be used during daylight 
hours.
29
 They were unheated and the concrete floor was covered only by wooden 
‘duck-boards.’ At times the ablutions were busy and crowded due to the limited 
availability of hot water,
30
 and in addition the wash houses never seemed to have had 
plugs. While Eileen Smith and others improvised by wrapping a hanky around a 
penny,
31
 many had their own plugs which they took with them as part of their wash 
kit. The ablutions at East Kirkby in Lincolnshire froze one winter,
32
 and walking or 
cycling between sites in the in all weathers also had a demoralising effect on 
personnel. 
The airmen and airwomen’s messes were another area of asserted 
institutional authority. RAF practice was to have separate messes for officers, 
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sergeants and airmen.
33
 Combined messing facilities for male and female personnel 
of the same rank were formally introduced in 1943.
34
 With allowances made for 
those working shifts, weekly menus could consist of bacon and tomato with bread 
and marmalade for breakfast, roast or boiled meat served with potatoes and cabbage 
followed by chocolate blancmange for dinner, sausage and mash and bread, butter 
and jam for tea, and macaroni cheese or soup for supper, when cocoa, Horlicks, 
Ovaltine or hot milk would also be available.
35
 Some messes could seat hundreds at a 
time, and after eating, leftovers had to be scraped into a pigswill bin, plates were 
stacked and personnel rinsed their own mug and ‘eating irons’ in a tub of hopefully 
hot water before shaking them dry.
36
 
It was an offence to leave too much food,
37
 and the mess was sometimes a 
site of resistance. In the NCO’s mess at Bexwell in Norfolk, the men complained to 
the orderly officer that the food was so bad a dog wouldn’t eat it. This was tested 
with a station dog, and indeed the armourer’s mascot turned its nose up. Unknown to 
the officer the food had been laced with paraffin and the food quickly improved.
38
 As 
well as resistance to authority, the messes were also sometimes the site of conflict 
between the hierarchical groups within the RAF. When one WAAF complained to an 
officer about the food she was ‘sent to Coventry’ by the corporal who served the 
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meals, and she went hungry for several days.
39
 Generally however, RAF personnel 
tended to eat better than civilians, their diet was carefully balanced and, although it 
was a rare occurrence worthy of writing home about, sometimes even the lower 
ranks were given real eggs.
40
 Those who had missed the main meal times, did not 
like the food, or were still hungry could augment their diet by visiting local cafes or 
the NAAFI for a cup of tea and ‘wad’ as cakes or buns were colloquially known.41  
The RAF provided sports facilities, most stations had a cinema, messes 
arranged dances, ENSA shows occasionally visited,
42
 and, on some stations, 
personnel organised their own stage shows. At RAF Chedburgh in Suffolk a 
biweekly camp newspaper, ‘The Con’, was even started by some personnel.43 Camp 
cinema cost 7d and was usually full. It often showed a double feature with news and 
a MOI short.
44
 Audiences behaved differently to civilian cinema audiences, and 
rather than quietly watching the films, they were given witty, sarcastic commentaries 
by the audience. Farfetched scenes were ‘mocked’, love scenes were given ‘cat calls’ 
and ‘leg displays’ were ‘greeted… with appreciative whistles.’45 Apart from 
‘domestic nights’, when personnel were supposed to carry out mending and cleaning 
in their quarters, on evenings off, personnel could spend their free time on or off the 
station. However, due to the relative isolation of many stations and the problems of 
transport, personnel often chose to remain on the station and the NAAFI was very 
popular.  
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The NAAFI at Woodhall [Spa] was a large wooden hut, occupied by some 
twenty small tables, each with three or four chairs around it. Within an hour 
of opening time at seven pm., the tables were invariably covered with dirty 
plates, cups and glasses, pools of spilt tea, and cake crumbs. At one end was a 
counter, divided into four sections, one selling sweets, cigarettes, soap, razor 
blades etc., the next tea, coffee and cakes, the third, suppers, and the last beer 
and minerals. The place was usually crowded, the tables being occupied by 
airmen and WAAFs, either singly or in groups. On a wet, winter evening, the 
atmosphere was thick with tobacco-smoke, coke fumes from the glowing, but 
useless stove, the smell of food, and the peculiar odour of damp uniforms.
46
  
Frequently featuring in both contemporary sources and in later recollections, the 
NAAFI was important to both servicemen and women. Although some thought it had 
the ‘atmosphere’ and ‘comfort’ of ‘railway buffets’,47 with its piano and cheap food 
and drink, to ‘the impecunious airman, the NAAFI was front parlour, lounge and 
social club.’48 Open from 6pm until 10pm, but serving food between 7pm and 9pm, 
the menu at Wickenby was written on a blackboard: 
Steak Pie 4d  
Mutton & Potato Pie  5d  
Beef & Leek Pudding 4d 
Cheese Pasty 3½d 
Battered Spam 6d 
Double Chips 2d 
Rabbit Pie 6d 
Beans on Toast 3½d 
Mushy Peas 1½d 
Slice of Bread & Marge 1d 
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Nelson Cake 2d 
Jam Tarts 2d 
Rock Buns 1d 
49
 
 
The NAAFI was ‘the enforced centre’ of social life on bomber stations and was a 
place where personnel of all ranks and trades could meet.
50
 Many people maintain 
they preferred the food in the NAAFI, but perhaps more importantly, the NAAFI 
gave airmen and women the freedom to choose what they ate, and to avoid the 
authority of the messes. However, airmen preferred the beer in civilian 
establishments if they could get to one or afford it.
51
  
After working a succession of night duties, AC1 Frank Taylor enjoyed a day 
off and visited the cinema and the YMCA in the nearest town, and the ‘local’ just 
outside the station.
52
 A Mass-Observation correspondent thought that older men and 
NCOs tended to stay on camp and it was the younger men who went out. He felt that 
nearly all personnel who left the station pursued the activities of eating, drinking, 
dancing, meeting women, and the cinema.
53
 In Cambridge the large numbers of RAF 
and WAAF personnel remained separate from the students;
54
 arguably the city was 
divided into town, gown and RAF. However, surrounded as it was by so many RAF 
stations and without a university, Lincoln became an RAF town.
55
 Known as ‘the 
snake pit’, the Saracen’s Head on the High Street was famously popular with flyers,56 
and places such as the YMCA canteen (also on the High Street) were often full with 
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both servicemen and women.
57
 For some men swimming in the pool in Lincoln and 
watching football were popular pastimes in the summer.
58
  
Bomber Stations as Total Institutions 
Erving Goffman defined total institutions as:  
a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated 
individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, 
together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life.
59
  
Although Goffman used T. E. Lawrence’s The Mint as an example of a military total 
institution,
60
 wartime bomber stations were different to the inter-war establishments 
as described by Lawrence. When they could not afford to go out in Lincoln, or did 
not have the time for the journey there and back, personnel from RAF Wickenby 
descended on The White Hart at Lissington. At other stations too, RAF personnel 
almost took over certain public houses in nearby villages.  
Like the NAAFI, visits to the nearest town or village local enabled personnel 
a brief escape from military regulations, and civilians in the village pubs ‘were 
tolerant’ of the ‘invasion.’61 Holes in the hedges surrounding the airfield allowed 
personnel to come and go from the station circumnavigating the guard room, and 
working on the dispersals, some ground crew were given shelter and refreshments by 
locals in nearby houses and farms.
62
 Personnel had some freedom to pass between 
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the military and civilian spheres; however, despite this permeability, the wartime 
RAF can still be regarded as a ‘total institution’ and personnel had a very different 
experience to civilians. Personnel became institutionalised; on a trip into Lincoln 
from East Kirkby, Eileen Smith and a friend visited ‘Ye Olde Tea Shoppe’ and on 
leaving automatically took her plate and cutlery away with her.
63
 In effect the towns 
and villages, cafes and public houses they visited almost became extensions of the 
RAF. Personnel were still in uniform, they were still subject to the force’s discipline; 
they had to salute officers, and they were under a curfew. When off the station both 
air crew and ground personnel often went out of their way to avoid having to salute 
each other.
64
 Apart from rare occasions when ground crew might be invited to 
celebrate an air crews’ completion of a tour, officers and other ranks, air crew and 
ground personnel usually drank in different pubs, or at least in different rooms in the 
same pub. When in Lincoln, Eric Howell and his friends preferred to drink in a pub 
around the corner from the Saracen’s Head.65 Personnel tried to circumvent the 
regulations but were still bound by them; public civilian spaces became controlled by 
conventions of RAF discipline.  
Although unlike the relatively small number of the pre-war professionals, the 
majority of personnel in the RAFVR saw themselves as civilians in uniform, but as 
an airman told his parents in a letter home, once in the RAF there was little time for 
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anything other than to ‘eat work and sleep’.66 In gentle wartime propaganda readers 
were reminded that:  
the whole thing’s a system, and as soon as you get into the R.A.F. you 
become part of the system and not a person any more. Civvies are persons, 
but airmen are part of the system.
67
  
Apart from a minority who lived off the station, living and working did not take 
place in separate spheres. For many, the station’s living accommodation became 
home and their colleagues became a surrogate family. As will be discussed further in 
the following chapter, personnel formed ‘cliques’ with strong ‘group loyalty’ and 
their ‘own particular coterie.’68 Living and working together, personnel ‘ended up 
looking after each other’s interests.’69 Life in the RAF ‘was very enclosed and there 
were so many rules governing your life that external things appeared less 
important.’70 The government, the War Office, the Air Ministry and the RAF chain 
of command were seen as an amorphous ‘them.’  
“They” were equally responsible for every item of our military disasters, and 
the complex structure of rules and regulations that arranged the details of our 
daily lives; “they” were to blame for the quality of our food, the rate of our 
pay, for every petty hard-ship and injustice that we had to suffer, for every 
example of bureaucratic frustration and inefficiency that came our way, for 
everything that tended to make our lives in uniform a burden and weariness.
71
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Recruits and volunteers quickly recognised that the RAF attempted to control all 
aspects of personnel’s lives. Each station had an education and an entertainment 
officer, and as well as the NAAFI, camp entertainments included a cinema, 
occasional dances, theatrical variety shows and ‘pretty grim’ ENSA concerts.72 After 
a visit to the station dentist, one airman quipped in a letter home ‘I suppose if you 
have false teeth from the air force, every one would be marked A.M.’73 As James 
Hinton discusses, identity and selfhood was continually renegotiated,
74
 and, in his 
study of individuals during the war, he noted that in the ‘interplay between the 
private and public lives of wartime citizens’, women especially struggled for 
‘personal autonomy.’75 Individuals in the Air Force had to negotiate the balance 
between conformity and individualism. There was considerable pressure to conform 
as ‘dutiful citizens’ during the war, however many attempted to retain aspects of 
their individuality and their private lives.
76
 This included the individual touches to 
their uniforms, (as discussed in the previous chapter), and maintaining their hobbies, 
interests and relationships during of duty periods and leave. 
Many of the young men and women in the RAF and WAAF were single and 
in their late teens or early twenties. As Claire Langhammer has discussed, there was 
a change in courtship rituals during the war, the fear of loss could lead to hurried 
hedonism. For many, the blackout, and the lack of parental supervision, together with 
the freedom and acceptance of long distance travel provided opportunities for sexual 
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liaisons.
77
 The emotional aspects of pursuing a love life in the service will be 
discussed further in the following chapter, but, beginning with the hygiene lectures 
during training, the RAF also attempted to govern personnel’s sexuality and sexual 
behaviour. Concealing a venereal disease was an offence, and ‘early treatment’ kits 
were supplied in or near the guard room or ablutions.
78
 For WAAFs pregnancy 
meant discharge from the force. Recently released documents discuss the discovery 
of lesbians in the WAAF,
79
 and male and female living quarters were carefully 
segregated and policed. Officers were not supposed to ‘fraternise with other ranks,80 
consequently local lovers’ lanes and haystacks were popular with couples,81 and it 
was common for a WAAF officer with a torch to patrol frequently used areas to 
enforce segregation and the curfew.
82
 Edith Kup was caught by a WAAF admin 
officer who accused her and her friend of ‘waiting to meet officers’ and ‘becoming 
ladies of the town’ when they went to Cambridge.83 Although the force could do 
little about airmen who had ‘liaisons’ with local women, or who entered into 
relationships that were effectively a ‘practical substitution of husbands’,84 sleeping 
out passes were restricted. Periods of leave were dictated by the force, personnel 
were entitled to a 48 hour pass every month and to seven days leave every three 
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months,
85
 but it was inflexible; personnel had to report back to the guard office at a 
very specific time.
86
 Leave was also dependant on the exigencies of the service; it 
could be stopped or postponed at short notice.
87
 In a letter home, one airman felt that 
leave was held back ‘as a sort of hostage to good behaviour.’88  
Joana Bourke believes that during modern total wars, the distinction between 
the “home” and “military” fronts dissolve’,89 and unlike other armed forces, the 
personnel of Bomber Command fought their war as part of the home front. Through 
occasional telephone calls (if their family had a phone) and regular letters personnel 
had frequent contact with their families, but letters posted on the station could be 
censored.
90
 In his letters home Frank McCarthy frequently thanked his parents for 
sending him food, cigarettes, and stamps. He also occasionally sent his dirty laundry 
home.
91
 His letters discussed the big events of the war and family matters, and he 
once asked for his dancing shoes and swimming costume.
92
 Like Michael Roper’s 
study of troops on the Western Front during the previous war, RAF ground personnel 
were still embedded in their civilian life.
93
 When Frank McCarthy was posted to 
RAF Wattisham in Suffolk in January 1941 he wrote home saying, ‘I’m as happy as 
anyone in uniform could be – but all the same I shall be glad to get my dressing 
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gown on again and my feet on the mantelpiece.’94 The RAF did not fully become a 
surrogate family. Through frequent correspondence, personnel were able to keep in 
touch with their families, wherever they were posted. Relatively safe on dispersed 
bomber stations, many personnel were worried about their loved ones in cities 
targeted by the Germans. In his letters home to his family in Tottenham, Frank 
McCarthy frequently reassured his parents that he was safe but worried about his 
family during the blitz.
95
 The dates and arrangements for their next period of leave 
were also frequent topics of such letters. However, some were able to see their loved 
ones more regularly than when on leave. Many ground crew members had been 
employed in other trades in their civilian lives before the war, they were often older 
than air crew or other recruits and some were married with families of their own.
96
 
Married men were sometimes allowed to live off the station with their wives and 
families. Working at RAF Waddington, Eric Howell arranged for his wife to travel 
from Wales to stay in digs in Lincoln, and he was able to obtain a sleeping out pass 
to see her when not on duty.
97
 A flight mechanic felt that having a living out pass and 
being able to see his wife, ‘was the best of both worlds - duties permitting’.98 Living 
with his wife did not stop Howell’s worries about her safety however. Although raids 
on London drew all the attention in the press,
99
 Howell was in bed with his wife 
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when Lincoln was bombed,
100
 and he insisted she returned to the safety of Wales 
when she became pregnant.
101
  
For those whose family lived some distance from the station, leave was often 
the only time they could see their families, and for those who were in relationships 
with other service personnel, arranging leave that coincided with each other was 
especially difficult. The RAF provided rail passes, but many personnel preferred to 
hitchhike especially for short breaks. This was a common experience during the war, 
and although there was little on the roads, wearing a uniform made it easier to get 
lifts. For men and women, travelling ‘in those days was often an adventure, and 
“thumbing” was a way of life.’102 Anecdotal evidence tells of lifts in a multitude of 
vehicles ranging from sports cars, staff cars and dustbin lorries. Transport could 
often be summoned by telephone from a railway station to make the last leg of the 
journey back from leave, but relying on lifts could risk being late back and lead to 
disciplinary proceedings.  
Being absent without leave (AWL), whether it was being a few hours or 
several days late in returning from leave, was a common reason for being put on 
‘jankers’ as disciplinary action was known. Being twelve hours late returning from 
leave could lead to the stoppage of a day’s pay, while an airman who was four days 
late could expect seven days of jankers and a loss of four day’s pay.103 Punishments 
could also be handed out for seemingly petty misdemeanours however, and an 
airman was given seven days jankers for turning up his overcoat collar without 
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permission.
104
 Jankers meant being confined to camp, frequent inspections, drill and 
unpleasant duties or fatigues. As some unfortunates had to report to the guard room 
for inspection after reveille, and drill in the evenings, if their turnout was not up to 
standard, the punishment could be self perpetuating. Work frequently included 
scrubbing floors or fatigues in the cookhouses of which the washing of greasy pans 
was the least favourite.
105
 In some instances the confinement to camp was seen as no 
great punishment; on some stations there was nowhere to go, and personnel working 
shifts could not leave the camp anyway. More serious offences could be dealt with 
by detention in the ‘glasshouse’ and court martial. The RAF’s detention centres are 
outside the scope of this thesis, but the harsh military regime was an ever present 
threat.
106
 Rumours of individuals who had been discharged from the RAF and being 
drafted into the Army also served as effective deterrents.
107
  
The disciplinary procedures for WAAF personnel were different and changed 
during the war. For the first drafts of WAAFs only minor punishments were allowed; 
these included extra duties, stopping leave, restrictions of privileges and 
‘admonition.’108 Originally WAAFs could not be charged with desertion or being 
AWL without a court martial. If a WAAF chose not to accept punishment she could 
leave the service without notice and no charges could be pursued.
109
 After a new act 
in April 1941 WAAFs could be admonished and confined to camp as a punishment 
by officers and NCOs, and although the Markham report advised that more 
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disciplinary powers were required, no further changes were made.
110
 The differences 
in disciplinary procedures did lead to some discontent among airmen that women 
received preferential treatment particularly in the first years of the war, but as many 
ground personnel discovered, the secret to survival in the RAF or the WAAF was to 
bend the rules as far as possible without being caught.
111
 For both male and female 
personnel, life was more regimented than for those who were drafted into civilian 
industry. Civilians in the armaments industry could expect more pay, but might have 
to work longer hours,
112
 and in some industries, strike action for better pay and 
conditions was possible.
113
 In engineering a male civilian could earn around £7 a 
week,
114
 while a flight sergeant engine mechanic with four years service received 
close to £4 a week.
115
 Unlike the services, there were few sanctions (other than a loss 
of pay) for absenteeism in civilian life; workers took days off to prevent fatigue, and, 
as Angus Calder discusses, around half of absenteeism was due to certified 
illnesses.
116
 As will be discussed in chapter five, reporting sick in the RAF could lead 
to a confrontation with the medical officer and RAF authority. As an institution, the 
RAF controlled most of its personnel’s lives; it dictated their daily routine, restricted 
their free time and routinely inspected their living quarters, their possessions and 
their bodies. Any failure to conform was punished by further restrictions of freedom, 
being docked pay, and by being given unpleasant duties. Frank McCarthy wrote to 
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his mother that working with aircraft on the flights was different to his earlier 
experiences in the RAF; ‘we work seven days a week & we don’t have to polish up 
except about once a week or when we go out anywhere.’117 Even the comparative 
lack of ‘bullshit’ noticed by personnel in certain trades still concealed the RAF’s 
domination over them. 
Hierarchy of trades 
As discussed in chapter one, air crew were at the ‘apex of the station pyramid’;118 in 
their letters, diaries and in later recollections most ground personnel measured their 
courage and sacrifice in contrast to that of the air crews.
119
 In her study of 
masculinities, Raewyn Connell notes that the hierarchical structure of institutional 
settings is not accidental,
120
 and as Frank Barrett highlighted in his study of modern 
U.S. Naval officers, group unity was constructed around common qualities, shared 
tasks and experiences, and through conflict and difference to personnel in other 
trades.
121
 In the wartime RAF, hegemonic patriarchal assumptions about race, class, 
and gender, together with the RAF intelligence tests, pay scale and ranks dictated a 
hierarchy of trades on personnel; but the subtle and complex hierarchy was also self-
imposed. In common with Max Weber’s components of social stratification, this 
hierarchy of trades can be regarded as ‘occupational status groups’;122 members of 
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each group had to conform to the expectations and social norms of the group.
123
 
Certain trades were regarded as important and prestigious. Ground crew were ‘a class 
apart’,124 while ground defence personnel and kitchen staff were at the bottom of the 
hierarchy. Indeed, some unpleasant kitchen duties were used as punishment.  
Personnel of the same rank but of different trades saw themselves as of 
differing levels of importance. Part of this was a continuation of the unwritten, but 
universally understood system of social class prevalent in the civilian life personnel 
had recently left. Don Charlwood, an Australian navigator was puzzled by the British 
class system, and thought that rather than rank, their perception of their place in the 
class system determined their ‘outlook and attitude.’125 Gwen Arnold felt she ‘had 
progressed up the social scale’ from a shop assistant to a clerk before joining the 
WAAF, and she felt it would have been humiliating to become a batwoman, an 
officer’s servant.126 Even from their training the hierarchy of trades was explicit. 
Radio Mechanic James Newton was told by a drill instructor that their standard was 
far better than ‘reluctant’ General Duties men.127  
Once on operational stations however, ‘spit and polish’ and ‘square bashing’ 
became signifiers of those who were distanced from the aircraft (or air crew) and 
were consequently less important.
128
 Unlike the station defence personnel, ground 
crews were rarely paraded; they spent the majority of their time working on aircraft 
at the dispersal areas away from the administration sites.
129
 Once ‘on the flights’ 
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there was little need for orders; once a regular crew had been established, they ‘knew 
and trusted each other.’130 For mechanics on operational stations ‘there was still a 
distinct pecking order… but the sergeants and corporals were not martinets and the 
air crew officers were not salute-happy.’131 Posted to an operational station, signals 
staff soon learned where they came on the ‘ground crew pecking order.’132 Ex-Halton 
apprentice airframe and engine fitters and mechanics really mattered.
133
 
Although all those who worked directly on the aircraft believed themselves to 
be superior to other ground trades, there were distinct hierarchies among them too. 
Mechanics, fitters and riggers were assigned to work on one aircraft, but every 
aircraft was visited by what ‘fitters and riggers disparagingly called the “gash” 
(superfluous) trades:- the armourers, electricians, instrument “bashers” photographic 
mechanics, and radio and radar mechanics.’134 The wartime dictionary of RAF slang 
politely defines ‘gash’ as ‘poor’,135 but in the masculine and patriarchal society of the 
RAF the word ‘gash’ also had obvious connotations of both women and female 
genitalia, in effect working directly with the aircraft was ‘a man’s job.’136 In turn 
armourers and others who worked in ‘gash trades’ treated ‘with indifference’ those 
‘whose tasks lay beyond the perimeter track.’137 Even those whose work did not 
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often take them away from the communal or technical sites had an idea of their own 
status. Joan Beech, a meteorological WAAF briefly shared a hut with ‘a very 
superior set of girls who worked in Radar.’138 This was based largely on their 
perception of the importance of their work and higher pay group, but they would not 
let Beech enter their clique. Radar mechanics and operatives, although also part of 
the ‘gash trades’, were regarded with a ‘grudging awe’ because of their ‘aura of 
mystery and secrecy’.139 
Serving as a WAAF in a station admin office, Mary Lee Settle noticed a 
connection between morale and aircraft. The aircraft were the reason they were there, 
and ‘those in touch with them, the mechanics, the “met” girls, the signals operators, 
carried… with them a verve, a dash from nearer the centre.’140 Frank McCarthy was 
proud to be ‘working on “kites” that have been out on raids.’141 Stephen Rew, an 
engine mechanic, thought that working on aircraft was ‘the next best thing to flying 
them,’142 and a LAC armourer was upset to be posted away from working with 
Lancasters to working in the station armoury on a satellite airfield.
143
 It was 
understood during the war itself that for WAAFs ‘the nearer they can get to the 
aircraft the better they like it.’144 Margo West, a driver at RAF Waddington found it 
‘satisfying’ to ‘put aircraft to bed’ in their dispersals after they had been on an 
operation.
145
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Working in dispersal areas away from the eyes of administrative officers, 
ground crew were ‘not too involved in Station Routine Orders’.146 Ground crews on 
the flights often saw air crew officers but despite the differences in rank, they were 
sometimes on first name terms.
147
 While most air crew were treated with the upmost 
respect and regarded as heroes,
 148
 there is also some evidence of inverse snobbery, 
as because of their training, some ground personnel knew more about some aspect of 
the aircraft than those who operated in them. A commissioned air-gunner’s erroneous 
views about hydraulics and how machine guns should be harmonised ‘were listened 
to with respect, [but also with] wondering pity.’ The armourers felt that the officer 
‘owed his commission to influence and his public school background.’149 Ground 
crew were presided over by a flight sergeant, who was always called ‘Chiefy’.150 
Often a regular, who had been one of ‘Trenchard’s little bastards’ in the Aircraft 
Apprentice Scheme during the 1930s,
151
 ‘Chiefy’ epitomised the difference between 
career ‘Regulars’ and RAFVR in for the duration.152 Ground crew were little 
troubled by other officers, and embodying the competence that came from length of 
service, the experience of Chiefy sometimes even trumped higher rank. On a rare 
occasion when one mechanic was reprimanded by the squadron engineering officer 
for not working on a Lancaster that was about to be taken into the hangars for major 
repairs, Chiefy arranged for the aircraft to be towed away and assigned the crew to 
another aircraft.
153
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Working Conditions: Mechanics, fitters and riggers ‘on the flights’  
The work of mechanics, fitter and riggers was romanticised in propaganda: 
These air frame and engine fitters, flight mechanics, electricians, armourers, 
instrument mechanics swear by the aircraft they service. They work day and 
night, often missing their meals, to prepare her for the air; they watch her take 
off, and in turn they watch her land. Every ground crew is loyal to its own 
bomber. These men in overalls, with greasy hands and dirty faces, follow the 
career of their colleagues in the air – and the aircraft they fly – with the 
closest concern and attention; and at the end of each operational flight one of 
them proudly paints another bomb on the nose of the bomber.
154
  
In common with the fashionable relaxed attitude to uniform of the air crew, 
mechanics, ‘fitters and riggers were proud of their oil spotted uniforms faded from 
washing’.155 The ground crew’s appearance was symbolic of their importance and 
place in the hierarchy of trades. (See FIG 3.2). Their practical need for protective 
clothing set them crew apart from other ground personnel. Ground crew were 
‘scruffy’; they wore an odd assortment of clothes because of the seasonal demands of 
working in the open air, and because of the dirty nature of their work. In the summer 
the men might work in shorts and vests and in the winter in whatever they could find 
to protect them from the elements. Clothing was also in short supply.
156
 Eric Howell 
managed to acquire a leather and lamb’s wool jerkin that had been issued to 
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Rhodesian ground crew, and wore two pairs of socks and newspaper inside his 
wellington boots when on duty on the coldest nights.
157
  
                            
FIG.3.2. ‘Flight Mechanic (Engine).’ Raff, Behind the Spitfires, (London, Methuen, 1941). p. 86. 
 
Theoretically each aircraft was serviced by its own ground crew of two 
engine fitters, two riggers, a wireless mechanic, an electrician, an ‘instrument basher’ 
and an armourer, all responsible to a corporal. Each flight of eight or ten aircraft was 
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supervised by a flight sergeant.
158
 However, in Eric Howell’s experience with 44 
Squadron at Waddington in Lincolnshire, while in the early years of the war there 
were lots of ground personnel working on each aircraft, by 1942 the crew he worked 
with on his Lancaster was reduced to two fitters and a rigger.
159
 For a short period of 
time Howell had to carry out the daily inspections on all eight engines of two 
Lancasters by himself.
160
 For much of the war ‘there was always a shortage of 
ground crews’ and crews were ‘very hard pressed’ to maintain standards and 
serviceability.
161
 Equipment was poorly maintained and there was a shortage of 
engine stands, tools and parts such as gaskets.
162
 Also contrary to the image created 
by propaganda, while each ground crew were indeed responsible for their own 
aircraft, for some the loss of aircraft was far too common an occurrence:  
Each ground crew had its own Lancaster to take care of, and remained with it 
until it was either lost on operations, transferred to another squadron, or it 
crashed. If any of the above happened, a new aircraft would appear on the 
pan stand the next day and the cycle would start all over again.
163
 
However crews ‘really loved’ their aircraft, and would ‘jokingly curse the aircrew for 
not being more careful’ if they returned with a damaged aircraft.164 Ninety per cent 
of the servicing of aircraft was done exposed to the elements at dispersal sites.
165
 
Trestles were used to work on the engines; they were hard to move and involved a lot 
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of climbing.
166
 (See Fig 3.3) 
 
FIG 3.3. Ground crews overhaul the Rolls-Royce Merlin XX engines of Handley Page Halifax Mark 
II, BB194 'ZA-E', of No. 10 Squadron RAF, in a dispersal at Melbourne, Yorkshire, IWM, CH 7910. 
 
Putting the engine, turret and cockpit covers on aircraft when there was to be no 
flying was a frustrating job.
167
 An engine fitter at Waterbeach recalled that tying 
engine covers on in a strong wind required the ‘abilities of a chimpanzee and the skill 
of a budgie’.168 FIG 3.3 clearly shows the trestles placed by each engine to enable the 
crew to work on them, and a cover over the front turret. It gives some idea of the task 
involved to get the covers in place. Engine cowlings and tool boxes, as well as an 
airman’s bicycle can also be seen. The airmen in the picture are working in the open 
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in what appears to be moderate weather conditions, but ‘on even moderately warm 
summer days the dull camouflage paint on top of the black fuselages made the inside 
of the aircraft become like slow ovens.’169 In winter however, they were freezing 
cold.
170
  
Exposure to the elements and especially the cold was a common experience 
of those who worked on the flights. Frank Taylor told his parents in a letter ‘believe 
me its dammn cold on dispersal at 1o/c in the morning, the wind practicly [sic] cuts 
you in two every time it blows.’171 Even fifty years later, engine mechanics 
remember the wind chill factor on exposed airfields. The wind from the North Sea 
was ‘like a whetted knife’,172 and while Daily Inspections (DIs) on a warm engine 
could be ‘bliss’, on a cold engine, mechanics’ hands froze and slipped and tore their 
knuckles on sharp edges.
173
  
the winters would be so cold that we two engine fitters would take turns 
doing the DIs or repairs on the engines, while one was working the other 
would be warming his hands in front of a fire of wood and old engine oil. Our 
makeshift shelter was made out from tree branches with engine and canopy 
covres [sic] over the top, the fire would be right outside the doorway.
174
 
Such shelters were a necessity during the winter months, and were made from 
whatever materials were available. See (FIG 3.4.) A crew at Wickenby had a hut 
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made from bits of Anderson shelter and timber; some crews even planted vegetables 
outside theirs.
175
 
 
FIG 3.4. Ground crew warm themselves on a stove in the snow at Rufforth, Yorkshire, before 
venturing onto the dispersal behind them to service a Handley Page Halifax of No. 1663 Heavy 
Conversion Unit, IWM, CH 12430. 
 
Although obviously staged, this image shows a shelter constructed from tarpaulins 
and timber, the ubiquitous brazier and the differing items of clothing (including 
fingerless gloves) these men have obtained to keep themselves warm. On the far side 
of the nearest aircraft the legs of an engine trestle can just be seen. The cold was 
made worse for ground crews by their long hours and the distance they worked from 
the messes and the communal sites. The arrival of the NAAFI van was an important 
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part of the day when everyone downed tools for a hot drink and a ‘wad’,176 but meal 
times were often missed because of their work. Sandwiches and hot drinks were 
sometimes sent out to them but food was often erratic.
177
 At Waddington, when he 
eventually got to the mess, Eric Howell often had to make do with left-overs, and 
‘shit on a shingle’.178 At Binbrook in Lincolnshire, ground crew became friendly 
with a housewife who lived on the other side of the boundary near their disposal site; 
she supplied them with tea and allowed them to get warm.
179
 As well as the cold, the 
lack of sleep was also a great problem to those who worked on the aircraft.
180
 Howell 
routinely worked two nights on and one night off.
181
 When his aircraft was on an 
operation he slept under his greatcoat on a bed made from tool boxes in the dispersal 
office. When his aircraft returned he would guide the pilot to the dispersal with 
torches, but before he could return to sleep he had to record any ‘snags’, check the 
oil, and refuel the petrol tanks to a minimum load.
182
 However as well as working 
routine shifts, ground crew also had to cover sickness and work extra hours when 
there was a ‘flap on.’ Before D-day, because one of the three wireless mechanics on 
‘A flight’ at RAF Graveley in Cambridgeshire was on compassionate leave, and one 
was ill with tonsillitis, the remaining mechanic had to sleep at the dispersal hut so as 
to be ready if needed.
183
 It was common for ground crews to do whatever was needed 
to keep aircraft serviceable. To clear a ‘mag drop’ on all four engines of a Lancaster 
at RAF Syerston in Nottinghamshire, Walter Thompson’s ground crew worked 
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through the night and half of the following day to remove clean and replace all 48 
spark plugs.
184
 Although spare aircraft were sometimes available, air crews tended to 
prefer their own, and it was part of the relationship that ground crew had with the 
flyers that they would do all they could to prepare the air crew’s favourite.  
Armourers and ‘Gash trades’  
Those who worked in the ‘gash trades’ but who also worked with aircraft, shared the 
same conditions exposed to the elements, long hours and irregular meal times. 
Armourers were held in awe by some other trades because they worked directly with 
the aircraft and because their role was dangerous. However they were often rather 
blasé about it. Loading bombs with a hand winch was ‘an exhausting experience’. 
One armourer remembers it took something around twenty turns of the handle to lift 
a bomb an inch, and it was ‘heartbreaking’ if the load had to be changed.185 Bombing 
up Stirlings was particularly hard because of their height from the ground.
186
 
Although they later had power operated winches, the weight of the bomb loads also 
increased, and the engines and hydraulics that drove the winches were often 
temperamental. 15 Squadron at RAF Mildenhall in Sufolk had 22 aircraft and three 
bombing up teams; the first team to finish their seven aircraft had to start the last.
187
 
Bombing up could also be repetitive as the armourers at the bomb dump often 
prepared one type of ordnance at a time; they rarely fused and prepared a complete 
bomb load for each aircraft. At Wickenby, the teams had to visit each aircraft several 
times loading at first the ‘cookie’ and then other bombs and incendiaries.188 James 
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Johnstone remembered the length of the working day for armourers. Starting at 8:00, 
on a bad day they may have to change aircrafts’ bomb loads three times. They would 
frequently work through their lunch, have a meal around 17:00 and then return to the 
aircraft.
189
 
At the bomb dump much of the work for armourers was ‘sheer hard physical 
slog’ and often involved lifting boxes containing 30 4lb incendiaries into the small 
bomb containers, fitting tail fins and lugs to larger bombs and, with the aid of 
winches and gantries, lifting bombs onto the bomb trailers.
190
 An armourer ‘loathed’ 
his work at the armoury and felt it was a waste of his training and abilities. He found 
it ‘monotonous and totally devoid of… job satisfaction’.191 Personnel in other trades 
were able to take pride in their skill, in the unusualness of the trade and in their 
importance. Ken Lee was one of only two compass adjusters on his squadron, and 
the accuracy of every aircrafts’ compass, and therefore potentially the accuracy of 
their navigation was his responsibility.
192
 Up to September 1944 only 623 compass 
adjusters were trained in the entire RAF.
193
  
 Those ‘beyond the perimeter track’ 
All personnel had certain shared experiences. Whatever their rank, their living 
conditions were similar, and while not everyone worked for hours in the open out on 
the flights, they suffered from the cold and exposure to the elements as they walked 
or cycled between sites. In his diary, medical officer David Stafford-Clark wrote ‘my 
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face froze almost solid where the wind could reach it round the corners of my 
greatcoat collar. What price my long awaited Balaclava?’194 All personnel (including 
air crew) were sometimes needed for snow clearing duties on the runways and 
perimeter tracks for example. However some trades and roles were gendered, and 
personnel in some trades had more contact with aircraft or air crew, or could see a 
direct relevance between their trades and the war effort. WAAFs in trades including 
sparkplug testers, trolley accumulator operatives and parachute packers had obvious 
and direct links to either the aircraft or the flyers. Some drivers were among the last 
to see flyers as they were driven to the dispersals before an operation. Cooks could 
even rationalise that they cooked the air crew’s bacon and eggs. WAAFs working in 
radar, in radiotelephony, and in the watch office took especial pride in their work.  
Personnel trained in one trade had little idea of the intricacies and working 
conditions of others. At night, when aircraft were flying, one person from each 
technical trade was assigned to form a ‘duty crew’; unless there was urgent work to 
be done on the aircraft, most ground personnel took it for granted they could have 
their evenings off.
195
 However, personnel in other trades were just as frequently 
required to work anti social hours, either because of ‘flaps’ or because they were on a 
rota to do so. At Waddington, ‘Pip’ Beck was one of four radio-telephone operators 
covering a 24 hour watch system in the watch office. Each operator worked a four 
hour watch and an eight hour watch with a day off between each twelve hour day 
worked.
196
 Working in the ops room at RAF Pocklington in Yorkshire, Edith Kup 
also worked a rota of watches. She was often on duty throughout the night from 
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19:00 until 09:00 the next morning. After 28 hours off she would be back on duty 
13:00 to 19:00.
197
  
After seeing some WAAF patients, the RAF psychiatrist, Robert Gilllespie, 
called for better welfare supervision. He identified that as well as the living 
conditions on dispersed sites, the ‘irregular watches’ they kept, often being ‘on night 
duty two nights out of six’, was ‘a factor in their breakdown’.198 Eventually the Air 
Ministry attempted to restrict their hours. Ideally, except in special emergencies, 
WAAFs would be limited to a 48 hour week, working no more than 8 hours a day. 
They were supposed to be provided with meals every four hours (except when they 
were asleep) and they were entitled to one day off a week and a 48 hour pass every 
month. It was later admitted that these guidelines were infrequently adhered to.
199
 
When a ‘Queen Bee’ (WAAF administration officer) ‘expressed horror’ at the duty 
rota and submitted a new one, the watch-keepers at Pocklington carried on as 
before.
200
 Edith Kup claims she preferred to work a long night shift as it enabled her 
to ‘carry through the operation from start to finish.’201 Working these shifts, WAAFs 
were able to maintain their contact with the flyers, but it occasionally brought them 
into conflict with administration officers who wanted to enforce their authority and 
WAAF discipline. If the facilities were available, shift workers were housed 
separately, and working shifts was frequently used as an excuse to avoid other duties, 
parades and inspections.
202
 The officers were doubtless concerned about unwanted 
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pregnancies, but some showed a lack of empathy for those who worked shifts.
203
 
WAAFs were sometimes given surprise morning kit inspections and paraded despite 
the fact that they had had less than two hours sleep.
204
 Men too sometimes found 
their sleep disturbed by officers who tried to follow regulations to the letter.
205
  
It was realised that one of the physically hardest, and least popular trades 
among WAAF personnel were those of cooks and kitchen assistants. Rarely if ever 
having to venture onto the airfield, they were lower down the unofficial ‘pecking 
order’ and had to work very long hours with little free time.206 By mid 1940 the Air 
Ministry was aware there was a problem with the working conditions, pay scales, 
discipline, and retention of WAAF cooks and kitchen workers. When the average 
male wage in 1940 was over £4 a week,
207
 a male LAC cook earned around £3 a 
week,
208
 and a WAAF cook just over £2 a week.
209
 It was found that these trades 
made up the ‘bulk’ of desertions from the WAAF. 210 Preparing breakfast for a 
thousand personnel was a task which began the night before by slicing eight sides of 
bacon to be fried in fifteen three foot square pans. To serve breakfast at 07:00, the 
cooks had to wake at 04:00 and start work at 05:00 by heating up 40 gallons of 
porridge in 2 giant cauldrons.
211
 Although a LACW cook liked it when miscreants 
were detailed to help in the cookhouse as they could help with the heavy lifting, it 
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still reminded her of the undesirability of her trade. Kitchen duties, ‘spud bashing’, 
cleaning, and washing up the greasy cooking pans were used as punishments; for 
kitchen staff working in the kitchens could seem ‘like jankers every day.’212 
Other tasks were equally tedious and were as hard to view as important to the 
war effort; clerks faced reams of paperwork and typing, drivers struggled to start 
engines without electric starters on winter mornings, and airmen spent summer 
afternoons sweating as they carried chairs from stores to set up for an ENSA show.
213
 
Guard duty was a miserable experience,
214
 and it was found that in Bomber 
Command personnel assigned to ground defence were twice as likely to report 
sick.
215
 During the war the Air Ministry began to become interested in ergonomics 
and work efficiency, but only in certain trades. This began with an interest in air 
crew efficiency, but by the middle of the war, research was also being undertaken by 
the Flying Personnel Research Committee into teleprinter switchboards and radar 
operators.
216
 For example it was understood that radio telephone operators were 
affected by working in poorly lit and ventilated blacked out rooms.
217
   
It was harder for general duties aircraftsmen and women, those without a 
trade, whose duties could include guard duty, cleaning, fetching and carrying, and 
collecting and incinerating refuse, to reconcile their role in the war effort. After the 
threat of invasion had lessened, members of the RAF ground defence were regarded 
by many as the lowest of the low, they were furthest removed from the aircraft and 
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were most likely to be required to drill and pay attention to the shine on their boots, 
buttons and badges. To a certain extent, as long as the job was done, like those on the 
flights, the WAAFs who worked in the watch office and those in trades directly or 
indirectly connected with either the aircraft or the airmen could usually avoid the 
‘bullshit’ ground defence and general duty personnel had to contend with.  
Dangers and Risks: RAF Health and Safety and traumatic events  
Sometimes we of the ground crews had our own little scares, bombs dropping 
off on the dispersal, some blew up, and enemy air raids etc, but a lot of the 
minor duties called for a little courage beyond the normal… No one fancied 
climbing up under the undercarriage to prime the engines prior to starting up, 
a frightening place, especially in the dark.
218
 
Other trades had their own health risks. A doctor at RAF Hospital Rauceby learnt of 
‘Morse Headache’ from ‘listening for 6 hours’ and ‘Tele-graphists Cramp’. He also 
became aware how WAAFs could get eyestrain and headaches from working on 
‘Radiolocation’ (Radar).219 WAAFs were also aware of the risk of ‘Signals Shock’ 
from the accumulative effect of listening to the wireless through the German 
Jamming attempts.
220
 However, the dangers, risks and discomforts ground personnel 
faced paled into insignificance when set beside the heroism of the air crew, and the 
numbers of aircraft that did not return. Indeed, even compared to the publicised tales 
of heroic WAAFs during the blitz,
221
 and stoic civilians in London, Coventry and 
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elsewhere, ground personnel were relatively safe from enemy action. Slit trenches 
and shelters were quickly dug on pre war stations and blast shelters were designed 
and built on new dispersed sites. Gas drill and decontamination was regularly 
practised. However, apart from sporadic attacks by enemy intruders, personnel on 
bomber stations were obliged to do some things which, although by today’s 
standards would seem excessively risky, were considered as part of the exigencies of 
war.
222
 Accidents occasionally happened, and many ground personnel witnessed, 
experienced or knew about accidents and potentially traumatic events.  
On the flights, mechanics, fitters and riggers frequently worked on the aircraft 
in precarious positions on the wings and fuselage, on engine trestles or standing on 
the undercarriage up in the wheel wells. Although he was unhurt, Stephen Rew once 
slipped and fell from the wing of a Lancaster, and he knew of someone else who fell 
and broke their leg while trying to put cockpit covers on.
223
 In another incident he 
needed 12 stitches when a tool box that fell from an engine trestle hit him on the 
head.
224
 As well as frequent heavy lifting, armourers had to contend with bombs 
resting on the bomb-bay doors of returned aircraft, ‘hang ups’ and fused delayed 
action bombs. For those on the flights, working long hours and under pressure to 
keep all aircraft serviceable, fatigue could lead to mistakes and accidents with 
armaments, aircraft and other machinery, while for all ground personnel, the 
cramped conditions in the living quarters facilitated the spread of illness and 
infection.  
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FIG 3.5. Data taken from W. F. Mellor, History of t Second World War: Casualties and Medical 
Statistics, (London, HMSO, 1972), pp. 588-592.  
The average incidence of sickness or disease among other ranks ground 
personnel was just over 40 per cent per year. Accounting for more than a quarter of 
all sickness, upper respiratory tract infections were by far the most common cause of 
illness.
225
 496 WAAFs died during the war, 287 from diseases (68 due to 
Tuberculosis) and 209 due to injuries.
226
 Each year on average just over 4 per cent 
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were injured severely enough to warrant recording.
227
 Figures only exist to examine 
injuries and illnesses by trade for the first three years of the war, but fitters, drivers 
and open air workers, wireless operators, riggers and armourers were more prone to 
accidental injuries than other trades. (See FIG 3.5.) Over the entire Air Force, and 
excluding air crew who became casualties on operations or in flying accidents, the 
cause of most non fatal injuries was recorded as ‘other’ (60 per cent). (See FIG 3.6) 
Causes of fatalities and injuries in the entire RAF 1939-1945  
 Fatalities Injuries 
Air Raids 1611 2925 
Propeller 204 1027 
Mechanical transport 1256 21277 
Starting motor engines  1 1357 
Workshop Accidents 1 458 
Accidental Explosions 474 2577 
Athletic Injuries 148 43224 
Self Inflicted 408 194 
Other Causes 2704 110835 
 
FIG 3.6. Data taken from: W. F. Mellor, History of the Second World War: Casualties and Medical 
Statistics, (London, HMSO, 1972), p. 568.
228
 
 
However the next largest causes of injury were ‘athletic’ injuries. Over 43000 
personnel (23 per cent) were injured playing sport or undertaking athletic activities. 
Most of these injuries were to the lower limbs.
229
 Air raids killed 1611 personnel (23 
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per cent of those who died while in the RAF) and injured nearly 3000 (only 2 per 
cent of those injured). Most were killed or injured in 1940 and 1941when German air 
raids were more frequent.
230
 Mechanic transport accidents accounted for 21277 
injuries (12 per cent) and 1256 deaths (18 per cent). Road traffic accidents were a 
national problem in the blackout. The figure includes those killed or injured while off 
duty.
231
 Starting motor vehicles and static engines by hand injured 1357 people and 
one was killed presumably because the vehicle had been left in gear when they 
started it using the starting handle. 
The figures show that airmen and women were statistically more at risk from 
playing sport or from road traffic accidents than being killed or injured by the enemy 
or in accidents with armaments or aircraft. However, workshop accidents, accidental 
explosions and incidents with propellers, while not statistically very likely, left a 
lasting impression on those who witnessed them. Where practical the RAF put in 
place safety precautions and trained personnel to reduce the likelihood of accidents. 
The RAF also attempted to reduce the occurrence of other less obvious industrial 
diseases and causes of disruptions to work. Focussing on Maintenance Command but 
also relevant to Bomber Command, lighting, heating and ventilation of aircraft 
hangars compatible with the blackout, industrial dermatitis, the inhalation of 
solvents, and dust, fumes and mists were also studied and regulated, and where it was 
thought necessary personal protection equipment was supplied.
232
 The fumes of 
solvents and nitro-cellulose dope, used for setting the fabric covering on aircraft like 
the Vickers Wellington were dangerous if inhaled. Riggers could get ‘high’ on the 
fumes, but repeated exposure could also cause long term liver and nervous system 
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damage. It was thought that drinking milk could lessen the effects and so riggers who 
worked with dope were given an extra milk ration.
233
 As a new phenomenon, studies 
were also made into shift patterns, lighting and ventilation for those working with 
radar.
234
  
Revolving propellers were an unavoidable danger (See FIG 3.6). In her semi-
autobiographical novel, Mary Lee Settle describes how an airman was decapitated 
when he slipped from the wing of an aircraft he was in the process of refuelling,
235
 
and at Croft in North Yorkshire an airman cycled into a revolving air-screw. He 
suffered a ‘Compound fracture of skull and laceration of the brain and sagittal sinus’ 
but his life was saved by a mobile surgical unit from the RAF hospital at 
Northallerton.
236
 Accidents also occurred when personnel took a short cut across the 
runways rather than going around the perimeter track. Crossing the runway in a light 
van during blackout, Edgar Wilson misread a green light, which was meant for a 
returning Lancaster, and was nearly hit by it as it touched down.
237
 Rostered to drive 
a station ambulance, WAAF driver Florence Riddoch once had to collect the 
decapitated remains of the occupants of a car which had been driven into the path of 
an aircraft doing ‘circuits and bumps’.238 Crossing the airfield runways was a 
calculated risk that personnel took on numerous occasions to try to save time. 
However some personnel also had to perform hazardous tasks as part of their 
everyday trade. Many personnel considered armourers had to be brave to:  
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fuse up and load bombs… and particularly to deal with ‘hang ups’ brought 
back or to make safe armament or bombs on crashed aircraft… courage of 
some sort or another was part of the daily life of an operational airfield.
239
 
Armourer James Johnstone learnt to slowly open the bomb bay doors of returned 
Stirlings one or two inches as sometimes a small number of incendiaries could be 
lying on the doors having been hung up in their boxes.
240
 This also happened on 
Lancasters, although the bomb doors could not be opened slowly.
241
 At Waterbeach, 
one armourer remembers catching loose bombs on old bedding biscuits when the 
bomb doors were opened.
242
  
Although they did not usually explode, descriptions of the terrifying moment 
when a bomb accidentally fell from an aircraft onto the dispersal points are quite 
common in memoirs.
243
 Fourteen 1000 lb bombs were accidentally jettisoned from a 
Lancaster by an electrician while Howell and a friend were sitting in the cockpit 
having completed their daily inspections. All three quickly exited the aircraft. Howell 
admitted that his ‘hands were shaking for several days after this incident.’244  
Unfortunately however, accidental detonations did occur on many stations 
throughout the war. Just over 3000 personnel of all ranks and trades were killed or 
injured by accidental explosions (See FIG.3.6). At 10:15 on Friday 29 December 
1944, the bomb load of a 514 squadron Lancaster at RAF Waterbeach exploded, 
destroying the aircraft and damaging seven others on their nearby dispersals. It is 
thought that a defective 250lb bomb fell when being loaded and caused the 
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sympathetic explosion of the aircraft’s entire bomb-load.245 From the ground crew 
working on the aircraft or in the vicinity, three bodies were recovered, six men were 
missing and four were wounded.
246
 The station medical officer, Geoffrey Dean stated 
in his report that: 
three bodies were found with “multiple injuries” which is a euphemism, they 
had been thrown about 300 yards… hundreds of small pieces of cadaver were 
dispersed over a wide area.
247
  
A roll call showed that six men who had been in the vicinity of the explosion were 
missing, but not one ‘recognisable fragment’ was discovered. ‘Station Sick Quarters 
staff gathered all the small pieces of cadaver that could be found and the total filled a 
blanket.’248 Dean’s staff worked ‘like Trojans, although much of the work was 
exceptionally unpleasant.’249 Written in March 1944, ‘Casualty’, a poem by the 
previous senior medical officer at RAF Waterbeach, David Stafford-Clark, gives an 
emotive description of the task of removing a casualty from a gun turret of a heavy 
bomber by relating the conversation between the medical team and uninjured air 
crew members.  
‘Easy boys; leave it to the doc…’ 
‘Afraid he’s pretty bad, doc; we’ve not heard 
A word from him since just before we bombed…’ 
Hands under his arms and knees 
Lift him down gently; unplug his intercomm. 
And disconnect his oxygen. 
Now guide his shoulders and dislodge his feet 
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From the wrecked turret; 
So lay him down, and look at him. 
 
‘Much you can do?’ 
 ‘No-I’m afraid he’s dead, 
Has been for hours-‘ ‘Oh. Well I’m sorry-’ 
   ‘Yes, 
Probably never knew what hit him.’ 
But in the torchlight you can see 
His face is frozen: 
Cannon shells pumped into his side  
From neck to knee. Skin white like rigid lard, 
Eyes glazed, with frosted lashes, 
Flying suit crusted with red chalk 
That was his blood… 
 Such is the cold 
In a smashed turret open to the wind 
Torn at that height and speed through icy darkness. 
 
Yesterday 
I heard someone complain 
‘Last night the bombers in procession  
Kept me awake…’250 
 
If the complaining voice in the envoi is interpreted as a civilian, it also highlights the 
separation between the RAF and civilians. As well as injured and dead air crew 
members on returning aircraft, personnel also had to deal with crashes and fires, 
sometimes with very little training or equipment. P. C. Knight was trained as RAF 
fire and rescue service, but his training mostly consisted of domestic fires. In the 
early days of the war on operational stations a small core of trained men were 
augmented by ‘disinterested’ airmen rostered to fire piquet duty.251 The fire tender 
was a lorry driven by someone from the motor pool with a 30 gallon fire extinguisher 
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in the back. When they approached a crashed aircraft the crash crews rarely knew 
whether it had any bombs on board.
252
 Working on fatigue duty on the crash tender, 
wireless mechanic John Grimstone attended a damaged Whitley after it landed. One 
crew member had been badly burnt and he remembers freezing at the sight of 
faceless wireless operator whose ‘eyes looked like two black sockets.’ Grimstone 
recalled he had to be ‘shoved’ to stir him from the shocked ‘seizure’ he was in.253 As 
well as the medical team and crash crews, of the ‘heat and meat wagons’, as the 
ambulances and crash tenders were called,
254
 other ground personnel were also 
reminded of the frailty of human life. Those that smelt burnt human flesh never 
forgot it. After a collision the crash crew brought a sergeant’s charred chevron into 
the watch office, to be given to the investigating officer the next day. ‘A most 
dreadful smell of burnt human flesh permeated the ops room, which I shall never 
forget.’255 When two bombers collided over RAF Stradishall in Suffolk, from the 
fourteen air crew, only ten bodies and three survivors were found. The following 
morning ‘all spare personnel, aircrew and ground crew alike, were linked arm-in arm 
in one mighty line, and the countryside was combed in every direction.’256  
For those who attended them, the not infrequent air crew funerals could be 
upsetting and traumatic for various reasons. One WAAF found it hard to approach 
the foot of the grave; she was worried about falling in as she saluted,
257
 and a WAAF 
corporal found it hard to command a detachment of WAAFs for the funerals of 
Hampden air crew at RAF Cottesmore in 1941. 
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Many of the young airwomen found it difficult not to be overcome by the 
solemnity of the situation, especially the firing of the funeral escorts rifles over the 
young airmen’s graves. Some of the girls could not experience it for a second time. 
We all learned to be “brave” very quickly during the war years…’258 For a radio 
mechanic a funeral he attended was unpleasant for other reasons. Having been kept 
in a room near the sickbay for a few days in the summer, the remains of two air crew 
members, who had died in a crash, had begun to seep through the wood of their 
coffins and the smell remained with the pallbearers for days afterwards.
259
 
Conclusion  
‘We old ground crew ‘Bods’ had a gruelling time really’.260  
During the war and in the following decades, the lives of ground personnel were 
considered in opposition to the sacrifices made by air crew and their perceived 
bravery. Influenced by the ‘Myth of the Blitz,’ in their contemporary letters and 
diaries, as well as later memoirs, ground personnel also compared their role in the 
war to their perception of the stoic civilian population living in cities targeted by the 
Luftwaffe. Working on dispersed sites, the lives of ground personnel could be 
monotonous, the conditions and tasks were often cold and unpleasant. Personnel in 
all trades worked long hours, with little time off, but also with comparatively little 
risk to themselves. It is impossible to separate personnel’s living and working 
conditions on bomber stations; in common with Goffman’s theories of total 
institutions, almost every aspect of life was controlled by the RAF, and any 
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divergence from regulations or misdemeanours could be punished. However bomber 
bases were not closed sites, members of the RAFVR regarded themselves as civilians 
in uniform, and the distinction between the separate military and civilian spheres was 
constantly blurred. Although discipline and authority was not applied consistently 
over all living and working areas, or over all groups of people, the forces’ discipline 
was applied in civilian areas and could be enforced by service police. RAF authority 
was acknowledged by many as a conflict between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and was 
constantly being tested and resisted. Personnel survived by adapting and by ‘bending 
the rules’, they learnt to look after themselves and each other, by scrounging extra 
clothes and equipment and by stealing coal to keep warm. WAAFs learnt to supply 
their own bathplugs, and against regulations used their gas mask cases as handbags. 
Although they were effectively extensions of the military sphere, on some evenings, 
together with the NAAFI, local pubs and cafes enabled personnel to express their 
individuality and freedom of choice, at least in what they ate and drank.  
Personnel in different trade groups had different experiences of the RAF, and 
this was largely due to their trades’ perceived importance to the war effort and their 
proximity to the aircraft or air crew. The more involved a person was with the 
aircraft, the higher up the hierarchy they were and the less they had to conform to 
RAF discipline. Due to their importance and their long hours of work, those on the 
flights rarely had to attend parades and were proud to be ‘scruffy Erks.’ Similarly, 
WAAF watch-keepers were in contact with the flyers through radio-telephones, and 
because they worked shifts, they were also able to avoid a certain amount of 
‘bullshit.’ Conversely those who worked furthest away from the flights and 
dispersals were more likely to be seen by the administration officers who enforced 
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regulations. Parades, drill and bullshit became part of the everyday for general duties 
AC2s and ground defence personnel.  
The hierarchical positioning and framing of different trades’ relative 
importance in the war effort was created during the war and has continued into later 
narratives. The importance of the flyer, and their glamour and heroism, was first 
constructed as a narrative by wartime propaganda and has been reinforced by 
subsequent retellings of life on a bomber station. Ground crew who worked directly 
with the aircraft and associated with air crew gained extra status because of this 
association, but ground personnel rarely put their lives at risk through exposure to 
enemy fire. Becoming ill after months of living in cold, cramped conditions and 
working exposed to the elements, or falling from an aircraft when trying to place a 
cover over an aircraft’s cockpit and breaking a leg, is neither heroic nor glamorous. 
On the rare occasions ground crew were killed or injured in accidents or even 
explosions, they were regarded as unfortunate accidents; these tales could not be 
romanticised as could the heroic deaths of air crew. Personnel were constantly 
reminded of the sacrifices being made by the air crew, by the sight of damaged 
aircraft, by the numbers who failed to return, the quick turnaround of air crew 
personnel and by attending their funerals. How witnessing the high attrition rate and 
the frequent deaths and injuries of air crew affected ground crew and ground 
personnel emotionally will be discussed in the following chapter. For all personnel, 
life on bomber station involved a constant redefinition of self that included an 
attempt to reconcile the conflict between the concept of individuality and the 
authority of the RAF (and the state) within the concept of total war.  
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4 
THE LIVES AND EMOTIONS OF GROUND PERSONNEL 
 
The Erk’s Lament.  
 
Why did I join the RAF? 
Why can’t I learn to fly? 
Why can’t I join this bloomin’ war 
And Spitfire in the sky? 
Of flying we do nil all day, 
Our duty’s on the ground, 
Where even squadron leaders 
Are terra firma bound.  
 
Of stunting, jinking we see none, 
Of trips there’s even less, 
We spend our time in carting swill 
And sweeping out the mess. 
We’re fitters, drivers, Woms and Wops, 
Mechanics and G.D.’s- 
We fill in form and documents 
And lubricate and grease. 
 
The Warrant Officer is tough, 
And Chiefy’s even worse, 
The Corporal carries all the cans 
The Police are one long curse. 
Why did we join the RAF? 
Why can’t we sweep the sky? 
We’re browned-off doing ground staff jobs- 
Why can’t we learn to fly?261 
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The reader of the ‘Erk’s Lament’ can assume several things about the Erk in the 
poem. The poem acknowledges that the Erk regrets joining the RAF and it is clear 
that he is not happy, but although he does not like the war, he and other in his 
situation want to ‘join’ and play a bigger part in it. The Erk wants to fly, and in 
particular he wants to fly Spitfires, but as even squadron leaders are forced to work 
on the ground, the poem suggests that Erks should accept their position and do their 
duty. It may be going too far to interpret the last line as suggesting metaphorical 
constipation or impotence, however as will be discussed below, many ground 
personnel were ‘browned off’ with their lot. The context of wartime events, RAF 
regulations and the working and living conditions on bomber stations were crucial to 
how personnel experienced their service in the war. This chapter will expand on the 
previous chapter and discuss the lives and emotions of ground personnel on an 
operational bomber station. Sections of the chapter will consider the study of the 
history of emotions, its key theories and methodology, as well as examine specific 
emotions including fear and anxiety, guilt and grief. Personnel’s identity and 
emotions were positioned within prevalent wartime discourses, of heroism and stoic 
endurance and duty. As was illustrated in the previous chapter, personnel struggled 
against harsh living and working conditions; occasional traumatic events and the 
frequent loss of aircraft and air crew also affected their lives. This chapter will show 
that personnel were able to cope with these conditions and events because of the 
shared emotional support of small communities with common interests within the 
complex hierarchical structure of the RAF Bomber Command. Personnel constructed 
nuanced identities through shared experience, belonging to a group, and through a 
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series of binaries; they saw themselves in opposition to both civilians and RAF 
authority.  
Emotions  
Studies of emotion in history tend to examine a particular society or, as in the case of 
Joanna Bourke’s Fear, investigate one particular emotion over time.262 A growing 
field of study that is hoping to be accepted into mainstream history in much the same 
way as gender,
263
 the study of the history of emotions is problematic largely because 
contemporary science and medicine are divided as to whether emotions are socially 
constructed or biologically hardwired.
264
 It is important therefore, to understand how 
emotions were regarded in the period of study.
265
 In 1985 Peter and Carol Stearns 
coined the term ‘Emotionology: the attitudes or standards that a society, or a 
definable group within a society, maintains toward basic emotions and their 
appropriate expression’.266 In different societies, emotions are either regarded as 
restrained or freely expressed in what William Reddy has called emotional 
regimes.
267
 In a rigid emotional regime, emotional norms are more strictly drawn and 
enforced.
268
 Reddy also describes ‘emotional refuges’ as places or times where 
emotions do not have to be guarded and ‘deviant feelings’ may be expressed to a 
partner or a close friend.
269
 Barbara Rosenwein prefers the term ‘emotional 
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communities’.270 Like Peter and Carol Stearns, she argues that in any given society 
there can be multiple ‘emotional communities’, and as people move through them 
they moderate the outward display of the emotions and act or behave differently.
271
 
While there may be numerous sub-cultures within any given society, there may also 
be a hegemonic emotional norm, if not a singular dominant emotional regime. 
During the war, the RAF was part of wider society, while, as has been discussed in a 
previous chapter, many social divisions existed within RAF Bomber Command. 
Affected by wider social determinants such as class and gender, it will be shown that 
the emotional norms varied according to the hierarchical structure of the RAF, within 
emotional communities formed around trade groups and even within individual 
cliques. Throughout much of the twentieth century, emotions can be seen to have 
conformed to what Rosenwein has described as the ‘Hydraulic model of 
emotions.’272A study of the use of metaphors used to describe emotions highlight that 
emotions are restrained or ‘bottled up’, until they escape as an emotional outburst. In 
this way, the metaphor of man as a machine was applied to the understanding of the 
bodies’ ‘fight or flight’ adrenal response.273 During the war an important emotional 
norm was that that of stoicism and the ‘stiff upper lip.’ Those who gave in to 
emotional displays, particularly of negative emotions, were thought of as weak, and, 
applying cultural stereotypes of class and gender, could be regarded as predisposed 
to neuroses. Distinctions between mental health and emotions are often blurred in 
some societies; as will be discussed in later chapters on the role played by the 
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medical officer and RAF neuropsychiatric specialists; this was also the case within 
the wartime RAF and wider society. As will be discussed in chapter five, fear, 
anxiety and other negative emotions were medicalized, and came to be seen as a 
medical problem.
274
  
Fear and anxiety 
Fear and anxiety were seen as the dominant emotions during the war and for much of 
the first half of the twentieth century,
275
 and as Joanna Bourke has highlighted, 
beliefs about fear and bravery were important cultural concepts during the war.
276
 
Discourses of fear, bravery and stoicism were important in constructing perceptions 
of ground personnel. Francis maintains that in the RAF, concepts of fear and bravery 
were ‘closely attuned to the emotional codes and standards of a wider society’ and 
‘authority of psychoanalytical expertise.’277 However, when both male and female 
ground personnel are considered, codes of courage and fear appear more nuanced. 
There was a distinction between the bravery of those who flew and those on the 
ground. Expectations of men and women were subtly different too, ‘if a woman lost 
her emotional control she was being a silly girl or a foolish woman, if a man lost 
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control of his emotions he was being unmanly.
278
 John Tosh argues that the British 
‘stiff upper lip’ had its roots in Victorian gender roles,279 and after the First World 
War it was accepted that courage consisted of recognising and overcoming fears.
280
 
As Joanna Bourke discusses, people had a strong fear of displaying fear.
281
 Edgar 
Jones argues the RAF policy towards LMF air crew was motivated by the need to 
punish and stigmatise those who refused to fly as a deterrent to others.
282
 It was 
expected that fear would be the underlying cause of mental breakdown in pilots and 
air crew,
283
 and it was thought that tens of thousands of civilians would become 
casualties from ‘mass panic, fear and anxiety’ caused by prolonged bombing.’284 
Even though ‘The Blitz’ suggested that civilian morale would not be broken by 
bombing,
285
 the morale of German workers was a target for Bomber Command from 
at least 1941 onwards.
286
 However, wartime Britain’s hegemonic emotional norm or 
dominant emotional regime was of stoicism; ‘fear and anxieties could not be overtly 
expressed.’287 During the war the RAF and wider British society can be regarded as 
‘rigid’ emotional regimes. Although fear is an understandable ‘individual and 
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cultural response to danger’, its expression is mediated by the historical cultural 
context.
288
 The expression of fear was countered by the powerful wartime discourses 
of heroism and stoicism,
289
 and, particularly in the culture of the RAF, was hidden by 
euphemism and understatement. Parachutes were ‘brollies’, steel helmets were ‘panic 
bowlers’, to be killed was to have ‘gone for a Burton’ or to have ‘bought it’, and an 
ambulance was a ‘meat wagon’.290 Acknowledgement of fear is hard to find directly. 
Fear was not directly documented by civilians in their diaries during the blitz, 
however it can be discerned through the descriptions of physical symptoms that may 
be the manifestation of fear.
291
 Compared to the flyers, or even civilians during the 
blitz, the lives of Bomber Command ground personnel were not often in any grave 
danger; there was relatively little to be afraid of. Unlike fighter stations during the 
first stage of the ‘Battle of Britain’, bomber stations were only infrequently attacked 
by enemy aircraft, and throughout the RAF personnel had to live up to the example 
set by WAAFs who were fêted for heroically staying at their posts and continuing 
with their duty whilst being bombed and strafed.
292
  
At RAF Waddington Pip Beck was on duty in the watch office logging the 
radio-telephone communication with returning aircraft when there was a red air-raid 
alert and an intruder bombed the airfield. Although after the event she admits she 
was ‘petrified’ and her ‘mind went blank’, she continued to do her duty as a stick of 
bombs came closer. The nearest bomb detonated between the watch office and a 
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hanger and shook the watch office.
293
 Writing decades after the event, she admitted 
that once it was all over she had a ‘nervous reaction’, and laughing was replaced by 
‘teeth chattering’ and ‘violent shivering’. Conforming to the discourse of stoicism 
even this reaction was relieved by a cup of tea.
294
 Following the writings of Freud, 
the distinction between the emotions of fear and anxiety was clearly defined. Fear 
was the emotion felt during a concrete event as it occurred, while anxiety was the 
emotion felt when anticipating future dangers,
295
 and involved an obsession with 
distinct fears.
296
 Fears needed to be dwelt upon to become debilitating. Having 
already witnessed an aircraft fire that killed all on board, engine mechanic, Stephen 
Rew imagined himself winning a posthumous George medal, or at least a mention in 
despatches, as he struggled to extricate the tail gunner from another crashed and 
burning Halifax. Although terrified and listening to the crackle of flames and 
smelling petrol he expected an explosion at any moment, the aircraft had ‘pranged’ 
on the edge of the dispersal where there was some fire fighting equipment, and ‘some 
intelligent characters’ quickly got the fire under control.297 Unlike the flyers, ground 
personnel did not have to contemplate repeatedly risking their lives. If a dangerous 
event like an aircraft fire or an enemy raid occurred it was sudden and there was little 
time for much other than action. Training, the cultural expectation of stoic behaviour, 
and the discourse of doing their duty helped individuals such as Beck and Rew to be 
brave. As will be discussed below, a subsequent reflection on events could be 
problematic for some, but for many ground personnel their anxieties can be divided 
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into individual or personal fears and anxieties partially created by the state and 
shared with civilians. Early in the war, the fear of invasion, parachutists and bombing 
were commonplace; these fears diminished after the blitz and the German invasion of 
Russia, but the fear of being bombed re-emerged with the V1 and V2 attacks.
298
 
Personnel serving on RAF stations were concerned for the safety of their families at 
home during air raids,
299
 and although he had found his wife digs to be near him at 
RAF Waddington, after an air raid on Lincoln Eric Howell persuaded his wife to 
move back to the relative safety of Wales.
300
 For those who were in relationships 
with air crew on their station this fear was made more immediate because of the 
intimate knowledge of when operations were on. Watching take offs at Spilsby, 
WAAF intelligence officer, Joyce Brotherton: 
felt like the old hen who watches her adopted children when they first 
become waterborne and sail away from her. I suddenly felt horribly alone. 
Waiting for return… I felt weighed down with the sort of sick feeling that I 
always had when I was waiting for the boys.
 301
  
Anxieties about the safety of air crew meant that superstitious rituals were hard to 
resist. On the one evening at RAF Spilsby that Joyce Brotherton failed to wave as the 
aircraft took off on operations, six aircraft failed to return; she never missed a take 
off again.
302
 RAF chaplains were thought of as ‘good, bad, or indifferent welfare 
officers; and the Church itself… played no significant part in the life and thought of 
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the camp.’303 Flyers relied on lucky talismans and rituals, and civilians were also 
superstitious during the war.
304
 This was symptomatic of a decline in ‘orthodox 
beliefs’, a trend which was noticed in a Mass-Observation survey published after the 
war,
305
 Ground personnel were also frequently open to superstition and the 
supernatural. A common superstition in the RAF was the ‘chop girl’ or ‘jinx.’306 
After a WAAF had lost three or four lovers, air crew avoided her and even refused to 
‘accept a cup of cocoa from one.’ At Waterbeach, jinx girls were posted away, 
although one ‘hanged herself with a lavatory chain.’307 At East Kirby, Eileen Smith 
remembered a ‘jinx’ girl who had been engaged to several air crew members who 
had been killed:  
On her bedside she had a few large studio photos of these men and I would 
see the dim red glow of a cigarette as she smoked into the early hours of the 
morning trying to come to grips with the tragedies of war.
308
  
One of Eric Howell’s friends worried he might be a jinx because he had lost so many 
aircraft,
309
 and on other stations particular letters used to identify squadron aircraft 
were thought to be jinxed.
310
 Ground personnel also sometimes believed they had 
premonitions about which members of air crew were for ‘the chop’:  
I had developed sixth sense already and living amongst the tension of ops I 
knew when I got the list of a/c and captains and put them on the board, who 
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would return that night – this seems ridiculous, but was there, some sort of 
aura which enveloped the crews as well.
311
  
Michael Bentine served as an intelligence officer at Wickenby. He believed he saw a 
friend’s face become a skull as he looked at him and ‘knew that he would die that 
night.’312 Although they believed them to be real, these feelings are due to the 
fallibility of memory, coincidence, and narrative created from hindsight.  
Marjorie Bevan Jones was often convinced that her husband, a pilot, was 
dead when he was late or had not been in touch.
313
 In common with many female 
civilians, members of the WAAF were afraid for the safety and lives of their friends, 
boyfriends, lovers and husbands. In the early years of the war the propaganda 
campaign carried out by the Ministry of Information in posters and films led the 
public to assume spies and fifth columnists were everywhere.
314
 Some air crew were 
convinced of the danger of saboteurs and fifth columnists.
315
 I have found no 
evidence of ground crew worrying about sabotage; however they were concerned 
that they had made mistakes. After modifying the radio on a mosquito, radio 
mechanic E. J. Williamson’s work was investigated when it was found that snatches 
of the air crews’ conversations had been transmitted and could have given away the 
target and information to the enemy. It was found that the insulation on some of the 
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wiring was defective, and Williamson was relieved to keep his ‘clean sheet’ and not 
to be facing a court martial.
316
  
As well as concerns for others, whatever their rank or trade, all ground 
personnel were anxious for themselves when they were posted to new stations. An 
armourer gave himself a self inflicted wound to avoid posting to Wick,
317
 and it was 
acknowledged by the Air Ministry that to: 
enter a strange barrack room in which you have to live for the next few 
months, a barrack room full of strange faces, … all of them taking stock of 
you without showing any signs of admiration, is always a bit of an ordeal.
318
 
According to Rew, depression was the usual state of posted airmen,
319
 but posting 
could be even more daunting for women. Separated from her friends and the support 
of an emotional community, Edith Kup found false bravado was necessary:  
In rather a quake I arrived in the mess, always an ordeal at a new station, for 
the boys having heard one was coming, were waiting to see what presented 
itself – I used to stand outside the anteroom door, count to ten and then stride 
in, head held high and looking straight ahead – a quick glance to locate any 
WAAF and go over and join her. Once that was over there were no further 
qualms. One was quickly accepted as part of the team.
320
  
Compared to the flyer any unpleasant events were minor ‘ordeals’ that had to be 
stoically endured without complaint. For many personnel, illness was another 
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hardship to be ‘endured in silence’.321 When ill, some WAAFs dosed themselves up 
with aspirin rather than visit the medical officer.
322
 Sylvia Pickering used quinine and 
thought that benzedrine inhalers were ‘jolly good stuff.’323 Some anxieties were 
specific to an individual’s trade within the RAF, and did involve a genuine fear for 
their life. Although armourers could become rather blasé about retrieving ‘hang ups’, 
bombs and incendiaries that had failed to drop over the target and remained in the 
aircraft, often resting on the bomb-bay doors,
324
 personnel from other trades were 
much more in awe of the danger from explosives.
325
 An earth fault could drop bombs 
on the pan,
326
 and, as discussed in chapter three, explosions did occur. Ground crew 
personnel had a healthy respect for revolving propellers especially at night,
327
 and 
engine mechanics also feared the collapse of undercarriages.
328
 These fears were 
based on individuals’ knowledge of accidents that had occurred and they had either 
witnessed or heard about. Personnel were also expected to stoically downplay 
traumatic events and experiences, and evidence of this can be seen in both wartime 
sources and later sources. Discussing an aircraft that had failed to return in Neville 
Shute’s Pastoral, a WAAF officer ‘had found, from two years in the Command, that 
the harder and more matter-of-fact you were about these things, the easier it was.’329  
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RAF medical officer David Stafford-Clark first witnessed wartime traumatic 
injuries when serving in France in 1940. Recording having to deal with a ‘charred 
corpse with trailing entrails and brittle limbs’, he wrote ‘urgh!’330 Later on he was 
more matter of fact when describing the corpse of a German airman ‘who had no top 
to his head.’331 Although a modern understanding of Post Traumatic Stress Disorders 
may be evident in sources created after the 1980s, the wartime emotionology is also 
evident. Eric Howell’s typewritten description of a Hampden which crashed during 
take-off killing an electrician gives subtle clues to the emotional impact of such 
events. Throughout his eleven-page typewritten testimony his spelling is impeccable, 
however when he wrote ‘I was in a fl[igh]t dispersal at the time and witnessed the 
crash’ the word ‘witnessed’ was originally spelt with two ‘t’s, but has been corrected 
by a blue pen.
332
 In the self-deprecating style typical of many similar testimonies, 
Howell admits that he typed his story with one finger, but, more than correcting a 
typographical error, the unusual handwritten deletion and alteration suggests the 
strength of emotions that still surrounded the memory of the event at the time of 
writing. Working as a radio mechanic in Lincolnshire towards the end of the war, 
Patricia Lockitt’s job sometimes entailed examining radio sets recovered from 
crashed bombers to see if they were serviceable or beyond repair:  
and one very unpleasant job I had to do – was to – clean up the radio which 
had got – part of a radio operator’s head embedded in it, which was very 
unpleasant and er – but – er – I felt for the radio operator, it was an 
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unpleasant job for me, but I thought, what a ghastly end. Erm, but on the 
whole it was pretty routine.
333
  
Lockitt’s oral testimony is archived in the Imperial War Museum, and in describing 
this scene her narrative is full of pauses that perhaps can be interpreted as conveying 
the emotion she still felt about this event in 2004. She admits it was ‘very 
unpleasant’ for her, but she framed her experience in the context of the radio operator 
who died. She ‘thought, what a ghastly end’ it had been for the operator, and that ‘on 
the whole’ her job ‘was pretty routine.’334 The occasional unpleasantness Lockitt 
experienced in her job was insignificant compared to the heroic sacrifice the radio 
operator had made; her narrative displays typical wartime stoicism.
335
 Such stoicism 
is evidence of an important discourse that framed ground personnel’s experiences.  
At RAF Marston Moor, the first time a nursing orderly was confronted by 
bodies mutilated by a crash she followed the example of the male orderlies who were 
playing ‘tough’ and did not show any weakness in front of them, but walked off to 
cry on her own afterwards.
336
 Personnel ‘learned to be “brave” very quickly’.337 
However it was not just events that were visually witnessed that affected ground 
personnel. Sylvia Pickering, a clerk who worked in the sick quarters at Conningsby 
in Lincolnshire, could not forget ‘the strange sickly stench of burnt bodies’ kept in 
the station morgue.
338
 Pip Beck, a Radio Telephone operator at RAF Waddington, 
was haunted by the brief conversation she had with a pilot of a Wellington bomber 
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before he crashed trying to land on one engine.
339
 She ‘felt shaken and sick… [hers] 
had been the last voice they had heard – would ever hear… [and she] felt related to 
them in a strange hollow intimacy.’ She admitted that the ‘experience haunted her 
dreams for a while’,340 and the event was powerful enough to lead to her writing this 
poem.  
Darky Call 
 
Through the static 
 Loud in my earphones 
 I heard you cry for aid. 
 Your scared boy’s voice conveyed 
 Your fear and danger: 
 Ether –borne, my voice 
 Went out to you 
 As lost and in the dark you flew. 
 We tried so hard to help you, 
 In your crippled plane – 
 I called again 
 But you did not hear. 
 You had crashed in flame 
 At the runway’s end 
 With none to tend 
 You in your dying…341 
 
Marjorie Bevan-Jones worked in an operations room as a plotter, she did not even 
speak to air crew, but plotted the position of aircraft from radar and observer corps 
reports. At night, lost aircraft with damaged radios returning from raids were plotted 
as they tried to visually locate somewhere to land. She recalled:  
The awful part is knowing they will probably crash in the end, and that they 
will all die, and all the time they are so near somewhere they could land if 
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they could see…The helpless feeling is a big hole in the pit of my stomach. 
When the plots stop coming we know they are dead, lying on some cold 
hillside, miles from anywhere. And we feel harrowed and torn apart inside.
342
 
Coming to terms with the death of air crew was hard for all personnel. There are 
numerous tales of women crying themselves to sleep after their favourite airman was 
killed or posted as missing, and Pip Beck remembers a girl she was billeted with who 
had to be sedated when she learnt of the death of her fiancé.
343
 Unsurprisingly grief 
was also a powerful emotion that had to be expressed or repressed during the war, 
and it is clear that it was the loss of friends among air crew officers who Stafford-
Clark drank and played with in the officers’ mess that affected him most. In his diary 
are the names of twenty friends who were killed and ten who were badly wounded. 
His brother John who died in 1941 was at the top of the list.
344
 After the death of one 
of Stafford-Clark’s particular air crew friends at Waterbeach, he wrote a long 
eulogistic entry in his diary and wrote nothing further for several pages.
345
  
Loss and grief 
After training, friendships were broken up by individual postings. In a way this 
prepared people for the disruption of friendships and the loss that service life and war 
would bring.
346
 All personnel on an operational station knew about the loss of 
aircraft and the loss or death of air crew when it occurred. Those in the kitchens and 
the messes knew because of the surplus food and extra place settings in the officers’ 
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mess.
347
 Others were aware of the ‘dismal ritual’ of collecting and packing the air 
crew’s possessions and the arrival of their replacements.348 Ground crews became 
‘numb and devoid of feeling’ when aircraft did not return and it was learnt that they 
had not diverted to another station,
349
 and after five years of service an intelligence 
officer had had his ‘fill of grief.’350 It was worse for those on the station who were 
emotionally attached on a personal level. WAAFs on the station who were in 
relationships with air crew could be close to their men; but they could be close to 
their deaths too.
351
  
WAAF Nina Chessall continued to write letters to her fiancé after he was 
posted as missing,
352
 and it took ‘superhuman powers’ for her to put her face on and 
get through the day.
353
 She was given compassionate leave almost a month later 
because her mother was ill.
354
 After an airman was posted as missing it might take 
weeks before conformation was received as to what had happened to them. Displays 
of emotion were considered bad for morale and misinterpreted as weakness; as a 
consequence, few firsthand accounts of grief survive.
355
 In the wartime emotionology 
it was acceptable to grieve only in private,
356
 but for the rank and file in the WAAF 
or the RAF there was little or no privacy. Emotional refuges were rare. While it was 
not uncommon for air crew members to ‘have a good cry’ on the shoulder of an 
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understanding WAAF in private,
357
 WAAFs could only cry in the arms of a close 
friend in their billet or in the arms of the mother once home on compassionate 
leave.
358
 Pip Beck and two of her friends found themselves to be tearful when 
attending an off duty choir practice. Once one girl started to cry the other two friends 
did too, but they had to leave the room and cry outside unseen and unheard.
359
 Some 
WAAFs cried alone at night in their bed while others in the hut pretended to ignore 
them. The emotional community of the RAF dictated that when on duty displays of 
emotion were to be avoided at all costs. Edith Kup: 
was mortified to be called out of debriefing to explain to an angry H.Q. why 
they weren’t being informed as our a/c landed – my new w’keeper was just 
standing there in floods of tears – we had a crash on the runway, everybody 
being killed… One was her boy friend, but I’m afraid to say she got little 
sympathy from me, and I sent her back to her billet. I sat down to sort out the 
chaos. I posted her to one of the satellites the next day, there was no room for 
failure and all crying must be done off duty and in private. Crews went 
through enough without harrowing scenes.
360
  
The watchkeeper’s grief was regarded as an unnecessary ‘harrowing’ scene that 
could have had a negative impact on air crew and station morale, and having broken 
the code of the emotional regime, the unfortunate WAAF was banished, and as well 
as her boy friend, she lost the support network of her female friends. It was expected 
that duty would overcome personal feelings. The girl was punished for failing to 
conform to the stoic ideal of the emotional community of the WAAF and RAF. As 
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will be discussed below, as an officer, Kup belonged to a more rigid emotional 
community than other ranks WAAFs.  
Loss of aircraft 
Within the Air Force, groups of people experienced the loss of aircraft and air crew 
differently. Engine mechanic Stephen Rew remembered the loss of ‘his’ Wellington, 
J Johnny:  
‘Sometimes she had been a perfect lady, and sometimes a fickle bitch, but she 
had been ours, we let the Aircrew fly her, and they had abused our trust; 
foolish, illogical sentiments, perhaps but very human, and our grief was only 
partially alleviated when five of her crew turned up safe and sound.’361  
Ground crews could and did form relationships with flyers, especially those who 
reached double figures of operations or even completed a tour, At Wickenby they 
played cards, cricket and football with each other when take-off was delayed. 
However other crews might not reach double figures of operations. ‘When a crew did 
not return there would be glum faces, but within a day or two a new crew would 
arrive and the whole cycle would begin again.’362 Either through attrition or the 
completion of their tour, air crew came and went within weeks or months, while 
mechanics like Eric Howell at Waddington worked on the same station for years.
363
 
If a crew completed a tour of 30 operations over four to six months,
364
 they would 
often celebrate with their ground crew, and promise to keep in touch, although they 
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rarely if ever did.
365
 Aircraft continued to fly with a new crew, by the end of the war 
some ‘lucky’ aircraft had flown more than 100 operations. However ground crew 
could see the real picture of attrition that even the air crew could not. 
Ground crew can be regarded as another separate emotional community. 
They often believed that the aircraft they worked on was superior to all other types, 
and they became attached to the individual aircraft they worked on. Indeed they 
could be saddened more by the loss of ‘their’ aircraft than by a ‘sprog’ crew they 
didn’t know. At an OTU a Whitley crashed into a hill, and Ian C----s ‘felt a greater 
sense of loss over AD699’s demise than I did for the crew whom I did not know.’366 
Although this Whitley was lost from a training unit with a fast turnaround of trainee 
air crew, ground personnel on operational stations also felt the loss of aircraft keenly. 
Aircraft belong to the ground crew,
367
 and were given a character.
368
 It was common 
for ground crew to feel affection for ‘their kite’ although it ‘was strictly taboo in 
conversation’ and, until they needed to come to their aircraft’s defence if someone 
had insulted it, they would often refer to it in negative terms as a ‘bloody kite.’369 
Stephen Rew saw Lancaster G for George as her ground crew’s ‘mistress’, and their 
‘lives were largely ordered by her whims and caprices.’370 When she was lost on the 
night 3
 
/ 4 May attacking Mailly-le-Camp, Rew ‘felt an unreasoning hatred for every 
damned aeroplane’ he saw as he returned to his billet. He questioned why it had to be 
his ‘G’ that was lost and thought it must have been shot down by either flak or 
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fighters as he was sure mechanically she was ‘on the top line.’371 During two years 
with 44 squadron at RAF Waddington, Eric Howell lost ten Lancasters;
372
 like all 
ground crew, when his aircraft failed to return he worried he had missed something 
in his inspections that led to each aircraft’s loss.373 At Woodhall Spa, waiting for his 
aircraft to return from an operation, Stephen Rew prayed that ‘the centre of his hopes 
and fears, and her crew,’ would be safely returned to him.374  
Guilt 
As well as niggling doubts and uncertainty that mechanics and fitters had that they 
were responsible for an aircraft failing to return, many of these men had joined the 
Air Force in the hope that they would become flyers. Some of those who were 
assigned to ‘gash trades,’ or remained as a lowly AC2, were ashamed, angry and 
frustrated that they had failed to make the grade. John Sommerfield had volunteered 
to be an air observer but in 1940 he was posted to RAF Siloth as a general duties 
airman. He complained that men who applied to become air gunners were turned 
down although large adverts for air crew were continually placed in the press.
375
 As 
Sonya Rose argues, in wartime society the importance of individuals ‘doing their bit’ 
was stressed.
376
 The adult population was under pressure to be ‘quietly… heroic’ and 
‘quintessentially reasonable citizens who willingly and with good humour sacrificed 
their private and personal interests for the collective good.’377 In the RAF, ground 
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personnel were constantly reminded of the sacrifice and bravery of the air crew, and 
some felt guilty that they were not doing more. Too old for air crew duties, Derek 
Barnes hoped that ‘any infinitesimal danger… would not find… [him] wanting.’378 
Later on in the war large numbers of ground personnel volunteered to become 
gunners, and mechanics were encouraged to become flight engineers.
379
 As well as 
the glamour of being air crew, it meant promotion to sergeant,
380
 but ground crew 
knew the risks they would be taking and the odds against their surviving a tour.
381
  
Today Bomber Command veterans are thought of as either heroes (as victims 
of a failed military strategy and lacking in deserved recognition), or villains and 
‘terror flyers’ responsible for the death of hundreds of thousands of civilians. While 
the political debate over their place in history has coloured testimony since the war, 
the debate over the legitimacy of area bombing began during the war itself. Protests 
against bombing were reported in the press;
382
 as early as 1941 a campaign was 
started to stop the RAF from bombing at night.
383
 However, led by a ‘small 
intellectual and spiritual elite’ including Vera Britain, George Bernard Shaw and the 
Bishop of Chichester, their opinions were very much in the minority.
384
 The 
‘Bombing Restriction Committee’ campaign was countered in the press by 
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continuing propaganda,
385
 including publications such as J. B. Spaight’s Bombing 
Vindicated.
386
 Although the military did not tend to consume the news, especially in 
its printed form, many were aware of the increasing capability of Bomber Command 
to destroy large areas of German cities. In a remarkably prophetic poem ‘Sound in 
the Sky’ Stafford-Clark was concerned in 1944 about the morality and ethics of 
bombing and the future legacy of the campaign: 
There may come a day 
When we who did this job are made ashamed. 
Unsmiling now, his eyes are old with wisdom. 
People forget; the end accomplished 
But the means disowned. – All I should ask 
If I lived then, would be acceptance 
In my own heart, of truth untouched by bitterness; 
The absolution of sincerity.
387
 
 
A WAAF was seen crying because she had realised even her small part in the war 
effort was helping to kill Germans.
388
 However, in contrast, a flight mechanic was 
happy in the knowledge that Bomber Command was ‘very important’ and that 
Bomber Command ‘alone…[was] winning the war.’389 Knowledge of the damage 
caused by the Blitz on British cities was a powerful justification for the RAF 
bombing campaign, and yet people surveyed in areas that had not been heavily 
bombed were more in favour of reprisals than those who had experienced 
bombing.
390
 Isolated from the blitzed cities by geography as the war continued, 
ground personnel were more likely to be in favour of the RAF bombing campaign as 
a reprisal for the Blitz. A WAAF typist admitted ‘It gave me enormous satisfaction 
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that we were giving the Hun a dose of his own medicine having been through the 
blitzes (as a civilian) on Birmingham during the early part of the war.’391 In 1943 
propaganda had a lot in common with Lord Vansittart’s views; in his book Ground 
Staff, an RAF intelligence officer decried the existence of ‘nice Germans’ and called 
for the escalation of the bombing until Berlin was ‘devastated’ and the population 
was on ‘their knees.’392 It was easy for ground crew and ground personnel to support 
the bombing campaign; night after night, they learned about aircraft that failed to 
return, and for them the flyers were the immediate victims of war rather than the 
abstract German war worker or civilian. For members of ground personnel who flew 
on ‘Cooks tours’ over Europe after ‘VE day’ to survey the damage, the sight of 
ruined cities was ‘sobering’.393 Robert Collins was posted to Hamburg as part of the 
Allied force occupying Germany; observing the results of the bombing he ‘felt a 
tangle of emotions. On the one hand: We really stuck it to the Nazis this time! But 
then, There were women and children in there…’394 As Stafford-Clark suggested in 
his poem above, ideas about guilt and the ethics of area bombing have to be 
considered in the context of total war. For many their role in Bomber Command only 
became problematic after the war ended. Many sources written after the war attempt 
to create a positive narrative of Bomber Command. Personal testimonies describe 
Operation Manna (in which food was dropped to starving people in the Netherlands), 
and the use of Bomber Command aircraft to repatriate prisoners of war. However 
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during the war, in common with the wider population, the majority of personnel were 
firmly in favour of bombing Germany.  
Boredom 
As Angus Calder and Paul Fussell have highlighted, boredom was a common state 
for both civilians and Army personnel during the war.
395
 In the RAF, many 
personnel, especially ground defence personnel, were also ‘browned off.’ John 
Sommerfield complained to Mass-Observation that:  
we clean buttons, present arms, have ceremonial parades. To prevent us 
falling into idleness on mornings off we have bayonet drill – how to stick a 
bloke in the guts, by numbering…. Am trying very hard to change my job 
(which consists of standing around beside a large A.A. machine gun in wind, 
rain, cold for no apparent reason, since I can’t fire the gun until ordered, and I 
can’t be ordered because the phone doesn’t work….).396  
WAAF meteorological clerk P. Willmott found her work at an operational station 
more interesting than she expected, but thought she would ‘get bored with it in time.’ 
In a letter to a close friend she admitted that:  
‘I think I must have a very unstable character Peg. It’s the routine of things 
which gets me … probably my dislike of routine is why I like this shift 
work.’397  
Both Sommerfield and Willmott regarded their wartime roles in the context of the 
trope of ‘doing their bit’ and of stoic acceptance of their place in the Air Force and 
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wider society. Sommerfield felt he should be performing a more active, heroic role, 
while Willmott was concerned that she would be found wanting due to a perceived 
flaw in her character. After a while in the RAF personnel became ‘thick skinned’, 
they learned to play the system, ‘to scrounge… to evade unnecessary work… [and] 
to shift responsibility.’398  
John Sommerfield acknowledged the difference between service personnel 
and civilians. RAF personnel lived, thought and felt differently to others in the 
country.
399
 Personnel had an ‘extraordinary lack of interest in outside affairs,’400 and 
isolated from the outside world, conversation was ‘almost entirely shop and 
women.’401 Meeting for the first time, conversations between members of the forces 
were very formulaic, and topics centred around service life.
402
 Men moaned ‘about 
the lousy conditions and the general lousiness of life in the RAF’,403 and Picton 
reported to Mass-Observation that at least two of his roommates admitted to regular 
masturbation.
404
 Boredom was symptomatic of individuals’ perceived lack of 
importance and participation in the war effort. Their apathy and lack of interest in 
world affairs was a reaction to their isolation from world events and their lack of 
agency. 
Emotional norms and emotional communities 
Personnel often forged a sense of belonging to mutually supporting friendship 
groups. These could be partly constructed around the civilian concepts of class, but 
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although an individuals’ original social status played a part in determining their role 
in the RAF, the subtle hierarchical distinctions between different RAF trade groups 
were more important. Group identities were partially constructed by when, where 
and how they worked. Emotional communities formed around the hierarchical 
groups.
405
 Such groups were formed around shared experience and expectations, and 
each could have its own unwritten codes of behaviour and rules for inclusion.
406
 As 
Penny Summerfield highlighted in her study of wartime women, in the women’s 
services, individuals were forced to conform to the values of the group.
407
 When 
training, Barbara Mills shared a hut with a ‘tow’ haired ‘monstrosity’ who being a 
widow and older than the others, did not fit in.
408
 American, Mary Lee Settle was 
singled out and bullied because she was ‘toffy-nosed’.409  
The hydraulic metaphor of emotions was applied to both positive and 
negative emotions described in personal letters and by medical science.
410
 A pilot 
wrote to his WAAF fiancé ‘all the feelings and emotions are there in my heart, Nina, 
just as they have always been, with the safety valve clamped down tightly.’411 She 
later used similar metaphors in letters to him: 
Oh I remember the keen pleasure I felt at seeing you after an absence of four 
weeks. It was like a river, that has been damned up for so long, running 
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swiftly again on its course and overflowing its banks, the cool feel of it, the 
playful rippling edges, the hot turgid torrents and the strong pull of the tide.
412
  
Within the RAF and the WAAF emotional norms were influenced by the 
emotionology of wider society but with subtle differences. As well as personal 
relationships, their place in the RAF hierarchy and their proximity to the lives of the 
air crew had a large impact on the lives and emotions of ground personnel. 
For ground crew, squadron morale appeared highest during periods of 
frequent operations and slumped during quiet periods.
413
 Individuals measured 
themselves against the perceived heroism and stoicism of the flyers. The ‘resilience’ 
of the air crew made one intelligence officer feel ‘ashamed of… [his] own 
inwardness’,414 and keeping a stiff upper lip on an operational station was ‘a 
must’.415 Ground personnel were on edge when the aircraft were operating and felt 
‘intense exhilaration’ when they all returned safely.416 However, the emotional 
regimes of the Air Force varied according to the hierarchical and gendered structure 
of the service, within emotional communities formed around rank, trade groups and 
even individual cliques. 
There was a more rigid code of behaviour for officers and other ranks who 
interacted with air crew on a daily basis. Including, amongst others, intelligence 
officers, the drivers who took them to their aircraft, and members of ground crew, 
they felt the need to maintain a positive demeanour for the flyers. At Wickenby and 
other stations there were separate quarters and messes for the two squadrons.
417
 On 
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an operational station the ground personnel of different squadrons were friendly 
rivals; they took pride in their squadron and in their own aircraft. Together with the 
effect of the fortunes of war, the group’s personnel worked in also effectively 
constructed separate emotional communities. On a smaller scale there was rivalry 
between individual crews within the same squadron.
418
 Ground crew took pride in 
their work,
419
 especially in getting their aircraft ‘back in the line’ after a fault had 
been identified or it had been damaged.
420
 This also meant that separate ground 
crews would be on their own emotional rollercoaster depending on their aircraft 
returning from raids. Ground defence personnel, trade-less AC2s, kitchen staff, and 
those with repetitive jobs furthest removed from the war effort were the most likely 
to be ‘browned off’, and more likely to complain.  
Whatever their trade, officers also conformed to a different, more rigid 
regime than other ranks because of their status. They had more training and, 
generally coming from a different social class, they had the responsibility of setting 
an example to other ranks. Newly promoted to officer rank, one WAAF felt 
uncomfortable with both her fellow officers and the WAAFs she commanded.
421
 As 
described above, Edith Kup was unsympathetic with the tearful watch office WAAF 
who could not perform her duty after witnessing her boyfriend’s aircraft crash, but 
she herself had to put a brave face on her own personal loss, and not openly 
acknowledge her own superstition and fears:  
my own crew were to fly ‘Q’ one night and my heart dropped to my boots – 
Higgy came into the the ops room… ‘R’ our own Ruhr valley express was u/s 
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and ‘Q’ the standby a/c. I looked at Higgy, and he just shrugged and gave me 
a glance I recognised. The target was Hamburg… I met him just leaving the 
mess after his bacon and eggs as I came off duty. He never said a word, just 
kissed me and left. They were washed up on T….. several weeks later.422 
Officers shared their living accommodation with less people than other ranks and 
may therefore had more opportunity for private moments, but they could also be 
observed by their batman (or woman) and they were also expected to set an example 
to those in their charge. Arguably for officers like Stafford-Clark their diaries and 
writing poetry served as emotional refuges and enabled them to release their 
emotions. Publishing poetry may have been acceptable to him as an educated officer 
and as a doctor, but it may have been regarded as too effeminate for others.  
Airmen were more secure presenting a performance of more typical 
masculinity to their peers which involved swearing, the objectification of women and 
bragging about sexual conquests.
423
 For men the acceptable emotional refuge for the 
acknowledgement and ‘release’ of emotions involved masculine drinking culture.  
We took Pensy to the Black Bull with the express intention of getting him 
drunk, but Pensy didn’t want to get drunk. We think that he realised our 
intentions, and he would not co-operate. He was no dummy. Pensy was hard 
to understand, his mood swings were not unusual, but his reaction to the loss 
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of his aircraft was unpredictable. From experience we realised that a trip to 
the Pub would dull and placate his emotions, but not this time.
424
  
The use of alcohol as an ‘anodyne’ was common in the military.425 In the RAF, men 
drank to celebrate success and to drown their sorrows in times of loss and failure.
426
  
As has been established, although it was frowned upon, women could cry 
freely in certain spaces and at certain times. They could cry in front of their friends 
and be consoled by them, ‘conventional barriers of restraint… [were] torn down,’ 
topics of conversation reached ‘bedrock’ and WAAFs used language they would not 
have used in public.
427
 However after petty squabbles a frustrated WAAF ran out of 
the dorm because she didn’t want to be seen crying.428 For WAAFs, the expression 
of their emotions was closely linked to their identity, their rank, trade, friendship 
groups, and love life. Good citizenship for women was to be ‘a good mother’ and 
‘sexually virtuous’.429 The Markham report was partially intended to investigate and 
counter the popular conception of promiscuity and loose morals in the women’s 
services. Many WAAFs ‘bitterly resented’ the idea that they had joined to ‘get a 
man’.430 Air crew were excused their hedonistic behaviour. They ‘learned to live in 
hurry, fall in and out of love much faster… in short what would come to be 
considered promiscuous a decade later was more or less a necessity…’431 Once on an 
operational station, air crew in their late teens and early twenties were ‘a generation 
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without a tomorrow’,432 and could have a life expectancy of only weeks. Young men 
and women were free from parental supervision but constrained by time, and they 
often had conflicting motives for entering a relationship; men wanted sex, while 
women hoped for commitment.
433
 Some WAAFs formed relationships with flyers 
because of their maternal and protective instincts.
434
 Some WAAFs saw it was their 
duty to console overwrought air crew. Others admitted that although it often led to 
heartbreak they were ‘happiest when… conducting two or three successful affairs.’435 
Pip Beck was heart-broken when she lost her wireless operator fiancé, and again 
when she discovered her next boyfriend had a wife in a Rhodesia.
436
 However, most 
WAAFs were aware of the potential risks of forming relationships with air crew, and 
admitted that sensible advice could be hard to follow.  
As One WAAF to Another 
 
Oh, do not fall for a pilot tall, 
My bonnie little WAAFY, 
And that goes too, for the rest of the crew 
You may dance with in the NAAFI 
 
If you give your heart it will fall apart 
When the crews take off at night. 
So don’t be a fool but play it cool, 
And they’ll come back all right. 
 
You’ll only cry if you love a guy 
Who’s equally fond of you. 
For you well know as you see him go 
That he’s got a heartache too. 
 
Can’t you be friends till the b. war ends? 
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Wait, without fret or fuss. 
No, my dear, and nor I fear 
Can he and the rest of us.
437
  
  
The poem acknowledges that although it would be in WAAF’s best interests to ‘play 
it cool’ it was hard not to fall for the glamour of the flyers. In the emotional 
communities of groups of WAAFs, there was considerable peer pressure to be in a 
relationship with a man, particularly a flyer. As Claire Langhamer argues, 
‘established courtship practices were disrupted and the relationship between public 
and private expression was differently weighted.’438 Stationed at RAF Digby, Mass-
Observation correspondent ‘N.M’, was not averse to leaving a dance to spend some 
time in an air-raid shelter kissing and cuddling with a partner. She reported to Mass-
Observation that on her station girls felt there was a hierarchy of men that were 
worth being seen with and they were in competition with each other. Top of her list 
were Canadian officers (flying) and at the bottom ‘must I go out with an erk?’ In her 
eyes Canadians always trumped the English, flyers were preferable to ground 
personnel, and the higher the rank the better.
439
 In a small clique of ‘Met girls’, those 
without a steady boyfriend were ‘regarded as rather a poor fish.’ Joan Beech 
resurrected a love interest with a childhood friend who was in the RAF but posted 
missing.
440
 On operational stations women were far outnumbered by men; however 
the bright dresses of civilian girls attracted more men than the blue of WAAF 
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uniforms.
441
 Without the glamour of wings on the uniforms, male ground personnel 
were at a similar disadvantage.  
Unless they were married and had their wife in digs nearby, or had a mistress, 
sergeants and other older men tended to stay in the mess.
442
 One Mass-Observation 
correspondent felt that married men who lived near enough to go home were most 
happy in the RAF, younger men spent nights with ‘semi prostitutes’ while older 
airmen engaged in open bigamous relationships, and in a ‘practical substitution of 
husbands’ airmen slept at their ‘bint’s house’ whenever they could.443 Canadian 
Robert Collins thought that married men wanted to sleep with virgins as ‘fooling 
around with other men’s wives was immoral’ but that for single men married women 
were ‘fair game’ [and] they knew what they were getting into…’444 Relationships 
with other people, whether colleagues, family or partners were important in helping 
personnel cope with life on operational stations.  
Identity 
Although many RAF personnel were British subjects, personnel came from the 
Dominions and from all over the world; the enemy was the common ‘external 
other’.445As part of the hegemonic cultural construction of the nation, citizenship 
rested on an obligation to serve the state, and citizenship depended on self sacrifice 
for the common good.
 446
 However, Langhamer sees this period as a time of social 
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change and ‘conflict between self-discipline and self-expression’,447 and Rose 
maintains that issues of gender and class problematised the hegemonic narrative of 
shared identity.
448
 Although one WAAF thought that service life taught her self 
restraint and made her realise what a ‘selfish little pip’ she had been at home,449 a 
‘batwoman’ refused to do domestic chores at an officer’s private house.450 As Lucy 
Noakes discusses, women in uniform challenged established concepts of gender, 
while men in uniform were an enactment of ‘desirable masculinity.’451 Both male 
and female volunteers and conscripts were part of a citizen service and only ‘in it for 
the duration’, but for many their uniform made them feel superior to civilians.452 
Although young women could not be thought of as fulfilling the roles of mothers or 
homemakers,
453
 their roles in the WAAF were only temporary,
454
 and they were less 
of a threat to masculinity of male servicemen (who also expected to be demobbed 
after the war) than women in industry. As well as their perceived place in wider 
society, an individual’s rank and trade in the RAF played an important part in their 
identity.
455
  
Civilians were also othered, and because of the sacrifice of personal freedoms 
they made, personnel felt they were doing more for the war effort. Personnel housed 
in civilian billets potentially had much more freedom than those who lived on the 
station, (the curfew could be avoided for example). From the military perspective 
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‘this close contact with civilian life was not good for the solidarity of the station’,456 
but even those who lived on camp were still part of wider society. They drank in 
public houses, and ate in tea-shops, they used public transport, attended dances, and 
went to the cinema.  
The RAF was aware of the differences between what personnel expected and 
the reality of service life. An official lecture told ground personnel:  
To those of you who joined up for the war, the initial effort of getting into 
uniform and into the service was stimulating – morale was high.  
All that has happened since – the realities, sometimes the discomforts, 
of the service – the lulls, sometimes the boredom – the disappointments may 
have had an opposite effect. 
Do not let these things worry you. 
Morale is affected by Physical, Physiological and Psychological 
factors. In other words by external factors like the weather, and by internal 
ones: your state of health and your state of mind. 
You cannot control the weather, but to a great extent you can control 
both your state of health and your state of mind; and if these are sound, your 
morale will stand the worst physical conditions.
457
 
As was shown in chapter three, ground personnel and ground crew in particular 
endured the hardships of working long hours exposed to the elements, often returning 
to equally uncomfortable living quarters with poor amenities. WAAFs in some trades 
worked long night shifts and then struggled to sleep during the day. After a night 
shift at RAF Dunholme Lodge, Pip Beck was woken by the sound of the Sunday 
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service being taken in the nissen hut next to hers. ‘I was very tired – so tired that I 
was almost in tears at having my sleep snatched from me – and I became more and 
more irritable as the service progressed.’458 To a certain extent night workers can be 
considered another emotional community. An observer for Mass-Observation 
recorded overhearing WAAFs complaining about their pay in comparison to those 
working in industry.
459
 Military personnel had no recourse to industrial action, and in 
common with the majority of the voting public, many ground personnel leant to the 
left politically.
460
 Many felt that, having done their duty as responsible citizens, after 
the war the state owed them employment, an improvement in living conditions, and 
the welfare state.
461
 At Bomber Command Headquarters the Labour victory in 1945 
was seen as a disaster by ‘the Establishment’; for others it was ‘the beginning of a 
hopeful new age.’462  
Group solidarities were created at all levels of the hierarchy and, particularly 
in groups at the bottom of the hierarchy, their unity could resist the ‘official ethos’ of 
the service.
463
 As Tessa Stone concluded in her study, WAAFs were proud of their 
military status. Although they acknowledged that it was only temporary, they thought 
of themselves as military personnel rather than civilians. They made alterations to 
their uniforms to show their individuality rather than to accentuate their 
femininity,
464
 but more importantly as a signifier of their competence and to give an 
impression of long service. However, those at the bottom of the hierarchy, 
disenchanted with the RAF and looking forward to the day they would be demobbed, 
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saw themselves as civilians trapped in the RAF. While such men (and women) have 
left few records of their lives in the Air Force, they are visible as personnel 
problematic to the RAF who were thought of by officers as having poor morale or 
lacking in discipline. Being a member of smaller emotional communities of friends 
and trade groups gave individuals a sense of shared identity in opposition to the big 
‘them.’ Personnel tried to both protect and conceal their emotions behind an 
impervious ‘hide’; they developed an apathetic, protective cynicism about any 
promises for an improvement to their lot.
465
 The lowest ranks knew they ‘were 
aircraftmen second class, AC2s, “acey-deucys,” “erks,” the bottom of the barrel, the 
lowest form of human life.’466  
There was ‘a special intimacy of men in groups.’ They knew more about each 
other, their ‘habits, quirks, and secret worries – than parents, wives or sweethearts 
ever did.’ One man was ashamed of his hairy back, another by warts on his hands 
and one was embarrassed to reveal to the group in the nissen hut that he was 
preserving his virginity until he was married.
467
 Recruits preferred to use Christian 
names during their free time in their accommodation but they were called by their 
surname and service number by those in authority.
468
 Service numbers were the 
force’s unique identifiers and were needed in order for personnel to be paid. Today 
service numbers are a mark of honour, and even 70 years after the end of the war, 
many surviving veterans have not forgotten theirs. Nicknames were also common in 
the RAF, and were often either a bastardisation of a surname, or a comment on an 
individual’s physical attribute, such as their height or hair colour. Collins worked 
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with ‘Goodie’, ‘Red’ and ‘Mac’. He never knew their Christian names and wished 
for a nickname of his own.
469
 One WAAF felt that girls ‘affected boys’ names’ in 
order to be a social success.
470
 A nickname was also a badge of belonging to the 
group, and a specific emotional community.  
Belonging to a group was recognised as important in helping individuals 
cope.
471
 People who did not fit in, or who crossed people in other trades or cliques 
could be bullied.
472
 Leaving aside the problematic national identity, ground 
personnel saw themselves as part of their trade group, their squadron, the station and 
the Bomber Command group of which they were part.
473
 They took pride in their 
groups’ successes and were hard hit by setbacks and losses. Being posted to a new 
unit damaged the integrity of the group and left individuals feeling vulnerable and 
insecure. Personnel latched on to others they were posted with or recognised at their 
new station even if they had previously disliked them.
474
 The homesickness felt by 
many was not a wish to go home, but rather to be reunited with friends and people 
they knew. As well as individuals personalising their bed spaces with pin-ups, 
pictures of films stars and family members,
475
 one group of WAAFs decorated their 
hut at Christmas using the filling from service issue sanitary towels to represent snow 
on the rafters.
476
 Shared humour and the ‘harmless leg-pulling and the sort of 
badinage common to friends in the local pub’ was an ‘antidote’ to depression, 
                                                 
469
 Collins, The Long and the Short and the Tall, p. 83. 
470
 Beech, One WAAFs War, pp.40-41. 
471
 B. Shephard, A War of Nerves, (London, Jonathon Cape, 2000), p. 244. 
472
 Settle, All the Brave Promises, pp. 36-37, 144-145. 
473
 There was also a hierarchy of Bomber Command groups. By the end of the war, the squadrons in 
Five Group and Eight Group (Pathfinders) were established as elites. See Hastings Bomber Command, 
p. 298. 
474
 Rew, p. 91, RAFMH, B3692. 
475
 Smith Why Did We Join, p. 101. 
476
 Ibid., p. 23. Sanitary towels ‘also came in very handy… for polishing floors, [and] covering the 
eyes when trying to sleep – the loops reaching the ears…’  
238 
 
discomfort and… fear.’477 For example, the chorus of ‘The Airmen’s Prayer’, a song 
popular with members of the RCAF, allowed airmen to safely vent their anger and 
frustration at their officers. 
There were Squadron Leaders and Wing Commanders and Group Captains, 
too, 
Hands in their pockets with fuck all to do, 
Stealing the beer of the poor AC2. 
May the Lord shit on them sideways, 
May the Lord shit on them sideways, 
May the Lord shit on them sideways, 
Said the airmen “Fuck you.”478 
 
The camaraderie of the group was crucial for many and humour was also used as a 
form of resistance. Having made their nissen hut their home, when WAAFs were 
made to vacate it for air crew they had taken out their revenge by filling the chimney 
pipes of the hut’s stoves with used sanitary towels. When the air crew lit the stoves 
the hut quickly filled with smoke.
479
  
Coping 
Diversions were also important in helping personnel cope with service life. At 
stations up and down the country personnel staged concert parties, dances, and sports 
including football leagues between units. (See FIGs. 4.1 & 4.2.) 
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FIG. 4.1. The ‘Ad Astras’ at RAF Wickenby 1944, WMC, WR0076. 
 
 
FIG. 4.2. WMC, WR 0156, RAF Wickenby Maintenance Wing Group Cup Final Football Team 
1944-45. 
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‘Service life… was a life of physical and mechanical skills with little for the mind. 
Letters were my refuge.’ Collins was happiest when reading or writing letters.480 
Although AC1 fitter, Frank Stevens was based at RAF Hibaldstow, a fighter station 
twenty miles north of Lincoln, the conditions on a bomber station in the ‘pestilent, 
soul searing nothingness’ of Lincolnshire were the same.481 He wrote to his parents 
in Portsmouth regularly, and in a letter dated 12 March 1942 he told them:  
The temperature has risen to about zero now, just enough to let the mud 
reform. There is no sign of spring, and in any case I doubt anything grows 
here except germs. Monotony, influenza & despair are the chief products of 
this hole. Seven nights out of eight I know exactly what I shall be doing, - 
wash, go to the Naafi & eat a meat pasty & chips & coffee, come back – go to 
bed at 9 – lie there reading and coughing till about 10.30 then merciful sleep 
until 8 am. So it goes on night after night, week after week, year after year. 
There was a fellow at Skeabrae so browned off with the RAF that his motto 
was “Roll on Death.” I begin to understand his feelings.482 
Letters and diaries also show evidence of the wartime obsession with food, Frank 
Taylor was astonished to be given a real egg,
483
 and Stevens thought a meal of pasty, 
chips and coffee was worth writing home about. Although he and others complained, 
they accepted the hardships on operational stations. Like many others, Stevens was 
bored and counted the days until his next leave. The civilian world was easily 
accessible during regular leave when British personnel at least could return to their 
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family home. Frequent evening passes allowed personnel off the station to visit 
cafes, cinemas, dance halls, and public houses. Following the ‘popular association 
between the RAF and youthful hedonism’,484 many personnel dampened emotional 
responses through dancing and drinking. Joan Wyndham took Benzedrine 
recreationally to help her keep going during parties.
485
 
Conclusion 
The recovery of lives and emotions of ground personnel is problematic. There was a 
reticence to record negative emotions in letters to loved ones; with a few exceptions, 
most letters home put a brave face on events and living conditions. Mass-
Observation and diaries are only slightly more revealing. Ex WAAFs produce 
considerably more post war testimonies than male personnel. Most sources describe 
the effects of anxiety and grief on others and tell of the emotional impact of life on a 
bomber station second hand. For most personnel Bomber Command’s role in the war 
was not a cause for concern, it was a job to be done as an important part of the war 
effort; indeed some men felt disappointment and guilt that they were unable to 
become flyers. While the contentious debate over the morals and ethics of area 
bombing has to be taken into account when using post-war testimony as sources, 
during the war, most personnel fully supported the actions of Bomber Command. 
Conforming to the hydraulic model of emotions, emotional refuges were different for 
different emotional communities. Off duty and amongst close friends, some WAAFs 
were permitted to release their emotions and cry, while it was more acceptable for 
men to drown their sorrows with alcohol; officers such as Stafford-Clark found 
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solace in his diary and writing poetry. The morale of the entire station was affected 
by the success of operations and the attrition of air crew. Personnel’s darkest days 
were caused by the loss of aircraft and air crew, or when friendship groups were 
broken by postings. 
As part of the hierarchy of the RAF, all personnel had to know and to come to 
terms with their place in the scheme of things and their perception of their value to 
the war effort. Early in the war WAAFs had to contend with the popular conception 
that they were merely ‘officers’ groundsheets’, while some men who had hoped to 
become flyers had to resign themselves to a less glamorous position. Ground 
personnel’s perception of their role in the war effort was important. But whatever 
their role, the performance of their duty and stoic sacrifice was expected. The 
discomforts and hardships endured by ground personnel were measured against the 
loss and sacrifice of the air crew according to dominant cultural expectations of 
stoicism and duty. In the context of the socially constructed cultural archetype of the 
‘stiff upper lip’, ‘Britain can take it’ emotional resilience, it was their duty to 
overcome events and hardships without an embarrassing display of their feelings. 
Airmen and airwomen needed to become thick skinned, or to ‘grow a hide’ early in 
their air force career. They had to stoically accept that if they complained, perhaps 
about cancelled leave or absence of comforts, they would be told: ‘You’ve had it!’486 
The cultural and social divisions evident in civilian society were reflected in the 
military, but as well as the rigid emotional regime of the RAF, personnel belonged to 
smaller emotional communities formed around their rank and responsibility, their 
trade, shift patterns and their proximity to the aircraft and air crew. The hierarchy of 
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trades was concurrent with emotional communities and how groups experienced and 
expressed their emotions. Those near the top of the hierarchy who worked closely 
with the aircraft or with the air crew took pride in their trade and contribution to the 
war effort, others further down the order rationalised their involvement in the war as 
best as they could, however, those at the very bottom of the hierarchy, regarded 
themselves as civilians caught up in the military machine. Apathy, cynicism and 
boredom were acceptable expressions of their reaction to the unglamorous and 
inconsequential roles some other ranks played in the war effort and their lack of 
agency.  
Fear was expected to be the dominant emotion during the war, although for 
many ground personnel grief, guilt and anxieties were more common emotions. Fear 
was countered by the discourse of stoicism, and in the culture of the RAF by 
euphemism and superstition. Individuals in specific trade groups had their own 
particular fears; more general anxieties about the safety of family and loved ones 
were shared with the civilian population. Although personnel often worried about 
their families being bombed by the Germans, living on dispersed stations ground 
personnel themselves usually felt safe. Anxieties of service life were often caused by 
the disruption of the supportive emotional community and friendship groups. A sense 
of belonging to a group was crucial. Ground personnel’s emotional survival was 
dependent on the friendships that were forged, often based around the trade they 
worked in, and their trade group was also an important part of individual’s identity. 
Older personnel, who had had previous employment before the war, could be 
married with young families. However, all personnel constructed their identity 
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through a series of binaries, against the civilian ‘other’, but also in contrast to the 
‘them’ of military authority, officers, air crew, and personnel in other trade groups.  
The living and working conditions on an operational station were hard. 
Ground crew worked long hours exposed to the elements. For ground personnel in 
other trades, rather than the glamorous life suggested by the recruitment posters, their 
jobs could become routine, they had few luxuries, and everyone suffered in the 
winter. Personnel became bored; they obsessed about leave and reacted against the 
constraining nature of the RAF as an institution and their need to express their 
individuality. The hardest thing to come to terms with was the loss of air craft and air 
crew, especially as the expression of grief was regarded as a weakness. Personnel 
coped with traumatic events and loss through the emotional community of their 
friendship group. Together through humour, drinking and mutual support, these 
groups helped individuals to cope. It was when individuals were not part of a group, 
because they did not fit in, or because they had been posted to a new station, that 
they were more likely to become inefficient, have an emotional break-down or seek 
escape from the service through a real or feigned illness. It was then that such 
individuals came to the attention of the RAF authority and the medical officer. Their 
treatment and the role of the medical officer will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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5 
THE MEDICAL OFFICER’S ROLE IN RAF BOMBER COMMAND 
 
The first duty of the Service medical officer in war is to maintain the 
effective strength of his unit by every means in his power. This duty exceeds 
his individual obligations to his patients even as these obligations precede his 
personal gain... much of a junior M.O.’s work is exasperatingly trivial.1  
Performing much the same function in the RAF medical service as a general 
practitioner, the medical officer was the first port of call for personnel of all ranks 
with any illness. It was their job to distinguish between those who were genuinely ill 
and those who were malingering, and this was often subjectively determined 
depending on the individual doctor’s interests, knowledge, training and personal 
whim.
2
 In January 1943 the British Medical Journal published an article, ‘Aspects of 
War Medicine in the R.A.F.’ by Squadron Leader David Stafford-Clark, RAFVR. In 
his article he described the daily sick parade and the importance of training efficient 
medical orderlies. He discussed the treatment of both air crew and ground personnel, 
and how in many cases prevention was better than treatment. Stafford-Clark’s 
published and unpublished work on air crew morale and flying stress was important 
in forming the official RAF understanding and policy towards LMF air crew, and its 
subsequent historiography. Studies have highlighted the importance of the medical 
                                                 
1
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officer in maintaining the efficiency of air crew and ensuring that only a small 
minority ever refused to fly and were found to be ‘lacking in moral fibre’ or ‘LMF.3 
However, the medical treatment of male and female ground personnel who suffered 
emotional breakdown (also discussed by Stafford-Clark) has not been examined. 
This chapter examines the prophylactic and primary treatment of ground personnel 
who were potential neuropsychiatric casualties by RAF medical officers. During the 
Second World War mental health was often treated as a disciplinary rather than 
medical problem by the RAF. By the end of the war over 52,000 male personnel (1.5 
per cent of the entire home force) and over 15,800 WAAFs (2.4 per cent) had been 
diagnosed with ‘nervous system and mental diseases.’4  
Due to an understandable reluctance to admit to perceived weaknesses and 
mental health problems, there are few examples of life history written by personnel 
who suffered from mental health issues or emotional problems. Consequently, there 
is a shift in focus of the sources used in the final section of the thesis. Together with 
the following chapter, this chapter focuses on the medical officers’ opinion of 
patients rather than personnel’s experience of treatment. Using official records, 
medical journal articles and the personal testimony of medical officers, it 
concentrates on the role of the medical officer in diagnosing and treating mental 
illness amongst the ground personnel and WAAFs in their care. Together with an 
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understanding of the RAF hierarchy, the medical treatment of ground personnel can 
be recovered through the sources available. However, the opinions and emotions of 
medical officers themselves are also important. As well as acting as intermediaries 
between personnel and the RAF authority, they were crucial members of ground staff 
in their own right.  
This chapter begins by describing the role played by the typical medical 
officer on operational stations, before considering the social and cultural construction 
of mental health. It finally considers different definitions of malingering and the 
medical officer’s conflict of duty between the needs of the service and the doctor’s 
duty to the well-being of the individual. Medical officers were more concerned with 
the operational efficiency of the station, and the health and well being of air crew, 
than the mental health of ground personnel. Given their minor importance to the 
RAF and the war effort, individual neuropsychiatric ground personnel patients (both 
male and female) were marginalised by the medical officer. 
The ‘typical’ medical officer 
The RAF medical services expanded rapidly after war was declared to keep pace 
with the increasing size of the RAF. In September 1939 there were just over 550 
doctors and over 121,000 personnel in the entire RAF;
5
 but at the force’s largest in 
1944, over 2500 doctors were responsible for more than 1,000,000 personnel.
6 
The 
majority of medical officers recruited were posted to either Flying Training 
Command or Technical Training Command, which included the majority of the RAF 
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hospitals. In July 1941 only approximately one tenth were serving with Bomber 
Command.
7
 By 1941 a bomber station with two operational squadrons was home to 
between 2000 - 2500 personnel, and this remained typical throughout the war.
8
 In 
1943 RAF Coningsby in Lincolnshire was fortunate to have three medical officers: a 
senior medical officer with the rank of squadron leader and ‘two young’ flying 
officers.
9
 However, this was unusual; the majority of bomber stations had one 
medical officer per squadron. Squadron medical officers usually carried the rank of 
either flying officer or flight lieutenant, while the senior medical officer was usually 
a squadron leader.
10 A typical medical officer’s ‘practice’ then was in excess of 1000 
patients; consequently when weather was good and the station was busy, the chance 
of a medical officer being granted leave was remote.
11
 The vast majority of these 
doctors were not servicemen and in 1941 over 70 per cent of medical officers were in 
the RAFVR.
12 
Some small satellite stations were even contracted to the care of a 
civilian medical practitioner who ‘to all intents and purposes’ worked as ‘an M.O. 
without uniform.’13 Few medical officers had any practical experience of mental 
health problems and most were ‘inadequately prepared’ for psychiatry.14 Flying 
Officer Geoffrey Dean qualified as a doctor in June 1942 and was called up in 
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August 1943 after spending some time as a locum.
15
 Aidan MacCarthy qualified as a 
doctor from Cork in 1938, but by the following year he acknowledged his career was 
‘drifting.’16 In late 1939, after previously discounting a career in the Army, he and 
two friends decided to join the RAF rather than the Navy by the toss of a coin in a 
West End night club.
17  
Elliot Philipp served as a medical officer at RAF Feltwell and Mildenhall in 
East Anglia and published his experiences under the pen name of ‘Victor Tempest’ 
shortly after the war.
18
 The medical centres under his command were staffed by 
around ten trained medical orderlies and three or four administrative staff who had 
been trained by the medical officer.
19
 Sick quarters on large stations could have beds 
for up to 35 patients, an examination room, an operating theatre, electrical treatment 
room and dentist’s surgery.20 The medical officer’s role was wide and varied. The 
duty medical officer usually worked a twenty-four hour ‘tour of duty’ from eight am 
and, in case of emergency, was required to inform the NCO in charge of sick quarters 
of his movements throughout the day.
21
 At RAF Scampton, after presiding over sick 
parades, the medical officer went on his rounds of the station sick quarters, and in 
February 1942, as well as the male and female wards, this also included an ‘over-
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flow of airmen in the Warrant Officer’s hut.’22 Each station was equipped with 
ambulances and, on some well established stations, the sick quarters were prepared 
for resuscitation and emergency surgery.
23
 On satellite stations medical officers were 
limited to emergency first aid, before transferring the patients to the local RAF 
hospital.
24
 In order to minimise complications caused by ‘unnecessary movements’, 
it became the medical officer’s responsibility to extricate casualties from aircraft; a 
medical officer and orderlies were expected to attend all crashes and forced landings, 
even those that occurred away from the airfield.
25
 Other duties included FFI 
inspections and regular routine inspections of the station’s living conditions 
including the sleeping quarters, ablutions, messes, kitchens and sanitation.
26
 On a 
large dispersed station this sanitary inspection could take up to three days,
27
 but this 
meant that he was aware of the sometimes adverse conditions the ground personnel 
lived and worked in.
28
 Although the medical officer was responsible for the health of 
everyone in the squadron or on the station, ground personnel and WAAFs were very 
much of secondary importance, and it is acknowledged that doctors were 
predominantly concerned with the physical and mental health of the air crew and 
their subsequent combat efficiency.
29
 In order to take every opportunity to observe 
fluctuations in individual air crew members’ morale, the medical officers were 
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expected to attend briefings and debriefings,
30
 and to socialise with air crew in the 
mess.
31
 Air Ministry pamphlets gave some instructions and advice regarding the 
mental health of air crews,
32
 but in common with the institutionalised hierarchy of 
the RAF, the emotional well-being and mental health of ground personnel and 
WAAFs was given less consideration.  
Medical officers had a close working relationship with their squadron and 
station commanding officers. It was their duty to give advice to the commanding 
officer about the health and hygiene of the station, but it was also expected that the 
commanding officer would act on such advice.
33 
Although medical officers could 
only advise commanding officers on matters effecting morale,
34
 to an extent, 
however unwillingly, they became part of the RAF disciplinary machine. The RAF 
expected its doctors to concentrate on preventative medicine, and a great deal of 
stress was placed on the importance of the health of the unit rather than the 
individual. This shift in priority, together with an understanding of RAF discipline 
and administration was to be learned in what was initially a three-month training 
period, although, due to the exigencies of the war, this was sometimes reduced to a 
week.
35 Geoffrey Dean’s training consisted of a week ‘square bashing’ being taught 
about the RAF, how to march and salute together with some time at RAF Halton 
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learning about aviation and tropical medicine.
36
 Theoretically medical officers were 
given some training on ‘the psychological health of personnel’37 but in a condensed 
training schedule this cannot have been very comprehensive, even if it was not 
completely omitted. Certainly, at the start of the war, the medical knowledge was 
based on the experiences of the previous war and was largely concerned with 
physical stresses of flying; the lack of oxygen, the vibration and cold.
38
 However, 
lectures on practical psychiatry for new medical officers were held weekly at the 
Central Medical Establishment at Halton and at local NYDN centres.
39
 There were 
also exchanges of doctors between operational bases and RAF hospitals that included 
NYDN centres.
40
 Flying Officer Jones of 83 Squadron found one such exchange 
invaluable as he felt there was ‘a tendency for a squadron medical officer to lose 
touch with the more recent developments in the treatment of disease.’41 Perhaps 
influenced by the Beveridge report, towards the end of the war doctors began to 
discuss the future of post war medicine and whether any lessons could be learnt from 
their employment in the services. A flight lieutenant was concerned that many 
medical officers were ‘out of touch with civil practice.’42 He believed that too much 
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time was spent on administration and inspections of sanitation and that hygiene took 
precedence over tending to the sick. He complained that the general practitioners 
could not follow the progress on ‘interesting’ cases as they were treated by 
specialists, and that the artificial population of male and female adults in the services 
meant that even specialists were becoming unfamiliar with illnesses affecting the 
young and old.
43
 However, another doctor praised the access to effective drugs and 
the availability of RAF specialists, and he emphasised the importance of efficient 
orderlies to maintain accurate records and keep abreast of paperwork, which would 
allow the practitioner to concentrate on the ‘clinical aspect of medicine.’44 As well as 
having alternate conceptions of the future of post war medicine, it is clear that these 
two doctors saw their role as medical officers within the RAF differently, delegating 
differing amounts of routine administrative tasks to medical orderlies. 
The medical officer first came into contact with potential psychoneurotic 
ground personnel casualties at the daily sick parades. (See FIG 5.1.) The sick parade 
fulfilled a similar role to the civilian general practitioner’s surgery with a duty 
corporal acting as the receptionist; after reporting, patients were seen in the 
consulting room.
45 
Separate sick parades were held for officers, WAAFs, NCOs and 
airmen between 08:30 and 10:30, with a later parade in the afternoon for air crew 
who had been on night duty.
46 
In this illustration the medical officer, a flying officer 
complete with stethoscope, gives a cursory examination of the throat of a member of 
ground personnel, while the medical orderly, who is closely following the doctor, 
clearly has an administrative role. 
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FIG. 5.1. Raff, Behind the Spitfires, (London, Methuen, 1941), p. 26.  
 
Philipp found that on an average day twelve ground personnel and four or five air 
crew would report for sick parade.
47 
Throughout the war the numbers of sick daily 
from the entire service never exceeded two per cent of total personnel.
48
 Over a 
quarter of the illnesses were upper respiratory tract infections including the common 
cold.
49
 The majority of recorded illnesses lasted less than forty-eight hours.
50
 In a six 
month (summer time) study of ground personnel (excluding WAAFs) on a typical 
operational station the average attendance was 9 patients, the fewest 3, and the most 
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22.
51
 Then at RAF Waterbeach, Stafford-Clark found that on his station the average 
was slightly higher when on a ‘normal morning’ a maximum of fifteen men and four 
women might report sick.
52
 Philipp found that ‘ground crew suffer[ed] from gastric 
troubles, foot troubles from standing long hours, varicose veins and many everyday 
conditions of an identical nature to those met in general practice.’53 Where possible 
the patients were treated for minor injuries and complaints in the sick quarters. 
However, specialists in all fields of medicine, including neuropsychiatry, were 
available for consultation in RAF hospitals. Personnel had to report for sick parade in 
uniform with their ‘small kit’ in case they were told to stay in the sick quarters. One 
WAAF wondered if the ‘ordeal’ of sick parade, often being kept waiting for long 
periods on an uncomfortable bench, was intended to discourage attendance. She 
preferred to self medicate ‘with aspirin, hot water bottle and bed’, and believed many 
chose to only report to sick quarters when in dire need.
54
  
Illness varied but the most common reasons for ground personnel to attend 
sick parade during neuropsychiatric specialist, Squadron Leader, R W Crocket’s 
limited study were respiratory infections (15.2 per cent), skin complaints (13.6 per 
cent) and injuries including burns (13.6 per cent). Illnesses diagnosed by Crocket as 
neuroses were the next largest group making up almost a tenth of new patients (9.4 
per cent).
55
 However, as a specialist he was more likely to recognise and diagnose 
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these conditions; other medical officers may not have identified their patients as 
such. Stafford-Clark felt that the ‘daily sick list’ could be easily divided: a 
‘constantly changing; smaller group, of the ‘healthy majority’ who were unfortunate 
enough to ‘have something wrong’ and a larger group of individuals who repeatedly 
attended: those with ‘feeble spirits and faint-hearts... martyrs to a consuming self-
pity... hopeful scroungers... [and] malingerers, all essentially indifferent to the 
challenge of this war and unable to accept its reality.’56 In all the RAF home 
commands during the war, over 67,000 personnel were diagnosed with diseases of 
the nervous system and mental diseases and over a third of these cases were 
invalided from the service.
57
  
The majority of medical officers were newly qualified general practitioners 
with little experience of psychiatry or psychology and limited training. The RAF 
emphasised the importance of the health and well being of the flyers. Many medical 
officers considered their knowledge of aviation medicine to take precedence over the 
study of mental health issues. Routine duties were time consuming, the daily round 
of inspections and administration and concern with air crew meant that leave was a 
rare luxury. Only those medical officers with a strong interest in psychiatry such as 
Stafford-Clark may have taken the time to educate themselves further. The efficiency 
of the whole station was seen as more important than the complaints of an individual 
Erk or WAAF. During sick parades it was easier for the medical officer to 
concentrate on more obvious, organic diseases, physical illness and injuries that were 
arguably more responsive to treatment than mental health issues. RAF specialists at 
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nearby hospitals were available for consultation for complicated cases of all kinds. 
However, to take advantage of the experience of neuropsychiatric specialists, the 
medical officer had to correctly diagnose neuropsychiatric illnesses. As will be 
discussed next, medical officers were influenced by the prevailing cultural 
assumptions and medical beliefs about mental health. 
The social construction of mental health  
Following the discussion of the cultural construction of ground personnel in chapter 
one, this section focuses on the social construction of mental health in wider society, 
the military and the RAF. It examines how the inter-war legacy of shell shock, 
soldiers’ responses to Dunkirk and civilian responses to the Blitz affected the 
understanding, diagnoses and treatment of RAF ground personnel with 
neuropsychiatric symptoms by RAF medical officers and specialists. In the treatment 
of neuropsychiatric patients, medical officers were informed by theories developed 
during the inter-war period.  
While many of the symptoms are similar, diagnoses such as shell shock, 
battle fatigue and post traumatic stress disorders (PTSD) are not synonymous. Rather 
each subsequent term is a culturally constructed re-examination of a selection of 
medically unexplained symptoms that, while it may refer to previous explanations, is 
specific to its own context.
58
 At the start of the Second World War, in an attempt to 
reduce the number of neuropsychological casualties, a press report from the Ministry 
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of Pensions made it public that the ‘popular term “shellshock”… was a gross and 
costly misnomer… [which] should be eliminated entirely from our nomenclature.’59 
Combat troops displaying symptoms were told they were suffering from battle 
exhaustion or combat fatigue.
60
 However, the concept of shell shock had achieved 
such a cultural significance and acceptance in society that it continued to be used in 
common parlance.
61
 The general public regarded war neuroses as significantly 
different to peacetime ones, however, psychiatrists and neurologists argued that the 
symptoms of war neuroses were the same as normal psychoneuroses.
62
 The RAF 
specialists argued that apart from demographic peculiarities, there was little 
difference between neuroses in civilians or in those who had experienced combat.
63
 
Throughout the early twentieth century there was an increased acceptance of the 
psychological rather than organic causes for certain symptoms.
64
 Between the wars, 
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the importance of ‘unconscious drives’ was increasingly accepted,65 and by 1939 it 
was largely understood that hysteria was caused by the subconscious ‘conflict 
between the instinct of self-preservation… and… ideas of duty and self respect’.66 
Edward Shorter states that psychosomatic illnesses are ‘any illness in which physical 
symptoms, produced by the action of the unconscious mind, are defined by the 
individual as evidence of organic disease and for which medical help is sought.’67 
According to Shorter, ‘culture intervenes in both forms, legislating what is 
legitimate, and mandating what constitutes an appropriate response to the disease.’68 
Driven by the need to avoid a repetition of the volume of shell shock cases from the 
First World War and to avoid paying costly pensions, the thousands of men suffering 
from shell shock had been partly explained by their own inherent weaknesses rather 
than their experiences of industrial warfare.
69
 During the Second World War, mental 
breakdowns continued to be explained as a function of a person’s character rather 
than as a natural reaction to a traumatic event or events. It was believed that events 
did not cause neurosis, but that they were the excuse on which patients projected 
their ‘previously existing problems.’70 Nervous disorders were constructed as a 
failure in self discipline,
71
 and by the 1930s it was also accepted that in civilian 
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industrial environments ‘the genesis of nervous pathology lay in the workers 
themselves, not in the industrial environment or in the nature of their work.’72  
Research in the inter-war period established that constitutional and 
environmental influences predisposed some people to psychoneuroses.
73
 In the 
limited number of studies of social conditions and mental health, class prejudice and 
psychological diagnoses were combined to explain working-class behaviour in terms 
of pathology.
74
 Conforming to cultural expectations of class and race and partly 
influenced by the eugenics movement, mental health was linked to physical well 
being; a ‘neurotic constitution and inadequate intellectual endowment… [were] held 
to be the two most important predisposing factors for the manifestation of neurotic 
breakdown.’75 Some neuroses were expected in people with ‘low intelligence’ or 
who were ‘feeble-minded’.76 It was believed that psycho-dynamic causes reaching 
back in to patients’ childhood and early family life could both explain and predict 
their breakdown. As discussed in chapter two, it was hoped that psychological 
screening could prevent breakdown. After a breakdown occurred, the particular form 
a hysterical conversion took could almost always be explained by some ‘weakness’ 
or event in the patient’s history if the doctor searched enough.77 
By the end of the war, while theories of predisposition were still relevant, it 
was increasingly accepted that everyone had a breaking point.
78
 Lord Moran, 
Churchill’s person physician, believed that ‘a man’s will power was his capital and 
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he was always spending... When their capital was done they were finished.’79 
Although mental health problems became less stigmatised during the war, in popular 
culture, physical rather than psychological aetiologies were more acceptable. The 
wartime films This Above All (1942),
80
 and A Matter of Life and Death (1946) both 
portray issues of mental health and what seem to be symptoms of hysteria, anxiety or 
neuroses due to combat.
81
 The male protagonists of both films are shown to be 
suffering from neuroses. In This Above All, soldier Clive Briggs has nightmares, 
headaches and mood swings, while in A Matter of Life and Death, Squadron Leader 
Peter Carter presents medically unexplained symptoms; he suffers from headaches, 
blind spots in his vision and hallucinations. However, rather than being ‘cracked’ 
both Clive Briggs and Peter Carter’s symptoms were depicted as being caused by 
physical injuries. Both required emergency neurosurgery to save their lives and 
sanity. Both characters were shown to be intelligent and to possess a strong moral 
code and sense of duty. The possibility that they were deliberately malingering, or 
were cowards, could be discounted by their implicit courage. Although it ostensibly 
seems in these films that mental illness was acceptable, ultimately the symptoms 
both Briggs and Carter exhibit are explained by previous physical injuries rather than 
psychological trauma. As this suggests, in physically fit military men, mental 
problems without an organic, physical cause still seem to have been problematic. 
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As discussed previously, the powerful inter-war discourses of fear and 
anxiety continued throughout the period.
82  
It was believed that fear and anxiety were 
the main causes of psychoneuroses during wartime, either from an ‘over-stimulation 
of the fear mechanism’ or from an ‘unconscious emotional conflict’ over continuing 
to work or fight despite suffering from anxiety.
83
 Medical theories and definitions of 
psychoneuroses continued to evolve, but, influenced by theories surrounding shell 
shock during the First World War, psychoneuroses were largely divided into two 
distinct syndromes, anxiety or hysteria.
84
 
Diagnoses were also influenced by cultural assumptions about social status, 
class and gender. Hysteria has a long history of association with women, and it was 
found during and after the previous war that conversion hysterias were more 
common among the ‘rank and file’ while officers, and even ‘the better class of 
officers’, were more likely to be diagnosed with anxiety neuroses.85 Requiring a level 
of intelligence and imagination, anxiety states were the product of the patient’s 
excessive introspection and ‘rumination’ on either past experiences or on their 
anxiety for the future.
86
  
Military personnel were in the prime of life, healthy, fit and under military 
discipline. It was hoped that psychological selection, training and new more fluid 
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tactics would reduce the impact of psychoneurotic casualties, but events including 
the fall of France and the evacuation of the Army from Dunkirk highlighted a large 
number of neurotic soldiers.
87
 It was assumed that in a modern total war, civilians, 
men, women and children of all ages, would effectively be in the front line, and in 
contrast to the ideal of a highly trained, fit, healthy and disciplined soldier. It was 
believed that civilians would be even more susceptible to neuroses and the 
psychoneurotic manifestations of fear and anxiety.
 88 
Experts predicted millions of 
psychological casualties among the civilian population during the first six months of 
bombing suffering from ‘acute panic, hysteria and other neurotic conditions’.89 
However, after examining cases from Dunkirk and the Blitz, the medical profession 
discovered that there were far more military psychoneurotic casualties and fewer 
civilian casualties than were expected.
90
 Edward Glover argued that before the war 
and during the ‘phoney war’ a ‘mass-neurosis myth’ had formed; the consensus of 
opinion was that air raids would lead to widespread war neuroses. However, after the 
Blitz an opposite belief, a ‘no neurosis myth’, that bombing did not cause the 
expected numbers of civilian psychoneurotic casualties gradually became 
prevalent.
91
 A study on Hull and Birmingham published in 1942 came to the same 
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conclusion.
92
 There were claims that only those who were regarded as already 
predisposed succumbed. In a study published in 1942, it was found that almost three 
quarters of civilians with neuroses were neurotic beforehand, and severe neuroses 
hardly occurred except in those already previously neurotic.
93
  
Constructed by the media in films such as London Can Take It, and in the 
press, it was believed that among the civilian population, the effect of air raids in 
causing neuroses was ‘almost negligible’.94 Although only a minority of the 
population experienced the bombing, propaganda and the media depicted the Blitz as 
a national event,
95
 stoicism under adversity was highlighted as a national character 
trait.
96
 Publishing in the BMJ, one doctor maintained that more neuroses were 
brought to his attention caused by anxiety and the fear of impending raids in 1939 
before the Blitz than by actual bombing in 1940.
97
 Giving only six examples of 
neuroses that were largely explained in terms analogous to shell shock and their 
proximity to explosions, during the Blitz the Daily Mail misquoted from the article 
and told its readers the ‘number of air-raid neurosis casualties has so far been 
“surprisingly small.”’98 Although specialists were careful to use the medical 
terminology and maintained that reactions to air raids were the same as ‘those met in 
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ordinary civilian life,’99 the media helped to perpetuate the concept of shell shock 
and neologisms such as ‘air-raid neurosis.’ 
The unexpectedly high number of military and the corresponding lack of 
civilian casualties were explained by the argument that, in contrast to service 
personnel under military discipline, civilians had a degree of autonomy and were 
able to move away from a place of danger. Those in the military suffered an internal 
conflict between self preservation and performing their duty. The concept of 
‘secondary gain’ also meant that once the symptoms of a neurosis had been 
acknowledged, it was in a soldiers’ personal interest, whether consciously or 
subconsciously, to stall their recovery, while civilians had little to gain from 
prolonging their illness.
 100
 In addition, as Ben Shephard argues, civilian psychiatry 
was being overseen by ‘tough-minded veterans of the First World War’ who 
deliberately discouraged neuroses, while military psychiatry was largely governed by 
‘younger, quasi-Freudian analysts’.101 Unlike civilians, individual soldiers were 
‘permitted’ to become psychiatric casualties, while ‘policy towards civilians was 
much tougher’.102 In a recent article examining how fear, anxiety, panic and hysteria 
were conceptualized at the time by psychological experts from both ‘functional and 
analytical’ perspectives, Michal Shapira disagrees with Shephard and concludes that 
doctors came to accept that people were susceptible to neuroses and were less 
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judgemental on civilians displaying symptoms that they believed were caused by 
fear.
103
 However, neuropsychiatric casualties in the RAF were perceived differently 
to both civilians and soldiers with similar symptoms, and neither Shephard nor 
Shapira’s conclusions can be directly applied to this study. As Edgar Jones has 
argued, in the RAF, the stigma of the LMF was used as a deterrent to discourage air 
crew from becoming psychological casualties.
104
 Some reactions to fear were 
‘ethically illegitimate’.105 Flyers were told that fear was normal and should be 
accepted or ignored.
106
 Despite this, as Shephard suggests was the case in the Army, 
RAF medical officers such as Stafford-Clark could be sympathetic to air crew who 
risked their lives and had broken down towards the end of a tour or after exceptional 
strain.
107
 However, more in common with Shapira’s theory, medical officers had 
little sympathy with ground personnel in relatively safe trades, who seemingly could 
not cope with the hardships of service life. Measured against both the heroism of the 
flyers and the publicised stoicism of civilians and WAAFs during the Blitz, ground 
personnel who broke down were treated more harshly.  
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Mental Health in the RAF 
All the armed forces expanded rapidly after war was declared and there was a 
perceived difference between professional servicemen and volunteers or conscripted 
personnel. In the Royal Navy, most cases of mental illness were to be found amongst 
‘hostilities only’ personnel, while the mental health problem in the Army was 
thought to be more serious than in the other arms because of the high percentage of 
men of low intelligence who were harder to place in suitable jobs.
108
 In the First 
World War, it was felt that ‘the deskilled nature of trench warfare’ led to the 
acceptance of mental defectives into the Army.
109
  
The cultural assumptions that underpinned the theories of predisposition in 
turn informed the RAF medical officer. By the 1930s the RAF was regarded as a 
highly technical service. Many trades required a level of intelligence and mechanical 
aptitude. Although the rapid expansion of the RAF meant that it became more 
socially diverse, the ‘caste system’ of ‘class prejudice’ remained.110 As in the Army, 
an individual’s ‘character’ or ‘personality type’ was crucial to their success or failure 
in their trade,
111
 and the tacit hierarchy of the service informed prejudices about 
different groups of people. In the RAF it was believed the very best quality of men 
were to be found amongst air crew officers. Air crew were commissioned because it 
was felt certain individuals had ‘officer like qualities’.112 At the start of the war these 
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were defined by the ‘public school ethos’ and family connections.113 Despite 
acknowledging his faults, Arthur Harris regarded Guy Gibson, the leader of the 
famous Dam Buster operation, as ‘a thoroughbred.’114 It was believed that, among air 
crew, non commissioned officers broke down more frequently because of certain 
fixed and ‘inherent qualities’.115 Within the culture of the RAF it was assumed that 
this was partly because they were not officers and gentlemen. Such men were often 
either middle-class ex-grammar-school boys,
116
 or members of the working classes 
who had been employed in ground trades, but who had volunteered as air gunners. 
Working in the Air Ministry personnel department, and responsible for investigating 
cases of lack of moral fibre, Wing Commander J. Lawson, found that 40 to 50 per 
cent of LMF cases were from wireless operators and gunners, and he ‘expressed the 
opinion that the educational standard was the main cause.’ He felt that even amongst 
air crew, wireless operators, engineers and gunners felt ‘a sense of inferiority’ and 
struggled with the ‘unwelcome knowledge, however true, that they were of inferior 
quality.’117  
RAF officers expected the tradesmen and the working classes who 
constituted the majority of the ground personnel and WAAFs to have certain 
characteristics that explained their inability to persevere in unpleasant duties. As 
discussed earlier, at the other end of the spectrum, it was felt that the least intelligent 
and least ambitious personnel had only a tenuous connection to the flyers and the 
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raison d’être of the RAF. Following their study of neuropsychiatric casualties in 
North Africa, the American psychiatrists Roy Grinker and John Spiegel made similar 
assumptions about USAAF ground personnel: 
members of the ground personnel of the Air Forces have few of the 
identifications so important to the development of the kind of morale which 
has proved protective against the traumata of war. This is only to be expected 
in groups not designed primarily for combat. The groups are loosely 
organised, there is much shifting and transferring of personnel, and the 
officers function not so much as leaders, as administrators and technical 
experts. Because the function of these groups… is essentially civilian in 
nature … the outlook is essentially civilian.118  
Stafford-Clark found that ground personnel often reported sick with a ‘grievance 
thinly disguised as a vague ache or “terrible pains”, when they were called to do 
some, seemingly irrelevant, unpleasant duty such as a ground defence “backers-up 
course”’.119 One RAF neurologist believed that many men were invalided from the 
RAF regiment because they had joined the RAF in the hope that they could avoid the 
‘horrors’ of drill, parades and practice with weapons.120  
Working at WAAF training selection depots, the RAF psychiatrist Henry 
Rollin carried out studies to confirm the accepted links between neuropsychiatric 
disorders and intelligence and, reinforcing class stereotypes, even the correlation 
between head-lice and intelligence. Rollin found that the majority of WAAFs who 
failed their trade training did so because of a lack of intelligence, and suggested that 
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head lice were ‘more prevalent among the less intelligent recruits.’121 Another 
neuropsychiatric specialist discovered in his study of both male and female personnel 
who broke down, a significant proportion had either left school aged fourteen or had 
very few qualifications.
122
 However, he believed that provided there were no 
complications caused by any other predisposition, personnel with a mental age as 
low as ten could be employed in the services in certain trades.
123
 Rollin suggested 
that ‘dullards’ could serve in menial roles such as cook or batwoman.124 
The ‘industrial misfit’ was a popular trope of industrial psychology in the 
1930s,
125
 and it was believed that people often broke down because they were in 
occupations that they were intellectually and temperamentally unsuited for. 
Throughout the war it was felt that ‘square pegs’ were being put into ‘round 
holes.’126 Such ‘vocational misfits’ were recognised in the services too.127 While 
some personnel may have been required to perform roles beyond their capabilities, 
culminating in unnecessary levels of stress, others riled at occupations that to them 
were unimportant, unglamorous or beneath them. An airman who came to the 
attention of RAF specialists admitted to being ‘scared stiff’ of standing sentry 
duty.
128
 Medical officers noted that ground defence personnel had a higher than 
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average sickness rate. Philipp identified that members of the RAF regiment, trained 
to defend stations from airborne invasion and other threats that failed to materialise 
‘naturally became bored’, but ‘Erks’ who with a ‘sense of duty’ were kept busy 
servicing aircraft around the clock did not often report sick. They did not attempt to 
use tiredness as an excuse to avoid work.
129
 In the services mental illnesses were 
explained as a failure to adapt to military life and the main causes of breakdown were 
thought to be ‘separation from home and family, home worries…[and] the pressure 
of tasks, physically, intellectually or temperamentally beyond them.’130 This failure 
was regarded as the fault of the individual rather than events or the environment, and 
they were regarded as inferior. For example, in his study of neuropsychiatric ground 
personnel one RAF neuropsychiatric specialist established that only 15 per cent 
participated in what he considered ‘average’ hobbies and interests.131  
The majority of medical officers had little training or knowledge in 
psychology or psychiatry and used Air Ministry guidelines for the treatment of 
‘wavering’ air crew as a model for the treatment of ground crew.132 In one 
investigation into the psychological health of air crew, medical officers were advised 
to avoid asking questions about the patient’s ‘family or past history which might 
upset the patient or impair his confidence in himself’.133 Less important ground 
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personnel may have been more aggressively questioned however. Informed by 
contemporary beliefs, and assuming predisposition existed, specialists persisted in 
their investigations until they were satisfied a predisposing factor had been 
identified. Robert Gillespie, the psychiatric consultant for the RAF, found 60 per cent 
of air crew who broke down ‘showed predisposition of at least a moderate degree’ 
compared to the 80 per cent of ground personnel who exhibited ‘considerable to 
severe’ predisposition. He felt that the ‘difference between the two groups in severity 
of predisposition is what might be expected in flying personnel compared with 
ground personnel.’134 
Bomber Command ground personnel were also compared to the reported 
bravery of Fighter Command personnel (including WAAFs ) who were blitzed on 
fighter stations and in operation rooms during the opening stages of the ‘Battle of 
Britain’.135 After 1942 the Luftwaffe stopped intruder raids on bomber stations,136 
and ground personnel were often at less risk of death or injury than civilians living in 
large cities. In Britain, the number of armed forces personnel killed by enemy action 
did not exceed the number of civilians who died until ‘two years of war had 
passed’.137 Those diagnosed with hysteria or anxiety states were also regarded in 
opposition to mythological stoic civilians who displayed the Blitz spirit. 
Consequently, neurotic reactions to fear were inexcusable in ground personnel. It is 
                                                 
134
 R. D. Gillespie, in: Lord Horder, D. Curran, J. R. Rees, R. D. Gillespie, W. M. Fairlie, H. B 
Craigie, J. A. Hadfield, W. R. Reynell ‘Discussion of Functional Nervous States in Relation to Service 
in the Armed Forces’ Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine Vol.36, No. 5, 1943, p. 257. 
135
 See for example: Anon, ‘3 Military Medals for W.A.A.F.s’ The Daily Mail, 2 November 1940, p. 
1, Anon, ‘Military Medal for three W.A.A.F.s: Bravery during attack on R.A.F. station’ The Times, 
(London), 2 Nov. 1940, p. 2 and Anon, ‘Military Medal For Two Women’ The Times (London), 11 
Jan. 1941, p. 6.  
136
 M. Hastings, Bomber Command, (London, Michael Joseph, 1980), p. 235. 
137
 Titmuss, Social Policy, p. 335. 
273 
 
likely that such beliefs led to them being given a less than sympathetic reception 
when they presented to their medical officer with psychoneurotic symptoms.
138
  
RAF ground personnel were in uniform, but were only infrequently exposed 
to high levels of danger. In a continuation of industrial psychology and medical 
theories that rationalised the aetiology of shell shock as a function of inherited 
constitution and character, the patient’s own weaknesses were responsible for their 
failings rather than external traumatic situations and events. As well as being 
subservient in rank, in the distinct hierarchy in the RAF, ground personnel were 
unfavourably compared against the heroic ideal of air crew, and stoic civilians. As 
Elaine Showalter has argued, men who broke down in the previous war were seen to 
display traits associated with hysteric women; they were regarded as ‘simple, 
emotional, unthinking, passive, suggestible, dependant and weak’.139 Ground 
personnel who broke down failed to maintain even a low standard of competence. In 
common with soldiers in the previous war they were thought to display feminine 
qualities, and they were further emasculated by being identified as having degenerate 
flaws or character traits. As will be seen in the next chapter, although 
neuropsychiatric specialists made the distinction between inherent and acquired 
predisposing factors, RAF medical officers frequently conflated the constitutional 
origins of predisposition with psycho-dynamic causes.  
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Neuropsychiatric ground personnel  
As the majority of medical officers had been drawn from civilian practice, their 
knowledge of neuropsychiatric illnesses was largely influenced by their civilian 
rather than military training, although some guidance was given in how to recognise 
and treat psychoneuroses in air crew. Freudian theories were predominant,
140
 and 
within the RAF it was accepted that neurosis developed ‘from the interaction of 
stress and a predisposed personality.’141 In the case of a member of air crew who was 
suspected of developing a neurosis or lacking in moral fibre, the medical officer was 
instructed to assess the patient’s medical history, looking for any domestic stress, any 
predisposition to neurosis, while also trying to judge the amount of flying stress the 
patient had endured. Flying stress could include ‘severe enemy combats, crash-
landings, bale-outs [sic] or “shaky dos” in general.’142 Predisposing factors included 
‘nightmares as a child’, introspection, ‘timidity’ psychological illnesses in the 
patient’s family, ‘headaches’ and ‘eyestrain’, or numerous other clues that would 
show that the patient was ‘a slightly unstable type’.143 Although they could not be 
expected to form relationships with ground personnel as they could with the smaller 
numbers of officer air crew, the medical officer would have undertaken an 
assessment of the patient’s predisposition to psychoneuroses. As was discussed in 
chapter three, ground personnel often experienced traumatic and stressful events, but 
it is not known to what extent such experiences were taken into account by medical 
officers as their risk of death or injury were comparatively low. The neuropsychiatric 
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specialist Squadron Leader D. N. Parfitt found that less than ten per cent of his 
patients with hysteria ‘had suffered bombing or serious threats’ and that only a 
quarter of those diagnosed with an anxiety state had undergone ‘terrifying 
experiences’.144 Such experiences were familiar to doctors who had attended crashed 
aircraft. For instance, in figure 5.2 the commanding officer, a padre and a medical 
officer attempt to rescue the crew from a burning Mosquito after it crashed at 
Predannack, Cornwall.  
 
Fig 5.2. Photographs. Royal air Force: Air Defence of Great Britain, 1943-1944, IWM, CH 18732. 
 
For medical officers, risking their lives to rescue crewmen from aircraft with 
the inherent danger of aviation fuel and unexploded munitions was not an unusual 
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occurrence, and dealing with the dead and injured was common.
145
 Medical officers 
could experience terrifying and traumatic events as part of their everyday duties. 
Some (like Parfitt above) subsequently had little patience with personnel who 
developed symptoms of hysteria or anxiety without experiencing any risk or danger 
to themselves.  
As is the case with air crew, many potential cases of neuropsychiatric 
casualties amongst RAF ground personnel may have been averted and unrecorded by 
an imaginative and understanding medical officer. Recruits often found the rapid 
change from civilian life to a military regime hard to cope with and medical officers 
were forced to undertake a role similar to an ‘industrial welfare worker.’146 It was 
possible for the medical officer to find himself organising the exchange of ill-fitting 
clothing and equipment that was considered detrimental to their patient’s well-
being.
147
 Although diagnoses were defined by the Air Ministry, a wide variety of 
treatments and outcomes were still available to the medical officer, and unlike 
civilian doctors, the medical officer had recourse to military discipline. However, 
Stafford-Clark believed that it was more effective to rekindle the patient’s 
enthusiasm through a ‘pep talk’ as the threat of military discipline was often 
insufficient, no matter how ‘just’ it was. He hoped to remind his patients of the 
‘nature of their obligations’ while giving them an ‘insight... into the shallow 
inadequacy of their symptoms’.148 Patients exhibiting somatic manifestations of 
neuropsychological problems could be given medical treatment for their symptoms, 
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or even a placebo.
149
 Frustrated and depressed patients who complained that certain 
tasks seemed ‘trivial and inappropriate’ could be reassured that their work, however 
tedious, was important to the war effort,
150 
and if caught early hysterics could be 
successfully encouraged to carry on with their duties.
151 
The medical officer was 
authorised to enforce sick leave, either in the patient’s quarters or in the station sick 
quarters, or to recommend short periods of leave.
152
 If necessary, after consultation 
with the patient’s immediate superiors, the medical officer could recommend to the 
commanding officer that the ‘misemployed’ [sic] were remustered or given a more 
suitable occupation.
153 Parfitt admitted that ‘treatment aimed at resolving the 
immediate strains produc[ed] satisfactory results from the point of view of the 
continuation of service duties.’154 However, as this may have often entailed a 
downgrading in medical category, reposting or remustering to a new trade,
155
 or 
other changes in duties, the dilemma confronting medical officers was whether to 
prioritise the needs of the individual or the service. There was a risk that, by 
deceiving the medical officer, some individuals could shirk their duties and possibly 
escape military service entirely. The medical officer was not able to downgrade the 
patient’s medical category or invalid them from the service, but they were able to 
begin this process by referring them to specialists at RAF hospitals and NYDN 
centres. The treatment of patients referred to RAF hospitals as both in or out-patients 
will be discussed in the following chapter.  
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The medical officer was a cog in the military medical machine, he was 
expected only to perform as a general practitioner, and awkward cases were to be 
referred to centralised specialists. Although it is likely that many patients with early 
symptoms of neuropsychiatric illness may not have been recognised, influenced by 
their training on the psychological treatment of air crew, more imaginative medical 
officers tried to prevent neuropsychiatric illness rather than attempt a cure later. 
Neuropsychiatric illness was seen to be a function of the patients’ ability to cope 
with stress and how predisposed they were. Ultimately, the amount of stress it was 
felt personnel had suffered and the amount of predisposition recorded for any given 
patient was dependent on the subjective opinion of the doctor, the openness of the 
patient, the time available, and the questions the doctor asked.  
WAAFS 
Dislocated from the masculine heroism of air crew by their gender, WAAFs were 
also found to be more prone to sickness including neuropsychiatric illnesses.
156 
Although it varied during the war, statistically women were twice more likely to 
report sick than their male counterparts, and more had illnesses lasting over forty 
eight hours. However, perhaps due to a larger proportion of minor physical ailments 
among women, the average length of treatment until return to duty was shorter.
157 
A 
study of absences lasting more than three days among 10,000 civilian workers in 
1943 and 1944 found similar findings; males lost twice as much time from work due 
to accidents, but women were absent for more days during the year, and were over 
five times more likely to have time off due to what was diagnosed as ‘nervous 
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debility.’158 In addition, when WAAFs were referred to a neuropsychiatric specialist 
by their medical officer, only two fifths were returned to full duty, compared with 
three quarters of men.
159
 The concept of a ‘suburban neurosis’, had been introduced 
to the medical profession by Stephen Taylor in The Lancet in 1938. Taylor believed 
that factors including financial concerns, boredom, a lack of community and an 
unfulfilling life, led to a psychological conflict that in turn caused neurosis in young 
middle class women.
160
 He argued that a sense of purpose could distract them and 
lead to an improvement in their symptoms.
161
 It was acknowledged that recruits 
brought their established neurosis with them into the WAAF. For many however, the 
purpose and regimentation of military service did not provide relief from neurosis as 
may have been expected. One RAF specialist thought that the WAAF attracted 
women who were ‘emotional or impulsive types’ and that their ‘inability to adjust’ to 
service life heightened such psychological failings.
162
 In his study of 2000 female 
auxiliary service personnel, the psychiatrist, William Linford Rees, stated that 
women had particular problems adapting to military life. Women found the loss of 
individuality brought about by conforming to military discipline, wearing uniforms 
and the lack of privacy disturbing.
163
 Women were regarded as conversely either 
‘solitary, shy individuals’ or were affected negatively by the breakup of ‘strong 
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emotional attachments’ caused by posting.164 Medical officer Flight Lieutenant M. 
Hamilton stressed the importance of service personnel’s ‘emotional development’, 
exchanging their ‘dependence on the family for dependence on the community.’165 
As discussed in the previous chapter, groups of WAAFs formed strong friendship 
groups and emotional communities. One WAAF wrote: 
the last few days I’ve felt a bit fed up with everything. I think the fact that 
quite a few of the crowd we know have been posted, may account for this. 
One gets so used to everything… - then suddenly bang - & off everyone 
seems to go.
166
  
The importance of a strong esprit de corps was emphasised in all the services, 
however it was acknowledged that amongst ground personnel this could be hard to 
achieve, as personnel were posted as individuals rather than redeployed as complete 
units. It was felt that for this reason, in addition to unit morale, women especially 
suffered emotional upsets as their ‘strong individual emotional ties’ were broken.167 
Medical officers made further assumptions based on gender stereotypes, and the 
patriarchal belief that men were rational while women were emotional.
168
 Some 
women were described as ‘aggressive’ psychopaths; they were ‘vivacious, attractive 
and intelligent’ but spoilt and prone to ‘rebellious antisocial activity.’169 Women 
were also more likely to be diagnosed as hysterics than men.
170 
Rarer psychosomatic 
symptoms took the form of headaches, ‘rheumatic pains’ and ‘gynaecological 
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complaints especially related to menstruation.’171 Despite the fact that many women 
in the WAAF were active sexually, as can be seen in the numbers treated for 
venereal disease or who left the service due to pregnancy, it was expected that 
serving in the WAAF had a ‘psychobiological significance’ as ‘traditional female 
values’ and ‘primary biological functions’ had to be ignored.172 Bomber Command 
had the second highest rate of recorded venereal disease amongst WAAFs at 3.1 per 
thousand in 1942.
173
 In 1945 almost 2000 WAAFs left the service due to pregnancy. 
(13.26 per thousand.)
174
 In comparison, the rate of venereal disease amongst men in 
the entire service peaked at 18.6 per thousand in 1945,
175
 while the highest rate was 
amongst Bomber Command air crew at 34.5 per thousand in 1942.
176
 Although a 
minority of older women could perhaps be thought of as maternal figures who cared 
for the flyers, as discussed in chapter one, it was easier to understand women who 
wanted to serve as a sexual predators. The social and cultural assumptions which 
contributed to the construction of the hierarchy of WAAF trades were widely 
accepted and were later reproduced in the official history:  
a large proportion of patients had a low standard of intelligence… the highest 
rates occurred in the trades of A.C.H., waitress, batwoman, sparking-plug 
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tester and fabric worker, whereas trades such as radio operator, special duties 
clerk and teleprinter operator had a very low incidence.
177
 
Although the hedonistic excesses of air crew explained and excused their high 
incidence of VD, the rates of disease amongst different WAAF trade groups was 
seen as evidence of the quality of the women in these roles.  
The incidence of Women reporting for sick parade for what were regarded as 
spurious reasons was believed to increase after 1942 and the conscription of women 
to the services (see chapter two). Philipp noticed the ‘deterioration in the type of girl 
entering the Service.’178 It was found that men and women who failed to cope had 
frequently ‘joined the service for poor or inadequate reasons.’179 As discussed in 
chapter two, spurious motives for women joining the WAAF included the glamour of 
serving with air crew, to avoid domestic problems, or an attempt to forget 
bereavement. Others may have enlisted to overcome feelings of inadequacy or to 
meet their ‘desire for masculine identification.’180 Rollin found that in his study of 
women who failed their trade training almost a quarter had ‘selfish rather than 
patriotic’ motives for volunteering for the WAAF. These reasons included wanting 
an ‘open air life’, wishing to avoid working in a munitions factory, thinking it ‘would 
take her out of herself’ and ‘to spite her husband.’181 It was accepted that for 
servicemen RAF discipline enforced a ‘social responsibility’ but that the ‘less 
stringent’ discipline of the WAAF was ‘inadequate’; women could not be pushed as 
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‘vigorously.’182 In the early days of the WAAF, being absent without leave or even 
desertion was not a punishable offence,
183
 and until 1944 a WAAF could not be 
disciplined by incarceration, detained on camp for more than a fortnight, punished by 
heavy duties or have her pay withheld for long.
184
 Many women who struggled to 
cope with the discipline and demands of a military life may have been invalided from 
the service. The service had invested less in them and they were easier to replace. 
Even by the end of the war, neurotic women were thought to be more of ‘a menace to 
unit morale and discipline’.185  
In summary, the treatment of women in Bomber Command was determined 
by discourses that socially constructed ideological gender differences. With the 
expansion of the WAAF and after conscription was introduced, women’s motives for 
joining up were questioned. Women were likened to children; they were overtly 
emotional and selfishly individualistic. It was expected that many would struggle to 
adapt to the strict regime of a military environment. Medical officers’ diagnoses and 
treatment of women were influenced by all these preconceptions. 
Identifying Malingering 
As Ben Shephard argues, malingering had a long history, and following an unwritten 
code, soldiers differentiated between those who feigned symptoms to avoid danger or 
work that others would then have to do, and ‘swinging the lead’ to deceive doctors 
and experts when it did not affect their comrades.
186
 In the RAF too, when it was 
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appropriate, the crafty skill of a malingerer could be acknowledged.
187
 (See Fig. 5.3.)
 
FIG. 5.3. D. Langdon, All Buttoned Up! A Scrapbook of RAF Cartoons, (London, Sylvan Press, 
1944), p. 43. 
 
Langdon’s Latin translation of lead swinging gives the practice a humorous and 
believable medical name. Supposedly ill in bed, the character is smoking a cigarette 
and winking at the viewer. The audience shares the knowledge that he is deliberately 
avoiding work by feigning or exaggerating illness, and the humour is at the expense 
of the RAF military authority and the medical profession. 
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For those at the bottom of the hierarchy, malingering was a form of resistance 
and a way of reclaiming personal agency. In the book Industrial Medicine, Dr 
Donald Norris defined four types of malingering:  
1. Exaggeration – Genuine symptoms are present, but the patient 
fraudulently makes these out to be worse than they are. 
2. Perseveration – Genuine symptoms were formerly present, have 
ceased, but are fraudulently alleged to continue.  
3. Transference – Genuine symptoms are fraudulently attributed to some 
cause which would entitle the patient to benefit, although he knows that in 
fact they are due to some other cause. 
4. Invention – The patient has no symptoms, but fraudulently represents 
that he has.
188
 
Another doctor defined malingering as reporting purely invented symptoms, while 
‘skrimshankers’ exaggerated an actual illness for deliberate gain.189 Philipp believed 
in his experience that malingering was very rare, but that ‘a man... employed on 
duties... uncongenial to him... may exaggerate symptoms that will give... relief 
from... duties temporarily.’190 As a form of fraud, it was understood that malingerers 
were often either of criminal persuasion, of ‘less than average intelligence’, or 
both.
191 
However, using Freudian theories, malingering had been increasingly 
medicalised throughout the first half of the twentieth century.
192
 Certain symptoms 
                                                 
188
 D. C. Norris, ‘Malingering’ in: Rolleston, H. and Moncrieff, A. A. (eds) The Practitioner 
Handbooks: Industrial Medicine, (London, 1944), p. 99. 
189
 Hadfield, ‘War Neurosis’, p. 284. 
190
 Tempest, Near the Sun, p.62. 
191
 Norris, ‘Malingering’, p. 102. 
192
 R. Cooter, Malingering in Modernity: Psychological Scripts and Adversarial Encounters During 
the First World War’ in: Cooter, Harrison, and Sturdy, War Medicine and Modernity, p.135. 
286 
 
were regarded as illegitimate; individuals were discouraged from developing them at 
the risk of being ‘undeserving’.193 An Army psychiatrist maintained that: 
The malingerer is a psychopath with... a complete absence of guilt-feeling 
concerning his malingering... he consciously assumes an exploits symptoms 
of physical or mental illness…194  
Medical officers faced the problem of differentiating between those with a genuine 
physical complaint, and potential psychopaths who were malingering. As well as 
their dubious symptoms, Norris suggested that malingerers had a ‘tendency’ to 
‘overact’ and, assuming they would not be believed, were often aggressive towards 
the doctor.
195
 They also made the mistake of concentrating on one major symptom, 
often choosing to complain of unrealistic ‘constant unvarying pain’.196 Others were 
concerned that, in common with theories regarding shell shock, if a patient with 
psychological disorders was given a diagnosis such as ‘a tired heart’ this would ‘fix 
his symptoms, in some cases for life.’197 Although, as part of their treatment, they 
were encouraged to continue with their duties and not to report to the medical officer, 
neurotics also attended subsequent sick parades more often than people with other 
illnesses.
198 
It is likely that some patients with genuine complaints were defined as 
neurotic or malingerers simply because the doctor had failed to treat them. Under 
service conditions a second opinion was the prerogative of the medical officer not the 
patient. By the end of the war, there was also growing concern that, through 
increased awareness of neuropsychiatric illness, malingerers knew the correct 
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responses to the doctor’s questioning to ensure an advantageous downgrading or 
discharge.
199
 
During the First World War, preventing malingering became a principal duty 
of medical officers.
200
 In industrial factories and workshops of the 1930s the 
‘neurotic worker’ was identified by ‘repeated illness and absenteeism, unsatisfactory 
home conditions and introversion.’201 In civilian industrial medicine it was felt that, 
at least on their first consultation, every patient should be given a benefit of doubt,
202 
and it seems as though this was the case in the RAF. The majority of medical officers 
certainly tried to rule out physical illness before labelling a patient as neurotic. 
‘Assessment [was] naturally difficult,’203 and usually, in the case of suspected 
neuropsychiatric patients, a physical examination was combined with an informal 
psychiatric interview, but it was ‘sometimes hard to separate psychiatric symptoms 
from immorality.’204  
The problem facing station medical officers was distinguishing those who 
were genuinely ill from those who were perceived to be ‘swinging the lead’ in order 
to ‘work their ticket’.205 As Crocket discussed, ‘two patients presenting... with almost 
identical symptom-complexes can show extreme differences in behaviour... one will 
quickly become totally incapacitated, while the other remains on duty, and 
apparently refuses to permit his disability to prevent him doing so.’206 Each case 
should have been taken on its own merits, and in each case the medical officer had to 
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make an informed, but almost entirely subjective decision. Faced with similar 
problems, W. E. Hick, an Army medical officer wrote: 
As to the methods in vogue for separating the wheat from the tares, they fall 
into three classes: 
(1)  “The Sign from Heaven,” otherwise known as clinical intuition or 
diagnostic acumen. 
(2)  “The Geographical.” Certain parts of the British Isles seem to 
maintain steady streams of “bad eggs” to the Services. Wild horses would not 
induce me to name my own favourite black spots. 
(3)  “The Police Method,” which relies on “information received” and on 
catching the accused out in contradictory statements.
207
 
Crocket admitted that in an ‘ordinary psychiatric examination one uses rough and 
ready methods, often half unconsciously.’208 However, the methods described by 
Hick highlight some of the preconceptions and concerns prevalent at the time. Hick’s 
use of ‘clinical intuition or diagnostic acumen’ suggests the logic with which 
Stafford-Clark identified the ‘handful’ of patients who saw illness as an escape from 
disagreeable duties’ at RAF Waterbeach.209 They were discernible because their 
symptoms appeared unresponsive to treatment, or as in Crocket’s experience, they 
consistently and repeatedly attended sick parade ‘with melancholy and improbable 
tales of woe.’210 The second of Hick’s ‘classes’, his ‘Geographical’ method of 
exposing ‘bad eggs’ illustrates the functioning of race and class prejudices and it 
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would be interesting to speculate where these ‘black spots’ were. In the case of the 
WAAF, gender stereotypes may also have influenced doctor’s diagnoses, while 
Hick’s ‘Police’ method, ‘catching the accused out in contradictory statements’, 
indicates a confrontational relationship between doctor and patient.  
A debate in the British Medical Journal reveals differing views among 
medical officers on how psychiatry should be applied to the treatment or disposal of 
cases who reported on sick parade with various suspicious symptoms. Some medical 
officers felt ‘moral indignation’ at the perceived advantage to be gained by such 
illnesses.
211
 A vociferous proportion of RAF medical officers endorsed the 
assumption especially prevalent within the military that those, whose behaviour 
might now be explained and forgiven by modern diagnostic labels, were lazy, 
malingering, shirkers or skrimshankers.
212
 Medical officer Wing Commander 
Kenneth Bergin became cynical and suspicious of the use of psychiatry in the 
services and found specialists’ results unacceptable. Although he admitted he had 
once been more sympathetic, by the end of the war he felt the RAF laid ‘too much 
stress on psychological illness and not enough on a man’s responsibility to his 
fellows.’213 Citing examples, Bergin implied that personnel knew the symptoms of 
anxiety states as well as he, and were attempting to achieve their aim of release from 
service ‘by conscious or unconscious deception.’214 He claimed that acknowledging 
symptoms of such imagined or actual illnesses ran the risk of burdening the armed 
forces, the medical services and society; it was also detrimental to the patient as it 
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caused ‘a chronic state of neurotic invalidism’.215 G. F. Magurran agreed that many 
patients had no concept of duty and were ‘sickened only by selfish thoughts.’216 
Bergin saw recourse to neuropsychiatrists as ‘the refuge of the diagnostically 
destitute’ and admitted that he referred increasing numbers of potential 
neuropsychiatric patients for executive disciplinary action rather than medical 
treatment. Magurran also maintained that it was expedient to exhort personnel to: 
‘Do your duty or take the consequence.’217 In the short term at least, such methods 
may have been effective. As Bergin concludes, ‘a senior N.C.O. dealt with in this 
manner … decided that hard work was more acceptable outside prison than 
inside.’218 Wing Commander Philip Perkins agreed, and he described the practice of 
‘substituting the neuropsychiatrist for the guardroom’ as a ‘calamitous folly’.219 
However, considering the conflict between individual freedom and state interests, 
others felt that insisting that ‘misfits’ continued to carry out their duties was 
reminiscent of the behaviour of totalitarian states liberal democracies had been 
fighting against.
220
 Hick believed it was ‘perhaps better to be fooled occasionally 
than to be unjust to an honest man.’221 A squadron leader highlighted that a 
temporary downgrading in medical category ‘enable[d] many patients to carry on 
serving,’222 and an Army medic also believed that a more sympathetic approach 
would have better results, arguing ‘it pays better to take what the man will give 
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rather than break him because he will not give you all you want.’223 Squadron Leader 
P. R. Kemp thought that ‘uncontrolled neurotics’ reduced efficiency and that the 
forces would be improved if they were invalided.
224
 In pre-war industry it was felt 
that workers could be problematic due to poor training or psychological 
unsuitability.
225
 However, in the RAF it was not easy to admit that training might be 
at fault. 
In reply to Bergin, perhaps more in touch with contemporary psychiatric 
theories, a flying officer thought that very few of his patients were malingering. He 
saw physical symptoms as ‘psychoneurotic manifestations’ of ‘emotional illness’ that 
could be equally as debilitating as ‘organic illness.’226 Another medical officer was 
aware of follow up studies of discharged service personnel and doubted that the 
primary purpose of a malingerer’s symptoms was their eventual discharge. As 
Squadron Leader A. Harris pointed out, a patient’s neurotic symptoms did not 
disappear when they realised that downgrading or discharge would not be 
forthcoming.
227
  
The identification of malingering was informed by social discourses of race, 
class and gender, and conscientious medical officers attempted to rule out organic 
illnesses before labelling patients as malingerers. However, medical officers may 
have become frustrated by patients’ lack of response to the treatment of physical 
symptoms, while those with suspected neuroses lost faith in the medical officer.
228
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Patients who failed to respond to the treatment of their physical symptoms ran the 
risk of being accused of malingering. In the First World War immorality had been 
medicalised.
229
 By the Second World War malingering had therefore come to be 
addressed as a psychological problem, but in the case of the RAF and its hierarchy of 
ground personnel in particular it was tackled as a disciplinary issue. In parallel to the 
lack of moral fibre policy for the treatment of air crew with no medical reason for 
their refusal to fly, ground personnel who were believed to have exaggerated or 
invented symptoms were still defined as malingerers. It was acknowledged in 
civilian practice during this period that the doctor’s prejudices concerning class, race 
or religion led to mistakes in correctly identifying a malingerer.
230
 That some 
medical officers were concerned that similar errors were made in the RAF is evident 
from correspondence in medical journals.  
The medical officer’s role was defined and constrained by the military.231 To 
an extent, diagnoses and treatments available to medical officers were regulated by 
the Air Ministry consultants. The adversarial relationship between patient and doctor 
has been noted by historians studying the First World War and this conflict continued 
into the Second World War.
232 
Rather than the individual’s interests, military doctors 
had to prioritise the interests of the state.
233
 Although it was mediated by the 
necessities of the war, at the time some doctors themselves also recognised a conflict 
between their Hippocratic oath and military authority. Rather than subject his 
patients to punitive military discipline, one doctor hoped that medical officers could 
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‘remain clinicians primarily, seek... cures first through the science of medicine... 
[and] retain the spirit of detached sympathy’.234 However, an article discussing the 
role of the medical officer in the BMJ suggested that a logical approach to ‘man-
mastership’ was crucial; the medical officer should take ‘a strong line’ to ensure the 
‘efficiency of the unit’.235 In his article in the BMJ, Stafford-Clark expressed his 
belief that the medical officer’s duty lay in preserving the strength of his unit, and 
that the health and efficiency of the unit took precedence over his obligation to 
individual patients.
236
 Totally immersed in the culture of the RAF, he spent as much 
time as he could with air crew officers. At Waterbeach, he even flew as a passenger 
with them on several bombing operations.
237 
He felt terrible when his friends were 
killed or injured and thought that the loss of air crew was ‘Bloody tragic.’238 
Stafford-Clark’s brother was killed in February 1941 and his role as a medical officer 
during the war became ‘a deeply personal as well as a professional crusade.’239 He 
believed that the war effort took precedence over many other considerations, and 
being more aware of the strain air crew endured than other medical officers, it is 
unsurprising that he had limited sympathy for ground personnel with apparently 
lesser emotional upsets. He ensured that a ‘dead beat’ medical orderly was 
remustered as an aircrafthand,
240
 and he believed that the ‘reality of war need[ed] 
emphasizing to many whose nearest approach to it was the sound of a bomb ‘in civvy 
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street’.241 Crocket believed that neurotic ground personnel were more demanding on 
doctors’ time than any other patients.242 To maintain efficiency, the service 
demanded swift diagnoses and either medical or disciplinary treatment. Squadron 
Leader P. R. Kemp RAFVR pointed out that neurotics hindered the service and for 
the sake of efficiency it was expedient to invalid or discharge them.
243 
As mentioned 
above, some malingerers were caught out by ‘police methods’, and Stafford-Clark 
believed that such individuals could be given a more acceptable sense of perspective 
by ‘belligerent medicine’: a mixture of a pep talk and military discipline.244 In a 
similar way to persuading air crew in the early stages of breakdown to continue 
flying,
245 
some medical officers forced male personnel to carry on by threats of 
making their life worse if they did not. Ground personnel therefore usually continued 
working on until their symptoms became undeniable, their work suffered and they 
became detrimental to the efficiency of the unit. Treatment was then inevitably more 
protracted with less hopeful prognosis.  
 Stafford-Clark felt that people at the Air Ministry took for granted that 
a qualified doctor had an understanding of the effect of stress on morale, and of how 
to treat it. In his opinion they were mistaken; medical officers had to learn about 
psychiatry ‘on the job.’246 It was only those with psychiatric qualifications or a strong 
interest in the subject who published in journals about servicemen and women with 
neuropsychiatric symptoms. Originally a surgeon,
247
 Stafford-Clark qualified in 
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psychiatry after the war, publishing his book Psychiatry Today in 1951. Other 
medical officers were likely to investigate physical aetiology for their patient’s 
symptoms. As Ballard and Miller highlighted, hysterical symptoms regularly 
confounded the ‘organically minded investigator.’248 However, for both psychiatrists 
and general practitioners, before a diagnosis of neurotic illness could be made, 
organic causes had to be discounted. It was common practice for medical officers to 
refer patients to neuropsychiatric specialists at NYDN centres as either in-patients or 
out-patients, and the specialists at such centres frequently highlighted that medical 
officers with little understanding of neurology or psychiatry tried too hard to find 
organic causes for the presented symptoms. One ‘problem’ WAAF spent eight days 
in the sick quarters as the medical officer ‘delighted in jabbing everywhere as hard as 
he could’ in an attempt to prove she had appendicitis. Suffering from ‘a complete 
lack of appetite, & a lack of energy’, it was later decided that she ‘had nothing at all 
wrong’ with her ‘other than a bad attack of mental un-settledness’.249 
In summary, medical officers had varied opinions that depended on their 
view of the war and their opinion and knowledge of neuropsychiatry and psychology. 
At least some doctors persisted in treating physical symptoms, before referring 
patients to RAF neuropsychiatric specialists. Others, like Stafford-Clark, were more 
confident in their knowledge of psychology and attempted to persuade neurotic 
patients of their duty. However, for many medical officers the dilemma they faced 
was not whether to put the needs of the patient or the RAF first, but whether 
retaining or expelling malingerers would be most effective for the war effort.  
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Conclusion 
Besides his role as an emergency doctor, the medical officer was responsible for 
practising preventative medicine and maintaining morale, and he was predominantly 
concerned with the physical and mental health of flying personnel. It was easy for 
him unobtrusively to observe the emotional and mental state of air crew officers; he 
had less opportunity or incentive to observe ground personnel. Individual WAAFs 
and ground personnel members sometimes served on the same station for months, if 
not years, but because they were not usually subject to the attrition of combat, until 
they reported at sick parade, they were made invisible by their ubiquity and 
perceived relative unimportance. Medical officers had even less opportunity to assess 
the morale and emotional resilience of the members of the WAAF they were 
responsible for. The majority of medical officers were civilians commissioned for the 
duration of the war as part of the RAFVR, and their limited additional training 
focused on peculiarities of aviation medicine, with perhaps one lecture on the 
psychology of air crew. Only a small minority had any further training in 
psychology, psychiatry or neurology. As Stafford-Clark suggested, they were 
unprepared for their role as psychiatrists in attempting to maintain the morale of their 
station. Informed by pamphlets from the Air Ministry on how to treat air crew who 
were ‘wavering’ in their ability to continue to fly, medical officers applied social 
hygienist, hereditarian and Freudian theories of predisposition and stress when 
attempting to diagnose potentially neuropsychiatric ground personnel. Illness was 
thought to be ‘the outcome of an individual’s behaviour, his or her genetic 
inheritance, together with a range of social and environmental factors’.250 Unable to 
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explain a range of bewildering symptoms, some medical officers concluded that 
patients were malingering rather than suffering from neuropsychiatric illness. Such 
decisions were often influenced by social and cultural preconceptions and ideologies, 
which caused doctors to consider certain patients to be more predisposed to neuroses 
or more likely to malinger. Correspondence in medical journals highlights that, for 
some medical officers at least, the conflict between the interest of the individual and 
the state was problematic, and that attempting to uncover malingerers and enforce 
military discipline, could prompt a confrontational relationship between doctor and 
patient. For many medical officers, the treatment of neuropsychiatric patients and 
malingerers became a disciplinary problem. Second opinions were available from 
colleagues and the neuropsychiatrists at NYDN centres, but ultimately it was the 
medical officer who had to make a subjective choice about the diagnosis and 
treatment of his patients.  
Medical and cultural discourses were employed to explain neuropsychiatric 
breakdown. Medical officers were influenced by, and played a role in maintaining, 
the constructed binary between weak and strong. However, the hierarchical and 
patriarchal culture of the RAF was also important in determining the treatment of 
neuropsychiatric casualties. Air crew epitomised the pinnacle of hegemonic, heroic 
masculinity all other personnel were measured against. Informed by such beliefs, 
medical officers expected ground personnel to be less resilient and more likely to 
breakdown. It was expected of WAAFs because they were female. Emasculated by 
their lowly rank and status, male ground personnel were also effectively feminised. 
Although Shapira and Shephard disagree on how compassionately neurotic civilians 
and soldiers with battle exhaustion were treated by the medical profession, in RAF 
298 
 
Bomber Command, both male and female ground personnel were regarded and 
treated entirely differently to civilians, soldiers, or flyers in the RAF. While in the 
culture of the RAF it was considered normal for air crew to feel fear, succumbing to 
it was stigmatised; because they had less reason to be afraid, ground personnel who 
broke down were treated with little sympathy.  
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6 
THE TREATMENT OF GROUND PERSONNEL IN NOT YET DIAGNOSED 
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC CENTRES  
 
The very existence of NYDN centres attracts thither an appalling crowd of 
mal-adapted, unstable, homesick, humourless and inadequate personalities 
who are the despair of their unit medical officers. Much more difficulty is 
created by these individuals than by any of the neurological problems that 
arise.
1
  
Medical officers on operational stations referred personnel they thought might be 
suffering from neurosis, anxiety, hysteria or other mental illnesses to the RAF’s Not 
Yet Diagnosed Neuropsychiatric (NYDN) centres attached to RAF hospitals 
throughout the country.
2
 By 1942, there were eleven neuropsychiatric diagnostic 
centres in the United Kingdom: the main hospital at the Central Medical 
Establishment in London, four centres for operational squadrons and six for non-
operational personnel.
3
 In 1943, this figure had risen to thirteen with an additional 
four in Scotland.
4
 NYDN centres were primarily concerned with diagnosis and 
disposal of neuropsychiatric cases. These centres predominantly functioned as short 
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stay and outpatient units; cases that required treatment for more than three weeks 
were transferred to other RAF or Emergency Medical Service (EMS) hospitals.
5
 By 
1942, as well as the three neuropsychiatric consultants - Air Commodore H. L. 
Burton (neurology and psychiatry), acting Air Commodore Charles Symonds 
(neurology) and acting Group Captain Robert Gillespie (psychiatry) - there were 20 
other neurological or psychiatric specialists at the NYDN centres and a further six in 
special hospitals.
6
  
The study of shell shock has dominated the historiography of war, medicine 
and psychiatry during the twentieth century. Studies often use a longitudinal 
approach to examine both world wars and change over time.
7
 Work that does address 
the Second World War tends to focus on either military or civilian casualties rather 
than both together. As Michal Shapira points out, following Angus Calder’s re-
examination of the official history by Richard Titmuss, historians have debated 
whether mass neuroses among civilians during the war was a myth or a reality, and 
have attempted to quantify whether anxiety or morale on the home front was high or 
low.
8
 Ben Shephard considers how the Ministry of Pensions used the medical 
profession to limit the number of people eligible for both military and civilian 
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pensions.
9
 Although in A War of Nerves he largely focuses on the treatment of 
military personnel, he also examines civilian responses to war.
10
 Shephard highlights 
that civilian resilience was partly explained by their freedom to ‘trek’ from city 
centres to the relative safety of the countryside and by the support of their families 
and community.
11
 Shephard also examines the military medical profession’s 
response to the number of neurotic casualties following Dunkirk, new treatments 
developed in the western desert, psychological testing and selection of recruits, and 
considers neuropsychiatry in the RAF.
12
 In Shell Shock to PTSD: Military 
Psychology from 1900 to the Gulf War, Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely argue that 
during the Second World War military psychiatrists’ exaggerated the success of their 
‘treatments and outcomes’ in order to justify their place in military medicine.13 As 
well as the specific studies of LMF and RAF psychiatry highlighted in the previous 
chapter, other detailed studies of specific groups have been made. Peter Hobbins has 
examined Australian psychiatric casualties in Malaya and Singapore,
14
 and more 
recently Edgar Jones and Stephen Ironside studied battle exhaustion cases after the 
D-day invasion.
15
 The historiography of RAF psychiatry and neurology focuses on 
the work of Symonds and Gillespie.
16
 Although they had worked together before 
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joining the RAF, the two specialists frequently disagreed with each other.
17
 Symonds 
had served in the First World War and became the RAF’s consultant neurologist with 
the eventual rank of air vice marshal.
18
 He maintained that that psychotherapy could 
be practiced by any doctor without any expert training,
19
 Gillespie had been a student 
during the First World War, but worked with shell shocked soldiers in the inter-war 
period. Together with David Henderson, he wrote A Text-Book of Psychiatry for 
Students and Practitioners, which ran to several editions.
20
 Rather than seeing the 
war as ‘a test of character’ and heredity, he was more interested in the effect of the 
environment and events.
21
 However, as Shephard discusses, the pragmatic theories 
endorsed by Symonds had a stronger appeal to the RAF and the Air Ministry. As a 
consequence, neurology rather than psychiatry became dominant,
22
 and this was 
revealed in the prevalent RAF use of the compound noun ‘neuropsychiatry.’23 
Symonds was knighted in 1946. Gillespie attained the rank of air commodore, but 
suffering from depression and a peptic ulcer, he resigned his commission. He took 
his own life in October 1945.
24
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Largely concentrating on the example of the RAF hospitals at Rauceby and Matlock, 
this chapter discusses the everyday running of a NYDN centre. The opening sections 
of the chapter consider the numbers of ground personnel who were seen at NYDN 
centres and how patients were treated by the RAF medical profession in these 
centres, and the theories behind this treatment. In an examination of the work carried 
out at NYDN centres, the chapter discusses the unavoidable comparisons made by 
the specialists between the sick and the healthy. In accordance with the hierarchy of 
the service, air crew were contrasted with ground personnel, and men with women. 
Later sections discuss the diagnosis and treatment of patients, before finally 
focussing on patients’ pension prospects and their downgrading or disposal due to 
psychoneurotic symptoms through medical boards held at the hospitals. This chapter 
expands on the binary between heroic, stoical air crew, and cowardly, malingering 
ground personnel illustrated by the epigraph and discussed in the previous chapters.  
As Martin Francis recently highlighted, the lives of flyers treated at Matlock 
for neuropsychiatric illnesses still remain ‘highly obscure.’25 Few historians have 
considered RAF NYDN centres,
26
 and indeed in his article on LMF, Jones confuses 
NYDN centres with Air Crew Reselection Centres and Air Crew Disposal Units.
27
 
As well as having some provision for long-term care of psychotic patients, Rauceby 
catered for the numerous operational Bomber Command stations in the ‘Bomber 
County’ of Lincolnshire. There are few first person narratives that tell of their 
experience in NYDN centres. However, unlike similar establishments, Rauceby’s 
operational record books (ORBs) preserved in the National Archives contain several 
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useful reports, while the centre’s neurologist Eric Jewesbury submitted a 42 page 
report entitled ‘Work and Problems of an R.A.F. Neuropsychiatric Centre’ to the Air 
Ministry in July 1943.
28
 Each centre was overseen by a ‘Neuropsychiatric 
specialist… as far as possible with adequate training in both neurology and 
psychiatry.’29 Larger centres, such as Rauceby, had two specialists, one from each 
discipline.
30
 Although staff changed throughout the war, in 1942 the NYDN centre at 
Rauceby was overseen by the Canadian psychiatrist, Squadron Leader T. A. Sweet 
and the neurologist, acting Squadron Leader Eric Jewesbury.
31
 RAF Rauceby was 
created shortly after the beginning of the war when the Air Ministry commandeered 
the South Kesteven Mental Hospital. Staff and 75 patients from nearby RAF 
Cranwell moved into part of the hospital in April 1940 and, displacing more than five 
hundred patients who were evacuated to asylums in other counties, the RAF took 
over the entire hospital in June the same year. N. K. Henderson, the asylum’s 
resident medical superintendent, was commissioned in the RAF as the new hospital’s 
commanding officer.
32
 Like squadron medical officers, neuropsychiatric specialists 
at NYDN centres were usually civilians commissioned in the RAFVR. The main 
hospital buildings became the general hospital, and there were annexes for the burns, 
orthopaedic and tuberculosis units.
33
 The number of cases passing through the 
NYDN centre at Rauceby increased during the hospital’s first three years. From an 
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average of 47 cases being seen per month in 1941, the following year the average 
was 141.
34
  
The RAF hospital at Matlock Derbyshire was established in September 1939 
at ‘Rockside Hydro’, ‘Oldham house, and Prospect Hydro’, nineteenth century 
hydrotherapy centres. With three squadron leader neurologists and twenty female 
nursing staff, it had provisions for 50 in-patients with the potential to expand to 200 
beds.
35
 Sometimes referred to as the ‘Hatter’s Castle’ by the airmen, it became a long 
stay convalescent centre for neuropsychiatric NCOs and other ranks.
36
 The nickname 
has all the connotations of Lewis Caroll’s Mad Hatter, but perhaps more tellingly to 
the 1942 film The Hatter’s Castle, in which Brodie, a more sinister mad hatter, lives 
in a pretentious crenellated house not dissimilar to the sanatorium at Matlock.
37
 It is 
possible that the patients saw the film as a metaphor for their time at Matlock as well 
as a nickname for the hospital. The RAF’s psychiatric consultant, Robert Gillespie 
and the neuropsychiatrist, Squadron Leader D. N. Parfitt worked there during the 
war.  
The scale of the problem 
Both in and out-patients were seen at NYDN centres, and an idea of how busy 
NYDN centres were can be seen in official war-time reports on RAF psychiatry held 
in the National Archives. Over the twelve months beginning September 1940, there 
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were 859 admissions to Matlock, and 543 of these were ground personnel.
38
 At 
Rauceby in 1942, Jewesbury and Sweet interviewed 1,647 new neurological and 
psychotic cases as out-patients,
39
 and over 600 similar in-patients.
40
 Between June 
and December 1942, there were on average over 1200 new neuropsychiatric cases 
seen as out-patients by specialists at NYDN centres each month (See Fig: 6.1).
 41
  
 
Fig: 6.1. Attendance of new neuropsychiatric out-patients at NYDN centres during 1942. Taken from: 
Expert Committee on Work of Psychologists and Psychiatrists in the Services (1942 – 1943), ‘VIII 
RAF Psychiatry: Attendances of new neuro-psychiatric cases at NYDN centres’ TNA, AIR 2/5998. 
 
These figures consisted of an average of 809 male ground personnel (64 per cent), 
293 air crew (23 per cent) and 169 WAAFs (13 per cent) as new patients per 
month.
42
 Most of the work at NYDN centres involved out-patient consultations, 
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although there were some referrals from other wards, and a limited number of beds 
were available for in-patient investigation and treatment of suitable cases.
43
  
Although in the entire air force the ratio of ground personnel to air crew was 
around 7:1,
44
 as can be seen in the graph, there were approximately only three times 
more male and female ground personnel than air crew seen at NYDN centres. This 
can be explained by the medical officers’ preoccupation with the mental health of air 
crew, as only the very worst ground personnel cases were referred to NYDN centres. 
Seeing only the worst cases in the service, the neuropsychiatric specialists continued 
to believe that the incidence of neuroses amongst ground personnel was 
disproportionally high and the quality of personnel was worryingly poor. 
Neuropsychiatric specialists were also influenced by the hierarchy of RAF personnel, 
but in addition, the neuropsychiatric specialists at NYDN centres had little concept of 
the numbers of fit and healthy personnel. Working at Rauceby on the weekly medical 
boards responsible for downgrading or discharging personnel, Squadron Leader G. 
Chambers reported how an exchange visit to an operational station helped to redress 
this:  
Meeting, as I do almost daily the Grade IV personnel of the Royal Air Force, 
I was inclined to take a rather jaundiced view of the general morale and I 
found it most stimulating to realise how small a fraction of the whole force 
this category form.
45
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In his report, Jewesbury quoted an article ‘The Psychopathic Tenth’ from The Lancet 
at length. He agreed with the author, Stephen Taylor, that ‘the uniformity of their 
behaviour’ made neurotics and psychotic personalities visible ‘as a coherent group’ 
who ‘flood[ed] the service psychiatric hospitals.46  
As discussed throughout this thesis, hierarchical assumptions of class and 
gender were reinforced throughout the war, within the RAF, by the other armed 
forces, and by the medical profession. Specialists like Jewesbury expected to find 
mental health problems in at least ten per cent of the population, and as part of the 
distinct cultural hierarchy within the RAF, the stereotypical image of ground 
personnel influenced the staff at NYDN centres. There was also a marked difference 
in how the specialists at NYDN centres regarded air crew and ground personnel; 
because of their ‘original selection’ it was assumed that air crew were ‘of a better 
type of personality and unlikely to harbour in their midst the many constitutional 
neurotics who form the bulk of ground-staff patients.’47 To a certain extent, social 
factors which restricted an individual’s role in the RAF to unskilled ground trades 
also effectively feminised men from poorer backgrounds. WAAFs who suffered from 
nervous breakdown were regarded as weak in comparison to the public image of 
WAAF plotters who carried out their duty while under attack in the early days of the 
Blitz, but also to the stoic housewife or factory worker portrayed in the popular 
media and discussed in medical journals. In addition, the staff at NYDN centres 
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prioritised the early diagnosis and prophylactic treatment of psychological disorders 
in air crew.
48
 They were far less concerned with ground staff.  
Reporting on a visit to RAF Scampton, Wing Commander R. W. B. Ellis, a 
doctor stationed at Rauceby, referred to ground personnel airmen as ‘A.C. Plonk’ 
who would, if allowed, ‘eat 3 dinners consecutively!’49 Conforming to the class 
bound stereotypes discussed in chapter one, in displaying greed and self interest the 
airman failed to live up to the cultural ideal of discipline and duty.
50
 In an article for 
the Journal of Mental Science written during his time at Matlock, Parfitt regarded 
ground personnel diagnosed as suffering from hysteria in similar, but even stronger 
terms: 
The hysteric... remains egotistically puerile and has the child's selfishness... 
the hysteric is lazy... and ready to lie unhesitatingly to avoid work and 
danger... He lacks morality, conscience and the sense of duty which drives 
man to conquer his laziness.
51
  
At Rauceby, Jewesbury discovered that many ground personnel cases admitted 
selfish motives behind their decisions to join the RAF or WAAF rather than the other 
services. Many men were attracted to a ‘less military type of life’ and the chance to 
avoid combat duties, others who confessed they had always been ‘delicate’, thought 
that the RAF and the ‘fresh air’ would be beneficial to them.52 Although she had a 
successful and healthy, if short lived, career in the WAAF, Patricia Lockitt admitted 
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she did not join the WAAF in September 1943 for ‘very altruistic’ reasons, but 
because she felt stuck in ‘an extremely boring job.’53  
Echoing Jewesbury’s patriarchal expectations of individuals’ capabilities 
based on assumptions regarding class and gender, S. I. Ballard and H. G. Miller felt 
that a ‘contributory factor’ to many WAAF cases was the female tendency to form 
strong hetero- or homo-sexual emotional attachments, which in conjunction with 
repostings and other ‘exigencies of the service’ often caused ‘neurotic conflicts.’ 54 In 
their study of almost a thousand RAF and WAAF cases referred to them as 
‘temperamentally unstable’, Ballard and Miller described 11 per cent of male but 28 
per cent of female patients as ‘only children.’ Over a quarter of women as compared 
to one tenth of men were recorded as of below average intelligence.
55
 Women were 
also expected to have a higher degree of ‘constitutional emotional instability and 
neurotic predisposition.’56 They also found evidence of ‘psychosexual immaturity’ in 
73 per cent of WAAFs, but in less than 40 per cent of airmen.
57
 Ballard and Miller 
also more frequently diagnosed men with anxiety and women with hysteria. This 
follows a similar pattern to the difference between diagnoses of officers and other 
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ranks suffering from shell shock in the previous war,
58
 and in the RAF between pilots 
(often officers) and gunners (often NCOs),
59
 (See Fig: 6.2).  
 
Fig: 6.2 Diagnosis of 250 psychiatric consecutive male and female cases. Taken from: I. Ballard, and 
H. G. Miller, ‘Psychiatric Casualties in a Women’s Service’ British Medical Journal, 1, 4387, (1945), 
p. 293. 
 
The graph shows that almost twice as many women than men were diagnosed with 
hysteria. Given that it was more socially accepted, women tended to display 
hysterical symptoms if they began to suffer emotionally. More constrained by 
military authority and their gender stereotypes, it was felt that men suffering from 
neuroses were more likely to present symptoms of amnesia or fugue states or become 
a disciplinary problem by going absent without leave or deserting.
60
 The disruption 
of the family unit was felt to be a contributory factor in the breakdown of those who 
were weak and predisposed to psychoneuroses.
61
 Following gender stereotypes, the 
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security of home and family was seen to be more important for women because of 
their role as a home-maker. However, in the military, the service itself was expected 
to play the role of the family. Individuals who failed to overcome their 
homesickness, or misfits who struggled to be accepted, were more prone to 
emotional problems. It was the consensus of opinion in the medical profession and 
among the RAF neuropsychiatric specialists that fear was the main cause of anxiety 
neuroses.
62
 With non-combatants, an individual’s subjective emotional conflict 
between their duty and their individualism were made less excusable because, as 
discussed previously, in comparison to air crew, and even some civilians, they were 
less exposed to danger.  
Jewesbury drew distinctions between those who were doing what they could 
for the war effort, whether in the air or on the ground, and those who struggled to 
cope with service life although they were not necessarily in any peril. His impression 
of the binary between air crew and ground personnel was strengthened when he took 
part in an exchange visit to RAF Cranwell. Whereas before he had ‘little or no 
understanding of the controls of an aircraft,’ he spent some time practising in the 
cockpit of a link trainer, and shown over several aircraft he was also able ‘to gain a 
clear idea of the position and function of each member of the crew.’63 
Jewesbury saw an injustice in the contrast between the service’s policy 
towards the disposal of neurotic air crew and neurotic ground personnel who had not 
‘in either case been exposed to exceptional stress.’ He had little patience with 
personnel who suffered breakdowns without just cause, especially after only a short 
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period of service. They had breached the unwritten contract between the citizen and 
the state, that they would receive medical care in return for their time and effort in 
the services.
64
 While air crew could be ‘disgraced’ and ‘ignominiously reduced in 
rank or removed from the service’ following the LMF procedure, ground personnel 
with similar symptoms were ‘customarily regarded as purely medical cases’. As will 
be discussed later in this chapter, once invalided, such cases may also have been 
entitled to a pension ‘for aggravation of their condition by war service.’65  
Diagnosis 
Medical science had changed tremendously in the aftermath of the First World War. 
It has been argued that the concept of shell shock enabled doctors of the relatively 
new practice of psychiatry to legitimate their profession within industrialised nations. 
It also became accepted that, in addition to ‘hysterical’ females, males were also 
susceptible to neuroses.
66
 The inter-war period saw a decline in the number of 
diagnoses of ‘old fashioned hysteria’, but an ‘increase in psychosomatic disorder and 
anxiety states.’67 However, there was still no consensus of opinion; even the 
terminology was disputed in medical journals during the inter-war period and during 
the war. Although Symonds encouraged RAF doctors to limit their diagnoses of 
mental disorders amongst air crew to anxiety, hysteria, fatigue syndrome, and 
depression, with regard to ground personnel, specialists at NYDN centres used 
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different nomenclature.
68
 Parfitt argued that while the meanings of the terms anxiety, 
hysteria, obsession, psychopathy and depression were accepted, there was 
considerable disagreement on the ‘proportionate incidence of various psychoneurotic 
syndromes’ and each specialist could find evidence to justify his diagnosis.69 
Military medical diagnoses were influenced by the political situation as, officially at 
least, there was no such thing as ‘war neuroses.’ As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the term ‘shell shock’ was not to be used and even NYDN or DAH were 
best avoided in case, becoming ‘catch-words’ with the same connotations as shell 
shock, they led to an increase in casualties.
70
 In the Army, because of its more 
positive connotations, the term ‘exhaustion’ began to be applied to neuropsychiatric 
casualties.
71
 However, trying to police language was futile. For air crew, LMF or 
‘wavering’ gained all the negative connotations the Air Ministry had been trying to 
avoid.
72
 The phrase ‘the wind up’ was the accepted euphemism for nervous disorders 
among air crew at the start of the war,
73
 and the RAF psychiatric specialist was 
referred to as the ‘trick cyclist’.74 New pseudo-medical diagnoses such as ‘Morse 
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Headache and Telegraphist’s Cramp’ or even ‘Morse Shock’ were created and 
attained popular acceptance.
75
  
Nationally, the numbers of personnel in the RAF who were diagnosed as 
suffering from nervous or mental illness increased throughout the war. Peaking in 
1944, over 10,000 male and female personnel serving in the United Kingdom were 
diagnosed with diseases of the nervous system or mental diseases. Almost 6,500 of 
these were diagnosed as suffering from psychoneuroses. However, expressed 
proportionally against the total number serving in the RAF, this figure remained less 
than 2 per cent per annum.
76
 In comparison to both the general population and 
neuropsychiatric casualties among combat troops, this figure is surprisingly low. 
Among the Army in the campaigns in Italy and Northern France 10 per cent 
casualties from ‘exhaustion’ was acceptable,77 and as discussed previously, a similar 
proportion of the wider population were thought to have mental health problems. 
This low figure can be explained due to the fact that they were not under the strains 
of front line combat, and as discussed in chapter two, personnel had been through a 
selection process.  
Around three quarters of over 800 ground personnel out-patients seen at 
Rauceby in 1942 were diagnosed with anxiety and depressive states due to their 
‘inability to cope with service life.’ This included ‘seven cases of homosexuality, 
sufficient to produce marked anxiety symptoms’. The rest of those seen at Rauceby 
were classified as hysteria, obsessional neurosis, psychopathic personality, mental 
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deficiency and nocturnal enuresis.
78
 12 per cent of ground personnel out-patients 
were diagnosed with organic conditions including epilepsy, migraine and head 
injuries.
79
 The diagnoses of samples of patients seen at RAF Rauceby during 1942 
and from Matlock over an earlier twelve month period can be seen below. (See Fig: 
6.3 and 6.4).  
The difference in the categorisation of psychoneurotic illnesses between 
Matlock and Rauceby can easily be explained. Firstly, Rauceby dealt with men and 
women of all ranks, while Matlock was solely for male NCOs (both air crew and 
ground personnel). Secondly, each hospital’s resident specialists had different 
experiences and particular interests. It was admitted that there was a fine line 
between a diagnosis of hysteria or anxiety. Some doctors diagnosed mixed states,
80
 
and, as in the First World War, it was possible for doctors to disagree, and to make 
different diagnoses of patients with the same symptoms.
81
 Anxiety was understood to 
be an obsession with distinct fears, while hysteria was understood as the conversion 
of often unconscious psychological conflict to physical symptoms. Those with 
‘psychopathic personalities’ included the ‘constitutionally timid’ or ‘aggressive, 
schizoid psychopaths’, and those with interests such as ‘astrology, spiritualism and 
yoga’, and homosexuals.82 
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Fig: 6.3. Jewesbury, ‘Work and Problems’ p.4. Diagnosis of 200 consecutive cases of psychological 
disorder observed at RAF Rauceby 1942, TNA, AIR 49/357.  
 
 
 
 
Fig: 6.4. Report on the work of the RAF hospital Matlock for the period 1 September 1940 to 31 
August 1941. p. 3, TNA, AIR 49/357.
83
 
Jewesbury included anxiety state, effort syndrome, gastric neuroses and 
depression among affective disorders. Hysterical conditions included fugues and 
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AFFECTIVE DISORDER 153 (76.5 %) 
HYSTERIA 23 (11 %) 
MENTAL DEFICIENCY 7 (3.5 %) 
NOCTURNAL ENURESIS 7 (3.5 %) 
OBSESSIONAL NEUROSIS 5 (2.5 %) 
ANXIETY - HYSTERIA 4 (2 %) 
PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY (1%) 
ANXIETY PSYCHONEUROSIS 51% 
DEPRESSIVE STATES (ENDOGENOUS 
AND REACTIVE) 19% 
HYSTERIAS 15% 
PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITIES 10% 
MENTAL DEFECTIVES, OBSESSIONAL 
STATES AND SCHIZOPHRENICS 5%  
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paralysis, while his small group of ‘Anxiety-Hysteria’ cases had symptoms of both 
hysterical and affective disorders.
84
 However, it can be seen that, in both hospitals, 
around three quarters of cases were diagnosed with anxiety or depression, while 
between ten and fifteen per cent were diagnosed as hysterics. In common with the 
findings of unit medical officers, few cases of ‘simple malingering’ were discovered 
at NYDN centres, but ‘intentional exaggeration of mild symptoms’ were prevalent.85 
The outcome of the cases recorded at Rauceby was not recorded but of the 530 seen 
at Matlock, 271 were invalided and 259 returned to duty.
86
 At Rauceby, because a 
diagnosis of malingering would result in a Court Martial, and the line between 
malingering and hysteria was so fine, neither Sweet nor Jewesbury gave a diagnosis 
of malingering.
87
  
Following an exchange visit to RAF Cranwell, Jewesbury observed the 
effects of poor lighting and pressure on those working on teleprinters and the 
problems of eyestrain and headaches suffered by WAAFs working with radar, and 
was made aware of problems such as ‘Morse Headache’ and ‘Telegraphist’s 
Cramp’.88 However, at Rauceby he found that:  
most of the psychological disorder in ground-staff occurs in hardened 
constitutional neurotics who are unable to adapt themselves to service life and 
in spite of repostings and remusterings, remain medical liabilities and have to 
be invalided, as much in the interests of the service as of themselves.
89
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Diagnosis and medical treatment at NYDN centres were affected by the Ministry of 
Pensions and military policy. It was the ‘hardened constitutional neurotics’ who were 
the most numerous among ground personnel cases. Rather than taking into account 
their work conditions or any traumatic events they may have witnessed or been 
involved in, the most important factor in making a diagnosis was regarded as the 
individual’s predisposition to psychoneurotic illness.  
To Parfitt, previously established causes of psychoneurotic symptoms 
including separation anxieties, ‘economic difficulties’ and ‘sex problems’ were less 
important causes of illness than the more ‘immediate strains’ of ‘hardship and 
danger,’ or adapting to unfamiliar technical tasks and RAF authority.90 The RAF 
psychiatric consultants, S. Ballard and H. Miller, also maintained that service was a 
catalyst for predisposed illnesses, but suggested that such tendencies were 
exacerbated by ‘boredom, monotony and separation from home’ rather than ‘real or 
anticipated exposure to physical danger.’91 The specialists agreed that, unlike air 
crew, danger was not an important cause of psychoneuroses in ground personnel. It 
was personnel employed in repetitive and less prestigious trades at the lowest end of 
the service hierarchy who were prone to boredom and less likely to adjust to service 
life. In civilian practice, it was felt that monotony and boredom was not the fault of 
the industrial process, but of the individual and their inability to ‘think pleasant 
thoughts’ rather than dwelling on negatives.92 In the RAF, as in civilian industry, it 
was the perceived inability or unwillingness of selfish individuals to ‘do their bit’ 
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and fulfil their obligation to the service and the state as an active citizen that was 
problematic.
93
  
 
As Mark Harrison argues, in Britian, wartime psychiatry ‘was predicated on 
the assumption that… certain individuals were predisposed, by virtue of [their] 
heredity or upbringing, to suffer from mental breakdown.’94 Predisposing factors 
included what were considered to be inherited constitutional weaknesses or 
psychological defects involving the doctor’s interpretation of the patients’ 
upbringing, experiences and behaviour. However, these factors were interconnected 
through social, economic and environmental differences including education and 
opportunities.
95
 RAF medical officers and specialists also sought the origins of 
patients’ neuroses and mental illnesses in inherited weak character traits and early 
childhood events that shaped their personalities. When considering the mental health 
of air crew, as well as gauging the patient’s ‘bodily constitution’, and ‘innate 
tendencies or instincts’, medical officers were advised to assess their ‘character… 
acquired tendencies,’ and ‘the sentiments and habits which have been developed.’96 
Gillespie acknowledged the importance of acquired psycho-dynamic causes, and 
Jewesbury felt that teachers were problematic because they displayed ‘artificial self-
importance’ while ‘professional gymnasts, boxers and P.T. instructors’ tended to be 
hypochondriacs.
97
 Inherited predisposition was also found. Studies of military 
neuropsychiatric patients found around half of their subjects had parents or siblings 
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with similar neuropsychiatric illness.
98
 In the RAF, Parfitt discovered in interviews 
that on average his patients had at least one family member with a ‘psychopathic 
defect’.99 Although he admitted his methods were a ‘rough estimation’ and a ‘general 
clinical impression’, he found that ‘many’ had a ‘low level of intellectual 
capacity.’100 A quarter had left school at fourteen without reaching the ‘standard’ and 
a quarter of those who were referred to a specialist had criminal records.
101
 Parfitt 
argued that ‘confusion… would be largely reduced if constitution was always 
distinguished from reaction type’.102 However, in common with Symonds, Gillespie, 
and Jewesbury, he felt diagnoses were largely dependent on the recognition of 
constitutional or psychologically acquired predisposing attributes such as a ‘chronic 
cough’ or a ‘liking for quiet jobs.’103 In investigations into psychological disorders of 
flying personnel, medical officers were required to grade air crew predisposition as 
either ‘nil, mild [or] severe’ regardless of cause.104 It was also acceptable for medical 
officers and specialists to conflate both types of predisposition in their search for 
factors to explain ground personnel patients’ breakdown. Predisposition was found in 
so many cases because the doctors were expecting to find it; they probed and 
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questioned their patients until convincing evidence was uncovered. As will be 
discussed below, because of the RAF’s pension policy, the severity of any 
predisposition identified was regarded as more important than its classification. 
Treatment 
Out-patients were seen daily by the neuropsychiatric specialists. Appointments were 
made in advance, although air crew took precedence over ground personnel and 
special cases were moved up the waiting list. After the interview, if required, the 
specialists gave their opinion as to whether cases were fit to undergo court martial or 
detention or, in cases of theft or absence without leave, whether they were 
responsible for their actions.
105
 All neuropsychiatric specialists were informed by the 
case’s history supplied by the medical officer on official forms,106 and questioning 
the patient about their home life, education and work history, the specialist looked 
for evidence of constitutional or psychological predisposition. After the interview, a 
copy of the specialist’s recommendation was sealed in an envelope and returned with 
the patient to their unit.
107
 In-patients were admitted directly from their unit 
following a telephone consultation with their medical officer, or were transferred 
from the out-patient clinic on the recommendation of the specialist.  
While the treatment of out-patients was often limited to a brief interview, in-
patients could undergo a variety of treatments including occupational therapy, 
narcoanalysis and narcotherapy.
108
 However, Parfitt believed that for many patients, 
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a period of leave was more effective than hospital treatment.
109
 Theoretically, 
psychoanalysis was avoided in the services because it was thought to be too time 
consuming.
110
 As Mark Harrison suggests, a quick ‘psychiatric interview’ was ‘the 
basis of all psychiatric treatment in the British Army’,111 and in the RAF an interview 
with the neuropsychiatric specialists performed a similar psychotherapeutic role. 
Depressed about her imagined inability to carry a child, worrying about her husband 
on operations, and debilitated by rheumatic fever, Marjorie Bevan-Jones fondly 
remembers being treated by Gillespie over several sessions at Torquay. They talked 
together ‘about dreams and things’, her personal life and favourite outdoor pursuits. 
He told her she would probably be given a ‘long leave pending discharge’112 The 
goals of any treatment at NYDN centres focussed on symptoms and was intended to 
return the patient to the state they were in before their breakdown, or to enable the 
patient to continue to play a ‘valuable’ part in society, either in the military or as a 
civilian.
113
 
  Both Gillespie and Parfitt explained practical psychotherapy in similar terms. 
Gillespie felt that during interviews with a patient after careful history taking, and a 
‘lucid explanation’ of the origin of the patient’s symptoms, the patient was ‘sooner or 
later confronted with the need to drop his symptoms… and face the prospect of 
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return to duty.’114 Parfitt thought that any psychotherapy for ground personnel 
consisted ‘of simple exploration and persuasion’.115 Many patients were ‘treated 
dogmatically’. The patient’s trust had to be gained, sometimes over several sessions, 
and Parfitt found it best to allow the patient to talk and express his or her ‘inner 
worries’ before explaining their problem in ‘psychological terms.’116 At Matlock, 
‘reassurance and suggestion’ that their mental health was improving was thought to 
be of great importance.
117
 Gillespie believed that neuroses caused by ‘normal’ fears 
were likely to be successfully treated in this way. However he felt that unless the 
patient was ‘sufficiently intelligent’, the prognosis was bad for a patient with a 
‘constitutional’ fear due to a faulty upbringing,.118  
As in station sick quarters, at both Matlock and Rauceby patients were treated 
with sedatives such as Nembutal or Luminal.
119
 Parfitt used barbiturates as sedatives 
for sleeplessness,
120
 and Jewesbury helped patients to adjust to service life with the 
use of ‘a simple sedative or hypnotic’.121 Specialists at NYDN centres also 
experimented with the newest treatments in an attempt to speed up a return to duty. 
Electro Convulsive Therapy, (ECT) was introduced in 1939, and, by the end of the 
war, it was a routine treatment for depression in some Army hospitals.
122
 While ECT 
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was used at RAF Matlock on at least one air crew member,
123
 there is no evidence 
that ECT, or other experimental treatments were carried out on ground personnel 
patients at Rauceby.
 
However other treatments were. Working with Army patients, 
William Sargant discovered that hysterical paralysis and amnesia could seemingly be 
cured by an injection of sodium amytal, while three weeks sleep enforced by 
intravenous barbiturates was effective in cases of ‘acute neurosis.’124 Narcotherapy, 
continuous sleep treatment, or ‘Prolonged Narcosis’, aimed to ‘procure 20 hours of 
sleep out of the 24... and to see that during the 7 to 10 days the treatment is being 
continued the patient receive[d] 3 to 4 full meals a day.’125 Based on the treatment of 
the previous war’s shell shock patients, this treatment aimed to give patients a 
distance from their traumatic experiences and to replace the weight they lost through 
stress.
126
 Parfitt successfully used narcosis for ground personnel cases diagnosed 
with ‘depressive conditions’ and ‘acute battle cases’, but found it of little use for 
anxiety states and long standing psychoneuroses.
127
 Other specialists used 
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‘continuous narcosis’ in a minority of ‘very tense and distressed’ air crew patients, 
and they also used ‘suggestion in the lighter states of drowsiness.’128  
Narcoanalysis, as such suggestion was called, was used by Gillespie at 
Torquay, at Rauceby by Jewesbury and tried by Parfitt at Matlock.
129
 It was indicated 
if, after normal analysis, the patient’s repressed memories could not be penetrated,130 
and it often seemed to achieve results faster than hypnosis.
131
 Various barbiturates 
were slowly injected to render the patient ‘drowsy’ but without ‘reaching the stage of 
incoherence,’132 and once ‘reduced to a semihypnotic state... the man [wa]s forced to 
re-live the frightening experience which precipitated breakdown.’133 Narcoanalysis 
was used as a shortcut in cases which had not responded to more conventional 
treatment, to aid relaxation, to facilitate hypnosis and as an attempt to discover the 
causative factors of problematic cases.
134
 It was found to be especially useful in 
recovering memories in cases of hysterical amnesia.
135
 Although it gives ‘an 
overwhelmingly positive view of outcomes’,136 the 1946 US Army training film, Let 
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There Be Light, shows the process of narcoanalysis. In cases of hysteria, sodium 
amytal was used as a ‘short cut to the unconscious mind’ and to ‘bring to the surface 
the emotional conflict which is the cause of the patient’s distress.’ The use of the 
drug also reinforced the doctor’s suggestion that the patients’ conditions would 
improve and their symptoms would disappear.
137
 At NYDN centres, narcoanalysis 
using intravenous sodium amytal was used to recover the memories of amnesiacs, 
hysterical fugues, and those with separation anxiety who had been AWL.
138
 Parfitt 
tried narcoanalysis using intravenous pentothal but did not find it to be very 
effective.
139
 He maintained that while he had observed some ‘patients benefit from 
emotional catharsis during treatment’, ‘abreaction as usually described’ occurred in 
only a very small number of cases.
140
 Although ostensibly for orthopaedic and 
medical patients, neuropsychiatric patients were also persuaded to participate in sport 
and physical activities, as the ‘enthusiasm’ and ‘high morale’ of physical training 
instructors was thought to exemplify ‘deportment and zest’.141 It was felt that such a 
regime of ‘carefully graduated exercises, games, and physical training’ would 
reinforce the psychotherapy that was an important part of their treatment.
142
 It was 
argued that the presence of nervous cases had a detrimental effect on the recovery of 
other patients, but that contact with ‘mentally normal’ patients was beneficial to 
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them. At Rauceby, a new NAAFI building was built with a supper room and two rest 
rooms, and the lighting, internal decorations and furniture were intended to create an 
‘artistic and “non-barrack room atmosphere.”’143 Men were encouraged to mix with 
WAAFs,
144
 and including visits by ENSA concert parties,
145
 there was ‘something 
on’ every night of the week’.146 Occupational therapy was ‘fully utilized’ and proved 
‘most beneficial and popular,’147 at Rauceby, patients were given instruction in 
handicrafts such as leather work, clay modelling, rug making, book-binding and 
model-plane making.
148
 Parfitt found occupational therapy including gardening to be 
‘the best form of ancillary treatment’.149 Fresh air and physical activity were 
considered beneficial to personnel and activities such as gardening or occupational 
therapy were regarded as slow and calming pastimes.  
In summary, treatment of in-patients at NYDN centres was decided by the 
specialists according to the patients’ symptoms, their diagnosis, best practice, and the 
doctor’s own experience. The majority of in-patients were treated by being given a 
rest and a break from the pressures that had led to their symptoms. The use of 
sedatives, occupational therapy, and leave can all be regarded in this manner. For 
ground personnel, a speedy diagnosis and quick resolution was of paramount 
importance. Particularly where the patient was found to be severely predisposed to 
psychoneuroses, invaliding from the service was the most efficient way to deal with 
the worst cases. For out-patients, NYDN centres largely performed as diagnostic 
centres where patients’ behaviour and illness was investigated in an interview with 
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the specialist, and explained in terms of their predisposition. NYDN centres offered a 
range of treatments for in-patients, but most treatments consisted of the change of 
environment and activity, together with interviews with the specialist. Together with 
the severity of their illness, their importance in their trade, and their position in the 
hierarchy dictated whether they were given treatment and retained in the service or 
whether they were quickly invalided. Predisposition explained their breakdown, and 
for those who were invalided it determined their chances of receiving a pension.  
Disposal 
In a combatant service in wartime, the interest of the individual is 
overwhelmed by that of the group. Every effort must be made to make the 
individual into a useful component of the group, but if it becomes evident that 
this is impossible, then the individual must be discarded without further 
delay.
150
 
There were three outcomes available to the neuropsychiatrists interviewing cases at 
NYDN centres. The patient could be helped to ‘adapt or readjust’ to their role in the 
service, be downgraded to grade three (which rendered them unsuitable for overseas 
service), or to grade four (invalided from the service).
151
 A main part of helping 
patients to adapt to service life involved ‘removing square pegs from round holes’ 
and finding suitable employment for them. Jewesbury maintained that ‘if men and 
women feel that the best and most appropriate use is not being made of them, a spirit 
of criticism and discontent is liable to be engendered.’152 He cited a case of an AC2 
who had been in the service for over two years who continually missed promotion, 
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not because of a lack of ability, but because of the lack of vacancies. It seems that he 
did not want to be reposted as his wife and family lived nearby. Jewesbury felt that 
such cases were best solved at a local level by the unit medical and commanding 
officer.  
Other cases required immediate invaliding from the service. Nafsika 
Thalassis maintains that ‘psychiatric illness was frequently thought to be incurable 
within a military context’,153 and that soldiers were invalided for either ‘low 
intelligence’ or ‘inadequate personalities’.154 Anxiety caused by separation from 
home was a common example of this. In his report on a twenty-two year old un-
skilled aircraftsman, Jewesbury wrote: 
This man is suffering from symptoms of an affective disorder consequent 
upon removal from his home environment. He showed nervous traits as a 
child and he and his whole family have always been very seclusive. When 
sent as an apprentice 30 miles from home in civil life he felt so homesick that 
he had to return after 2 weeks. He began to feel ill when he was awaiting his 
call-up and the death of his brother (upon whom he was very dependent) was 
an additional blow to him. He has nervous dyspepsia, depression, temporal 
headaches, trembling attacks, insomnia and lack of concentration. He is 
frequently tearful. 
I do not think that he will be capable of adapting himself to service life and I 
recommend that he be invalided, Grade 4.
155
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This man was found to have both constitutional and psychologically acquired 
predisposing factors to neuroses. Being ‘homesick’, ‘dependent’ and ‘frequently 
tearful’ effectively feminised him, and, as the lowest possible rank in the RAF, he 
was also perhaps unfavourably compared to his brother who made the ‘supreme 
sacrifice’ for his country. By 1942, Jewesbury admitted that he himself sometimes 
found his work ‘exacting and disheartening’,156 and he became ‘sceptical’ of the 
validity of treating patients only to be forced to invalid them at a later date.
157
 The 
patient had to want to get better, and this could create a conflict if their being cured 
meant their return to military service.
158
 For this reason, in the worse cases it was 
thought better to tell the patient that they would be discharged from service.
159
 In his 
report, Jewesbury gave six other examples of male and female ground personnel 
(including an officer) who he felt he had no option but to recommend invaliding. In 
these cases, he saw those who had ‘failed to respond to every effort that has been 
made on their stations either to encourage them or to obtain useful work from 
them.’160 Like the medical officers on operational stations discussed in the previous 
chapter, specialists at NYDN centres had to consider the war effort and the good of 
the service before that of the individual. Jewesbury believed that neurotics or those 
that were felt to be predisposed to neurosis should be downgraded to ensure against 
their potential and costly breakdown overseas.
161
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It was thought that cases of malingering should be dealt with firmly ‘pour 
decourager les autres’, but that it was most efficient to find an alternative occupation 
in which they could perform satisfactorily.
162
 Reviewing cases of absence without 
leave was equally problematic. In cases of psychopathic or depressed individuals, 
Jewesbury highlighted that punishment had no effect.
163
 A twenty-two year old 
airman who had been in the service for a year had only done eight weeks full duty. 
The rest of the time had been spent AWL, under arrest or in detention. Rather than 
‘make it too easy for the lazy or spineless’ and jeopardise morale, Jewesbury 
recommended that cases be invalided from the service immediately after they had 
completed their punishment.
164
 Many of the cases cited by Jewesbury had done such 
little service before they were referred to him, that the conditions in the RAF were 
not thought to be a contributory factor in their break down. 
Jewesbury was more lenient in cases displaying symptoms of anxiety with an 
identifiable social reason. He gave the examples of a NCO considered for a 
commission who was anxious because of his chances of promotion, and of a recently 
married WAAF who was unhappy in the service as she was anxious to have a child. 
His recommendations were that the man be promoted, and that the WAAF might ‘be 
of more value to the community in the capacity of a mother in civil life.’165  
 At the beginning of the war, a memorandum from the Ministry of Pensions 
was circulated to members of the medical profession informing them that in most 
cases of war neuroses a ‘congenital or acquired predisposition’ would be found, and 
that psychoneurosis or mental breakdown was to be recorded as a sickness or disease 
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rather than a battle casualty.
166
 In a study of 164 consecutive cases, Jewesbury found 
that 90 per cent were predisposed to neurosis as they admitted to a previous history 
of ‘nervous instability’ and over 70 per cent had a ‘family history of nervous or 
mental instability.’167 
Many patients were found to be so predisposed that it was thought best to 
invalid them from the service as soon as possible.
168
 ‘Exposure to enemy action 
played practically no part in the origin of these conditions’; it was the individuals’ 
existing weaknesses or nervous instabilities that were ‘brought to light under service 
conditions.’169 At Matlock, just over half of those invalided had been in the RAF for 
less than a year,
170
 which was considered too short a time to develop legitimate war 
neuroses. Concluding his report, Jewesbury wrote:  
‘In our dealings with them [psychoneurotics] in the service we must display 
sympathy – but not too much sympathy, firmness but not victimisation, 
understanding linked with common-sense, realism rather than idealism, 
reasonableness and much patience.’171  
The decision to invalid or retain a patient in the RAF was difficult and subjective. 
For cases who failed to respond to treatment, or for those whose treatment was likely 
to be prolonged, invaliding was the preferred option. On the recommendation of the 
specialist a medical board was held, and three medical officers of the rank of 
                                                 
166
 B.M.J. ‘Memorandum for the Medical Profession’, p.1200. 
167
 Jewesbury, ‘Work and Problems’, p. 32, TNA, AIR 49/357. 
168
 Ibid., p. 32. 
169
 Ibid., p. 32.  
170
 Report on the work of the RAF hospital Matlock for the period 1 September 1940 to 31 august 
1941, TNA, AIR 2/5998. 
171
 Jewesbury, ‘Work and Problems’, p. 42, TNA, AIR 49/357. 
334 
 
squadron leader or above examined the evidence and interviewed the patient before 
reaching a decision.
172
 
Medical boards were time consuming, and had to be held for all 
downgradings including invaliding. Most boards were for ground staff,
173
 and the 
number of boards held for neuropsychiatric patients exceeded the number held for 
other groups of patients.
174
 At Rauceby, Sweet and Jewesbury sat on boards for 
neuropsychiatric out-patients weekly.
175
 43 per cent of invaliding medical boards 
were held for in-patients with psychological conditions, while 35 per cent of out-
patients invalided were for similar reasons.
176
 Each case was to be assessed on its 
own merits, their medical and service records were examined and the applicant was 
‘interrogated’ and given another physical examination.177 They were not supposed to 
be ‘influenced unduly’ by the conclusions of earlier boards.178  
At Rauceby, Jewesbury found that almost half of his ground staff out-patients 
were invalided, about a quarter were medically downgraded, while the remainder 
were returned to duty. Many of these were recommended for remustering to a 
different trade or occupation.
179
 The diagnostic reasons for invaliding patients from 
Rauceby can be seen below (see Fig. 6.5). 
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Fig: 6.5. Jewesbury, ‘Work and Problems’ p. 9, TNA, Air 49/357. Types of psychological disorder in 
722 in-patient and out-patients invalided from RAF Rauceby during 1942.  
 
The diagnostic groups are slightly different to other doctor’s distinctions, but it can 
be seen that together anxiety and depression account for around 75 per cent of the 
invalidings from Rauceby and hysteria around 10 per cent. Enuresis cases were 
automatically invalided once it had been established they were not doing it 
deliberately as a form of malingering.
180
  
Proportionally more WAAFs were treated and invalided from the RAF than 
male ground personnel. (See Fig: 6.6). 
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Fig: 6.6. Numbers of men and women invalided from the RAF on the grounds of mental disorder as 
percentages of total medical discharges. Expert Committee on Work of Psychologists and 
Psychiatrists in the Services (1942 – 1943), TNA, AIR 2/5998.  
 
As can be seen in the graph, the number of WAAFs who were invalided for 
psychoneuroses increased over the first years of the war while the numbers of male 
ground personnel fell. This is partially explained by the increase in numbers of 
WAAFs, however this is before the mass enforced conscription of women in 1942, 
and may also be explained in part by the social and cultural construction of women 
as weaker than men. By 1941, most WAAFs were invalided because of 
psychoneuroses. It was felt that female cases showed ‘an appreciably higher degree 
of constitutional emotional instability and neurotic predisposition.’181 As discussed in 
chapter four, many believed men followed ‘a sterner social and emotional code.’182 
This was also a self-fulfilling prophecy; because they were perceived as less 
important and more easily replaced, women were found to be more prone to illness 
and invalided.  
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Mental patients were further categorised as either ‘dangerous or harmless’, 
and it was to be decided at their medical board whether they were to be placed in a 
civilian mental hospital, or handed over to a family member.
183
 As shown above, the 
president of the medical boards at Rauceby, Squadron Leader R. Chambers, 
effectively measured those appearing at medical boards in contrast to his opinion of 
both air crew and normal ground personnel.
184
 Crucially, much of the work at 
medical boards was deciding the cause and origin of a patient’s disability, which 
impacted on the payment of service pensions.  
Pensions 
The pension records that still exist remain secret and unavailable. The Ministry of 
Pensions policies were originally geared to save the government money and to avoid 
a repetition of the expensive pension claims for war neuroses, neurasthenia or shell 
shock that occurred during the previous war.
185
 There are no figures for the RAF or 
the Royal Navy, but between 35 and 41 per cent of discharges were for psychiatric 
illnesses,
186
 and 109,000 neuropsychiatric cases were discharged from the British 
Army between September 1939 and August 1945.
187
 The policy towards RAF 
service pensions was laid out in by the Ministry of Pensions in 1940 and amended in 
1943; only recorded injuries, diseases or illnesses attributable to or aggravated by 
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war service were to be eligible for a pension.
188
 By February 1941, over 12,000 men 
had been invalided from all three services due to ‘nervous disorders.’ Less than 400 
of these were eligible for a pension.
189
 As has been discussed earlier, the majority of 
neuropsychiatric cases invalided from the RAF were found to have been predisposed 
to neuroses and many had past history of such disorders. The Ministry of Pensions 
instructed medical boards that psychoneuroses and psychoses were due to the 
interaction of factors including ‘constitutional factors and pre-war illnesses’, ‘self 
advantage’ and ‘special stress’ from war service. ‘Constitutional factors’ included 
both ‘innate endowments’ and psychological ‘adaptations’, and covered those who 
were evidently feebleminded, psychopathic, depressive, paranoid, hypochondriacs or 
exhibited a ‘tendency to individualism.’190 ‘Self advantages’ covered those 
diagnosed with hysteria,
191
 while in some cases of ‘special stress’, it was accepted 
that for some, witnessing ‘horrifying sights’ was regarded as enough to precipitate 
‘emotional shock’.192  
After an amended pensions warrant white paper in July 1943, the pensions 
became more lenient. In cases where an illness was attributable to, or aggravated by 
military service, ‘the benefit of the doubt… [was] to be given to the claimant.’193 
Attributed pensions were to be paid for life, while pensions for aggravated illnesses 
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ended after the effect of the war was deemed to have passed.
194
 Shephard maintains 
that no one was paid a pension for psychoneurotic illness until 1944,
195
 but Edgar 
Jones, Ian Palmer and Simon Wessely disagree with Shephard’s figures. They 
maintain that around 30,000 pensions (somewhere between 2.3 and 10 per cent) were 
awarded for neuropsychiatric disorders.
196
 However, constitutional neuroses could 
not be considered attributable to service conditions.
197
  
In the RAF, invaliding medical boards had to decide whether a patient’s 
illness was ‘directly attributable to service’ during the war, or whether a pre-existing 
complaint had been aggravated by service. If so, the panel had to conclude whether 
the disability had been aggravated to a ‘slight’ or ‘material extent.’198 
Psychoneuroses were not attributable to the war unless there was ‘clear evidence that 
the member has been subjected to special stress or strain beyond that normally 
arising in active service in wartime.’199 Rarely exposed to enemy action, the 
breakdown of Bomber Command ground personnel was not often thought to be 
attributable to service conditions. Consequently, few of those invalided for these 
reasons were likely receive pensions. In addition to this, those that were granted a 
pension were unlikely to receive the full amount. The extent that their illness was 
disabling was defined as a percentage in comparison to a ‘normal healthy person of 
the same age and sex’ with total disablement being expressed as 100 per cent. If a 
pension was given, the amount of disability was expressed as a percentage of the full 
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pension.
200
 The least that was given was a twenty per cent pension, rising in 
multiples of ten per cent to the maximum.
201
 Scales were drawn up for the amount to 
be allocated for specific physical injuries, such as the loss of an eye or a limb, but 
there was no such chart for mental disabilities.
202
  
The pension policy led to further conflict between the RAF medical 
profession and their patients. That their future pension and financial comfort was at 
stake, led many patients to insist that their symptoms were caused by their service. 
Marjorie Bevan-Jones remembers that at her board the doctors wondered aloud how 
she had passed her initial medical. Wanting to qualify for a pension, she told them 
that when she joined up she was ‘as fit as a fiddle… could climb Snowdon, and run a 
mile easily.’ She insisted that it ‘was the wear and tear of winter life in the services 
that had finished… [her] off ’. 203 As well as suffering from depression, Bevan-Jones 
was diagnosed with a heart murmur, but it is unclear whether she was granted a 
pension. Jewesbury objected to granting pensions to ‘constitutional neurotics’ who 
could not cope with service life. He felt that to give ‘pensions to constitutional 
neurotics who fail to cope with the ordinary conditions of service is to offer rewards 
to all the inadequate personalities who are called up.’204 Jewesbury saw one solution 
to be stricter discipline, and thought it ‘unfortunate’ that there was not something in 
place to deter neurotic ground personnel who were aware that by being ‘troublesome 
enough or useless enough’ they were ‘likely to be invalided, with the possibility of a 
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pension and a more lucrative job in civil life.’205 In his report, he cited the case of a 
36 year old airman, a ‘medical nuisance’, who had been in the RAF for eight months 
but was previously a branch manager for the Ministry of Labour. It incensed 
Jewesbury that the man would probably be allowed to return to his civilian job and a 
salary six times that of his service pay, and he would rather have had him ‘shot for 
cowardice’ if he could.206  
In the context of the political struggle with the Air Ministry over the 
treatment of LMF air crew,
207
 Jewesbury’s report can be read as a political lever. 
Like others in the RAF medical services, Jewesbury felt strongly that the policy of 
granting pensions to neurotic ground personnel who may then be employed in a 
‘more lucrative job in civil life’ was unjust when air crew with similar symptoms 
could be transferred to the Army.
208
 He points out that wartime neuroses among 
civilians was not pensionable, and was especially exasperated by the case of the 
above airman.  
Throughout the twentieth century, it was felt that the payment of pensions for 
neuropsychiatric symptoms could lead to ‘shirking or even cowardice.’ Pressure for 
more liberal pension policies were met with arguments that payments hinder the 
patients’ recovery, and were countered by emphasising claimants’ constitutional 
weaknesses.
209
 During the war, there were very few follow up studies of people with 
‘war neuroses’, and there is no follow up study specifically of invalided RAF 
personnel. However, a limited number of studies on personnel from all three services 
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and from the Army were carried out.
210
 The studies showed that the antisocial ‘bad 
personality’ was less likely to do well in or out of the forces.211 Around three 
quarters had ‘marked neurotic traits’ before they enlisted,212 and consequently most 
were not entitled to a pension.
213
 Contrary to the debate in the British Medical 
Journal discussed in the previous chapter, patients could appear cured, but specialists 
admitted they were prone to a relapse if they were returned to the same environment 
in which their original breakdown had occurred.
214
 The War Cabinet stated there was 
little evidence that patients who had been discharged for mental health reasons had 
been incorrectly diagnosed, as it was understood that:  
a genuine case of mental illness, may on return to civil life and to his family 
rapidly become normal and may be able to keep the illness completely under. 
So long as he remains in these conditions. This does not mean that he would 
have “got well” in the conditions in which he became ill.215  
However, Jewesbury maintained that he had seen several cases of ground personnel 
being invalided who then re-enlisted only to be invalided once more.
216
 Their 
motives for rejoining the services cannot be known, whether it was because they had 
a sense of patriotic responsibility, because they were unsuccessful in civilian life, and 
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needed the security of service life and pay, or whether this was a manifestation of 
their illnesses.  
The majority of the wartime medical journal articles that consider war 
neuroses highlight that, due to predisposing factors, many who experienced mental 
health issues should not have been accepted into the service.
217
 As many have 
discussed, in all services, neuropsychiatric specialists emphasised the importance of 
the psychological selection of personnel.
218
 Attempts were made to reject recruits 
who were felt to be predisposed to neuroses. As discussed in chapter two, trade 
selection tests were extensively used in the RAF and the WAAF from 1942. 
However, an individual might say one thing in an interview in order to be accepted 
into the forces; equally a disillusioned individual might admit to anything to facilitate 
their release from the service. As is the case with the Army and RAF flyers, 
psychological testing and interviews failed to limit the numbers of male and female 
ground personnel who were seen at NYDN centres and invalided from the RAF.  
Conclusion 
The staff at NYDN centres concentrated on helping air crew and the war effort. 
Ground personnel were of secondary importance, and the exigencies of the service 
took precedence over the individual. The centres performed an important diagnostic 
function, and specialists attempted to explain illnesses in terms of predisposition. 
Around three quarters of ground personnel seen by specialists were diagnosed with 
anxiety or depression, and around ten per cent with hysteria. Taking into account the 
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severity of their illness, predisposing factors, and their position in the hierarchy of 
the RAF, specialists assessed whether it would be best to treat problem personnel or 
whether to invalid them.  
Treatment was as efficient and effective as possible; creating physical and 
mental distance from the stresses that had precipitated breakdown was found to most 
effective. After the interview with the specialist, treatments included rest, (sometimes 
assisted by sedatives) occupational therapy, and leave. For a minority of cases, 
narcoanalysis was carried out at NYDN centres with mixed results. There was an 
emphasis on the importance of a quick turnaround of patients. Acute cases, those 
who were deemed highly predisposed to psychoneuroses, and the unskilled, were 
quickly invalided. This included a high proportion of women. Medical boards to 
downgrade or invalid personnel were held at NYDN centres, and these effectively 
decided the fate of patients and their entitlement to a service pension. Around three 
quarters were invalided from the service.  
To a large extent, diagnosis and medical treatment was dictated by the 
Ministry of Pensions and military policy. Establishing the patient’s character, 
constitution and predisposition to psychoneuroses was seen as critical in order to 
avoid the payment of expensive pensions. Predisposition was seen as important in the 
follow up studies of invalided service personnel too, and only those whose illness 
was proved attributable to or aggravated by service were eligible to a pension. Even 
then, it was likely that only a percentage of the full pension was granted, and any 
identifiable predisposition reduced their chances of a pension.  
Informed by official publications, the culture of the RAF, medical journal 
articles and the media, the doctors’ stereotypical impression of ground personnel was 
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constructed through discourses of class, gender, and predisposition (including 
constitutional and acquired psychological weakness), together with their place in the 
hierarchy. Many ground personnel who were referred to NYDN centres were 
regarded by the specialists as the worst possible degenerates. They were ‘mal-
adapted, unstable, homesick, humourless and inadequate’.219 Ground personnel were 
measured in comparison to the model of heroic air crew, and, within the culture of 
the RAF, the further removed an individual was from the business of keeping the 
aircraft flying, the more likely they were to be susceptible to the weakness of 
psychoneuroses.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has examined the lives and emotions of RAF Bomber Command ground 
personnel during the Second World War. I have considered the selection and training 
of personnel, their living and working conditions and the medical treatment of those 
who were unable to cope with the pressures of wartime service life. This thesis has 
brought a significant group of the wartime population into focus, and in doing so has 
shed new light on the understandings of the wartime experience, work and 
citizenship, as well as Bomber Command and the RAF medical service.  
The central theme of this thesis is the gendered hierarchy within Bomber 
Command. The RAF was regarded as an elite; a technically advanced force that 
promised to defeat the enemy while avoiding the bloodshed of the previous war. Air 
crew were the epitome of hegemonic masculinity, and with their aircraft, they were 
the heart of the RAF. Ultimately the focus of every ground trade was to keep the 
maximum number of aircraft and crew available. This thesis has unpacked the 
importance of wartime discourses in the construction of the RAF hierarchy, and its 
importance in explaining the experiences of ground personnel. It was constructed in 
part by specific idiosyncrasies of RAF culture, its dialect, pay scale, trade tests and 
rank, as well as social and cultural discourses prevalent in civilian life: the 
interconnected discourses of class, race and gender, the medicalisation of fear and 
understandings of heroism and stoicism.  
As discussed in chapter one, the culture of the RAF influenced, and was 
influenced by, wider society, and as Paul Fussell, Joanna Bourke and others have 
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discussed, fear was expected to be the dominant emotion during the war.
1
 However, 
whatever their position in the hierarchy, all ground personnel were measured against 
the flyers, and in comparison to air crew, they had little to fear. Ground personnel 
were less likely to face imminent danger, or to be forced to confront their own 
mortality. Their concerns had more in common with those of civilians. They worried 
about family members, about flyers they had a relationship with, and about aircraft 
they worked on. For them grief, guilt and anxieties were more legitimate emotions; 
they lost friends, boyfriends, fiancés and family members. If an air crew managed to 
complete their tour they would be on an operational station for a matter of months, 
but ground personnel could serve on the same station for years. Consequently they 
had a clearer picture of the losses and attrition of aircraft and air crew. It is this that 
made ground personnel such fierce defenders of air crew, and bombing policy during 
and since the war. Some WAAFs like Pip Beck felt a connection with flyers in their 
last moments, and ground crews grieved for their aircraft when they failed to return.
2
  
It was understood that fear was countered by the discourses of heroism and 
stoicism, and in the culture of the RAF by euphemism and superstition. However, 
except in rare circumstances, ground personnel had little need or opportunity to be 
heroic. Horrific accidents involving revolving propellers, explosions and aircraft fires 
left lasting impression on witnesses, but such accidents were regarded as unfortunate 
events. These tales could not be romanticised in the same way as the heroic deaths of 
air crew, or even WAAFs who remained at their posts while being attacked. Ground 
personnel were more likely to be injured in traffic accidents or playing sports. The 
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forces’ penchant for understatement also meant that ground personnel were forced to 
conform to the model of stoicism. Keeping ‘a stiff upper lip’, they had to endure 
years of intense work in hard conditions. Illnesses, the cold, and fatigue had to be 
stoically accepted, and personnel could not complain when they were told ‘you’ve 
had it!’ Evidence of the effects of traumatic events can be seen in the sources used, in 
the poetry and cartoons, but also in oral histories and archived testimony. However, 
following contemporary medical understanding, personnel who suffered a 
breakdown were also unfavourably compared to civilians who lived through the Blitz 
without succumbing to the expected mass neurosis.  
Although the term shell shock was still in common use, in the hope of 
preventing a repeat of large numbers of neuropsychiatric casualties, it was forbidden 
as a military diagnosis. As discussed in chapter five, medical officers and specialists 
were informed by the RAF consultants that there was no such thing as war neuroses; 
all neuroses were the same, and were caused by a conflict between duty and self 
preservation in a predisposed and weak individual. Social and cultural patriarchal 
assumptions linked psychodynamic and constitutional predisposition to class, 
intelligence and gender. By 1942, psychological testing and trade selection attempted 
to eliminate recruits who were expected to either fail their training or succumb to 
psychoneuroses after only months of service. Proportionally more women than men 
were rejected. The tests legitimised the role of military psychologists, but the 
numbers of personnel with psychoneurotic symptoms who attended sick parades on 
operational stations or were invalided from the service, show that these tests were not 
altogether successful.  
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Most medical officers were newly qualified. They therefore had little 
experience of mental health problems, were given little training and were likely to 
search for physical illness or organic causes first. The health and well being of the 
flyers took precedence, and apart from a minority of ‘problem’ cases who repeatedly 
reported at sick parade, the medical officer gave ground personnel scant 
consideration. However, as chapter six shows, the perception of neuropsychiatrist 
specialists at NYDN centres was different. They saw a disproportionally large group 
of poor quality personnel, the majority of whom were ground personnel diagnosed 
with anxiety or depression. Although exchange visits to operational stations went 
some way to redress their understanding of the numbers involved, it also reinforced 
the hierarchical dominance of the flyers. At Rauceby, Jewesbury thought the 
difference between the treatment of air and ground personnel was unfair. Air crew 
risked the stigma of LMF, while ground personnel were routinely given medical 
discharges.
3
  
For both medical officers and the NYDN specialists, unit morale took 
precedence over the individual, and this could lead to a confrontational relationship 
with patients, particularly with those diagnosed as psychopaths, and suspected 
malingerers. The official policy was to assess the patient’s predisposition to 
psychoneuroses. As they were also responsible for attending crashes, dealing with 
dead and treating wounded air crew, medical officers were familiar with traumatic 
events. They therefore had little sympathy for those who fell short of the stoic ideal. 
Such individuals could be given a ‘pep talk’, be granted leave, have their duty 
changed, or be referred to a specialist. At NYDN centres, various experimental 
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treatments using sedatives were used for the worst cases, however the best treatment 
was thought to be rest and exercise. Neuropsychiatric specialists found predisposition 
in around 80 per cent of ground personnel; many had only served for a short length 
of time, and were regarded as constitutional neurotics, criminals, psychopaths, or 
simply unintelligent and inadequate. Such individuals were blamed for their own 
failure to adapt to RAF life and were either medically downgraded or invalided from 
the service. Medical boards were a main function of NYDN centres. The majority 
were held for ground personnel, and most were for psychological reasons. Only 
personnel with illness attributable or aggravated by the war received pensions, and 
evidence of a predisposition to neuroses negated the possibility of any compensation. 
Medical officers and neuropsychiatric specialists were influenced by, and played a 
role in maintaining, the constructed binary between weak and strong, and the RAF 
hierarchy.  
The RAF was a microcosm of wider society, and the hierarchy among ground 
trades was a continuation of the distinction between air crew positions from the 
supremacy of the pilot to the flight engineer and gunners. Together with the RAF 
intelligence tests, pay scale and ranks, the hierarchy of trades was socially and 
culturally constructed by a combination of patriarchal assumptions about race, class 
and gender. From 1942 onwards, personnel’s trade selection and their subsequent 
pay scale, rank and place in the hierarchy, was partially dictated by the GVK 
intelligence tests. The tests perpetuated social divisions and biologised the perceived 
superiority of those who had received the best education.  
Including rank, there were multiple signifiers of status within the RAF 
hierarchy. The ultimate symbol was the air crew’s wings, however for ground 
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personnel, their proximity to aircraft and their perception of their involvement with 
the raison d’être of Bomber Command was crucial. Personnel’s uniform and physical 
appearance was an important signifier of trade and status. When first issued, it 
marked the end of civilian identity, and rather than being an attempt to express their 
femininity or individuality, the changes WAAF personnel made to their uniform 
were intended as a sign of proficiency and belonging. Trousers were only issued to 
WAAFs in technical trades, and worn and faded uniforms denoted long service and 
suggested stoicism and competence. Carrying out physical labour in dirty and 
environments exposed to the elements, ground crews and trades such as armourers 
were of necessity ‘scruffy Erks.’ They were insulated from the authority of official 
discipline and ‘bull’. At the opposite end of the hierarchy, a smart uniform and an 
excess of ‘square bashing’ and ‘bull’ supervised by administration officers was a 
signifier of low status. Trades were also gendered. Some trades diluted by WAAFs 
were regarded as ‘cissy jobs’, while to ground crews working on the flights, all other 
trades were feminised as ‘gash trades.’ In this way the hierarchy of trades was also 
reinforced by language.  
In chapter four I considered three distinct levels of the hierarchy: mechanics 
and fitters who worked on the flights, those in ancillary trades, and those at the 
bottom of the hierarchy who worked ‘beyond the perimeter track.’ Often shorthanded 
and lacking tools, spares and equipment, mechanics and fitters stoically accepted the 
necessity of working long hours, losing sleep and missing meals. They ‘owned’ the 
‘kites’ they worked on and mourned their loss. As can be seen in the meticulous note 
books saved in the archives, from the beginning of their trade training they took great 
pride in their role. Those who worked in some ‘gash’ trades also took great pride in 
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the work they undertook in similar conditions; armourers earned the respect of others 
because of the risk of catastrophic accidents, while personnel in trades like the 
compass adjusters were secure in the knowledge that the aircraft would not be able to 
navigate to the target without their input.  
For some who worked beyond the perimeter track their contribution to the 
war effort and the raison d’être of Bomber Command was harder to justify. It was 
not problematic for WAAFs who worked in trades that brought them into contact 
with air crew, or in prestigious and ‘hush hush’ radar trades, however, the morale of 
general duties AC2s, ground defence personnel and others was seen as a problem for 
by RAF officers. It was thought that men in trades such as gunners, mess stewards, 
and general duties personnel could be doing more for the war effort. The work of 
kitchen staff was gruelling, they received little reward, and resented the fact that 
many of their tasks were used as ‘jankers.’ Those at the bottom of the hierarchy 
shared the same living and working conditions as others, but were disillusioned by 
the difference between their expectations and the reality of service. They were 
‘browned off,’ and aware that they were of little importance. For those at the bottom 
of the hierarchy RAF authority was an ‘other’ they shared in common with those in a 
similar position; rather than feeling part of Bomber Command they resisted the 
regime of the RAF. 
When contrasted to civilians in comparable trades and industries, life in the 
RAF was more demanding, underpaid and strictly disciplined. As well as their hours 
of work, the RAF controlled personnel’s social life by regulating passes off the 
station and periods of leave. Bomber Command stations were not closed sites, but 
RAF authority extended to uniformed personnel in the surrounding civilian areas. 
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Following the example of the hedonistic air crew, ground personnel used humour and 
alcohol as coping mechanisms, and early on in their Air Force careers, the most 
successful personnel learnt to bend the rules without being caught. 
The hierarchy of trades was interlinked with identity and gender, and to an 
extent it was self imposed and regulated by the emotional communities that were 
formed by different groups of personnel. Like civilian wartime society, Bomber 
Command was a rigid emotional regime that conformed to the ‘hydraulic’ model of 
emotions. After suppressing emotional displays and attempting to maintain a ‘stiff 
upper lip’, feelings were thought to burst out. Male and female personnel belonged to 
smaller emotional communities formed around common qualities including their 
trade and place in the hierarchy. Night workers effectively belonged to separate 
emotional communities, but because of their responsibility to set an example, officers 
followed a stricter emotional regime. They at least had more privacy to release their 
emotions, while others struggled to find an emotional refuge. Mutually supportive 
groups helped members to cope with service life, but could pressure individuals to 
conform. As RAF medics noted, it was isolated, antisocial individuals who were 
more likely to suffer from neuroses and succumb to genuine or contrived illnesses.  
Failures were found to be the wrong personality ‘type’ who had joined for the 
wrong reasons. Men volunteered in order to avoid serving in the Army, and after 
women were conscripted, large numbers of women joined the WAAF to avoid less 
appealing service. The fact that proportionally more women than men were 
discharged from the service confirmed patriarchal assumptions about class and 
gender. These assumptions were reinforced by evidence that unintelligent WAAF 
recruits were more likely to have head lice, or that those in low status trades had a 
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higher incidence of venereal disease. WAAFs struggled against the virgin or whore 
dichotomy, and they were thought of as weaker than men. Because they were 
perceived as less important and more easily replaced, women were also found to be 
more prone to illness and more frequently invalided.  
The Second World War is often examined as a time of social change in which 
gender roles were redefined, however in many of the sources examined for this thesis 
WAAFs were two dimensional stereotypes, women were marginalised and 
patriarchal assumptions were reinforced. Although Tessa Stone maintains that 
Higonnet and Higonnet’s ‘double helix’ model did not fit the experiences of the 
WAAFs she interviewed for her examination of WAAF dilution, women were seen 
to be inferior in all but sedentary and repetitive roles.
4
 More roles were open to 
women, but they were paid two thirds of the male wage, and often the most technical 
trades were diluted and simplified. Competence at trades and skills which were 
coded as feminine (or, as Stone studied, in Balloon trades at the bottom of the RAF 
hierarchy) did not challenge masculinity. As discussed in chapter one, the double 
helix model fits better than Stone suggests, and any crisis of masculinity caused by 
dilution was experienced predominantly by airmen at the bottom of the RAF 
hierarchy in trades that were hard to reconcile with the heroic masculine ideal.  
As Sonya Rose and Lucy Noakes have argued, the secure performance of 
masculinity during wartime was largely dependent on being in the forces.
5
 However, 
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in the RAF, only the flyers were the epitome of masculine ideal; for all other 
personnel their masculinities had to be constructed in other ways. Following the 
model of masculinity proposed by Raewyn Connell,
6
 those in the higher levels of the 
hierarchy of ground personnel were able to construct their masculine identities 
around their technical skills, their association with the aircraft and air crew, and their 
stoicism. Those at the bottom of the hierarchy were more likely to define their 
masculinity in opposition to the female other. In the specific culture of Bomber 
Command, an individual’s trade and their place in the hierarchy was more important 
than their gender. Some WAAFs saw themselves as more part of the military than the 
lowest men in the hierarchy, and some men certainly felt more like civilians in 
uniform.  
This thesis has uncovered nuanced divisions in this previously unstudied 
group of wartime society. The hierarchy in the RAF was created by discourses of 
class and gender, together with medical theories and the wartime understanding of 
fear, bravery and stoicism. More than the power and authority that came with rank 
and civilian social class, in Bomber Command the hierarchy was constructed by the 
proximity of different trade groups to the aircraft and air crew and their importance 
in the war effort. Their shift patterns, and amount of autonomy, their pay scale, the 
dialect of the RAF, and the visual signifiers of uniforms all contributed. The 
hierarchy also affected the construction of individual identities and mutually 
supportive emotional communities. These were crucial in helping people cope with 
the uncertainties of war; it was those who became isolated who were more at risk of 
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succumbing to an emotional breakdown. Those who did suffer from neuroses were 
feminised and regarded as weak.  
This thesis examined how male and female Bomber Command ground 
personnel were viewed by the wartime society, and how they saw themselves. In 
doing so, it has contributed to the historiography of the RAF and the Second World 
War by bringing a substantial but neglected part of the wartime population into 
focus. Ground personnel’s position in the hierarchy of the RAF made them believe 
that their stories were less important to narratives of the war than those of the flyer. 
That this stereotypical perception of ground personnel has continued to the present 
day can inform studies of memory and commemoration. This study has also shown 
that there were important divisions in this seemingly homogeneous group, and in 
doing so, it provides the history of emotions with new examples of small emotional 
communities. As the hierarchy of ground personnel was constructed within the wider 
society, this study is also pertinent to social histories of the Second World War, 
including those that address issues of class and gender. The peculiarity of the RAF in 
having women perform many of the same roles as men makes this case study 
particularly significant to gender history. Finally, by using the appreciation of the 
lives and emotions of ground personnel developed in the first four chapters, unlike 
many other studies, the last third of this thesis offers a new understanding of 
psychological problems and treatment during wartime by placing mental breakdown 
in the wider context of social history.  
Despite the volume of work that already examines the history of the RAF 
during the Second World War, there is still room for more study. As we approach the 
seventieth anniversary of the end of the war, more oral histories should be 
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undertaken while they still can, and this thesis has shown that there is room for a 
further examination of the RAF hierarchy, encompassing the flyers and ground 
personnel, and all commands of the RAF.  
Located in wartime culture and society between the stoic civilian population 
and the heroic fighting man, ground personnel came together as part of the hierarchy 
of the RAF in order to ‘do their bit’ for the war effort. The Erks and WAAFs of RAF 
Bomber Command knew their place behind the flyers, but they were also aware of 
their importance. I have attempted to add their memories to the choir of voices that 
tell of wartime experience. ‘Three cheers for the man on the ground.’ 
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APPENDIX A  
BOMBER COMMAND STATIONS IN ENGLAND 
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APPENDIX B 
RAF TRADES, VOLUNTEERS AND NATIONAL SERVICE RECRUITS (ALL 
COMMANDS) 
Taken from: TNA, AIR 20/8992, Royal Air Force: General (Code 67/1): RAF recruiting: policy, 
(1939-1953), Appendix C & D. (This list is not exhaustive). 
 
Trades 
 
Volunteers N SA Recruits  Total 
Aircrafthand General Duties 59594 87567 147181 
Arial Erector 25 29 54 
Airfield Controller 378 163 541 
Aircraft Finisher 52 288 340 
Armament Assistant 456 776 1232 
Armourer 11232 15935 27167 
Balloon Personnel 17123 6880 24003 
Barber 
 
392 378 770 
Batman 
 
4182 4467 8649 
Bricklayer 230 257 487 
Carpenter 1804 4315 6119 
Clerk Accts 2031 4443 6474 
Clerk GD 
 
6227 8730 14957 
Clerk SD 
 
1576 3231 4807 
Compass Adjuster 374 249 623 
Cook and Butcher  5807 7613 13420 
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Trades Volunteers NSA Total   
Dental Clerk Orderly 112 117 229 
Dental Mechanic 126 144 270 
Driver M T 10580 26606 37186 
Electrician 11828 15986 27814 
Equipment Assistant 5007 12448 17455 
Fitter II Airframe or Engine 3952 2359 6311 
Fitter Armourer 231 57 288 
Fitter Torpedo 92 29 121 
Flight Mechanic Airframe or 
Engine 80649 80704 161353 
Ground Observer 1027 978 2005 
Gunner 
 
31013 25807 56820 
Instrument Repairer 7377 7400 14777 
Link Trainer Instructor 772 518 1290 
Medical Orderly 4622 3492 8114 
Metal Worker 1309 1263 2572 
Blacksmith and Welder 109 124 233 
Coppersmith and Sheet Metal 
Worker 247 381 628 
Maintenance Assistant 1486 2193 3619 
Meteorologist 456 610 1066 
Motor Cyclist 580 898 1476 
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Trades Volunteers N SA Recruits  Total  
M T Mechanic 2923 5903 8826 
Musician 
 
834 15 849 
Packer 
 
49 166 215 
Photographer 1018 1730 3749 
Physical Training Instructor 2031 1854 3885 
Pigeon Keeper 6 5 11 
Plant Operator 88 235 323 
Plumber 
 
105 328 433 
Radar Mechanic 1855 823 2878 
Radar Wireless Mechanic 10326 11341 21667 
Radar Operator 3156 4579 7714 
Radio Telephony Operator 3092 4135 7227 
Station Police 7188 9220 16408 
Shoemaker 480 275 755 
Tailor  
 
226 311 537 
Telephonist 59 144 203 
Teleprinter Operator 1153 1009 2162 
RDF (Radar)  
 
189 119 308 
Wireless Mechanic 968 1220 2188 
Wireless Operator 42068 32137 74205 
Wireless Operator Mechanic 39 18 57 
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APPENDIX C 
WAAF TRADES, VOLUNTEERS AND NATIONAL SERVICE RECRUITS (ALL 
COMMANDS) 
Taken from: TNA, AIR 20/8992, Royal Air Force: General (Code 67/1): RAF recruiting: policy, 
(1939-1953), Appendix C & D. (This list is not exhaustive). 
 
Trades  
 
Volunteers NSA Recruits  Total 
Administrative 3798 261 4059 
Aircrafthand General Duties  14784 4183 18967 
Acetylene Welder 8 4 12 
Armament Assistant 602 116 718 
Armourer 51 2 53 
Balloon Personnel 17026 1094 18120 
Batwomen 7205 1581 8786 
Bomb Plotter 200 109 309 
Carpenter 151 13 164 
Charging Board Operator 1083 305 1388 
Cine Projectionist 245 29 274 
Clerk Accounts 6015 1281 7296 
Clerk GD 
 
14187 3182 17369 
Clerk Linguist 2 0 2 
Clerk GD Maps 6 66 72 
Clerk Personnel Selection 7 12 19 
Clerk General Duties Post D 212 304 516 
Clerk SD 
 
9052 1655 10407 
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Trades Volunteers N SA Recruits Total   
Clerk Signals 98 20 118 
Cook 
 
22725 3913 26638 
Dental Clerk Orderly  809 4 813 
Driver MT 14409 2437 16846 
Drouge Packer 97 0 97 
Electrician 239 215 454 
Equip Assistant 8123 837 8960 
Fabric Worker Aero 1744 240 1984 
Fabric Worker Balloon 2099 1 2100 
Flight Mechanic 2551 1338 3889 
Hairdresser 523 105 628 
Instrument Mechanic 105 0 105 
Instrument Repairer 176 196 372 
Chiropodist 12 10 22 
Dispenser 46 8 54 
Laboratory Assistant 16 5 21 
Masseuse 37 11 48 
Medical Orderly 4312 323 4635 
Operating Room Assistant 51 23 74 
Radiographer 19 3 22 
Maintenance Assistant 56 20 76 
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Trades Volunteers N SA Recruits Total   
Mess & Kitchen 2197 0 2197 
Mess Steward 138 53 191 
Meteorologist 1509 538 2047 
Morse Slip Reader 117 1 118 
M T Mechanic 62 143 205 
Orderly 
 
7002 1154 8156 
Parachute Packer 911 184 1095 
Parachute Repairer 80 0 80 
Pattern Maker A 1 2 3 
Photographer 382 22 404 
Plug Tester 1677 70 1747 
Radar 
Operative 
 
3971 699 4670 
Radio Telephone Operator 1581 531 2112 
Radar Wireless Operator 93 541 634 
Safety Equipment Assistant 28 33 61 
Safety Equipment Worker 70 113 183 
Service Police 133 43 176 
Shoe Repairer 33 17 50 
Tailoress 
 
1128 45 1173 
Telephonist 5074 469 5543 
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Trades Volunteers N SA Recruits Total   
Teleprinter Operator 5433 966 6399 
Tracer 
 
28 0 28 
Waitress 
 
9044 1134 10178 
Wireless Mechanic 479 25 504 
Wireless Operator 5211 3477 8688 
Workshophand 1038 0 1038 
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APPENDIX D 
TRADES AND PAY GROUPS 
(Taken from: J. Hammerton, ABC of the RAF: New & Enlarged Edition, (London, Amalgamated 
Press, 1943), p. 12.) 
 
Group 1 
 
Electrician grade 1 
Fitter, grade 1 
Fitter, grade 2 (airframe) 
Fitter, grade 2 (engine) 
Fitter (armourer) 
Fitter (armourer) (bombs) 
Fitter (armourer) (guns) 
Fitter (MT) 
Instrument repairer, grade 1 
Radio Mechanic 
Wireless Mechanic 
Wireless Operator Mechanic  
  
 
 
 
Group 2 
 
Armourer 
Armourer (bombs) 
Armourer (guns) 
Electrician, grade 2 
Flight Mechanic (airframe) 
Flight Mechanic (engine) 
Instrument repairer, grade 2 
MT Mechanic 
Photographer 
Radio Operator  
Wireless Operator 
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Group 3 
 
Cook and Butcher 
Motor Boat Crew 
Shoemaker 
Tailor 
 
 
 
Group 4 
 
Clerk (accounting) 
Clerk, equipment accounting 
Clerk, pay accounting 
Clerk (General Duties) 
Clerk (Special Duties) 
 Equipment assistant 
Teleprinter Operator 
 
 
 
Group 5 
 
Aircrafthand 
Aircrafthand u/t (trade) 
Barber 
Gunner 
Motor Cyclist 
Musician 
Physical Training Instructor 
Service Police 
Telephone Operator
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APPENDIX E 
DAILY RATES OF PAY FOR GROUND PERSONNEL AND NCO AIR CREW 
Taken from: Air Ministry, King’s Regulations and Air Council Instructions for the Royal Air Force, 
(London, HMSO, 1943), addendums to p.1139-1140. AMO A.97/43 and AMCO A.72/43.  
 
Ground personnel 
Rank Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 
(Shillings and Pence) 
AC2 4 9 4 6 4 0 4 3 3 0 
AC1 5 6 5 3 4 9 5 0 4 6 
LAC 6 6 6 0 5 3 5 6 5 0 
LAC (over 
three years 
service) 
7 0 6 6 5 6 6 0 5 3 
Corporal 8 6 7 6 6 0 6 6 5 9 
Corporal 
(over four 
years 
service) 
9 0 8 0 6 6 7 0 6 0 
Sergeant 10 6 9 6 7 6 8 0 7 0 
Sergeant 
(over four 
years 
service)  
11 0 10 0 8 0 8 6 7 6 
Flight 
Sergeant 
12 6 11 0 9 0 9 6 8 9 
Flight 
Sergeant 
(over four 
years 
service) 
13 0 11 6 9 6 10 0 9 0 
Warrant 
Officer 
15 0 13 6 12 6 12 6 12 6 
NCO Air Crew 
 Pilot 
Navigator 
Air 
Bomber 
Wireless 
Operator 
Mechanic 
Flight 
Engineer 
Wireless 
Operator 
Air 
Gunner 
Sergeant 13 6 12 0 10 0 10 0 8 0 
Flight 
Sergeant 
16 0 13 0 12 0 12 0 9 0 
Warrant 
Officer 
17 6 15 6 13 6 13 6 12 6 
 
370 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 
The National Archives (TNA) 
AIR 2/4019 Royal Air Force Personnel (Code B, 68): Treatment of airmen of 
unsound mind, (1939-1946). 
AIR 2/4821 Royal Air Force Personnel (Code B, 68): Requirements for various 
trades, (1942-1943). 
AIR 2/4899 Royal Air Force Personnel: Airmen: drafting and posting procedure 
1942 – 1944. 
AIR 2/5998, Expert Committee on Work of Psychologists and Psychiatrists in the 
Services (1942 – 1943). 
AIR 2/6252 Medical (Code B, 48): Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Registered 
Files Psychological disorders in flying personnel: occurrence reports, (1942-1945).  
AIR 2/6345 Royal Air Force Personnel (Code B, 68): Proposal for selection of 
candidates for aircrew by combined psychiatric and psychological methods (1941-
1943). 
AIR 2/6400, Medical (Code B, 48): Psychological examinations of recruits and other 
personnel by industrial psychologists, (1942-1945). 
AIR 2/8278, Overseas: Dominions, Colonies and Commonwealth (Code B, 42/1), 
(1943-1946). 
371 
 
AIR 2/8591, Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Registered Files. Royal Air 
Force Personnel (Code B, 68): Aircrew who refuse or are unfit to fly: disposal 
policy. 
AIR 2/9482, Women’s Auxiliary Air Force: Personnel (Code B, 77/1): Catering 
Officers: Substitution by WAAF Officers, (1940-1943). 
AIR 2/13443 Accommodation: RAF domestic accommodation: medical aspects 1940 
– 1957.  
AIR 2/13859 Women’s Royal Air Force (WRAF): treatment of immorality 1945 – 
1968. 
AIR 2/13443, Medical (Code B, 48): RAF domestic accommodation: medical 
aspects, (1940-1957). 
AIR 2/13859, Women’s Royal Air Force (WRAF): treatment of immorality; policies 
and procedures regarding lesbianism/homosexuality, (1945-1968). 
AIR 14/1009 Substitution of WAAF for RAF personnel: reports and policy (1942-
1945). 
AIR 14/1040, WAAF accommodation: policy, (1941-1942). 
AIR 14/1041, WAAF accommodation: policy, (1942-1943). 
AIR 14/1042, WAAF accommodation: policy, (1943-1944). 
AIR 14/1338, WAAF signals officers: introduction and policy, (1942-1944). 
372 
 
AIR 20/8992, Royal Air Force: General (Code 67/1): RAF recruiting: policy, (1939-
1953). 
AIR 20/9051Royal Air Force Personnel: West Indians serving in RAF: 
demobilization and repatriation. 1945 – 1953. 
AIR 20/10727 Records of the Air Historical Branch, Flying stress: DGMS (RAF)’s 
correspondence, 1941-1946. 
AIR 22/1 War room Summaries, September 1939. 
AIR 22/49, War room Summaries, January – April 1945. 
AIR 24/1641, Log of events submitted by W.A.A.F. detachments at various R.A.F. 
Stations, (1940). 
AIR 24/1642, Log of events submitted by W.A.A.F. detachments at various R.A.F. 
Stations, (1940-1941). 
AIR 24/1643, Operations record Books, Directorate, WAAF: Air Ministry, 
Appendices, (1939-1940). 
AIR 24/1644, Directorate, WAAF: Air Ministry, Appendices, (1940-1941). 
AIR 24/1645, Directorate, WAAF: Air Ministry, Appendices, (1941-1942). 
AIR 28/147, Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Operations Record Books, Royal 
Air Force Stations. Chedburgh. (1943- 1944). 
AIR 28/891 Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Operations Record Books, Royal 
Air Force Stations. Waterbeach. Appendices.  
373 
 
AIR 28/892 Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Operations Record Books, Royal 
Air Force Stations. Waterbeach. Appendices. (1944 – 1945). 
AIR 29/496, No. 2 RAF Depot, Cardington, (1937-1946). 
AIR 29/497, 3 RAF Depot, Padgate, (1939-1950). 
AIR 29/501, RAF Recruit Centres, (1940-1948).  
AIR 29/710 Operational Record Book: Central Trade Test Board, West Drayton, 
UK. Includes Remustering examination lists, and intelligence tests. (1941-1945). 
AIR 29/764 Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Operations Record Books, 
Miscellaneous Units Sept 1939 - Apr 1945. 
AIR 29/851 Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Operations Record Books, 
Miscellaneous Units. R.A.F. Bases, RAF 31 Base, Stradishall, 1943 June -1945 July. 
AIR 33/5, Visits: Reports 201 - 345 (1941-1945). 
AIR 49/324 Air Ministry: Reports used for Official History of Royal Air Force 
Medical Services, Second World War, R.A.F. Officers' Hospital, Torquay: 
miscellaneous papers, (1941- 1945). 
AIR 49/357 Neuropsychiatry: miscellaneous reports and publications, (1941-1945). 
AIR 57/10 Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Flying Personnel Research 
Committee: Reports and Papers (1942-1946). 
374 
 
CAB 66/27/10 Stafford Cripps, R. Alexander, A. V. Grigg, P. J. Sinclair A. H. M. 
‘The Use of Psychologists and Psychiatrists in the Services’ National Archives, 
(1942).  
CAB 66/27/41 Markham, V. Cazalet, T. Elliot, W. Milner, J. Munro, D. Stocks, J. L. 
Summerskill, E. Sykes, F. ‘Report of the Committee on Amenities and Welfare 
Conditions in the Three Women’s Services’ National Archives, (1942). 
CAB 66/28/15 Bracken, B. ‘Minister of Information: Report on Home Opinion’ 
National Archives, (1942). 
CAB 66/42/42, Committee of Inquiry into Detention Barracks, (1943). 
CAB 66/59/28, RAF Man Power Requirements January to June 1945, (1944). 
CO 968/55/14, RAF: recruitment in West Indies, (1942-1943). 
CO 968/132/2, West Indies: enlistment of aircraft-hands and ground staff for RAF, 
(1944). 
FD 1/5530, Research on RAF selection of personnel: reports by Dr R Buzzzard, 
(1942-1944). 
FD 1/3561, Flying Personnel Research Committee, Browne, R. C. ‘A Teleprinter 
Switchboard Study’. (1943). 
PIN 15/2218, Ministry of Pensions and successors: War Pensions, Registered Files 
(GEN Series) and other records. Air Force Order 1940 amendments. (1940-1943). 
PIN 15/2405, Neurosis attributable to war Service: treatment of men discharged from 
Services. (1941-1942). 
375 
 
MH76/74 Ministry of Health: Emergency Medical Services Memorandum No.4 for 
guidance of medical officers and other staff 1939. 
The Imperial War Museum (IWM) 
Art, PST 3096. J. Foss, ‘Serve in the WAAF with the men who fly’ (1941). 
Art, IWM PST 13911. H. Forster, ‘Keep Mum - She's Not so Dumb! - Careless Talk 
Costs Lives’ (1941). 
Documents. 117, Private Papers of J. R. Sharp, (1989). 
Documents. 507, Private Papers of E. M. Kup, (1998). 
Documents. 685, Private Papers of O. Noble, (1991). 
Documents.874, Private Papers of P. Sidle, (1989). 
Documents.1642, Private Papers of A. Benham, (1987). 
Documents. 1947, Private Papers of K. M. Cove, (1992). 
Documents. 2469, Private Papers of S. C. Dix, (1993). 
Documents. 3291, Private Papers of R. Brooks, (1995). 
Documents. 5652, Private Papers of Mrs S. Watts, (1996).
1
 
Documents. 6076, Private Papers of squadron leader, reverend G. H. Martin. 
Documents. 6384, Private Papers of S. Rew, (1997). 
Documents. 6649, Private Papers of Miss J. M. Brotherton MBE, (1997). 
                                                 
1
 Watts was the maiden name of Sylvia Pickering who published her autobiography as Tales of a 
Bomber Command WAAF (& her horse), (Bognor Regis, 2002). 
376 
 
Documents. 7199, Private Papers of Miss P. Willmott (1996). 
Documents. 8443, Private Papers of W. R. Smith, (1999). 
Documents. 8511, Private Papers of F. Taylor, (2004). 
Documents. 14842, Private Papers of E. Sadler, (2006). 
Documents. 14879, Private Papers of G. King, (2006). 
Interview with Arthur Batten, 27802 (2005). 
Interview with John Charles Elliott, 13094 (1993). 
Interview with Patricia Lockitt, 27207 (2004). 
Interview with Doreen May, 12205 (1991). 
Interview with Francis McGovern, 17825 (1998). 
Interview with Denis Wiltshire, 28561 (2004). 
Photographs. Royal Air Force Bomber Command 1942 -1945, CH 5988.  
Photographs. Royal Air Force Bomber Command 1942 -1945, CH 12430. 
Photographs. Royal Air Force: Air Defence of Great Britain, 1943-1944. CH 18732. 
Photographs. Royal Air Force: Bomber Command, 1942-1945. CH 7910. 
Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex (MOA) 
SxMOA1/2/29, Men in the Forces (1939-1956). 
SxMOA1/2/29/2/2/F, Reports from A/C 2 Pepper, (1940-1941). 
377 
 
SxMOA1/2/29/2/2/G, Reports and letters from LAC Papineau, (1941). 
SxMOA1/2/29/2/2/H, Account, Observations and Correspondence, R. Picton, (1940-
1941). 
SxMOA1/2/29/2/2/I, Correspondence, J. Sommerfield, (1940-1941). 
SxMOA1/2/29/2/2/J, Assorted material sent in by other Observers in the RAF, 
(1939-1943). 
SxMOA1/2/29/3/B, Printed Material, Recruitment, Information Leaflets, 
Regulations, Advertising, War Savings and other Ephemera, (1939-1945). 
SxMOA1/2/29/4/A, Life in the RAF, (1941). 
SxMOA1/2/29/4/A/2, Interviews with 54 Ground Defence men, Fire Staff, Police, 
Cooks, Drivers and Orderlies about their attitudes to being in the RAF, what they 
miss about civilian life, going to church, their expectations for the post-war period 
and the possibility of invasion, (1941) 
SxMOA1/2/29/4/A/3, Interviews with 50 RAF men about going out at night, type of 
entertainment most enjoyed etc (1941). 
SxMOA1/2/29/4/A/4, Interviews with 44 airmen about what they missed most from 
peace time, (1941). 
SxMOA1/2/32/1/E, Observations of women in uniform, July-Aug 1940 
‘Conversation between Ob. and working class family’ 29 July 1940. 
SxMOA1/2/32/1/F, Male Attitudes to Women in the Forces. (1941). 
378 
 
SxMOA1/2/32/1/G/5, Recruitment literature for the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force 
(WAAF) (1939-1945). 
SxMOA1/2/32/3/1, WAAF: Women’s Auxiliary Air Force, (1939-1945). 
SxMOA1/2/32/3/2, WAAF: Reports from an Observer, (1941-1942). 
SxMOA1/2/29/2, Reports from Individual Members of the Forces (1939 – 43). 
RAF Museum Hendon (RAFMH) 
001.3517/001. A. Rob, ‘RAF days: My life and times in the Royal Air Force.’  
AC96/5. Reminiscences by former members of Bomber Command gathered in 
research for the writing of The Hardest Victory, c1993. 
B1157J. C. Newton ‘Memoirs of an airman.’  
B3692. S. Rew ‘They also Served: The Story of an Ordinary Aircraftsman.’  
B4264. ‘Memoirs of Mr. Holman.’  
X002.5774.004. R. J. Bull Letter to ‘Ron.’ 
X002.6183.182.184. Letters from Frank Taylor. 
X002.9356. K. Lee, ‘Tales of Bomber Command.’  
X002-5411. ‘Memoirs of C. J. Shepherd.’  
X003-9925. Goldsmith Papers. 
X004.8447.0004.003. McCarthy letters. 
X005-6588-003. Letters from Cpl Stevens. 
379 
 
X006-0262. E. J. Williamson, ‘A Life for Men: Memoir of a non-flying, non-
commissioned regular Airman 1940 to 1953.’  
X006 7041. Cawner note book.  
Wellcome Library (WL) 
PP/CPS.16, Sir Charles Putnam Symonds, Notes and letter re war psychiatry, (1955). 
PP/DSC, Correspondence and papers of Dr David Stafford-Clark, (1916-1999). 
PP/HEW/C. Papers of Sir Harold Whittingham, RAF Medical Services, (1920-1945). 
PP/RMK/D.1: Box 7, RAF: miscellaneous official circulars, (1940-1945).  
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London 
GB99/Bryant/C/106 File on WAAF training, (1943). 
Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick (MRC) 
MSS.148/UCW/6/13/13/9 The Committee for the Abolition of Night-Bombing, 
Night Bombing (1941). 
RAF Wickenby Memorial Collection (WMC) 
Ashmore, A. ‘The Wickenby Armourer’ The Wickenby Register Newsletter (1992), 
No. 36, p. 4. 
DOC 00252. Wells, S. ‘Not all had wings’  
Plan of RAF Wickenby (c1944), 626 Squadron Research Project. 
380 
 
Rendall, M. ‘NAAFI Memories: “We Serve those who Serve”’ The Wickenby 
Register Newsletter, (2006), No. 63, p. 1.  
Sykes, E. ‘Three Cheers For The Men On The Ground’ The Wickenby Register 
Newsletter, (1988), No. 26, p. 8.  
WR 0156. Photograph: RAF Wickenby Maintenance Wing Group Cup Final 
Football Team 1944-45 
WR0076. Photograph: The ‘Ad Astras’ at RAF Wickenby 1944.  
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 
Air Ministry Air Publication 1269: Manual for Medical and Dental Officers of the 
Royal Air Force (London, HMSO, 1940).  
Air Ministry, Air Publication 3234: The Women’s Auxiliary Air Force, (Air 
Historical Branch, 1953).  
Air Ministry, Bomber Command: The Air Ministry Account of Bomber Command’s 
Offensive Against the Axis September, 1939-July, 1941, (London, HMSO, 1941). 
Air Ministry, Bomber Command Continues: The Air Ministry Account of Bomber 
Command’s Offensive Against Germany July 1941- June 1942, (London, HMSO, 
1942). 
Air Ministry, King’s Regulations and Air Council Instructions for the Royal Air 
Force, (London, HMSO, 1943).  
381 
 
Air Ministry, Psychological Disorders in Flying Personnel of the Royal Air Force 
Investigated During The War 1939-1945, (London, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
1947). 
Air Ministry, Royal Air Force Personnel Statistics for the period 3
rd
 September 1939 
to 1
st
 September 1945, (Air Ministry, 1946). 
Air Ministry, The Airman’s Welfare: Notes for Officers, (Air Ministry, 1941).  
Ministry of Information, We Speak from the Air: Broadcasts by the RAF, (London, 
HMSO, 1942). 
Ministry of Pensions, Instructions for Medical Boards, (London, HMSO, 1941). 
Ministry of Pensions, Order by His Majesty For: Retired Pay, Pensions, and 
Gratuities for Members of the Air Force and of the Nursing Auxiliary Services 
thereof Disabled, and for the Widows, Children and Dependants of Such Members 
Deceased, in Consequence of the Present War, (London, HMSO, 1943). 
NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS 
Anon, ‘3 Military Medals for W.A.A.F.s’ The Daily Mail, 2 November 1940, p. 1. 
Anon, ‘Fewer Suicides’ The Times (London), 1 Sept. 1942, p.5. 
Anon, ‘Jean and Joan Win the MM’ The Daily Mail, 11 January 1941, p. 3. 
Anon, ‘Military Medal for three W.A.A.F.s: Bravery during attack on R.A.F. station’ 
The Times, (London), 2 Nov. 1940, p. 2. 
Anon, ‘Military Medal For Two Women’ The Times (London), 11 Jan. 1941, p. 6.  
382 
 
Anon, ‘Obituary: Mr Basil Boothroyd’ The Times (London), Tuesday 1March, 1988, 
p. 14. 
Anon, ‘Our Women Do Not Weep!’The Daily Mail, 22 July 1941, p.2. 
Anon, ‘Shell-Shock Mistake’ The Times (London), Monday, 1 Jan. 1940, p. 5. 
Anon, ‘The Man who Lost his Nerve’ The Daily Mail, 26 October 1940,  
p. 3. 
Anon, ‘The WAAF Batman’, The Daily Mail, 4 March 1943, p.3. 
Anon, ‘Train Britons to be Tough’ The Daily Mail, 5 September 1942, p. 3. 
Anon, ‘You've Had It!’ The Times (London), Wednesday, Aug 19, 1942, p. 5. 
CONTEMPORARY ARTICLES AND BOOKS 
Anon, ‘Neuroses in War Time: Memorandum for the Medical Profession’ British 
Medical Journal, 2, 4119, (1939), pp. 1199-1201. 
Anon, ‘Psychiatry and the Services’ The Lancet, 235, 6088, (1940), pp. 839–840. 
Anon, ‘Army Medical Officers and Man-Mastership’ British Medical Journal, 1, 
4178, (1941), p. 167. 
Anon, ‘Technical Training’ Flight, December 11th (1941), pp. 423–426. 
Anon, ‘Incidence of Venereal Disease’ British Medical Journal, 2, 4205, (1941), p. 
208. 
Anon, ‘Fear and Anxiety at Tobruk’ The Lancet, 241, 6232, (1943), pp. 180-181. 
383 
 
Anon, ‘The Rise in Peptic Ulcer’ The British Medical Journal, 2, 4376, (1944), pp. 
665-666. 
Anon, ‘Rehabilitation in the RAF’ The Lancet, 243, 6297, (1944), pp. 608–609. 
Anon, ‘Proceedings of the Association of Industrial Medical Officers’ British 
Journal of Industrial Medicine, 3, 1, (1946), pp.48-54. 
Arnold, G. Radar Days, (Bognor Regis, Woodfield, 2000). 
Ashbridge, R. F. Yer actual ‘ERK’: A Collection of Stories of World War II 
Groundcrews, (Heighington, Lincoln, Tucann, 1998). 
B.M.J. ‘Progress in the Psychiatry of War’ British Medical Journal, 1, 4408, (1945), 
pp. 913-914. 
B.M.J. ‘The R.A.F. Medical Service, 1939 - 1945’ British Medical Journal, 2, 4420, 
(1945), pp. 397-398. 
B.M.J. ‘Neuroses in War Time: Memorandum for the Medical Profession’, British 
Medical Journal, 2, 4119, (1939), pp.1199-1201. 
B.M.J. ‘Obituary: R. D. Gillespie, M.D., F.R.C.P.’ British Medical Journal, 2, 4427, 
(1945), pp. 670-671.  
Balfour-Sclare, A. ‘Correspondence: Psychiatry in the Services’ British Medical 
Journal, 2, 4427, (1945), pp. 668-669. 
Ballard, S. I. and Miller, H. G. ‘Neuropsychiatry at a Royal Air Force Centre: an 
Analysis of 2,000 Cases’ British Medical Journal, 2, 4357, (1944), pp. 40-43. 
384 
 
Ballard, S. I. and Miller, H. G. ‘Psychiatric Casualties in a Women’s Service’ British 
Medical Journal, 1, 4387, (1945), pp. 293-295. 
Barnes, D.G. Cloud Cover, (London, Rich & Cowan, 1943). 
Bartlett, F. C. Psychology and the Soldier, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1927). 
Bartlett, F. C. ‘Ferrier Lecture: Fatigue Following Highly Skilled Work’ Proceedings 
of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 131, (1943), pp. 247-
257. 
Base, M. F. Get Some in! My wartime experiences with RAF Bomb Disposal, 
(Bognor Regis, Woodfield, 1999). 
Bates, H. E. The Stories of Flying Officer X, (Mayflower, 1976). 
Beck, P. Keeping Watch: A WAAF in Bomber Command, (Manchester, Crecy, 2004). 
Beech, J. One WAAF’s War, (Tunbridge Wells, Costello, 1989). 
Bell, G. A. To Live Among Heroes: A Medical Officer’s Insight into the Life of 609 
Squadron in NW Europe 1944-45, (London, Grub Street, 2001). 
Bentine, M. The Door Marked Summer, (St Albans, Granada Publishing, 1981). 
Bennett, D. Freedom From War, (London, Pilot Press, 1945). 
Bennett, D. Pathfinder: A War Autobiography, (1958) (Manchester, Crecy, 1998). 
Bentley-Beauman, K. Wings on Her Shoulders, (London, Hutchinson, 1943). 
385 
 
Bergin, K. G. ‘Correspondence: Psychiatry in the Army’ British Medical Journal, 2, 
4423, (1945), p. 508. 
Bevan-Jones, M. Pieces of Cake: The Diary of a Wartime WAAF 1940-1942, 
(Bangor, University of Wales, 2005). 
Bolitho, H. A Penguin In The Eyrie: An R.A.F. Diary, 1939 -1945, (London, 
Hutchinson, 1955).  
Boothroyd, B. Adastral Bodies, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1942). 
Boothroyd, B. Are Sergeants Human? (London, Allen and Unwin, 1944).  
Bottome, P. Within the Cup, (London, Faber & Faber, 1943).  
Brown, F. ‘Civilian Psychiatric Air-Raid Casualties’ The Lancet, (1941) 237, 6144, 
pp. 686-691. 
Brown, A. J. Ground Staff, (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1943).  
Buchan, W. The Royal Air Force at War, (Letchworth, John Murray and The Pilot 
Press, 1941). 
Butler, P. L. Searching in the Dark: the story of a radar operator from 1942 – 1946, 
(Chichester, HPC Publishing, 1995).  
Cameron, K. ‘Occupational Therapy for War Neuroses’ The Lancet, 236,6117, 
(1940), pp. 659-660. 
Caton, T. An Erk’s-Eye View: Memories of National Service in the Royal Air Force 
1952 – 54, (Chelmsford, Caton, 1998). 
386 
 
Charlwood, D. Journeys into Night, (Victoria, Hudson, 1991). 
Charlwood, D. No Moon Tonight, (Manchester, Crecy Publishing, 2007). 
Cheshire, L. Bomber Pilot, (1943) (London, Goodall, 1988). 
Churchill, W. S. Never Give in! The Best of Winston Churchill’s Speeches, (New 
York, Hyperion, 2003). 
Clegg, J. L. ‘Correspondence: Psychiatry in the Services’ British Medical Journal, 2, 
4426, (1945), p. 624. 
Collins, L. J. Faith Under Fire, (London, Leslie Ferwin, 1966). 
Collins, R. The Long and the Short and the Tall: An Ordinary Airman’s War, 
(Vancouver, Grey Stone Books, 1986).  
Committee of the National Research Council Psychology for the Fighting Man, 
(Washington, Penguin, 1945). 
Corbett, P. B. ‘Service Medicine’, The British Medical Journal, 2, 4366, (1944), pp. 
355-356. 
Crocket, R. W. ‘Observations on the Incidence of Neuroses in R.A.F. Ground 
Personnel’ Glasgow Medical Journal, 26, 4, (1945), pp. 97–104. 
Dahl, R. Over to You: Ten stories of Flyers and Flying, (1943) (London, Penguin, 
1973). 
Davies, F.M.E. ‘Correspondence: Psychiatry in the Services’ British Medical 
Journal, 2, 4425, (1945), p. 583. 
387 
 
Dean, G. The Touchstone:A Doctor’s Story, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 
2002). 
Debenham, G. Hill, D. Sargant, W. Slater, E. ‘Treatment of War Neurosis’ The 
Lancet, 237, 6126, (1941), pp. 107-109. 
Dillon, F. ‘Simulated Mental Disorders Among Soldiers in the Late War’ The 
Lancet, 234, 6056, (1939), p. 706–709. 
Dillon, F. ‘Correspondence: ‘Predisposition’ to War Neurosis’ British Medical 
Journal, 1, 4398, (1945), p. 570. 
Durand, R. W. ‘Correspondence: Psychiatry in the Services’ British Medical 
Journal, 2, 4427, (1945), p. 669. 
Eysenck, H. J. ‘Neurosis and Intelligence’ The Lancet, 242, 6264, (1943), pp. 362-
363.  
Fairbairn, D. ‘The War Neuroses: Their Nature and Significance’ British Medical 
Journal, (1943), pp. 183-186. 
Falla, W.A.S. ‘Fear Factors in Flying Personnel’ British Journal of Psychiatry, 93, 
(1947), p. 43–54. 
Frankau, G. Winter of Discontent, (London, The Book Club, 1942).  
Gane-Pushman, M. We All Wore Blue: Experiences in the WAAF, (Stroud, Tempus 
Publishing, 2006). 
Gibson, G. Enemy Coast Ahead, (London, Michael Joseph, 1951). 
388 
 
Gibson, G. Enemy Coast Ahead- Uncensored, (Manchester, Crecy, 2005). 
Gillespie, R. D. ‘Neurosis or Psychosis’ The Lancet, 234, 6053, (1939), p. 576.  
Gillespie, R. D. Psychological Effects of War on Citizen and Soldier, (London, 
Chapman and Hall Ltd, 1942). 
Gillespie, R. D. ‘War Neurosis after Psychological Trauma’ British Medical Journal, 
1, 4401, (1945), pp. 653-656.  
Gillespie, W. H. ‘The Psychoneuroses’ British Journal of Psychiatry, 90, (1944), p. 
207–306. 
Gillespie, R. D. ‘War Neurosis after Psychological Trauma’ British Medical Journal, 
1, 4401, (1945), pp. 653-656. 
Glover, E. ‘Notes on the Psychological Effects of War Conditions on the Civilian 
Population (1)’ The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 22, (1941), pp. 132–
146. 
Glover, E. ‘Notes on the Psychological Effects of War Conditions on the Civilian 
Population (3) The ‘Blitz’ - 1940-41’ The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
23, (1942), pp. 17–37. 
Good, R. ‘Malingering’ British Medical Journal, 2, 4264, (1942), pp. 359–362. 
Graff, E. L. ‘Refresher Courses for Service Medical Officers’ The British Medical 
Journal, 2, 4304, (1943), p. 19. 
Grant, C. A Member of the RAF of Indeterminate Race: Wartime experiences of a 
West Indian Officer in the RAF, (Bognor Regis, Woodfield, 2006). 
389 
 
Gray, P. Ghosts of Targets Past: the lives and losses of a Lancaster crew in 1944-45, 
(London, Grubb Street, 1995). 
Gregg, A. ‘What is Psychiatry?’ British Medical Journal, 1, 4346, (1944), pp. 550–
553. 
Grinker, R. R. and Spiegel, J. P. War Neuroses in North Africa: The Tunisian 
Campaign (January- May 1943), (New York, The Air Surgeon Army Air Forces, 
1943). 
Guttman, E. & Thomas, E. L. Public Health and Medical Subjects: The Re-
adjustment in Civil Life of Soldiers Discharged from the Army on account of 
Neurosis, (London, HMSO, 1946).  
Hadfield, J. A. ‘War Neurosis: A Year in a Neuropathic Hospital’ British Medical 
Journal, 1, 4234, (1942), pp. 281-285. 
Hadfield, J. A. ‘War Neurosis: A Year in a Neuropathic Hospital’ British Medical 
Journal, 1, 4235, (1942), pp. 320-323. 
Hambleton, J. No Brylcreem, No Medals: An Ordinary Airman’s Experiences in the 
Royal Air Force During World War Two, (Bognor Regis, Woodfield, 1999).  
Hamilton, M. ‘Correspondence: War Neurosis, Morale, and Social Psychology, 
British Medical Journal, 1, 4295, (1943), p. 549.  
Hammerton, J. ABC of the RAF: New & Enlarged Edition, (London, Amalgamated 
Press, 1943). 
390 
 
Harrington, J. (ed) Nina & Vic: A World War II Love Story, (Bognor Regis, 
Woodfield, 2004).  
Harris, A. ‘Correspondence: Psychiatry in the Services’ British Medical Journal, 2, 
4425, (1945), pp. 582-583. 
Henderson, D. K. and Gillespie, R. D. A Text-Book of Psychiatry for Students and 
Practitioners, fifth edition, (London, Oxford University Press, 1940).  
Herriot, J. Vets Might Fly, (London, Pan Books, 1977). 
Hick, W.E. ‘Correspondence: Psychiatry in the Services’ British Medical Journal, 2, 
4425, (1945), p. 583. 
Hillary, R. The Last Enemy, (London, Macmillan, 1942). 
Hitchcock, F. A Shillingsworth of Promises: An RAF Airman’s experiences During 
World War Two and Beyond, (Bognor Regis, Woodfield, 2001). 
Howard- Dobson, P. (ed) A WAAF at the Wheel: The Wartime Diary of Barbara 
Mills 31
st
 October 1941 to 8
th
 October 1942, (Ipswich, Gresham, 2008). 
Howell, E. The OR’s Story: Bomber Command Other Ranks in World War Two, 
(Swindon, NPG, 1998).  
Hurst, A. F. Medical Diseases of the War, (La Vergne, Lightning Source 
Incorporated, 2009) 
Hyland, H. H. and Richardson, J. C. ‘Psychoneurosis in the Canadian Army 
Overseas’ The Canadian Medical Association Journal, 47, 5, (1942), p. 432–443. 
391 
 
Ironside, R. N. and Batchelor, I. R. C. Aviation Neuro-psychiatry, (Edinburgh, E S 
Livingstone Ltd, 1945). 
James, G. W. B. ‘Anxiety Neuroses’, The Lancet, 236, 6114, (1940), pp. 561-564.  
Jamieson, G. A. ‘Correspondence: Psychiatry in the Services’ British Medical 
Journal, 2, 4426, (1945), p. 625. 
Karinthy, F. A Journey Round my Skull, (New York, New York Review, 2006.) 
Kemp, P. R. ‘Correspondence: Psychiatry in the Services’ British Medical Journal, 
2, 4428, (1945), p. 706. 
Knight, E. This Above All, (New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1941). 
Lancet ‘War and the Nerves’ The Lancet, 240, 6208, (1942), pp. 222-223.  
Lancet, ‘Service Pensions’ The Lancet, 242, 6256, (1943), pp. 105-106. 
Langdon, D. All Buttoned Up! A Scrapbook of RAF Cartoons, (London, Sylvan 
Press, 1944). 
Lambert, C. and Linford Rees, W. ‘Intravenous Barbiturates in the Treatment of 
Hysteria’ British Medical Journal, 2, 4385, (1944), pp. 70 - 73. 
Laurie, J. ‘Correspondence: Psychiatry in the Services’ British Medical Journal, 2, 
4427, (1945), p. 669. 
Lawrence, T. E. The Mint, (London, Penguin, 1978). 
Lewis, A. Incidence of neurosis in England under war conditions’ The Lancet, 240, 
6207, (1942), pp.175-183. 
392 
 
Lewis, A. and Goodyear, K. ‘Vocational Aspects of Neurosis in Soldiers’ The 
Lancet, 244, 6308, (1944), p.105-109. 
Lewis, A. and Slater, E. ‘Neurosis in Soldiers: A Follow-Up Study.’ The Lancet, 
239, 6191, (1942), p. 496-498. 
Lewis, A. ‘Social Effects of Neurosis’ The Lancet, 241, 6232, (1943), p. 167-170. 
Lindo, D. A WAAF at War: Wartime Jottings of a WAAF Driver 1941 – 1946, 
(Fontwell, Woodfield, 1992). 
Linford Rees, W. ‘Neurosis in the Women’s Auxiliary Services’ The British Journal 
of Psychiatry, 95, 1192, (1949), p. 880–895. 
Linford Rees W. ‘Physical Constitution, Neurosis and Psychosis’ Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of Medicine, 37, (1944), pp. 635-638. 
Lord Horder, Curran, D. Rees, J. R. Gillespie, R. D. Fairlie, W. M. Craigie, H. B. 
Hadfield, J. A. Reynell W. R. ‘Discussion of Functional Nervous States in Relation 
to Service in the Armed Forces’ Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 36, 5, 
(1942), pp 253–260. 
Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, (London, Robinson, 2007). 
Macadam, J. The Reluctant Erk and other stories, (London, Jarrolds, No Date). 
MacCarthy, A. A Doctor’s War, (1979) (London, Grub Street, 2006).  
Magurran, G.F. ‘Correspondence: Psychiatry in the Services’ British Medical 
Journal, 2, 4425, (1945), p. 583. 
393 
 
Mallinson, W. P. ‘Evaluation of Hysterical Symptoms in Service Patients’ British 
Medical Journal, 1, 4192, (1941), pp. 706-709. 
Mass Observation, Puzzled People: A Study in popular attitudes to religion, ethics, 
progress and politics in a London Borough, (London, Victor Gollancz, 1947).  
Masters, D. ‘So Few’: The Immortal Record of the Royal Air Force, (London, Eyre 
and Spottiswoode, 1941). 
Mawdsley, T. An Erk’s Eye View of World War Two: A Former ‘Instrument Basher’ 
Remembers Life on a Bomber Squadron in WW2, (Bognor Regis, Woodfield, 2003).   
Maycock, R. Doctors in the Air, (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1957).  
McGregor, J. S. ‘Insulin Treatment of Schizophrenia in Wartime’ British Medical 
Journal, 2, 4157, (1940), pp. 310–312. 
Milligan, W. L. ‘Correspondence: Psychiatry in the Services’ British Medical 
Journal, 2, 4425, (1945), p. 582. 
Muirhead, C. The Diary of a Bomb Aimer, (Tunbridge Wells, Spellmount Ltd, 1987). 
Musgrove, F. Dresden and the Heavy Bombers: An RAF Navigator’s Perspective, 
(Barnsley, Pen and Sword, 2005). 
Nicholson, J. Kiss the Girls Goodbye, (London, Hutchinson & Co, 1944). 
Noble, E. M. Jamaica Airman: A Black Airman in Britain 1943 and After, (London, 
New Beacon, 1984). 
Noble, V. Girls, You Amaze Me, (London, Hurricane Books, 1943). 
394 
 
Oakley, C. A. ‘The Industrial Misfit’ The Human Factor: The Journal of the Human 
Factors Society, 8, 4, (1934), pp. 123-130.  
Parfitt, D.N. ‘Psychoneuroses in R.A.F. Ground Personnel’ Journal of Mental 
Science, 90, (1944), p. 566–581. 
Parfitt, D.N. ‘The Psychoneurotic Spectrum and Dual Diagnosis’ The British Journal 
of Psychiatry, 91, (1945), p. 477–480. 
Parfitt, D. N. and Carlyle Gall, C. M. ‘Psychogenic Amnesia: The Refusal to 
Remember’ The British Journal of Psychiatry, 90, (1944), pp. 511-531.  
Pegge, G. ‘Psychiatric Casualties in London, September, 1940’ British Medical 
Journal, 2, 4164, (1940), pp.553-555  
Perkins, P. H. ‘Correspondence: Psychiatry in the Services’ British Medical Journal, 
2, 4428, (1945), p. 706. 
Pickering, S. Tales of a Bomber Command WAAF (& her horse), (Bognor Regis, 
Woodfield, 2002). 
Pickering, S. More Tales of a Bomber Command WAAF (& her horse), (Bognor 
Regis, Woodfield, 2003). 
M. Powell, A Life in Movies: An Autobiography, (London, Faber and Faber, 2000). 
Priestley, J. B. Postscripts, (London, William Heinemann, 1940). 
Pudney, J. Dispersal Point: and other air poems, (London, John Lane and Bodley 
Head, 1942).  
395 
 
Pudney, J & Treece, H. (eds) Air Force Poetry (London, John Lane and Bodely 
Head, 1944). 
Raff, Behind the Spitfires, (London, Methuen, 1941).
2
 
Raymond, R. & Langdon, D. (eds) Slipstream: A Royal Air Force Anthology, 
(London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1946).  
Rice, J. Sand in my Shoes: Wartime Diaries of a WAAF, (London, Harper Collins, 
2006). 
Rickman, J. ‘Panic and Air Raid Precautions’, The Lancet, 231, 5988, (1938), pp. 
1291–1295. 
Rolleston, H. and Moncrieff, A. A. (eds) The Practitioner Handbooks: Industrial 
Medicine, (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1944). 
Rollin, H. R. ‘Pediculosis Capitis and Intelligence in W.A.A.F. Recruits’ British 
Medical Journal, 1, 4293, (1943), pp. 475–476. 
Rollin, H. R. and Kerr, A. ‘Perspective: Henry R Rollin in conversation with Alan 
Kerr’ Psychiatric Bulletin 23, (1999), p. 286–290. 
Rollin, H. R. ‘Trade Training failures in the W.A.A.F. Factors in Predisposition and 
Precipitation’ British Journal of Medical Psychology, 20, 1, (1944), pp. 63–76. 
Rollin, H. R. Festina Lente: A Psychiatric Odyssey, (London, British Medical 
Journal, 1990). 
Roy, J. (Trans, Savill, M.) The Navigator, (New York, Signet, 1955). 
                                                 
2
 ‘Raff’ was the pseudonym of Bill Hooper. 
396 
 
Sargant, W. ‘Physical Treatment of Acute War Neurosis’ British Medical Journal, 2, 
4271, (1942), pp. 574 - 576. 
Sawyer, T. Only Owls and Bloody Fools Fly at Night, (London, William Kimber, 
1982). 
Settle, M. L. All the Brave Promises, (London, Pandora Press, 1984). 
Shute, N. Pastoral, (London, Pan, 1964). 
Slater, E. ‘The Neurotic Constitution: A Statistical Study of Two Thousand Neurotic 
Soldiers’ Journal of Neurology Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, 6, 1, (1943), pp.1-16.  
Smith, E. Why Did We Join? A former WAAF remembers service life in World War 
II, (Bognor Regis, Woodfield, 2003).  
Smith, R. Rear Gunner Pathfinders, (Southside, Crecy Publishing, 1997). 
Sommerfield, J. The Survivors, (London, John Lehman, 1947). 
Spaight, J. M. Bombing Vindicated, (London, Geoffery Bles, 1944). 
Stafford-Clark, D. Autumn Shadow and other poems, (Oxford, Shakespeare Head 
Press, 1941).  
Stafford-Clark, D. ‘Aspects of War Medicine in the RAF’ British Medical Journal, 
1, 4282, (1943), pp. 139–140. 
Stafford-Clark, D. Sound in the Sky and other poems, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1944). 
397 
 
Stafford-Clark, D. ‘Morale and Flying Experience: Results of a Wartime Study’ 
Journal of Mental Science, 95, 398, (1949), pp. 10 - 50.  
Stafford-Clark, D. Soldier Without a Rifle, (London, Collins, 1979). 
Stafford-Clark, D. ‘Perspective: An Hour of Breath’ Psychiatric Bulletin, 11, (1987), 
pp. 218-233. 
Stalker, H. ‘Masquerading in Uniform: A Wartime form of Psychopathic Behaviour’ 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 91, (1945), pp. 188–194. 
Stalker, H. ‘Psychiatric States in 130 Ex-Service Patients’ British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 90, (1944), pp. 727–738. 
Sutherland, J. D. ‘A Survey Of One Hundred Cases Of War Neuroses’ The British 
Medical Journal, 2, 4210, (1941), pp. 365-370. 
Sykes, E. If I Don’t Write it, Nobody Else Will, (London, Harper Perennial, 2006). 
Symonds, C. P. ‘Neurosis or Psychosis’ The Lancet, 234, 6054, (1939), pp. 622-623.  
Symonds, C. P. ‘The Neurological Approach to Mental Disorder’ Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of Medicine, 38, 8, (1941), pp. 289-302. 
Symonds, C.P. ‘Anxiety Neurosis in Combatants,’ The Lancet, 242, 6278, (1943), 
pp. 785-789. 
Symonds, C. P. ‘The Human Response to Flying Stress: Neurosis in Flying 
Personnel’ British Medical Journal, 2, 4326, (1943), pp.703 - 706. 
398 
 
Symonds, C. P. ‘The Human Response to Flying Stress: The Foundations of 
Confidence’ British Medical Journal, 2, 4327, (1944), pp.740 - 744.  
Taylor, L. Ground Gen for Airmen (and Airwomen): A Brief Guide for airmen and 
airwomen of all trades and grades to the interior economy of life in the Royal Air 
Force, (London, Pitman and sons, 1941).  
Taylor, S. ‘The Suburban Neurosis’, The Lancet, 231, 5978, (1938), pp. 759-761. 
Taylor, S. ‘The Psychopathic Tenth’ The Lancet, 237, 6132, (1941), pp. 321-323.  
Tempest. V. Near the Sun: The impressions of a Medical Officer of Bomber 
Command, (Brighton, Crabtree Press, 1946). 
Thompson, W. Lancaster to Berlin, (London, Goodhall Publications, 1985). 
Tripp, M. Faith is a Windsock, (London, Corgi, 1970). 
Tripp, M. The Eighth Passenger: a flight of recollection and discovery, (London, 
William Heinemann Ltd, 1969). 
Vernon, P. E. ‘Psychological effects of air raids’ The Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, 36, 4, (1941), pp. 457-476. 
Ward-Jackson, C. H. No Bombs At All: Some short stories of the Royal Air Force, 
(London, Sylvan Press, 1944). 
Ward-Jackson, C. H. (ed) Airman’s Song Book, (London, Sylvan Press, 1945). 
Ward-Jackson, C. H. It’s A Piece of Cake or RAF Slang Made Easy, (1945) (London, 
Read Books, 2010). 
399 
 
Wells, H. G. The History of Mr Polly (and) The War In The Air, (London, Oldham, 
undated).  
Wilde, J. F. ‘Narco-Analysis in the Treatment of War Neurosis’ British Medical 
Journal, 2, 4252, (1942), pp. 4 - 6. 
Wiltshire, D. Per Ardua Pro Patria: Autobiographical Observations of a World War 
Two Airman, (Bognor Regis, Woodfield Publishing, 2000). 
Winfield, Dr. R. The Sky Belongs to Them, (London, William Kimber, 1976).  
Wyndham, J. Love is Blue: A Wartime Diary, (London, Flamingo, 1987). 
FILM AND AUDIO 
Anderson, M. The Dam Busters, (Associated British Picture Corporation, 1955). 
Asquith, A. The Way to the Stars, (Two Cities Films, 1945). 
Calvacanti, A. Went the Day Well? (Ealing Studios, 1942). 
Comfort, L. The Hatter’s Castle, (Paramount British Pictures, 1942). 
Coward, N. and Lean, D. In Which We Serve, (Two Cities Film, 1942). 
Howard, L. The first of the Few, (Leslie Howard Production, 1942). 
Howard, L. The Gentle Sex, (Two Cities Film, 1943). 
Huston, J. Let There be Light, PMF 5019, (US Army, 1946). 
Jennings, H. and Watt, H. London Can Take It, (GPO Film Unit, 1940). 
Litvak, A. This Above All, (Twentieth-century Fox, 1942). 
400 
 
Nice, J. (ed) RAF Bomber Command at War 1939-45 (Vol 2) (CD41 Recordings, 
undated).  
Powell. M. Hurst, B. D. Brunel, A. The Lion has Wings, (London Film Productions, 
1939). 
Powell, M. and Pressburger, E. One of Our Aircraft is Missing (Archers, 1942). 
Powell, M. and Pressburger, E. The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp (Archers, 
1943). 
Powell, M. and Pressburger, E. A Canterbury Tale, (Archers, 1944). 
Powell, M. and Pressburger, E. A Matter of Life and Death, (Archers, 1946). 
Rennahan, R. Victory Through Air Power, (Disney, 1943). 
Thorpe, R. Cry Havoc, (MGM, 1943). 
War Office, Field Psychiatry for the Medical Officer, (Services Kinematograph Unit, 
1944). 
PUBLISHED SECONDARY SOURCES 
Adkin, F.J. From the Ground Up: A History of R.A.F. Ground Crew, (Shewsbury, 
Airlife, 1983). 
Adkin, F.J. Through the Hanger Doors: RAF Ground Crew since 1945, (Shewsbury, 
Airlife, 1986). 
Arnold-de Simine, S. Mediating Memory in the Museum, (Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013).  
401 
 
Ashplant, T. G. Dawson, G. & Roper, M. Commemorating War: The Politics of 
Memory, (London, Transaction Publishers, 2004). 
Barham, P. Forgotten Lunatics of the Great War, (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 2004). 
Barrett, F. J. ‘The Organizational construction of hegemonic masculinity: The case 
of the U.S. Navy’, Gender, Work and Organization, 3, 3, (1996), pp129-142.  
Bell, A. ‘Landscapes of Fear; Wartime London 1939-1945’ Journal of British 
Studies 48, 1, (2009), pp. 153-175. 
Bet-El, I. Conscripts: Lost Legions in the Great War, (Stroud, Sutton, 1999). 
Bingham, A. ‘The British Popular Press and Venereal Disease During The Second 
World War’ The Historical Journal, 48, 4, (2005), pp. 1055-1076. 
Binneveld, H. From Shellshock to Combat Stress: A Comparative History of Military 
Psychology, (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 1997). 
Bishop, P. Bomber Boys: Fighting Back 1940-1945, (London, Harper press, 2007). 
Bourke, J. Dismembering the male: men’s bodies, Britain and the Great War, 
(London, Reaktion Books, 1996). 
Bourke, J. An intimate history of killing: face to face killing in twentieth century 
warfare, (London, Granta, 2000). 
Bourke, J. ‘The Emotions in War: Fear and the British and American Military, 1914 
– 45’ Historical Research, 74. 185, (2001), pp. 314–330.  
402 
 
Bourke, J. Fear: A Cultural History, (London, Virago Press, 2006). 
Bourke, J. ‘Disciplining the Emotions: Fear, Psychiatry and the Second World War’ 
in: Cooter, R. Harrison, M. and Sturdy, S. (eds) War Medicine and Modernity, 
(Stroud, Sutton Publishing, 1999), pp. 225-234.  
Brandon, S. ‘LMF in Bomber Command 1939-45: Diagnosis or Denouncement?’ in 
Freeman & Berrios (eds) 150 Years of British Psychiatry, Vol. 2: The Aftermath, 
(Athlone, 1996), pp. 119-129.  
Brickhill, P. The Dam Busters, (London, The Companion Book Club, 1952). 
Broadbent Friedman, D. A Matter of Life and Death: The Brain Revealed by the 
Mind of Michael Powell, (Bloomington, Author House, 2008). 
Burney, I. ‘War on fear: Solly Zuckerman and civilian nerve in the Second World 
War’ History of the Human Sciences, 25, 5, (2012), pp. 49-72. 
Calder, A. The People’s War: Britain 1939-1945, (London, Pimlico, 1994). 
Calder, A. The Myth of the Blitz, (London, Pimlico, 2008). 
Casper, S. T. ‘The Origins of the Anglo-American Research Alliance and the 
Incidence of Civilian Neuroses in Second World War Britain’ Medical History, 53, 
(2008), pp. 327-346.  
Cerulo, K. A. ‘Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions’ Annual Review of 
Sociology, (1997), 23, pp. 385-409. 
403 
 
Chandler, A. ‘The Church of England and the Obliteration Bombing of Germany in 
the Second World War’ The English Historical Review, 108, 429 (1993), pp. 920-
946.  
Chant, C. Aircraft of World War Two, (London, Grange Books, 2004). 
Chapman, J. The British at War: Cinema, State and Propaganda, 1939-45, (London, 
Tauris, 2000). 
Connell, R. W. Masculinities, Second Edition, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2010). 
Connelly, M. ‘The British People, the Press, and the Strategic Air Campaign against 
Germany’, Contemporary British History 16, 2, (2002). pp 39-58. 
Connelly, M. Reaching for the Stars: A History of Bomber Command, (London, 
Tauris, 2014). 
Conrad, P. C. Training for Victory: The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan in 
the West. (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1989). 
Coombs, H. G. (ed) The Insubordinate and the Noncompliant: Case studies of 
Canadian Disobedience, 1920 to Present, (Toronto, Dundurn Group, 2007). 
Cooter, R. Harrison, M. and Sturdy, S. (eds) War Medicine and Modernity, (Stroud, 
Sutton Publishing, 1999). 
Cooter, R. Harrison, M. and Sturdy, S. (eds) Medicine and Modern Warfare, 
(Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1999).  
Cotter, J. and Blackah, P. Avro Lancaster 1941 onwards (all marks) Owners’ 
Workshop Manual, (Yeovil, Haynes Publishing, 2008). 
404 
 
Croft, H. ‘Emotional Women and Frail Men: Gendered Diagnostics from Shellshock 
to PTSD, 1914-2010’ in: Carden-Coyne, A. (ed) Gender and Conflict since 1914, 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
Cunningham, P. Bomb on the Red Markers, (Newbury, Countryside books, 2010). 
Davies, A. Conrad’s War, (London, Hippo Books, 1978). 
Dearnaley, E. J. and Warr, P. B. Aircrew Stress in Wartime Operations, (London, 
Academic Press, 1979). 
Dewey, L. War and redemption: Treatment and Recovery in Combat-related 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, (Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 2004). 
Dison, H. Some of the Story of 514 Squadron: Lancasters at Waterbeach, (514 
Squadron Association, Waterbeach, 2002). 
Dwyer, E. ‘Psychiatry and Race during World War II’ Journal of the History of 
Medicine and Allied Sciences, 61, 2, (2006), pp. 117-143. 
Edgerton, D. Britain’s War Machine, (London, Penguin, 2012). 
English, A. D. The Cream of the Crop: Canadian Aircrew, 1939 – 1945, (Montreal 
& Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996). 
Escott, B. E. Woman in Air Force Blue: The story of women in the Royal Air Force 
from 1918 to the present day, (Wellingborough, Patrick Stephens, 1989). 
Escott, B. E. Our Wartime Days: The WAAF, (Stroud, The History Press, 2005). 
405 
 
Falconer, J. RAF Bomber Command in Fact, Film and Fiction, (Stroud, Sutton 
Publishing, 1996). 
Falconer, J. The Bomber Command Handbook 1939-1945, (Stroud, Sutton 
Publishing, 1998).  
Farr, M. ‘The Labour Party and Strategic Bombing in the Second World War’ 
Labour History Review 77, 1 (2012), pp. 133-153. 
Fowler, S. Elliot, P. Conyers Nesbit, R. and Goulter, C. PRO Reader’s Guide No 8: 
RAF Records in the PRO, (London, PRO Publications, 1994). 
Francis, M. ‘The Domestication of the Male? Recent Research on Nineteenth- and 
Twentieth-Century British Masculinity’ The Historical Journal, 45, 3 (2002), pp. 
637-652. 
Francis, M. The Flyer: British Culture and the Royal Air Force 1939-1945, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
Freeman, H. and Berrios, G. E. (eds) 150 Years of British Psychiaty Volume II: the 
Aftermath, (London, Athlone, 1996). 
Friedrich, J. (Trans’ Brown, A.) The Fire: The Bombing of Germany 1940-1945, 
(New York, Columbia University Press, 2006). 
Fussell, P. Wartime: Understanding and Behaviour in the Second World War, 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990). 
Gardiner, J. Wartime Britain 1939-1945, (London, Review, 2004). 
406 
 
Gibson, T. M. and Harrison, M. H. ‘Aviation Medicine in the United Kingdom: From 
the End of World War I to the End of World War II, 1919–1945’ Aviation, Space, 
and Environmental Medicine, 76, 7, (2005), pp. 689–691. 
Gillies, M. Waiting for Hitler: Voices from Britain on the brink of invasion, (London, 
Hodder and Stoughton, 2006).  
Goffman, E. Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other 
inmates, (London, Penguin, 1991). 
Gray, P. ‘A Culture of Official Squeamishness? Britain’s Air Ministry and the 
Strategic Air Offensive against Germany’ The Journal of Military History, 77, 4, 
(2013), pp. 1349-1377.  
Grayling, A. C. Among the dead Cities: was the Allied bombing of civilians in WWII 
a necessity or a crime? (London, Bloomsbury, 2006).  
Grayzel, S. R. At Home and Under Fire. Air Raids and Culture in Britain from the 
Great War to the Blitz. ( Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
Grimson, A ‘Culture and Identity: two different Notions’ Social Identities, 16, 1, 
(2010), pp.61-77. 
Hall, A. We, Also, Were There, (Braunton, Merlin Books, 1985). 
Hamilton, T. The Life and Times of Pilot Officer Prune: The Official story of Tee 
Emm, (London, HMSO, 1991).  
Hamlin, J. F and Merrington, O. J. At the ‘Beach: The Story of Royal Air Force 
Waterbeach and Waterbeach Barracks, (Peterborough, GMS Enterprises, 2011).  
407 
 
Hancock, T. N. Bomber County: A History of the Royal Air Force in Lincolnshire, 
(Lincolnshire Library Service, 1989).  
Harrison, M. Medicine and Victory: British Military Medicine in the Second World 
War, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004). 
Harrison, M. ‘Sex and the Citizen Soldier: Health, Morals and Discipline in the 
British Army during the Second World War’, in: Cooter, Harrison, and Sturdy, 
Medicine and Modern Warfare, pp. 205-249.  
Hastings, M. Bomber Command, (London, Michael Joseph, 1980). 
H.C.C. ‘Obituary: S I Ballard LRCP&SED, LRFPSGLAS’ British Medical Journal, 
2, 6130, (1978), p. 133. 
Higonnet, M. R. Jenson, J. Michel, S. Weitz, M. C. (eds), Behind the Lines: Gender 
and the two World Wars, (London, Yale University Press, 1987). 
Hinton, J. Nine Wartime Lives: Mass Observation and the Making of the Modern 
Self, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010). 
Hobbins, P. G. ‘Living in Hell But Still Smiling: Australian Psychiatric Casualties of 
War During the Malaya-Singapore Campaign, 1941-1942’ Health and History, 9, 7, 
(2007), pp. 28-55.  
Hopkins, A. Songs from the Front & Rear: Canadian Servicemen’s Songs of the 
Second World War, (Edmonton, Hurtig Publishers, 1979). 
Hylton, S. Thie Darkest Hour: The Hidden History of the Home front 1939-1945, 
(Stroud, Sutton, 2001).  
408 
 
Ingham, M. Air Force Memorials of Lincolnshire, (Leicester, Midland Publishing, 
1995). 
Jackson, M. (ed), Health and the Modern Home (London, Routledge, 2007). 
J.N.W. ‘Obituary Notices: H G Miller MD, FRCP, DPM’ British Medical Journal, 2, 
6035, (1976), p. 591. 
Jalland, P. Death in War and Peace: Loss and Grief in England 1914-1970, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2010).  
James, J. The Paladins: A Social History of the RAF up to the outbreak of World War 
II, (London, Macdonald and Co, 1990). 
Jansson, A. ‘Mood Disorders and the Brain: Depression, Melancholia, and the 
Historiography of Psychiatry’ Medical History, 55, (2011), pp. 393–399. 
Jones, E. ‘War and the Practice of Psychotherapy: The UK Experience 1939–1960’ 
Medical History, 48, (2004), pp. 493–510. 
Jones, E. ‘‘LMF’: The Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the Royal Air Force during the 
Second World War’ The Journal of Military History, 70, (2006), pp. 439-458. 
Jones, E. ‘Neuro Psychiatry 1943: The Role of Documentary Film in the 
dissemination of Medical Knowledge and Promotion of the U.K. Psychiatric 
Profession’, Journal of The History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 69, 2, (2012), 
pp. 294-324.  
Jones E. and S. Ironside, ‘Battle Exhaustion: the dilemma of psychiatric casualties in 
Normandy, June-August 1944’, Historical Journal, 53, 1, (2010), pp. 109-28. 
409 
 
Jones, E. Palmer, I. and Wessely, S. ‘War Pensions (1900 -1945): Changing models 
of Psychological Understanding’ British Journal of Psychiatry, 180, (2002), pp. 374-
379. 
Jones, E. and Wessely, S. Shell Shock to PTSD: Military Psychology from 1900 to 
the Gulf War, (Hove, Psychology Press, 2005). 
Jones, E. and Wessely, S. ‘War Syndromes: The Impact of Culture on Medically 
Unexplained Symptoms’ Medical History, 49, (2005), pp. 55–78.  
Jones, E. and Wessely, S. ‘A Paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of 
psychological trauma in the 20
th
 century’ Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 21 (2007), 
pp. 164-175. 
Jones, E. Woolven, R, Durodie, B and Wessely, S. ‘Civilian Morale During the 
Second World War’ Social History of Medicine, 17, 3, (2004), pp. 463- 479. 
Jordanova, L. History in Practice, (London, Arnold, 2000). 
Joubert de la Ferte, P. The Forgotten Ones, (London, Hutchinson, 1961). 
Koch, H.W. ‘The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany: The Early Phase, May- 
September 1940’ The Historical Journal, 34, 1, (1991), pp. 117-141. 
Langhamer, C. The English in Love: The Intimate Story of an Emotional Revolution, 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013). 
Lewis, B. Aircrew: The Story of the men who flew the bombers, (London, Cassell, 
2000). 
410 
 
Lindenbaum, S. and Lock, M. (eds) Knowledge, Power & Practice: The 
Anthropology of Medicine and Everyday Life. (Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1993). 
Loughran, T. ‘Shell Shock, Trauma, and the First World War: The Making of a 
Diagnosis and Its Histories’ Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 
67, 1 (2012), pp. 94-119. 
Mangan, A. ‘Manufactured’ Masculinity: Making Imperial Manliness, Morality and 
Militarism, (London, Routledge, 2012). 
Marshall, P. ‘The British Commonwealth Training Plan’ The Round Table: The 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs (2000), 89, 354, pp.267-278. 
Matt, S. J. ‘You Can’t Go Home Again: Homesickness and Nostalgia in U.S. 
History’ The Journal of American History, 94, 2, (2007), pp. 469–497. 
Matt, S. J. ‘Current Emotion Research in History: Or, Doing History from the Inside 
Out’ Emotion Review, 3, 1, (2011), pp. 117–124. 
McCarthy, J. ‘Aircrew and ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ in the Second World War’ War 
and Society, 2, (1984), pp. 87-101. 
McCarthy, J. A Last Call of Empire: Australian Aircrew, Britain and the Empire Air 
Training Scheme. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1988). 
McKibbin, R. The Ideologies of Class: Social relations in Britain 1880-1950, 
(Oxford, Clarendon, 1994). 
411 
 
Mellor, W. F. History of the Second World War: Casualties and Medical Statistics, 
(London, HMSO, 1972). 
Middlebrook, M. The Nuremburg Raid: 31-31March 1944, (London, Cassell, 2000). 
Miller, I. ‘The Mind and Stomach at War: Stress and Abdominal Illness in Britain 
c.1939–1945’ Medical History, 54, (2010), pp. 95–110. 
Morgan, D. ‘Theatre of War: Combat, the military and masculinity’ in: Brod, H & 
Kaufman, M (eds), Theorizing Masculinities, (London, Sage Publications, 1994), pp. 
165-182. 
Nicholson, V. Millions Like Us: Women’s Lives in War and Peace 1939- 1949, 
(London, Penguin Viking, 2011). 
Noakes, L. War and the British: Gender and National Identity, 1939-91, (London, I. 
B. Tauris, 1998). 
Noakes, L. ‘“Serve to Save”: Gender, Citizenship and Civil Defence in Britain 
1937—41’ Journal of Contemporary History, 47, 4, (2012), pp. 734-753. 
Noakes, L. & Pattinson, J. (eds) British Cultural Memory and the Second World 
War, (London Bloomsbury, 2014). 
North, R. The Many Not The Few: The Stolen History of the Battle of Britain, 
(London, Continuum International, 2012). 
Otter, P. Lincolnshire Airfields in the Second World War, (Newbury, Countryside 
Books, 2009). 
412 
 
Overy , R. The Morbid Age: Britain and the Crisis of Civilisation 1919-1939, 
(London, Allen Lane, 2009).  
Overy, R. The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945, (London, Allen Lane, 2013). 
Plamper, J. ‘The History of Emotions: an Interview with William Reddy, Barbara 
Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns’ History and Theory, 49, 2, (2010), pp. 237-265. 
Paris, M. ‘The Rise of the Airmen: The Origins of Air Force Elitism, c. 1890-1918’ 
Journal of Contemporary History, 28, 1, (1993), pp. 123-141.  
Parker, T. Sirens: The Pin-Up Art of David Wright, (London, Titan Books, 2013). 
Partridge, E. & Beale, P. (ed) A Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English, 
eighth edition, (London, Routledge, 2000). 
Porter, R. and Gijswijt-Hofstra, M. (eds.), Cultures of Psychiatry and Mental Health 
Care in Post-war Britain and the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rudopi, 1998).  
Reddy, W. M. The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
Rexford-Welch, S.C. History of the Second World War: The Royal Air Force 
Medical Services: Volume I Administration, (London, HMSO, 1954).  
Rexford-Welch, S.C. History of the Second World War: The Royal Air Force 
Medical Services: Volume II Commands, (London, HMSO, 1955). 
Richards, D. The Hardest Victory: RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War, 
(London, Penguin, 2001). 
413 
 
Roach, D. ‘The Best Artist You Don't Know: Revealing the work of unknown artist 
genius David Wright’, Comic Book Artist, 18, (2002), pp. 9-11. 
Roper, M. ‘Between Manliness and Masculinity: The “War Generation” and the 
Psychology of Fear in Britain, 1914–1950’ Journal of British Studies, 44, 2, (2005), 
pp. 343-362. 
Roper, M. ‘Slipping out of View: Subjectivity and Emotion in Gender History’ 
History Workshop Journal, 59 (2005), pp. 57-72. 
Roper, M. The Secret Battle: Emotional Survival in the Great War. (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 2009). 
Roper, M. and Tosh, J. (eds) Manful Assertions. Masculinities in Britain since 1800, 
(London, Routledge, 1991). 
Rose, S. ‘Sex, Citizenship, and the Nation in World War II Britain’ The American 
Historical Review, 
103, 4, (1998), pp. 1147-1176.  
Rose, S. Which People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain 
1939 – 1945, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003). 
Rosenwein, B. H. Anger's Past: Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages, 
(Cornell, Cornell University Press, 1998). 
Rosenwein, B. H. ‘Worrying about Emotions in History’ The American History 
Review, 107, 3, (2002), pp. 821-845. 
414 
 
Rottman, G. L. SNAFU: Sailor, Airman, and Soldier Slang of World War Two, 
(Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2013). 
Scull, A. Hysteria: the disturbing history,(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009).  
Sellar W.C. and Yeatman R.J. 1066 And All That, (Harmondsworth, London, 1969). 
Shapira, M. ‘The Psychological Study of Anxiety in the Era of the Second World 
War’ Twentieth Century British History, 24, 1, (2013), pp. 31–58.  
Shephard, B. ‘‘Pitiless Psychology’: the role of prevention in British military 
psychiatry in the Second World War’ History of Psychiatry, 40, 4, (1999), pp. 491-
524. 
Shephard, B. A War of Nerves, (London, Jonathon Cape, 2000). 
Sheridan, D. (ed) Wartime Women: A Mass Observation Anthology, (New York, 
Phoenix Press, 2002).  
Sherwood, M. Many Struggles: West Indian Workers and Service Personnel in 
Britain 1939- 1945 (London, Karia Press, 1985). 
Shorter, E. from Paralysis to Fatigue: A History of Psychosomatic Illness in the 
Modern Era, (New York, Free Press, 1992).  
Showalter, E. ‘Male Hysteria: E. H. Rivers and the Lessons of Shell Shock’ in: 
Showalter, E. The female Malady: Women Madness and English Culture 1830-1980, 
(London, Virago, 1996). 
Small, N. Spit, Polish and Tears: Stories of W.A.A.F.s in World War Two, (Bishop 
Auckland, Pentland Press, 1995). 
415 
 
Smith, D. J. Britain’s Military Airfields 1939-45, (Wellingborough, Patrick Stephens, 
1989). 
Smith, M, ‘A Matter of Faith: British Strategic Air Doctrine before 1939’ Journal of 
Contemporary History, 15, 3, (1980), pp. 423-442. 
Smith, M. ‘Planning and Building the British Bomber Force, 1934-1939’ The 
Business History Review, 54, 1, (1980), pp. 35-62. 
Smithies, E. Aces, Erks & Backroom Boys, (London, Past Times, 2002). 
Stearns, P. N. & Stearns, C.Z. ‘Emotionolgy: Clarifying the History of Emotions and 
Emotional Standards’ The American Historical Review, 90, 4, (1985), pp. 813-836.  
Stratten, G. M. Rauceby Reflections: The story of a mental hospital 1902 – 1992. (G. 
M. Stratten, 1993). 
Stratten, G. M. ‘RAF hospital Rauceby’ Lincolnshire Poacher (2000), 1, 4, pp.13-17. 
Stone, T. ‘Creating a (Gendered?) Military Identity: the Women’s Auxiliary Air 
Force in Great 
Britain in the Second World War’ Women’s History Review, 8, 4, (1999), pp. 605- 
624. 
Summerfield, P. Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives: Discourse and Subjectivity 
in Oral Histories of the Second World War, (Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, 1998). 
Swift, D. Bomber County: The Lost Airmen of World War Two, (London, Penguin, 
2011). 
416 
 
Taylor, C. Sources of the Self: The making of the modern identity, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
Terraine, J. The Right of the Line, (Ware, Wordsworth Editions, 1997). 
Thalassis, N. ‘The Uses of Intelligence Testing in the Recruitment of ‘Other Ranks’ 
in the Armed Forces during the Second World War’ History and Philosophy of 
Psychology, 5, 1, (2003), pp. 17–29. 
Thalassis, N. ‘Useless Soldiers: The Dilemma of Discharging Mentally Unfit 
Soldiers during the Second World War’ Social History of Medicine 23, 1, (2010), pp. 
98-115. 
Thomson, M. ‘Status, Manpower, and Mental Deficiency in the First World War’, in 
Cooter, R. Harrison, M. and Sturdy, S. (eds.), War, Medicine and Modernity, 
(Stroud, Sutton Press, 1999), pp. 149-66. 
Thomson, M. Psychological Subjects: Identity, Culture, and Health in Twentieth-
Century Britain, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006). 
Titmuss, R. Problems of Social Policy (London, HMSO, 1950). 
Tolson, A. The Limits of Masculinity, (London, Routledge, 1988). 
Tosh, J. ‘What Should Historians do with Masculinity? Reflections on Nineteenth-
century Britain’ History Workshop Journal, 38, (1994), pp. 179-202. 
Vernon, P. E. & Parry, J. B. Personnel Selection in the British Forces, (London, 
University of London Press, 1949). 
417 
 
Watson, A. Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German 
and British Armies, 1914-1918, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
Weber, M. ‘Class, Status, Party’ in: Lemert, C. (ed) Social Theory: The Multicultural 
and Classic Readings, Third Edition, (Oxford, Westview Press, 2004), pp. 115-125.  
Webster, C. and Frankland, N. History of the Second World War: The Strategic Air 
Offensive against Germany 1939-1945 Volume I: Preparation, (London, HMSO, 
1961).  
Webster, C. and Frankland, N. History of the Second World War: The Strategic Air 
Offensive against Germany 1939-1945 Volume III: Victory, (London, HMSO, 1961).  
Webster, C. and Frankland, N. History of the Second World War: The Strategic Air 
Offensive against Germany 1939-1945 Volume IV: Annexes and Appendices, 
(London, HMSO, 1961).  
Wells, M. K. Courage and Air Warfare: The Allied Aircrew Experience in the 
Second World War, (London, Frank Cass, 1995).  
Wessely, S. ‘Twentieth-century Theories on Combat Motivation and Breakdown’ 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.41, No.2, 2006, pp. 268-286. 
Wiesner-Hanks, M.E. Gender in History, (Oxford, Blackwell, 2001). 
Williams, B. R. (ed) As We Were: Recollections of life in the Women’s Auxiliary Air 
Force, (Bognor Regis, Woodfield, 2004).  
Wilson, E. The Records of the Royal Air Force: How to find the Few, (Birmingham, 
Federation of Family History Societies, 1991). 
418 
 
Wilson, K. Bomber Boys: The Ruhr, the Dambusters and bloody Berlin, (London, 
Casell, 2005). 
Winter, J. Remembering War: The Great War Between Historical Memory and 
History in the Twentieth Century (New Haven, Yale University, 2006). 
Winter J. and Sivan, E. (eds), War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
Wynn, N. A. ‘‘Race War’: Black American GIs and West Indians in Britain During 
The Second World War’ Immigrants & Minorities, 24, 3, (2006), pp. 324–346. 
Young, A, The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995). 
 
UNPUBLISHED PAPERS AND THESES 
L. Allwright, ‘The war on London: defending the city from the war in the air 1932-
1943’ PhD thesis (University of Warwick, 2011).  
Ellin, D. ‘Not Yet Diagnosed Neurotic or Lack of Moral Fibre? The Treatment of 
Neuropsychiatric Casualties in Bomber Command during the Second World War.’ 
MA thesis (University of Lincoln 2010). 
Evans, S. J. ‘Empire Air Training Scheme: Identity, Empire and Memory’ PhD thesis 
(University of Melbourne, 2010).  
419 
 
Stone, T. J. ‘The integration of women into a military service: the Women's 
Auxiliary Air Force in the Second World War.’ PhD thesis (University of 
Cambridge, 1999).  
Thalassis, N. ‘Treating and preventing trauma: British military psychiatry during the 
Second World War’, PhD thesis, (University of Salford, 2004). 
Whitelaw, B. E. ‘Industry and the interior life: industrial ‘experts’ and the mental 
world of workers in twentieth century Britain’ PhD thesis (University of Warwick, 
2009). 
 
 
WORLD WIDE WEB SOURCES 
Anon, ‘David Stafford-Clark: Pioneering psychiatrist who brought compassion to his 
patients and lucidity to broadcasting’ The Guardian, Friday 10 September 1999, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/1999/sep/10/guardianobituaries2 (accessed 22 
January 2015).  
Barrass, M. ‘Air of Authority: A History of RAF Organisation’ (2010), 
http://www.rafweb.org/ (accessed 22 January 2015).  
Bint, T. ‘626 Squadron and RAF Wickenby: The Groundcrews’ (2012), 
http://www.626-squadron.co.uk/groundcrew.htm (accessed 22 January 2015).  
 Hatch, F. J. Aerodrome of Democracy: Canada and the British Commonwealth Air 
Training Plan 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Canadian Department of National Defence, 
420 
 
1983), http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/gh-hg/detail-
eng.asp?BfBookLang=1&BfId=20 (accessed 22 January 2015).  
Lincolnshire Bomber Command Memorial Trust, International Bomber Command 
Centre (2014), http://www.lincsbombercommandmemorial.com/ (accessed 22 
January 2015).  
The Royal Air Force Website, History: Bomber Command: Bomber Command 
Famous Raids: The Thousand Bomber raids, 30/31 May (Cologne) to 17 August 
1942 (2013), 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/bombercommandthethousandbomberraids3031may.cf
m (accessed 22 January 2015).  
RAF Wickenby Memorial Collection Website, A Brief History of RAF Wickenby, 
(2014), http://www.wickenbymuseum.co.uk/Museum/TheHistoryofWickenby.html 
(accessed 22 January 2015).  
Stafford-Clark, N.’Obituary: Dr David Stafford-Clark’ The Independent Tuesday 14 
September 1999, http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/obituary-dr-
david-staffordclark-1118992.html (accessed 22 January 2015).  
Willis, J. ‘David Stafford-Clark: Obituary’ Royal College of Physicians, Munk’s 
Roll, XI, p. 538, http://munksroll.rcplondon.ac.uk/Biography/Details/5033 (accessed 
22 January 2015). 
University of Kent British Cartoon Archive, David Wright Biography, 
http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/artists/davidwright/biography (accessed 22 January 2015).  
